The Iglesia de Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz

A Torrens title holder is generally entitled to possession, but an unlawful detainer complaint will not prosper absent proof of the jurisdictional fact of prior tolerance; ownership raised in ejectment is resolved only provisionally to determine possession, and a bare allegation of tolerance does not suffice.

Petitioner Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc. is a religious corporation represented by its president, Francisco Galvez. Respondent Loida Dela Cruz uses the name Church of Jesus Christ, “New Jerusalem,” and claims to represent Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo “Bagong Jerusalem” Inc. The controversy centers on possession of a parcel in Malabon City covered by OCT No. 35266, later OCT No. (8257) M-35266, and TD No. 06223. The record involves competing claims that the registered owner's name — “The Iglesia de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc.” — refers either to petitioner or to the corporation sole represented by Dela Cruz, which is also known by the translated names “New Jerusalem” and “Bagong Jerusalem.”

Petitioner Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc., represented by its president Francisco Galvez, filed before the MeTC of Malabon City a complaint for unlawful detainer with damages against Loida Dela Cruz, using the name Church of Jesus Christ, “New Jerusalem,” and all persons claiming rights under her. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. JL00-891, alleged that petitioner owned two parcels of land consisting of 204 square meters and 71 square meters, covered by OCT No. 35266 and TD No. 06223. Galvez alleged that he was the nephew of Rosendo Gatchalian, the founder and leader of petitioner in 1940, who organized the religious corporation and built a chapel within the subject lot. Since 1940, Miguela Gatchalian, Galvez's late mother, and her family occupied and possessed a portion of the subject lot and built a house in the concept of an owner, as relatives and long-time members of petitioner who were allowed by Rosendo to occupy the same. During Rosendo's lifetime, the chapel inside the subject lot was used exclusively by petitioner's members for worship every Sunday.

After Rosendo died, the members became disorganized, and members who came to visit the chapel were allowed to enter and conduct meetings and worship therein. Dela Cruz had been a member of petitioner. Sometime in 1998, without the knowledge and consent of all members and officers of petitioner, Dela Cruz allegedly formed, organized, and created the name Church of Jesus Christ, “New Jerusalem,” and used that organization as an instrument to claim that she was its representative and had a right over the subject lot. Petitioner alleged that Dela Cruz's occupation and possession of the subject lot was merely tolerated because she and her group were former members of petitioner. On February 12, 2007, a demand was sent to respondents to vacate and surrender the peaceful possession of the chapel and to stop using the subject lot, but respondents failed and refused to vacate. The demand letter was personally served, but Dela Cruz refused to sign it. Petitioner was thus constrained to institute the suit.

In her Answer, Dela Cruz countered that she was an officer of Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo “Bagong Jerusalem” Inc., and that her authority to represent the religious organization was embodied in a board resolution and a Secretary's Certificate. She denied petitioner's allegations, claiming that, as per inquiry with the SEC, no such corporation or entity as petitioner existed. She alleged that No. 27 Leono St. was the site of her church, not her office. She denied petitioner's ownership and alleged that Galvez deviously acquired a new title by declaring the previous one as struck by flood, even though OCT No. 8257 was never lost and was still in the possession of Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo “Bagong Jerusalem” Inc. She claimed that the tax declarations already bore the name “New Jerusalem, New Church of Jesus Christ” as owner. She further alleged that the church was founded in 1914, with principal office at 797 Dagupan Ext., Solis, Tondo, Manila, under Bishop Rev. Ildefonso Agulo, and was known as “Church of Jesus Christ New Jerusalem,” “Iglesia ni Jesu-Kristo Bagong Jerusalem,” and “Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva.” According to Dela Cruz, OCT No. 8257 showed that the owner-organization was incorporated only after September 3, 1955, when it was registered as a corporation sole before the SEC; its Articles of Incorporation mentioned Felicisima Pineda as Bishop Representative and General Pastor and stated that the entity would administer the temporalities of the estates and properties of the church. She denied that Galvez or his relatives were members and claimed that Miguela built a shanty upon tolerance by Pineda upon the prodding of a member, Feliza Bravo. She admitted filing an ejectment case against Galvez, which was dismissed on appeal as moot and academic because the defendants, including Galvez, allegedly voluntarily vacated the subject lot. She also claimed that Galvez used the church premises for profit by offering for lease the portion occupied by his house, prompting her to file a complaint before the Office of the Mayor of Malabon City on February 20, 2007, and that Galvez filed the present case to harass and intimidate her.

Petitioner submitted as evidence a Secretary's Certificate dated March 27, 2007 signed by Lourdes Co and Atty. Gerardo Cruz, OCT No. (8257) M-35266, TD No. 06223, the Decision in Appealed Case No. 1064-MN dated January 17, 2000 issued by RTC-Branch 169, a demand letter dated February 12, 2007 and the affidavit of Co, its SEC Certificate of Incorporation dated August 4, 1999 with Articles of Incorporation, an Order in Civil Case No. 1853-98 issued by MeTC-Branch 55, and a Temporary Receipt issued by MeTC-Branch 55 in Civil Case No. 1853-98. Dela Cruz submitted a Secretary's Certificate dated April 30, 2007 signed by Josie Sengco and notarized by Atty. Mamarii, a copy of OCT No. 8257, TD No. 16094, TD No. B-001-04457, a copy of SEC Certificate of Registration dated September 3, 1955 with Articles of Incorporation, Minutes of Lupon Proceedings dated June 4, 1998, a Complaint filed on February 20, 2007 with the Office of the Malabon City Mayor, and a Certification from the Punong Barangay dated February 2, 1999. Dela Cruz emphasized that the reconstituted title granted to Galvez was irregular and invalid because the alleged corporation represented by Galvez was not yet existing when the reconstituted title was issued, and that Galvez did not have authority to institute the proceedings in behalf of the existing corporation, Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesukristo “Bagong Jerusalem” Inc.

The MeTC found that petitioner was organized as a religious corporation only on June 15, 1999, and registered only on August 4, 1999, per its SEC Certificate of Incorporation; that petitioner did not own any real property per the List of Properties it submitted to the SEC; that petitioner, organized only in 1999, claimed that it lost the owner's copy of OCT No. 8257; that TD No. B-001-96214 covering the disputed property as shown in OCT No. 8257 in the name of New Jerusalem, New Church of Jesus Christ c/o Pineda was cancelled by way of correction of name by TD No. B-001-06223 in the name of petitioner, with Galvez as administrator; that Galvez's house was indicated as an improvement in TD No. B-001-06214; and that TD No. B-001-04457 beginning 1994 in Galvez's name indicated that his house was on the property of New Jerusalem, New Church of Jesus Christ with OCT No. 8257. The MeTC also found that Dela Cruz successfully proved she was the authorized representative of Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo “Bagong Jerusalem” Inc.; that this corporation sole owned the disputed property as shown by OCT No. (8257) M-35266 and TD No. B-001-06214 in the name of New Jerusalem, New Church of Jesus Christ beginning 1993; that the corporation sole was registered with the SEC on September 3, 1955; that the denomination was also known as “Church of Jesus Christ, New Jerusalem,” “Iglesia ni Jesu-Kristo, Bagong Jerusalem,” and “Iglesia de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva” per its Articles of Incorporation; and that it was in actual possession of the original owner's copy of OCT No. 8257 issued in 1940, when the religious denomination was not yet a corporation.

The RTC held that the disputed property covered by OCT No. (8257) M-35266 was registered in the name of “The Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc.” and that the only issue was who, as between the parties, was authorized to represent the registered owner. The RTC noted that although petitioner claimed its religious corporation was organized in 1940, it was allegedly registered only in 1999, compared to the earlier registration in 1955 of the religious corporation represented by Dela Cruz, which had the words “Bagong Jerusalem” in its name and also bore the translated names “New Jerusalem” in English and “Jerusalem Nueva” in Spanish. The RTC further noted that the disputed property was declared in TD No. 06214 dated January 23, 1967 under the name “New Jerusalem, New [Christ] of Jesus Christ” with Pineda as administrator; that Galvez's house was declared therein only as part of the improvements; that Galvez's house was shown in TD No. B001-6214 dated October 29, 1993 and TD No. B-001-6214 dated January 11, 2007 as situated on the land of New Jerusalem, New Church of Jesus Christ; and that it was only on January 30, 2007 that the disputed property was declared in the name of “The Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc.” under TD No. B-001-06223 with Galvez as administrator, with a notation at the back page stating that it was a correction of the owner's name. The RTC concluded that “The Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalemn Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc.” appearing as registered owner and respondent, with the registered name Bagong Jerusalem, also known as New Jerusalem in its English translation, were one and the same organization, and that Dela Cruz was properly authorized to represent the same as evidenced by a Secretary's Certificate. The RTC found respondent's evidence more preponderant, consistent, and credible. It also ruled that petitioner's alleged possession of the original owner's duplicate of OCT No. (8257) M-35266 was to no avail because petitioner merely filed a petition for the issuance of the duplicate owner's copy alleging loss of the original title, but failed to establish its legal right over the disputed property. The CA affirmed, finding Dela Cruz's evidence more consistent, credible, and trustworthy compared to petitioner's evidence, which it described as lacking consistency and reliability, and highlighted that Galvez and his sub-lessees had, in fact, vacated the disputed property.

• Ownership and Right to Possess: Petitioner argued that it is the true, absolute, and registered owner of the disputed property covered by OCT No. (8257) M-35266 and TD No. 06223; that its President, Galvez, is in possession of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. (8257) M-35266; and that as registered owner it has the right to possess, enjoy, dispose of, and recover the property under Article 428 of the Civil Code, and to file an unlawful detainer case under Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
• Tolerance and Demand: Petitioner maintained that respondents' right to possession was through mere tolerance, which expired upon receipt of its demand letter dated February 12, 2007; that the date of unlawful deprivation is counted from the date of the demand to vacate; and that respondents' continued possession became unlawful, warranting their ejectment.
• Failure to Present Originals: Petitioner contended that Dela Cruz's failure to present the original duplicate copy of the title negated her claim; that her allegation that petitioner is the same as Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesukristo “Bagong Jerusalem” Inc. is false because the latter's SEC Certificate of Incorporation clearly showed it was another entity; and that the MeTC, RTC, and CA erroneously found the two organizations to be one and the same despite respondents' failure to present the original documents.
• Perjury and Voluntary Vacatur: Petitioner argued that respondents could be prosecuted for perjury for falsely claiming that the ejectment case was dismissed because Galvez voluntarily vacated the disputed property; that Dela Cruz even paid attorney's fees to Galvez pursuant to the judgment; that while some defendants in the ejectment case vacated the property, Galvez did not vacate and still resides there; and that the CA's finding that Galvez vacated the property is contrary to the evidence.
• Scope of Unlawful Detainer and Torrens Title: Petitioner insisted that the only issue in the unlawful detainer case is who has a better right to possession, independent of ownership or possession de jure; that a validly issued Torrens title in its name entitles it to possession; that it complied with all requirements under Section 1, Rule 70; that the complaint filed on March 28, 2007 was within one year from the final demand letter dated February 12, 2007; and that Galvez's late registration in 1999 should not be adjudged against him because he was in peaceful possession until Dela Cruz filed the ejectment case, is now 94 years old, and has resided at the disputed property since birth.
• Collateral Attack: Petitioner argued that Dela Cruz's defense, upheld by the CA, that petitioner and the Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesukristo “Bagong Jerusalem” Inc. are one and the same organization, is a collateral attack upon the title validly issued to it, proscribed by Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529; that respondents did not resort to any legal action to annul or cancel the title issued to it; and that the CA erred in concluding that respondents' claim of ownership is better than petitioner's title.

• Presentation of Original AOI: Respondent countered that the records before the MeTC clearly showed that the original Articles of Incorporation was presented and marked; that if she and her co-respondents indeed failed to present the original AOI, petitioner should have made a comment thereon or requested correction of the Preliminary Conference Order; and that both the MeTC and the RTC found that Dela Cruz presented the original document.
• Irregular Reconstitution: Respondent argued that petitioner's title was obtained only because Dela Cruz filed an action or motion for the issuance of a reconstituted copy allegedly because the original title had been lost, although it was not in fact lost.
• No Real Property Owned by Petitioner: Respondent maintained that the MeTC itself adverted to petitioner's declaration before the SEC that it does not in fact own any real property, whether land or building.

• Clear and Convincing Evidence / Identity of Organizations: Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the appeal despite (1) clear and convincing evidence of petitioner and (2) the failure of respondent to present evidence on their claim that petitioner and respondent religious corporation are one and the same organization.
• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the appeal contrary to the well-settled rule that a validly issued Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.
• Voluntary Vacatur of Subject Lot: Whether the CA seriously erred in concluding that Galvez, representative of petitioner, voluntarily vacated the subject lot when respondent filed an ejectment case.

• Clear and Convincing Evidence / Identity of Organizations: No. The dismissal was affirmed because petitioner failed to prove its claim of tolerance, and the lower courts' finding that Dela Cruz was the authorized representative of the registered owner was supported by preponderant evidence; petitioner's evidence was inconsistent and unworthy of credence.
• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: No. The ejectment court may provisionally resolve ownership to determine possession; petitioner's Torrens title did not automatically entitle it to eject respondents where the jurisdictional facts of unlawful detainer, especially tolerance, were not sufficiently proven.
• Voluntary Vacatur of Subject Lot: No. The dismissal stands independently of that conclusion because petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that respondents' possession was merely tolerated.

• Clear and Convincing Evidence / Identity of Organizations: The governing rule is Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which requires that a complaint sufficiently allege a cause of action for unlawful detainer by reciting: (i) the defendant's initial possession was lawful, either by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (ii) such possession eventually became illegal upon the plaintiff's notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (iii) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the property; and (iv) the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment within one year from the last demand to vacate. The MeTC, RTC, and CA uniformly held that Dela Cruz was able to show by convincing evidence that she was the duly authorized representative of the registered owner of the disputed property. The property was registered in the name “The Iglesia de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc.” in 1940. Petitioner claimed it was organized in 1940 but registered only in 1999; Dela Cruz's corporation sole, “Bagong Jerusalem,” also known as “New Jerusalem” in English and “Jerusalem Nueva” in Spanish, was registered in 1955 with Rev. Pineda as Bishop Representative and General Pastor. Galvez failed to explain this glaring inconsistency, rendering his evidence unworthy of credence. The RTC found that “Nueva de Manila” and “Bagong Jerusalem” were one and the same organization, and Dela Cruz was authorized by a Secretary's Certificate. Dela Cruz's evidence was more preponderant, consistent, and credible. The reconstituted title was issued upon Galvez's affidavit of loss claiming the owner's duplicate was lost or struck by flood, but Dela Cruz claimed the original OCT No. 8257 was never lost and remained with the Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesukristo “Bagong Jerusalem” Inc.; the issuance was therefore described as irregular because the alleged corporation was not yet existing when the original title was issued. More importantly, petitioner failed to prove the jurisdictional fact of tolerance. Bare allegation of tolerance does not suffice; the petitioner must show overt acts indicative of its or its predecessor's tolerance. No such evidence was adduced, and the lower courts made no finding on tolerance. Thus, the unlawful detainer complaint could not prosper.
• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in the pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. The Court reiterated that the principal issue in ejectment is possession de facto, ownership being merely ancillary, and that summary proceedings may not be proper to resolve ownership. While a Torrens title is entitled to all attributes of property ownership, including possession, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who presents proof of ownership; the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven. Here, the lower courts resolved ownership only provisionally to determine who had the better right of possession. Petitioner's claim that Dela Cruz's defense was a collateral attack under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 did not entitle it to relief because the dismissal rested on petitioner's failure to prove tolerance and the jurisdictional requisites of unlawful detainer.
• Voluntary Vacatur of Subject Lot: The Court did not rest its disposition on the CA's conclusion that Galvez voluntarily vacated the subject lot. The denial of the petition was independently supported by petitioner's failure to substantiate its claim that respondents' possession was merely tolerated. The Court noted that possession is a question of fact generally not allowed to be raised in a Rule 45 petition, and that the MeTC, RTC, and CA made no finding on the question of tolerance. Thus, the voluntary-vacatur issue did not alter the outcome.

• Unlawful Detainer — Jurisdictional Requisites — A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites: (i) the defendant's initial possession of the property was lawful, either by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (ii) eventually, such possession became illegal upon the plaintiff's notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (iii) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the property; and (iv) the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment within one year from the last demand to vacate. In this case, petitioner failed to prove the requisite of tolerance, so the complaint was properly dismissed.
• Tolerance Must Be Proved — A bare allegation that the defendant's possession was merely tolerated does not suffice. The plaintiff must show overt acts indicative of its or its predecessor's tolerance. The Court applied this rule against petitioner, which adduced no evidence of tolerance and merely alleged it in the complaint.
• Ownership in Ejectment — Provisional Resolution — Where the defendant raises ownership in the pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Such adjudication of ownership is not final and binding but only for the purpose of resolving possession. The Court applied this to uphold the lower courts' provisional determination of who represented the registered owner.
• Torrens Title and Ejectment — A title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all attributes of property ownership, which necessarily includes possession. Nevertheless, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership; the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven. The Court applied this rule in denying petitioner's claim that its Torrens title automatically entitled it to eject respondents.
• Possession as a Question of Fact in Rule 45 — Possession is a question of fact generally not allowed to be raised in a Rule 45 petition. The Court noted this in observing that the MeTC, RTC, and CA made no finding on the question of tolerance.

• "A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (i) the defendant's initial possession of the property was lawful, either by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (ii) eventually, such possession became illegal upon the plaintiff's notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (iii) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the property; and (iv) the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate the property." — This passage states the requisites of an unlawful detainer complaint and is the framework the Court used to test petitioner's cause of action.
• "When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in [her] pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession." — This passage articulates the rule that ownership in ejectment is resolved only provisionally and is not a final adjudication.
• "Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all attributes of property ownership, which necessarily includes possession." — This passage states the general rule favoring a Torrens title holder, which the Court qualified by requiring proof of the jurisdictional facts of unlawful detainer.
• "With the averment here that the respondent[s'] possession was by mere tolerance of the petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice." — This passage supplies the ratio for the denial: petitioner failed to prove the alleged tolerance, a jurisdictional fact for unlawful detainer.

• Diaz vs. Punzalan, G.R. No. 203075, March 16, 2016, 787 SCRA 531, 535-536 — Cited for the requisites of a sufficient complaint for unlawful detainer.
• Corpuz vs. Spouses Agustin, 679 Phil. 352, 360-363 (2012) — Cited for the rule that although a Torrens title holder is generally entitled to possession, dismissal of an unlawful detainer complaint is justified where possession is in the concept of ownership and not mere tolerance; also cited for the provisional resolution of ownership in ejectment.
• Penta Pacific Realty Corporation vs. Ley Construction and Development Corporation, 747 Phil. 672, 686 (2014) — Cited for the principle that the principal issue in ejectment is possession de facto, ownership being ancillary, and that summary proceedings may not be proper to resolve ownership.
• Dr. Carbonilla vs. Abiera, 639 Phil. 473, 481 (2010) — Cited for the rule that an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who presents proof of ownership; the key jurisdictional facts must be averred and sufficiently proven.
• Quijano vs. Amante, 745 Phil. 40, 52 (2014) — Cited for the rule that a bare allegation of tolerance does not suffice and overt acts of tolerance must be shown.

• Section 1, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended — Defines who may institute an unlawful detainer action and when, including the one-year period from unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. The Court applied this provision in holding that petitioner failed to prove the jurisdictional facts, particularly tolerance.
• Section 16, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Provides that when the defendant raises ownership and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. The Court applied this provision to uphold the lower courts' provisional ownership determination.

The decision lists under “WE CONCUR”: Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (marked “On leave”), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Francis H. Jardeleza, and Noel Gimenez Tijam. The attestation was signed by Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro as Acting Chairperson, and the certification by Antonio T. Carpio as Acting Chief Justice.