Testate Estate of Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan vs. Rosalina C. Biascan

An order that determines the lawful heirs of a deceased person and an order appointing a regular administrator in a special proceeding are final orders appealable under Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court; the period for appeal is thirty days, and a motion for reconsideration filed after the expiration of that period does not interrupt the running of the appeal period because the order has already become final and executory by operation of law, not by judicial declaration.

Florencio Biascan died intestate. Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan was his lawful wife. Rosalina C. Biascan and her brother German Biascan were acknowledged natural children. Rosalina initiated an intestate settlement proceeding and obtained appointment as regular administratrix. Maria opposed the proceeding, sought to set aside Rosalina’s appointment, and prayed for her own appointment as administratrix.

• Nature of the proceeding: The dispute arose from Special Proceeding No. 98037, an intestate settlement of the estate of Florencio Biascan, filed by respondent Rosalina C. Biascan before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 4 (later RTC Manila, Branch 4).

• Appointment of administratrix: On August 13, 1975, the trial court appointed Rosalina as regular administratrix of the estate.

• Opposition by the lawful wife: On October 10, 1975, Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, the lawful wife of the decedent, entered her appearance as oppositor‑movant. She sought intervention, moved to set aside Rosalina’s appointment as special and regular administratrix, and prayed that she be appointed administratrix instead.

• The April 2, 1981 Order: After exchange of pleadings, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order which, among other things, resolved that (1) Maria is the lawful wife of Florencio; (2) Rosalina and her brother German are acknowledged natural children; (3) all three are legal heirs entitled to participate in the settlement proceedings; (4) the motion to set aside Rosalina’s appointment as regular administratrix was denied; and (5) the motion to approve the inventory and appraisal was deferred. Maria’s counsel received a copy of this order on April 9, 1981.

• Belated motion for reconsideration: Maria filed a motion for reconsideration of the April 2, 1981 Order only on June 6, 1981 — fifty‑eight days after receipt.

• Loss of records and reconstitution: On November 15, 1981, a fire at the Manila City Hall destroyed the court records. Rosalina filed a petition for reconstitution on January 2, 1985, causing further delay.

• Denial of motion for reconsideration: On April 30, 1985, the trial court issued an Order denying Maria’s motion for reconsideration.

• Substitution by the testate estate: Maria subsequently died; her testate estate was substituted as a party. Atty. Marcial F. Lopez was appointed interim special administrator and engaged the Siguion Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Offices.

• The attempted appeal: On August 21, 1996, the law office claimed to have learned of the April 30, 1985 Order and secured a certification that no proof of service of that order appeared in the records. A Notice of Appeal (dated April 22, 1996) and a Record of Appeal were filed with the trial court, but the court stamp indicated receipt only on September 20, 1996.

• Dismissal of the appeal: The trial court, by Order dated October 22, 1996, dismissed the appeal on the ground that the April 2, 1981 Order had become final because the motion for reconsideration had been filed beyond thirty days, and the notice of appeal itself was filed more than eleven years after the April 30, 1985 Order. The motion for reconsideration of the dismissal was denied on February 12, 1997.

• Finality of the April 2, 1981 Order: Petitioner maintained that the April 2, 1981 Order did not become final and executory because no opposition to the timeliness of the motion for reconsideration was filed by the adverse party, and the trial court itself never ruled on the issue of timeliness. The denial of the motion for reconsideration in the April 30, 1985 Order was made on grounds other than tardiness, thereby curing any procedural defect.

• Timeliness of the notice of appeal: Petitioner insisted that after it obtained a certification from the trial court on August 21, 1996 that no proof of service of the April 30, 1985 Order existed, it filed the Notice of Appeal the following day, August 22, 1996, well within the permissible period. It attempted to characterize the filing as having occurred on that date, pointing to the ostensible date on the Notice of Appeal.

The decision does not set out the respondent’s arguments in detail but records that respondent opposed the motion for reconsideration before the trial court and consistently resisted the appeal. Respondent’s position, reflected in the orders of the lower courts, was that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period and that the April 2, 1981 Order had attained finality long before the notice of appeal was filed.

• Finality of the April 2, 1981 Order and Timeliness of the Appeal: Whether the April 2, 1981 Order of the trial court had become final and executory, and whether the notice of appeal was filed out of time, such that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the dismissal of the appeal.

• Finality of the April 2, 1981 Order and Timeliness of the Appeal: The April 2, 1981 Order was a final order that determined the lawful heirs of Florencio Biascan and denied the motion to set aside the appointment of the regular administratrix; it was therefore appealable under Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court. In special proceedings, the appeal period is thirty days from receipt, with both a notice of appeal and a record on appeal required. Maria received the order on April 9, 1981. She had until May 9, 1981 to perfect an appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration that would suspend the running of the period. Her motion for reconsideration was filed only on June 6, 1981 — fifty‑eight days after receipt, or twenty‑eight days beyond the deadline. At that point, the April 2, 1981 Order had already become final and executory by operation of law. The fact that the opposing party did not object to the timeliness of the motion, or that the trial court denied the motion on grounds other than tardiness, was immaterial; a court cannot validly entertain a motion for reconsideration filed after the appeal period has lapsed, and such a motion cannot disturb the finality that had already attached. Even if the belated motion were treated as having suspended the appeal period, the appeal would still be out of time. The order denying the motion for reconsideration was issued on April 30, 1985. Giving petitioner the benefit of the doubt that it first learned of that order on August 21, 1996, the appeal had to be perfected by the following day, August 22, 1996. However, the trial court stamp unequivocally showed that the Notice of Appeal was received only on September 20, 1996. The appeal was thus filed manifestly late, and the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in sustaining the trial court’s dismissal.

• Finality by operation of law: A judgment or order becomes final and executory by operation of law upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal without an appeal or a timely motion for reconsideration or new trial being perfected. No judicial declaration is necessary to produce that effect. (Republic v. Associacion Benevola de Cebu, 178 SCRA 692; Munez v. CA, 152 SCRA 197.)

• Effect of a motion for reconsideration filed out of time: A motion for reconsideration filed after the period for taking an appeal has expired does not interrupt the running of the appeal period. The trial court cannot validly entertain such a motion, and its denial on the merits does not cure the jurisdictional fact of finality. (Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. v. CA, 143 SCRA 91.)

• Appealable orders in special proceedings: The orders enumerated in Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court — including an order determining the lawful heirs and an order appointing a regular administrator — are final determinations of the rights of the parties and are appealable. An order appointing a special administrator, being temporary and for a limited purpose, is not appealable, but an appointment of a regular administrator is a final order that may be challenged by appeal. (Torres v. Sicat Vda. De Morales, 93 Phil. 155; Si Hong Eng v. Sy Lioc Suy, 8 Phil. 594; De Borja v. Tan, 97 Phil. 872.)

• Period of appeal in special proceedings: Under Section 19(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing B.P. Blg. 129, the period to appeal in special proceedings is thirty days, and the appeal requires both a notice of appeal and a record on appeal. (Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 643.)

• Computation of appeal period when motion for reconsideration is filed: Under Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the time during which a motion for reconsideration is pending must be deducted from the appeal period; if the motion is filed on the last day, the appeal must be perfected within the day following receipt of notice of the denial of the motion. A motion filed after the appeal period has lapsed is a nullity and does not toll the period.

• “It is well-settled that judgment or orders become final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed.”

• “As such, it is of no moment that the opposing party failed to object to the timeliness of the motion for reconsideration or that the court denied the same on grounds other than timeliness considering that at the time the motion was filed, the Order dated April 2, 1981 had already become final and executory. Being final and executory, the trial court can no longer alter, modify, or reverse the questioned order.”

• Republic v. Associacion Benevola de Cebu, 178 SCRA 692 — Followed for the principle that judgments become final by operation of law upon the lapse of the appeal period.
• Munez v. CA, 152 SCRA 197 — Cited as additional authority that finality occurs by operation of law, not by judicial pronouncement.
• Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. v. CA, 143 SCRA 91 — Followed for the rule that a trial court cannot validly entertain a motion for reconsideration filed after the appeal period has expired.
• Pfleider v. Victoriano, 98 SCRA 491 — Cited for the proposition that the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality that has attached to the judgment or order.
• Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 643 — Applied for the 30‑day appeal period and record‑on‑appeal requirement in special proceedings.
• Torres v. Sicat Vda. De Morales, 93 Phil. 155 — Cited as authority that an order appointing a regular administrator is a final determination of rights and is appealable.

• Section 1, Rule 109, Rules of Court — Enumerates the orders and judgments in special proceedings from which an appeal may be taken. Applied to classify the April 2, 1981 Order as a final order determining the lawful heirs (paragraph b) and as a denial of a motion to set aside the appointment of a regular administratrix, both of which are appealable.
• Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court (then applicable) — Governs the computation of the period for appeal when a motion for reconsideration is filed. Applied to show that even if the motion for reconsideration had been timely, the appeal had to be perfected within the day following notice of the denial.
• Section 19(b), Interim Rules and Guidelines Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 — Prescribes a 30‑day appeal period in special proceedings and requires a record on appeal. Applied to confirm that the appeal period in the settlement proceeding was thirty days.

Melo, Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concurred.