Testate Estate of Amos G. Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis, et al.

The national law of the decedent governs the amount of successional rights and the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, so Philippine legitimes cannot be applied to the estate of a foreign decedent whose national law does not provide for forced heirs or legitimes.

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States, and he was domiciled in Texas. He had legitimate children by his first and second wives and three illegitimate children. The Philippine Civil Code contains a system of legitimes and conflict-of-laws provisions on succession, and the dispute concerns whether that system applies to the Philippine estate of a foreign national.

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who predeceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and Anna Bellis Allsman. By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy Bellis. He also had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, and Miriam Palma Bellis. On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines. In that will, he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration were paid, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, and Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each; and (c) after the foregoing two items were satisfied, the remainder should go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.

On July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died, a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein, including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition." It reported, among other things, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each, or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor, pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament, divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages. On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Article 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes. Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to the SC to raise the issue of which law must apply—Texas law or Philippine law. The parties admitted that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.

• Legitimes: Petitioners Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis opposed the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
• Choice of Law: Petitioners argued that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
• Public Policy Exception: Petitioners argued that Article 17, paragraph 3 prevails as the exception to Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.
• Separate Wills: Petitioners pointed out that the decedent executed two wills—one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate—arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.

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• Choice of Law in Succession: Whether Texas law or Philippine law governs the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions and the amount of successional rights of Amos G. Bellis.
• Public Policy Exception: Whether Article 17, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code prevails over Article 16, paragraph 2, so as to apply Philippine legitimes to the decedent's estate.
• Separate Wills: Whether the decedent's execution of separate wills for his Texas and Philippine estates shows an intention that Philippine law govern his Philippine estate.

• Choice of Law in Succession: Texas law. Under Article 16, paragraph 2, and Article 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent governs the amount of successional rights and the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions; the decedent was a Texas citizen and domiciliary, and Texas law has no forced heirs or legitimes.
• Public Policy Exception: No. Article 17, paragraph 3 does not prevail over Article 16, paragraph 2; Congress made the latter a specific provision for testate and intestate successions, and specific provisions prevail over general ones.
• Separate Wills: No. Even assuming the decedent intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate, a provision in a foreigner's will that his properties be distributed under Philippine law rather than his national law is illegal and void.

• Choice of Law in Succession: Article 16, paragraph 2, provides that intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Article 1039 provides that capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. The parties admitted that Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under Texas laws there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Since the intrinsic validity of the will's provisions and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to his testacy. The SC also noted that the parties did not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi applied in Aznar vs. Christensen Garcia. It was not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. Even assuming Texas had a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system should govern, the same would not result in a reference back to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. If Texas had a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. Appellants' position was therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi; they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments.
• Public Policy Exception: Petitioners argued that Article 17, paragraph 3, stating that prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country, prevails as the exception to Article 16, paragraph 2. The SC rejected this. Congress deleted the phrase "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Article 11 of the old Civil Code as Article 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Article 10 of the old Civil Code as Article 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Article 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate successions. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision under Article 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
• Separate Wills: Petitioners pointed out that the decedent executed two wills—one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate—arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. The SC held that assuming such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law. As ruled in Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10—now Article 16—of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

• National law of decedent governs succession — Under Article 16, paragraph 2, and Article 1039, intestate and testamentary successions are governed by the national law of the decedent with respect to (a) the order of succession, (b) the amount of successional rights, (c) the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, and (d) capacity to succeed, regardless of the nature and location of the property. Applied: Amos G. Bellis was a Texas citizen and domiciliary; Texas law had no forced heirs or legitimes; Philippine legitimes could not be applied.
• Renvoi not applicable where decedent is both national and domiciliary of the same foreign country — If the decedent is both a national and domicile of Texas, even a Texas conflict rule referring to the domiciliary system would still refer to Texas law, not Philippine law. Renvoi to Philippine law would arise only if Texas adopted the situs theory and the properties were in the Philippines; absent proof of Texas's conflict rule, it is not presumed different from Philippine law. Appellants did not invoke renvoi.
• Public policy exception does not override specific succession conflict rule — Article 17, paragraph 3 is a general provision on public policy; Article 16, paragraph 2 is a specific provision on testate and intestate successions. Congress deleted the phrase "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" from the old provision and added Article 1039, showing intent that the national law of the decedent govern. Specific provisions prevail over general ones.
• Foreigner cannot choose Philippine law contrary to national law — A provision in a foreigner's will that his properties be distributed under Philippine law rather than his national law is illegal and void; the national law cannot be ignored in matters covered by Article 16.
• Legitimes not extended to foreign nationals — Whatever public policy or good customs are involved in the Philippine system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend them to the succession of foreign nationals; the amount of successional rights is left to the decedent's national law.

• "However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." — This is the central conflict-of-laws rule applied by the SC to make Texas law govern the decedent's succession.
• "It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals." — This passage rejects the petitioners' argument that Article 17, paragraph 3's public policy exception should apply Philippine legitimes.
• "a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 - now Article 16 - of the Civil Code states said national law should govern." — This defines the rule on separate wills and a foreigner's attempt to choose Philippine law for distribution.
• "Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis." — This is the SC's conclusion applying the national-law rule to the facts.

• Aznar vs. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963 — The SC noted the doctrine of renvoi applied in this case, but distinguished it because the decedent was both a national and domicile of Texas, and the appellants did not invoke renvoi.
• Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870 — Controlling precedent; the SC relied on it to hold that a foreigner's will provision choosing Philippine law over his national law is illegal and void.
• Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472 — Cited for the rule that in the absence of proof of a foreign country's conflict of law rule, it should not be presumed different from Philippine law.
• In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 — Cited together with Lim vs. Collector for the same rule on absence of proof of a foreign conflict rule.

• Article 16, paragraph 2, Civil Code — Provides that intestate and testamentary successions, with respect to order of succession, amount of successional rights, and intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, are regulated by the national law of the decedent, regardless of property location. Applied to make Texas law govern.
• Article 1039, Civil Code — Provides that capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. Cited as an added provision reinforcing legislative intent that national law governs.
• Article 17, paragraph 3, Civil Code — Provides that prohibitive laws concerning persons, acts or property, and those with public order, public policy, and good customs as their object shall not be rendered ineffective by foreign laws or judgments. Petitioners invoked it as an exception; the SC held it does not prevail over Article 16, paragraph 2.
• Article 10, old Civil Code (now Article 16, new Civil Code) — Mentioned in Miciano vs. Brimo; national law governs matters covered by Article 16.
• Article 11, old Civil Code (now Article 17, new Civil Code) — Congress deleted the phrase "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when incorporating it as Article 17, showing Article 16, paragraph 2 is a specific provision.

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