Teves vs. Sandiganbayan

A public officer charged under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law solely with the mode of unlawful intervention may, under the variance doctrine, be convicted of the alternative mode of possessing a prohibited pecuniary interest if the latter offense is necessarily included in the charge as alleged; the penalty, however, shall be that prescribed by the special law specifically prohibiting the interest rather than the general Anti-Graft Law.

Edgar Y. Teves owned and operated the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center, having registered it with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission as early as 1983. In 1990 he transferred management to his wife Teresita, who thereafter renewed the registration. Upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991 on 1 January 1992, local officials were for the first time expressly prohibited from holding any interest in a cockpit. In February 1992 the Sangguniang Bayan of Valencia issued the cockpit’s business permit. The prosecution alleged that Mayor Teves, abusing his office, caused that issuance despite his prohibited ownership.

• Nature: The charge was violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which penalizes a public officer who, having a direct or indirect financial/pecuniary interest in any business, either intervenes in his official capacity or is prohibited by the Constitution or any law from having such interest.
• Ownership and Management: Edgar Teves registered himself as owner and manager of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center on 26 September 1983 and renewed the registration on 6 January 1989. By affidavit dated 27 September 1990, he declared that effective January 1990 he turned over the management to his wife Teresita, citing inability to devote full time.
• Wife’s Role: From 1990, Teresita Teves signed applications for renewal and lists of licensed personnel, indicating herself as Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager. Applications bore dates of 28 January 1990, 18 February 1991, and 6 January 1992; personnel lists for 1991 and 1992 were submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17 February 1992.
• The Issuance of the Permit: The Information alleged that on or about 4 February 1992, Mayor Edgar Teves, conspiring with his wife, caused the issuance of a business permit to operate the cockpit in favor of Daniel Teves.
• Sandiganbayan Findings: The anti-graft court found the charge of causing the permit’s issuance not well-founded because under the newly effective Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), the authority to issue cockpit licenses belonged solely to the Sangguniang Bayan, not the mayor. Nonetheless, it convicted both spouses on the ground that Mayor Teves had direct pecuniary interest in the cockpit, a prohibited interest under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code, thus violating the second mode of Section 3(h). It also held that because the spouses had been married since 1983 and no contrary evidence appeared, the cockpit was conjugal property under the conjugal partnership of gains, giving both direct interest.

• Right to Be Informed / Variance: Petitioners argued that they were charged only with the first mode of Section 3(h) — unlawful intervention — but convicted of the second mode — possession of prohibited interest under the Local Government Code — a charge never alleged. They contended their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was violated, and the variance doctrine could not override this fundamental right.
• Proof of Prohibited Interest: Petitioners maintained that the alleged prohibited interest was not proved. The Sandiganbayan erroneously presumed that Mayor Teves’s interest continued from 1989 and that the cockpit was conjugal property. Even under the conjugal partnership of gains, the interest of a spouse is merely inchoate and indirect.
• Acquittal of Teresita Teves: Teresita Teves insisted that she was charged solely as a co-conspirator in her husband’s alleged act of causing issuance of the permit. Since that act was disproved and conspiracy was not independently established, her conviction could not stand. Moreover, she is not a public officer, and the Information did not allege she had a prohibited interest.

• Variance Doctrine: The Office of the Special Prosecutor argued that the offense proved — possession of prohibited interest under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code — is necessarily included in the offense charged, because Section 3(h) penalizes the second mode as an alternative. The variance doctrine under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court permits conviction for the included offense despite the narrow allegation.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The respondent maintained that uncontroverted documentary evidence established Mayor Teves’s direct pecuniary interest dating to 1983, and the transfer of mere management to his wife did not divest him of ownership. Given the conjugal partnership, the cockpit was conjugal property, confirming direct prohibited interest.

• Variance and Right to Be Informed: Whether the conviction of the petitioners for the second mode of Section 3(h) (possession of prohibited interest) violated their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation when the Information charged only the first mode (unlawful intervention).
• Criminal Liability of Mayor Teves: Whether Mayor Edgar Teves could be convicted of possessing a prohibited pecuniary interest in the cockpit based on the variance doctrine.
• Appropriate Penalty: Whether the penalty should be governed by the Anti-Graft Law (R.A. No. 3019) or the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).
• Criminal Liability of Teresita Teves: Whether Teresita Teves could be convicted of conspiracy to possess the prohibited interest when the conspiracy alleged was limited to causing the issuance of a business permit, an act for which both were acquitted.

• Variance and Right to Be Informed: No violation of the constitutional right occurred. Under the variance doctrine, an accused may be convicted of an offense proved if it is necessarily included in the offense charged. The elements of the offense charged — (1) public officer, (2) pecuniary interest, (3) intervention — include the elements of the offense proved — (1) public officer, (2) pecuniary interest, (3) prohibition by law — because the first two elements as alleged constitute the offense proved. The Information informed the accused of the factual basis (ownership of the cockpit); the legal conclusion that the interest was prohibited merely followed from the law, and no new evidentiary element was needed.
• Criminal Liability of Mayor Teves: Conviction on the second mode was proper. The uncontroverted documentary evidence established Mayor Teves’s direct ownership from 1983. His affidavit transferring only management did not constitute divestment, and ownership was presumed continuous. Even if ownership had passed to his wife, the cockpit was conjugal property in which he had a direct interest. Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code prohibited that interest, satisfying the second mode. The variance between the allegation of intervention and the proved possession of prohibited interest did not prejudice the accused because the essential ingredients of the offense proved were already alleged in the Information.
• Appropriate Penalty: The Local Government Code of 1991, which specifically prohibits local officials from holding interest in a cockpit, is a special law that prevails over the general Anti-Graft Law. It is also the later expression of legislative will. The penalty provision of Section 514 of the LGC — imprisonment of six months and one day to six years, or a fine of P3,000 to P10,000, or both — thus governs. Given that the prohibition was new when the offense was committed shortly after the LGC’s effectivity, the imposition of the fine of P10,000 alone, without imprisonment, was deemed just.
• Criminal Liability of Teresita Teves: Acquittal was warranted. The Information charged her solely with conspiracy to cause the issuance of a permit, an act for which both were acquitted. Although the included offense of prohibited interest could theoretically extend to her, conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt independent of the substantive offense. No evidence showed she knowingly induced or caused her husband to commit the offense, nor any overt act of conspiracy. Her actions as owner/licensee were undertaken in her own capacity, not in concert with a criminal design. Being merely the spouse of the public officer does not establish conspiracy.

• Variance Doctrine (Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5, Rules of Court) — When the offense proved is necessarily included in the offense charged, conviction for the included offense is permissible even if not expressly alleged. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some essential elements of the former constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when its essential ingredients form part of those constituting the latter. Here, the first and second elements of the charge (public officer and pecuniary interest) constituted the offense of possessing prohibited interest, so the second mode was included.
• Special Law Over General Law / Later Law as Controlling Will — A special statute dealing with a particular subject prevails over a general statute, and the later enactment is the controlling expression of legislative will when two statutes otherwise apply equally. The Local Government Code’s specific prohibition and penalty for cockpit interest overrode the general Anti-Graft Law.
• Presumption of Continuity of Ownership — A fact once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature; ownership shown in 1983 and 1989 was presumed to continue in 1992 absent contrary evidence.
• Conjugal Partnership Presumption — All property of the marriage is presumed conjugal under Article 160 of the Civil Code; conjugal property is owned in common, giving each spouse a direct interest.
• Conspiracy Requires Independent Proof — Conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt separately from the crime itself. There is no conspiracy in merely being married to an erring spouse; an overt act or intentional participation in a common design must be shown.

• “The essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those constituting the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included in the offense charged…” — The ratio decidendi on variance.
• “It is a rule of statutory construction that where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter shall prevail regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute.” — Governing rule on penalty.
• “Certainly, there is no conspiracy in just being married to an erring spouse.” — Ground for acquittal of the wife.

• Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil. 32 (1952) — Applied for the proposition that a special law prevails over a general law, supporting the primacy of the Local Government Code.
• Wil Wilhemsen, Inc. v. Baluyut, Nos. L-27350-51, 11 May 1978 — Cited for the rule that where two statutes of equal theoretical application are of contrary tenor, the one specifically designed for the subject prevails.
• Esguerra v. People, 108 Phil. 1078 (1960) — Distinguished by the dissent as authority that a conviction cannot rest on an essential element not alleged; the majority implicitly rejected its application given the sufficiency of the Information.
• U.S. v. Tolentino, 5 Phil. 682 (1906) — Invoked in dissent regarding the rule that when an offense may be committed in several modes and the Information alleges two or more, proof of one suffices.

• Section 3(h), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Defines the offense as a public officer’s having direct or indirect financial/pecuniary interest in a business, contract, or transaction in connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or any law from having any interest. The Court parsed its two modes to apply the variance doctrine.
• Section 89(2), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Prohibits any local government official from holding any interest in a cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit. This provision made Mayor Teves’s interest criminal.
• Section 514, Local Government Code of 1991 — Prescribes the penalty of imprisonment from six months and one day to six years, or a fine of P3,000 to P10,000, or both, for violating Section 89; applied instead of the heavier penalty under R.A. 3019.
• Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — The variance doctrine allowing conviction for an included offense was the basis for affirming the conviction of Mayor Teves.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur. Callejo, Sr., J., on leave, but left his oath of concurrence with the dissent of J. Tinga.

• Justice Tinga — Dissented, maintaining that the conviction violated the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. The Information did not allege that the pecuniary interest was itself prohibited or specify any law making it so. The second mode is not necessarily included in the first because the element of prohibition by law is absent in the first mode. The accused was never given the opportunity to defend against the claim that his ownership was illegal and could not be expected to address Section 89(2) of the LGC. The Information was crafted to prosecute only the intervention mode, and the accused’s defense was directed exclusively at that allegation. Applying the variance doctrine mechanically, without the Information having put the accused on notice of the true charge, erodes the constitutional guarantee. Tinga voted to acquit both Edgar and Teresita Teves.