Testate Estate of the Late Adriana Maloto vs. Court of Appeals

For purposes of satisfying the constitutional qualification for membership in the House of Representatives, "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," which requires not only actual presence but also the intention to abandon one's old domicile and establish a new one. A candidate who fails to prove a change of domicile to the district where he seeks election is ineligible. The COMELEC's jurisdiction to rule on such ineligibility continues even after the elections, and a disqualified candidate's votes are not considered stray, precluding the proclamation of the second-place candidate.

Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the newly created Second Legislative District of Makati City for the May 8, 1995 elections. Private respondents Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a petition to disqualify him, alleging he lacked the constitutional one-year residency in the district. The COMELEC Second Division initially dismissed the petition, but after the elections—where Aquino garnered the highest number of votes—the COMELEC en banc, upon reconsideration, reversed and declared him ineligible. Aquino's proclamation was suspended, and he filed this petition for certiorari, challenging the COMELEC's jurisdiction and findings.

• Nature of the Action: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the COMELEC en banc's orders and resolution that suspended petitioner's proclamation and ultimately declared him disqualified as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
• Candidacy and Disqualification Petition: On March 20, 1995, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy, stating he had been a resident of the district for 10 months. On April 24, 1995, private respondents filed a petition to disqualify him for lacking the one-year residency qualification under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. On April 25, 1995, petitioner amended his certificate to state a residence of one year and thirteen days.
• COMELEC Proceedings and Elections: The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification petition on May 6, 1995. Elections were held on May 8, 1995, where petitioner garnered 38,547 votes, the highest among the candidates. Private respondents moved for reconsideration and to suspend proclamation.
• COMELEC En Banc Rulings: On May 15, 1995, the COMELEC en banc suspended petitioner's proclamation. On June 2, 1995, it reversed the Second Division, declared petitioner ineligible for lack of the required residence, and ordered the Board of Canvassers to determine the winner from the remaining qualified candidates.
• Evidence on Residency: The COMELEC found that petitioner's domicile of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac, as reflected in his previous certificates of candidacy. His claim of residency in Makati was based on a lease contract for a condominium unit. The COMELEC noted petitioner testified his intention was to reside there for only one year and that he maintained other residences in Metro Manila, undermining the animus manendi required to establish a new domicile.

• Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that after the elections, the COMELEC lost jurisdiction over his qualification, which became exclusively vested in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner contended the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion by suspuling his proclamation despite the unresolved jurisdictional issue and the ministerial duty to proclaim the winner.
• Residency Requirement: Petitioner maintained he satisfied the residency requirement, and in any case, the one-year requirement was legally impossible to comply with in a newly created district that was less than a year old.
• Second-Place Candidate: Petitioner asserted that if he were disqualified, the second-place candidate (Agusto Syjuco) could not be proclaimed as the winner, as that candidate was repudiated by the electorate.

• COMELEC Jurisdiction: The COMELEC and private respondents countered that the COMELEC retains jurisdiction to continue disqualification proceedings after the elections under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, as the petitioner had not yet been proclaimed or taken his oath of office, and thus was not a "Member" of the House whose qualification would fall under the HRET's exclusive jurisdiction.
• Residency as Domicile: Respondents argued that "residence" for election purposes means "domicile." Petitioner failed to prove he had abandoned his domicile in Tarlac and established a new domicile of choice in Makati, as his lease contract and testimony indicated a lack of intent to permanently reside there.
• Second-Place Candidate Doctrine: The COMELEC argued that the disqualification of a winning candidate does not entitle the second-place candidate to be proclaimed, citing prevailing jurisprudence (Labo v. COMELEC).

• Jurisdiction: Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to continue hearing and deciding a disqualification case against a congressional candidate after the elections.
• Residency Qualification: Whether petitioner satisfied the constitutional one-year residency requirement, with "residence" being interpreted as "domicile."
• Effect of Disqualification: Whether the second-place candidate can be proclaimed the winner upon the disqualification of the candidate who received the highest number of votes.

• Jurisdiction: The COMELEC's jurisdiction continues after the elections. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 expressly provides that if a candidate is not declared disqualified by final judgment before the election and receives the winning number of votes, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing. The HRET's jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 17 attaches only after a candidate has been proclaimed and has become a "Member" of the House.
• Residency Qualification: Petitioner did not meet the one-year residency requirement. For election law purposes, "residence" is synonymous with "domicile"—the place where a party has his permanent home, to which he intends to return. To change domicile, there must be (1) actual presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. Petitioner's evidence (a short-term lease, admission of other residences, and a history of domicile in Tarlac) failed to prove a bona fide change of domicile to Makati.
• Effect of Disqualification: The second-place candidate cannot be proclaimed the winner. The votes cast for the disqualified candidate in good faith are not considered stray. The electorate's will, expressed through their ballots for the disqualified candidate, cannot be disregarded to declare the repudiated second-place candidate the winner. This is the prevailing doctrine from Topacio v. Paredes, Geronimo v. Ramos, and Labo v. COMELEC.

• Residence as Domicile in Election Law — In election cases, "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile of origin is not easily lost and continues until a new one is established by clear and positive proof of (1) actual removal, (2) bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence, and (3) definite acts corresponding with that purpose.
• COMELEC Jurisdiction Over Post-Election Disqualification — The COMELEC retains jurisdiction to hear and decide a disqualification case against a candidate even after the elections, pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646. Its jurisdiction ends only upon the candidate's proclamation and assumption of office, at which point the Electoral Tribunal (for Congress) or the proper court assumes exclusive jurisdiction over contests relating to the member's election, returns, and qualifications.
• The "Second-Placer" Rule — The disqualification of a candidate who received the highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who received the second highest number of votes to be proclaimed the winner. The votes cast for the disqualified candidate are not considered stray, as they represent the will of the electorate who voted in good faith. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

• "The term 'residence' has always been understood as synonymous with 'domicile' not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution." — This establishes the controlling interpretation of the constitutional residency requirement.
• "A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section 17 of the Constitution." — This delineates the boundary between COMELEC and HRET jurisdiction.
• "The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters." — This succinctly states the rationale for not proclaiming the second-place candidate.

• Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692 (1991) — Cited as controlling authority that "residence" in election law means "domicile."
• Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989) and 211 SCRA 297 (1992) — Followed for the doctrine that the disqualification of a winning candidate does not entitle the second-place candidate to be proclaimed.
• Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 (1912) and Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 (1985) — Reiterated as the foundational cases supporting the "second-placer" rule.
• Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 (1991) — Applied to the effect that votes cast for a candidate in the sincere belief of their qualification are not rendered stray by subsequent disqualification.

• Article VI, Section 6, 1987 Constitution — Provides the qualifications for Members of the House of Representatives, including being "a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election."
• Article VI, Section 17, 1987 Constitution — Vests in the Electoral Tribunal the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
• Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 — Provides that if a candidate is not declared disqualified by final judgment before an election and receives the winning number of votes, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing and may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.
• Section 7, Republic Act No. 6646 — Makes the procedure in Section 6 applicable to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of B.P. 881.

Justices Regalado, Melo, Puno, and Hermosisima, Jr. concurred with the ponencia of Justice Kapunan. Justice Feliciano was on leave.

• Justice Padilla (concurring in the result but dissenting on reasoning): Agreed with the disqualification but argued that "residence" requires actual and physical presence, not merely domicile of choice. Also argued that under R.A. 6646, votes for a disqualified candidate "shall not be counted," making the qualified candidate with the highest number of votes the winner.
• Justice Francisco (concurring and dissenting): Agreed with the disqualification and COMELEC jurisdiction but argued the Labo doctrine should be abandoned. A disqualified candidate is a "non-candidate," and their votes should not be counted, allowing the second-place qualified candidate to be proclaimed.
• Justice Davide, Jr. (dissenting): Argued the COMELEC had no jurisdiction because the disqualification petition was not based on a false material representation in the certificate of candidacy (under Sec. 78, OEC) but on ineligibility. The suspension of proclamation was void as it was issued when the Second Division had found the candidate qualified. The petitioner should have been proclaimed, with any challenge left to a quo warranto proceeding before the HRET.
• Justice Mendoza (dissenting): Argued the COMELEC lacked jurisdiction over disqualification petitions based on ineligibility, as Section 6 of R.A. 6646 applies only to disqualifications under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (election offenses). Jurisdiction over a proclaimed congressman's qualifications lies with the HRET.