Testate Estate of Catalina de la Cruz vs. Pedro de la Cruz

A notarial will may be admitted to probate despite minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of subscribing witnesses attributable to the lapse of time between execution and trial, provided there is unanimity and certainty regarding the identity of the signatures of the testatrix, the attesting witnesses, and the notary public, and the fact that all were present when those signatures were affixed.

Catalina de la Cruz was a single woman without surviving descendants or ascendants who died at age 89 in San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. Andres Pascual, though not related by blood, claimed he was taken into and grew up with the family of the deceased, who considered him as her own son. The estate was valued at more than ₱300,000.00. The will was executed in 1954, when the testatrix was 83 years old and suffering from rheumatism severe enough to require thick socks and soft shoes. The will was prepared by Atty. Pascual, a nephew of the proponent, and notarized by a notary named Gatdula.

Catalina de la Cruz, a single woman without any surviving descendant or ascendant, died on January 2, 1960, at the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. On January 14, 1960, Andres Pascual, who was named in the will as executor and sole heir, filed a petition for the probate of Catalina's alleged will in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Although not related by blood to the deceased, Pascual claimed he was taken into and grew up with the family of Catalina, who considered him as her own son. Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, had likewise made Pascual her sole heir in her own will, without objection from Catalina and their sister Valentina Cruz.

The will was executed in 1954, when Catalina was already 83 years old and suffering from rheumatism to the extent that she had to wear thick socks and soft shoes. It was prepared by Atty. Pascual, a nephew of the proponent, and notarized by a notary named Gatdula. Three instrumental witnesses subscribed to the will, including Manuel Jiongco and Dr. Sanchez. It was Pascual, not the testatrix, who asked Dr. Sanchez to serve as one of the witnesses, owing to the testatrix's rheumatism, which made it difficult for her to look for witnesses herself. The evidence showed that Catalina read the will before signing, and no claim was made that she was incapable of reading or understanding it.

Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of Catalina contested the will's validity on four grounds: non-compliance with legal formalities, mental incapacity of the testatrix, undue and improper pressure and influence by Pascual, and procurement of the testatrix's signature through fraud. During trial, the subscribing witnesses and the notary testified to the due execution of the will. The oppositors pointed to inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimonies regarding the weather condition at the time of execution, the sequence of signing by the witnesses, and the length of time it took to complete the act. The oppositors also presented a tape recording (Exhibit 22; transcription, Exhibit 23) of a conversation between witness Manuel Jiongco and oppositor Pedro Cruz at the latter's house sometime in 1960, taken without Jiongco's knowledge, wherein Jiongco allegedly stated that when he signed the will, the other witnesses' signatures were already affixed and they were not then present, and that he signed the document in 1958 or 1959 rather than 1954.

The probate court upheld the due execution of the will, finding the inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimonies not substantial enough to discredit their entire testimony, attributing them to the eight-year interval between the will's execution in 1954 and the witnesses' testimony in 1962. The court found unanimity and certainty in the witnesses' testimony regarding the identity of the signatures of the testatrix, the attesting witnesses, and the notary public, and the fact that all were present when those signatures were affixed. The court likewise rejected the tape recording, noting that Jiongco denied the voice was his, and that the court's own comparison of voices revealed some similarity but not enough to justify a categorical conclusion that the recorded voice was Jiongco's. The oppositors appealed directly to the Supreme Court, the properties being valued at more than ₱300,000.00, raising only the issue of the due execution of the will.

• Credibility of Subscribing Witnesses: The oppositors-appellants claimed that the lower court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the subscribing witnesses and the notary that the will was duly executed, notwithstanding the existence of inconsistencies and contradictions in their testimonies.
• Non-Compliance with Legal Formalities: The oppositors maintained that the will was not signed by all the witnesses in the presence of one another, in violation of the requirement of law, and that the formalities required by law were not complied with.
• Mental Incapacity: The oppositors alleged that the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its execution.
• Undue Influence and Fraud: The oppositors asserted that the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the proponent, and that the signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud. They invoked the American presumption of undue influence held to exist where the beneficiary participates in the drafting or execution of the will favoring him.
• Tape Recording as Impeachment Evidence: The oppositors relied on a tape recording of a conversation between instrumental witness Manuel Jiongco and oppositor Pedro Cruz, taken without Jiongco's knowledge, wherein the witness allegedly stated that the other witnesses' signatures were already affixed when he signed and that he signed in 1958 or 1959 rather than 1954.

• Credibility of Witness Testimony: Whether the lower court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the subscribing witnesses and the notary despite alleged inconsistencies and contradictions.
• Due Execution and Legal Formalities: Whether the will was duly executed and attested in the manner provided by law, specifically whether all witnesses signed in the presence of one another.
• Impeachment by Tape Recording: Whether the tape recording of witness Jiongco's alleged out-of-court statements was sufficient to impeach his testimony and discredit the will's due execution.
• Undue Influence and Fraud: Whether the execution of the will was tainted by fraud and undue influence exerted by the proponent on the testatrix.

• Credibility of Witness Testimony: No. The inconsistencies related to unimportant details affected by the lapse of eight years and the treachery of human memory, and did not alter the probative value of the witnesses' testimonies on the due execution of the will.
• Due Execution and Legal Formalities: Yes. The will was duly executed and attested as required by law, there being unanimity and certainty in the witnesses' testimony regarding the identity of the signatures and the fact that all were present when those signatures were affixed.
• Impeachment by Tape Recording: No. The tape recording was insufficient to impeach Jiongco, who denied the voice was his, whose testimony was corroborated by two other witnesses and the notary, and whose alleged statement that he signed in 1958 or 1959 was contradicted by notarial registry entries showing the will's ratification in 1954.
• Undue Influence and Fraud: No. The evidence marshalled by the oppositors established at most grounds for suspicion but fell far short of establishing actual exercise of improper pressure or influence sufficient to destroy the testatrix's free agency.

• Credibility of Witness Testimony: The contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in the testimonies of the witnesses and the notary — such as the weather condition at the time the will was executed, the sequence of signing by the witnesses, and the length of time it took to complete the act — related to unimportant details of the witnesses' impressions about certain details which could have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. The will was signed in 1954 and the witnesses testified in 1962, an eight-year interval. It was therefore understandable and reasonable to expect that the witnesses would not retain a vivid picture of the details surrounding the execution and signing of the will. What was important and essential was unanimity and certainty in their testimony regarding the identity of the signatures of the testatrix, the attesting witnesses, and the notary public, and the fact that they were all present at the time those signatures were affixed. The Court cited People vs. Sigue (86 Phil. 139-140), which involved a three-year interval, in support of this principle.

• Due Execution and Legal Formalities: The law does not simply require the presence of three instrumental witnesses; it demands that the witnesses be credible (Article 805, Civil Code). In this jurisdiction, subscribing witnesses are generally regarded as the best qualified to testify on the due execution of a will, but their testimony must be reasonable and unbiased and not overcome by competent evidence. The fact that the witnesses were better known to proponent Andres Pascual than to the testatrix did not render their testimony suspect, given the testatrix's age and rheumatism, which made it not unlikely that she should have entrusted the task of requesting witnesses to Pascual. The error of recall, considering the eight-year interval, was consonant with the vagaries of human memory. The friendly relations of the witnesses with the testator or the beneficiaries do not affect the credibility of the former. The Court also noted that it would not be the first time a will had been admitted to probate even if one instrumental witness testified contrary to the other two, provided the court was satisfied that the will was executed and attested in the manner provided by law, citing Fernandez vs. Tantoco, Tolentino vs. Francisco, Cuyugan vs. Baron, and Ramirez vs. Butte.

• Impeachment by Tape Recording: Two circumstances militated against giving credence to the tape recording. First, there was no adequate proof that the declarations were in fact made by Jiongco, who denied under oath that the voice was his. The trial court, which had the opportunity to hear Jiongco testify and compare his natural voice with the recorded voice, found some similarity but not enough to justify a categorical conclusion. Between testimony given in court under oath subjected to rigorous cross-examination and loose statements made out of court of doubtful source, the court gave full faith and credence to the former. The Supreme Court, not having heard Jiongco testify, was not in a position to contradict the trial court's appreciation. Second, Jiongco's alleged assertion that he signed the testament only in 1958 or 1959 was contradicted by the Notarial Registry of notary Gatdula, where the ratification of the testament appeared among the entries for 1954, as well as in corresponding copies filed with the Clerk of Court's office. No evidence existed that these documents were not surrendered and filed in the regular course of official duty. The notary could not have reported in 1954 what did not happen until 1958.

• Undue Influence and Fraud: The basic principles on undue influence require that the influence exerted must so overpower and subjugate the mind of the testator as to destroy free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own. The contention that a will was obtained by undue influence cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; it is not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have been exercised. The exercise of improper pressure must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised, and the burden is on the person challenging the will. Mere general or reasonable influence is not sufficient, nor is moderate and reasonable solicitation, nor omission of relatives who are not forced heirs. Tested against these rulings, the oppositors' circumstances failed to establish actual undue influence. The oppositors' main reliance on Pascual's testimony that the deceased "did not like to sign anything unless I knew it" did not amount to proof that she would sign anything Pascual desired. The oppositors' own evidence that Pascual purchased a building in Manila for the testatrix, placed the title in his name, but caused her name to be painted thereon to mislead her, even if true, demonstrated that Pascual's influence was not such as to overpower the testatrix's free will — for if her mind were really subjugated, Pascual would have had no need to resort to deception. The fact that it was Pascual who asked Dr. Sanchez to be a witness was explained by the testatrix's rheumatism. The testatrix's failure to choose relatives or friends as witnesses was explainable by the natural desire to keep the will's terms secret from those interested in her succession but not favored by it. The American presumption of undue influence where the beneficiary participates in the drafting or execution of the will did not apply, since the will was prepared by Atty. Pascual, a nephew of the proponent, who in the normal course of events would follow the instructions of the testatrix. The charge of fraud, being premised on the existence of undue influence, needed no separate discussion.

• Subscribing Witnesses as Best Qualified to Testify on Due Execution — Where a will is contested, subscribing witnesses are generally regarded as the best qualified to testify on its due execution. However, for their testimony to be entitled to full credit, it must be reasonable and unbiased, and not overcome by competent evidence, direct or circumstantial. The law does not simply require the presence of three instrumental witnesses; it demands that the witnesses be credible (Article 805, Civil Code). The Court applied this doctrine by accepting the concordant testimony of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary, notwithstanding minor inconsistencies attributable to the lapse of time.

• Effect of Minor Inconsistencies Due to Lapse of Time — Minor contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of subscribing witnesses relating to unimportant details — such as weather conditions, the sequence of signing, and the duration of the act — do not, by themselves, alter the probative value of their testimonies on the due execution of a will, where there is a substantial interval between the will's execution and the witnesses' testimony. What is essential is unanimity and certainty regarding the identity of the signatures and the fact that all were present when those signatures were affixed. The Court applied this principle where eight years had elapsed between the will's execution in 1954 and the witnesses' testimony in 1962.

• Undue Influence Must Destroy Free Agency — To be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own. The contention that a will was obtained by undue influence cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; it is not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have been exercised. The exercise of improper pressure must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exerted at the time of the will's execution, and the burden is on the person challenging the will. Mere general or reasonable influence, moderate solicitation, or omission of relatives not forced heirs is not sufficient. The Court found that the oppositors' evidence established at most grounds for suspicion but fell far short of proving actual undue influence.

• Probate Despite Contrary Testimony of One Witness — A will may be admitted to probate even if one instrumental witness testifies contrary to the other two, provided the court is satisfied that the will was executed and attested in the manner provided by law. There is greater reason to admit the will where only the testimony of one witness is subjected to serious, if unsuccessful, attack. The Court relied on this doctrine in affirming probate despite the attempt to impeach Jiongco through the tape recording.

• Friendly Relations of Witnesses Do Not Affect Credibility — Friendly relations of the witnesses with the testator or the beneficiaries do not affect the credibility of the former, and thus the proven friendship between the proponent and the instrumental witnesses has no bearing on the latter's qualification to testify on the circumstances surrounding the signing of the will.

• "For it must be remembered that the law does not simply require the presence of three instrumental witnesses; it demands that the witnesses be credible." — This passage articulates the standard that the credibility, not merely the number, of attesting witnesses is essential to the due execution of a will, grounding the Court's acceptance of the witnesses' testimonies despite minor inconsistencies.

• "to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own" — This is the canonical formulation of the undue influence standard in Philippine succession law, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence, enumerating the threshold that the oppositors' evidence failed to meet.

• "It would be dangerous to rule otherwise." — This statement concludes the Court's refusal to accept the tape recording as sufficient to impeach witness Jiongco, emphasizing the evidentiary standard for impeaching subscribing witnesses through secretly recorded out-of-court statements of doubtful source.

• "the circumstances marshalled by the contestants certainly fail to establish actual undue influence or improper pressure exercised on the testarix by the proponent" — This passage states the Court's conclusion on the undue influence issue, applying the substantial evidence standard to the oppositors' circumstantial evidence and finding it insufficient.

• People vs. Sigue, 86 Phil. 139-140 — Cited for the proposition that inconsistencies in witness testimony due to a lapse of years (three-year interval in that case) do not necessarily discredit the witnesses' account of due execution.
• Estate of Javellana vs. Javellana, 106 Phil. 1076 (1960) — Cited for the rule that for determining due execution of a will, it is not necessary that instrumental witnesses give an accurate and detailed account of the proceedings; it is sufficient that they have seen or were so situated that they could have seen each other sign.
• Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380 — Cited both for the proposition that witnesses need only have been so situated as to be able to see each other sign, and for the doctrine that a will may be admitted to probate even if one instrumental witness testifies contrary to the other two.
• Coso vs. Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil. 596 — Cited for the undue influence standard: influence must overpower and subjugate the testator's mind to destroy free agency, and mere general or reasonable influence is insufficient to invalidate a will.
• Ozaeta vs. Cuartero, L-5597, May 31, 1956 — Cited for the rule that undue influence cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion, and that opportunity to exercise influence is not enough; substantial evidence of actual exercise is required.
• Teotico vs. Del Val, L-18753, March 26, 1965 — Cited for the propositions that improper pressure must be supported by substantial evidence of actual exercise, and that the burden is on the person challenging the will to show influence was exerted at the time of execution.
• Junquera vs. Borromeo, 19 SCRA 656 (1967) — Cited in support of the rule that subscribing witnesses are generally regarded as the best qualified to testify on due execution, but their testimony must be reasonable and unbiased.
• In re Knutson's Will, 41 Pac. 2d 793 — Cited for the proposition that bequests to those in whom the testator has confidence and who have won his affection are more likely to be free from undue influence than bequests to others.

• Article 805, Civil Code of the Philippines — Cited for the requirement that every will must be attested by three or more credible witnesses. The Court emphasized that the law demands not merely the presence of three witnesses but that they be credible, and applied this provision in upholding the probate court's acceptance of the subscribing witnesses' testimony.

Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, and Barredo, JJ., concurred. Teehankee, J., took no part. Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., were on leave and took no part.