Teves vs. COMELEC

A violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 under the second mode—possessing a pecuniary interest prohibited by law—does not involve moral turpitude where the act is mala prohibita and the attendant circumstances show no fraud, deceit, or deliberate intent to circumvent the prohibition.

Edgar Y. Teves, then Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, had been the owner and operator of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center since 1983. In January 1990, he transferred the management of the cockpit to his wife, Teresita Teves. On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code of 1991 took effect, prohibiting local government officials from holding interests in cockpits under Section 89(2). Shortly thereafter, on February 4, 1992, Teves was charged with violating Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 for maintaining a prohibited pecuniary interest in the cockpit. In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court convicted him under the second mode of Section 3(h), finding that he remained the owner of the cockpit despite the transfer of management to his wife, and that even if ownership were transferred, it would still belong to their conjugal partnership of gains. The Court nonetheless downgraded his penalty from imprisonment to a fine of P10,000.00, noting that the prohibition was newly enacted and that he presumably was not yet fully aware of it.

• Prior Conviction: Petitioner was convicted in Teves v. Sandiganbayan of violating Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 for possessing a pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991. He was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00, which he paid on May 24, 2005.
• Disqualification Petition: On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner from running for Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental, alleging that the conviction involved moral turpitude and carried the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
• COMELEC First Division Ruling: The COMELEC First Division granted the petition and cancelled petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy on May 11, 2007.
• COMELEC En Banc Ruling: Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the COMELEC En Banc denied it on October 9, 2007, on the ground of mootness, as petitioner had already lost the May 14, 2007 elections.
• COMELEC Findings on Moral Turpitude: In its assailed resolution, the COMELEC justified its finding of moral turpitude by applying a "totality of facts" doctrine. It concluded that petitioner had intentionally hidden his interest in the cockpit by transferring management to his wife, thereby maintaining ownership by deceit, exhibiting moral depravity and a betrayal of public trust.

• Abuse of Discretion in Declaring Mootness: Petitioner argued that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the case moot, as the resolution of the disqualification issue would determine his qualification to run for public office in future elections, specifically the May 2010 elections.
• Error in Finding Moral Turpitude: Petitioner maintained that the COMELEC erred in affirming the First Division's finding that his conviction involved moral turpitude. He argued that nothing in the Supreme Court's ruling in Teves v. Sandiganbayan supports the "totality of facts" doctrine applied by the COMELEC.
• No Moral Turpitude Under the Law: Petitioner contended that his conviction under the second mode of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019—possessing a prohibited interest—did not involve moral turpitude, as the act was mala prohibita rather than mala in se.

• Mootness: Respondent argued that the case was rendered moot and academic by petitioner's loss in the 2007 congressional elections.
• Moral Turpitude Based on Totality of Facts: Respondent countered that while the crime may per se not involve moral turpitude, the totality of facts evinced petitioner's moral turpitude. Petitioner knew of the prohibition but attempted to circumvent it by hiding his ownership and transferring only the management to his wife, thereby prioritizing self-interest over public duty.

• Mootness: Whether the issue of disqualification was rendered moot and academic by petitioner's loss in the 2007 elections.
• Moral Turpitude: Whether the crime of violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, under the second mode of possessing a prohibited pecuniary interest in a cockpit, involves moral turpitude.

• Mootness: The issue was not rendered moot and academic. A justiciable controversy remains because the resolution of the disqualification issue determines petitioner's eligibility for future elections. Furthermore, the five-year period of disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code—reckoned from the service of sentence on May 24, 2005—would only expire on May 25, 2010, rendering him ineligible for the May 14, 2010 elections.
• Moral Turpitude: The conviction did not involve moral turpitude. While crimes mala in se generally involve moral turpitude and crimes mala prohibita generally do not, the determination ultimately depends on all the surrounding circumstances of the violation. The circumstances here negated moral turpitude: (1) Petitioner did not use his official capacity to secure a cockpit license, as the Sangguniang Bayan, not the Mayor, had the authority to issue such permits under the LGC of 1991; (2) The transfer of cockpit management to his wife occurred before the prohibition took effect, negating any intent to hide his interest; (3) The offense is mala prohibita, as possession of a cockpit interest was legal prior to the LGC of 1991; and (4) The downgrading of the penalty from imprisonment to a fine indicated a lack of awareness of the newly enacted prohibition rather than a deliberate violation contrary to justice or good morals.

• Moral Turpitude — Defined as everything done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties a person owes to fellowmen or society in general. Whether a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. Crimes mala in se generally involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita generally do not, although there are exceptions.
• Three Approaches to Moral Turpitude (Concurring Opinion) — The determination of moral turpitude can be analyzed from three perspectives: (1) the objective approach, examining the inherent immorality of the act itself irrespective of legal prohibition; (2) the elements approach, examining the definition of the crime to see if elements like fraud inherently indicate depravity; and (3) the subjective approach, examining the offender's motives and the attendant circumstances to determine if there was ill will or depravity. All three approaches should be applied if possible, resolving any doubt in favor of the perpetrator.

• "Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. ... [T]he Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute."
• "Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited."
• "The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all."

• Teves v. Sandiganbayan, 488 Phil. 311 (2004) — Controlling precedent establishing the factual basis of petitioner's conviction. The Court relied on its findings therein that the petitioner did not intervene in his official capacity to issue the cockpit license and that the transfer of management to his wife occurred prior to the prohibition.
• Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 1144 (1996) — Followed for the rule that crimes mala in se generally involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, and that the determination depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation.
• Zari v. Flores, 94 SCRA 317 (1979) — Cited for the definition of moral turpitude and the principle that the act itself must be inherently immoral, not merely mala prohibita.
• International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, 221 SCRA 760 (1993) — Followed for the proposition that whether a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact depending on surrounding circumstances.
• Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. — Cited for the principle that the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue and that gambling is not illegal per se.

• Section 12, Omnibus Election Code — Disqualifies any person sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude from being a candidate and holding any office, unless plenary pardon or amnesty is granted. The disqualification is removed after five years from service of sentence.
• Section 3(h), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Penalizes a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by law from having any interest.
• Section 89(2), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Prohibits local government officials or employees from holding interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit.

Reynato S. Puno (CJ), Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Presbitero J. Velasco Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin.

Concurring Opinion (Brion, J.): Justice Brion concurred to further explore the term "moral turpitude" and systematized the analysis into three approaches: (1) the objective approach, examining the inherent immorality of the act; (2) the elements approach, examining the crime's elements for indicators of depravity like fraud; and (3) the subjective approach, examining the offender's motives and the attendant circumstances. Applied to the petitioner, all three approaches—particularly the objective and subjective—confirmed the absence of moral turpitude, as possessing a cockpit interest is not inherently immoral and the petitioner lacked the intent to circumvent the law.