Tesoro vs. The Director of Prisons

The President’s constitutional power to pardon upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper includes the power to grant and revoke paroles; his determination that a parolee violated a condition of parole is not subject to judicial review, and the parolee must serve the unexpired portion of the original sentence without credit for the parole period.

Eufemio P. Tesoro was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila of falsification of a public document and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from two to three years, six months and twenty-one days, plus a fine of one hundred pesos, or subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. While serving that sentence, he was released on parole by Governor-General Frank Murphy on November 14, 1935, under conditions prescribed in connection with the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, including residence in Manila, good conduct, and periodic reporting. The parole was granted under the Administrative Code’s provisions on executive parole, and the case ultimately required the Supreme Court to reconcile that statutory power with the constitutional grant of pardoning power to the President. The Director of Prisons was the respondent in the habeas corpus action that followed Tesoro’s recommitment.

On October 10, 1934, Eufemio P. Tesoro was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila of falsification of a public document and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days, to pay a fine of one hundred pesos (P100), or to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The penalty was to expire on October 28, 1937. On November 14, 1935, Governor-General Frank Murphy granted him a parole, which he accepted subject to conditions: (1) that he live in the City of Manila and not change his residence without first obtaining the consent of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence; (2) that he not commit any other crime and conduct himself in an orderly manner; and (3) that he report during the period of his parole to the Executive Secretary of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, once a month during the first year and thereafter once every three months. The parole provided that should any of the conditions be violated, the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect.

On December 3, 1937, Tesoro was charged in the justice of the peace court of San Juan, Rizal, with adultery alleged to have been committed with Concordia Dairo, the wife of his brother-in-law Jose Nagar. The complaint was supported by the affidavits of Jose Nagar, Luz Nagar, and Epimaco Nagar. The case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, where the provincial fiscal filed the corresponding information, but the information was dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant.

Sometime in February 1938, Jose Nagar lodged a complaint with the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, based on the same facts, charging Tesoro with violation of the conditions of his parole. On February 3, 1938, Tesoro was summoned to appear before the Board for a hearing, but he asked for postponement until the following day. On February 4, 1938, he addressed a letter to the Board denying the charge of illicit relations with the complainant’s wife and included therewith the supposed retraction of Epimaco Nagar of what the latter had stated in his former affidavit. On the same date, Simeon Figalang, a parole officer assigned to investigate the case, submitted his report to the Board, and on the strength thereof and the supporting papers, the acting chairman of the Board recommended to the President of the Philippines the arrest and reincarceration of Tesoro.

On February 19, 1938, the President issued an order reciting that Tesoro had violated the condition of his parole by maintaining adulterous relations with Concordia Dairo in the latter part of September 1937 and continuously thereafter. The order stated that after the death on September 18, 1937, of Tesoro’s wife, who was Jose Nagar’s sister, Jose Nagar and his wife came to live with Tesoro; that Tesoro, taking advantage of Jose Nagar’s frequent absences, made advances to Concordia Dairo, succeeded in having illicit relations with her, and later took her away from her legitimate husband, with whom she was now living in adultery. By virtue of the authority conferred by Section 64(i) of the Administrative Code, the President ordered Tesoro’s arrest and commitment to the custody of the Director of Prisons, who was authorized to confine him for the service of the unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally committed to prison. Tesoro was arrested and recommitted, and he thereafter sued for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of Prisons.

• Implied Repeal of Parole Power: Petitioner-appellant contended that Section 64(i) of the Administrative Code, insofar as it confers upon the Chief Executive the power to grant and revoke paroles, was impliedly repealed by the constitutional provision on pardons because the Constitution omitted to specify the power of parole among the President’s powers.
• Authority of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence: Petitioner contended that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence had no legal authority to investigate his conduct and recommend the revocation of his parole.
• Necessity of Judicial Conviction: Petitioner contended that a judicial pronouncement to the effect that he had committed a crime was necessary before he could be properly adjudged as having violated his conditional parole.
• Review of Presidential Findings: Petitioner impugned the President’s findings regarding the violation, claiming that according to the weight of the evidence the violation took place not in the latter part of September 1937, as found by the President, but after October 28, 1937, when the parole was supposed to expire.
• Expiration of Parole and Credit for Time Served: Petitioner contended that upon the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment, his conditional parole also expired and his liberty became absolute, subject to no conditions; he held that the period during which he was out on parole should be counted as service of his original sentence.
• Duration of Remaining Penalty: Petitioner raised the duration of the penalty he had yet to serve after recommitment, arguing in effect that the time between parole and arrest should be considered part of his sentence.

• Implied Repeal of Parole Power: Whether Section 64(i) of the Administrative Code, conferring upon the Chief Executive the power to grant and revoke paroles, was impliedly repealed by the constitutional provision granting the President the power to pardon, which omitted to specify the power of parole.
• Authority of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence: Whether the Board of Indeterminate Sentence had legal authority to investigate the conduct of the petitioner and recommend the revocation of his parole.
• Necessity of Judicial Conviction: Whether a judicial pronouncement or conviction for another crime is necessary before a parolee may be adjudged to have violated a condition of his conditional parole.
• Review of Presidential Findings: Whether the courts may review the President’s findings that a parolee violated the conditions of his parole.
• Effect of Expiration of Maximum Term and Credit for Parole Period: Whether the expiration of the maximum term of imprisonment also expires the conditional parole and renders the parolee’s liberty absolute, and whether the period out on parole should be counted as service of the original sentence.
• Duration of Remaining Penalty: Whether the petitioner, upon recommitment, should serve the unexpired portion of the penalty originally imposed, and which statutory provision governs that duration.

• Implied Repeal of Parole Power: No. The power to pardon upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as the President may impose includes the power to grant and revoke paroles; the Constitution’s omission of parole does not amount to denial.
• Authority of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence: Yes. The duty of the parolee to report to the Board implies the Board’s power to inquire into his conduct, and the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries the power to investigate; the President may use any government agency.
• Necessity of Judicial Conviction: No. The condition required that petitioner “will not commit any other crime”; the mere commission, not conviction, of another crime sufficed, and the Chief Executive was authorized to act in his judgment.
• Review of Presidential Findings: No. Where the determination of the violation rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, the courts will not interfere by way of review; the parolee consented to place his liberty on that judgment.
• Effect of Expiration of Maximum Term and Credit for Parole Period: No. A conditional parole does not expire into absolute liberty upon the expiration of the maximum term, and the time during which the convict was at large by virtue of the parole is not counted as service of the original sentence.
• Duration of Remaining Penalty: The unexpired portion of the penalty originally imposed must be served. No statute squarely governs; the express terms of the parole provide that upon violation the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect.

• Implied Repeal of Parole Power: The Constitution grants the President power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses except impeachment, “upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose.” The power to pardon on conditions includes the power to grant and revoke paroles. If the omission of parole in the Constitution were construed as a denial, the effect would be to discharge unconditionally parolees who had been released conditionally before the Constitution, an unintended result. Thus Section 64(i) was not repealed.

• Authority of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence: By accepting parole, petitioner agreed to report to the Executive Secretary of the Board once a month during the first year and thereafter once every three months. The duty to report implies a corresponding power in the Board to inquire into his conduct, and a fortiori to make recommendations to the President by whose authority it was acting. The power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with it the power to investigate and inquire into the conduct of parolees if revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In exercising this incidental power of inquiry, the President is not precluded from using any agency of the government or even any individual. The Board was a government agency created precisely for the concern of persons released on parole, and the President acted with legal authority and good judgment in using it.

• Necessity of Judicial Conviction: Condition No. 2 of the parole provided that petitioner “will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner.” It was the mere commission, not his conviction by court, of any other crime that was necessary in order that petitioner may be deemed to have violated his parole. Under Section 64(i) of the Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence. No prior judicial conviction was required.

• Review of Presidential Findings: Petitioner impugned the President’s findings regarding the violation, claiming that the violation took place not in the latter part of September 1937, as found by the President, but after October 28, 1937. Where the determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, the courts will not interfere, by way of review, with any of his findings. Petitioner, having consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. Even conceding that the violation took place after October 28, 1937, when his maximum penalty was to have expired, no error was found in the order of arrest and recommitment.

• Effect of Expiration of Maximum Term and Credit for Parole Period: Petitioner contended that upon the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment, his conditional parole also expired, and his liberty became absolute subject to no conditions, and that the period during which he was out on parole should be counted as service of his original sentence. The Court did not subscribe to this contention. In People vs. Tapel, it was held that when a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in which he was at the time the pardon was granted; he may be rearrested and recommitted. The rule is well-settled that, in requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release, the court should not consider the time during which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as time served on the original sentence. This rule applies, by analogy, to conditional parole.

• Duration of Remaining Penalty: Act No. 1561 provided that a convict released on parole who thereafter violates its conditions shall serve the full sentence of the court as though no parole had ever been granted, the time between the parole and the subsequent arrest not being considered as part of the term of his sentence in computing the period of his subsequent confinement. But this Act was repealed by the Administrative Code, and Section 64(i) thereof omitted such provision. Act No. 4103, Section 8, provides that any prisoner released on parole who violates any condition thereof shall, upon re-arrest and confinement, serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally committed to prison. This Act is not applicable to the present case, as petitioner was paroled not under its provisions but by virtue of Section 64(i) of the Administrative Code. There is thus no statutory provision squarely governing the duration of petitioner’s confinement after recommitment. In the absence of such statutory provision, the terms of the parole shall govern. From the express terms of the parole that “should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect,” petitioner should serve the unexpired portion of the penalty originally imposed upon him by the court.

• Parole as an exercise of the pardoning power — The constitutional power to pardon upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as the President may deem proper includes the power to grant and revoke paroles. The Court applied this by holding that Section 64(i) of the Administrative Code was not impliedly repealed by the constitutional pardon clause; otherwise, parolees released before the Constitution would be discharged unconditionally.

• Incidental power to investigate parole violations — The power to revoke a parole necessarily carries with it the power to investigate and inquire into the conduct of parolees, for revocation must be rational and intelligent. The parolee’s duty to report to the Board of Indeterminate Sentence implies a corresponding power in the Board to inquire into his conduct and recommend action to the President, who may use any government agency or individual to assist.

• Mere commission, not conviction, as basis for parole violation — Where the condition of parole is that the parolee “will not commit any other crime,” the mere commission of another crime, not his conviction by a court, is sufficient to constitute a violation. Under Section 64(i) of the Administrative Code, the Chief Executive may order arrest and re-incarceration of any parolee who, in his judgment, fails to comply with the conditions of parole.

• Non-reviewability of the Chief Executive’s determination of parole violation — Where the determination of a violation of conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, courts will not interfere by way of review with his findings. A parolee who consents to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the granting power cannot invoke judicial aid, however erroneous the findings may be.

• Effect of violated conditional pardon or parole — When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in which he was at the time the pardon was granted; he may be rearrested and recommitted, and the time during which he was at large by virtue of the pardon is not considered as time served on the original sentence. This rule applies by analogy to conditional parole.

• Terms of parole govern duration absent statute — In the absence of a statutory provision squarely governing the duration of confinement after recommitment, the terms of the parole govern. Because the parole expressly provided that upon violation “the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect,” the parolee must serve the unexpired portion of the penalty originally imposed. Act No. 4103, Section 8 was inapplicable because the parole was granted under Section 64(i) of the Administrative Code, not under that Act.

• "The power to pardon given the President by the Constitution, "upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose," includes the power to grant and revoke paroles." — This states the ratio decidendi on why the constitutional pardon clause did not impliedly repeal the Administrative Code’s parole power.

• "It was, therefore, the mere commission, not his conviction by court, of any other crime, that was necessary in order that the petitioner may be deemed to have violated his parole." — This defines the operative condition of the parole and explains why no prior judicial conviction was required before recommitment.

• "The petitioner herein having consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, he cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered." — This articulates the non-reviewability of the Chief Executive’s determination of a parole violation.

• "In the absence of such statutory provision, the terms of the parole shall govern. From the express terms of the parole that "should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect," it is evident that the petitioner herein should serve the unexpired portion of the penalty originally imposed upon him by the court." — This supplies the rule on the duration of the remaining penalty after recommitment.

• People vs. Tapel, 35 Off. Gaz., 1603 — The Court cited this as controlling on the effect of a violated conditional pardon: when a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in which he was at the time the pardon was granted and may be rearrested and recommitted. The rule was applied by analogy to conditional parole.

• U.S. vs. Ignacio, 33 Phil. 202, 204 (1916) — Cited in support of the rule that a convict who violates a conditional pardon may be rearrested and recommitted.

• U.S. vs. Villalon, 37 Phil. 322 (1917) — Cited together with U.S. vs. Ignacio for the same rule on rearrest and recommitment after violation of a conditional pardon.

• State vs. Horne, 52 Fla. 125, 42 So. 388, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 719, 725 (1906) — Cited for the rule that the time during which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon is not considered as time served on the original sentence.

• Ex parte Bell, Miss., 282 (1879) — Cited in support of the same rule on non-credit for time spent at large under a pardon.

• Paragraph 6, Section 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution — Grants the President the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses except impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. The Court construed this to include the power to grant and revoke paroles.

• Section 63(i) and Section 64(i), Administrative Code — The text refers to Section 63(i) as the provision under which parole was granted, giving the Governor-General power to grant reprieves or pardons, suspend sentences, remit fines, discharge convicted persons upon parole subject to conditions, and authorize the arrest and re-incarceration of any person who fails to comply with the conditions. The President’s order cited Section 64(i) for the same authority. The Court held that this power was not repealed by the Constitution.

• Act No. 1561 — Provided that a convict released on parole who violates its conditions shall serve the full sentence of the court as though no parole had ever been granted, the time between the parole and the subsequent arrest not being considered as part of the term of sentence. The Court noted that this Act was repealed by the Administrative Code, and Section 64(i) thereof omitted such provision.

• Act No. 4103, Section 8 — Provides that any prisoner released on parole who violates any condition thereof shall, upon re-arrest and confinement, serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally committed to prison. The Court held it inapplicable because petitioner was paroled under Section 64(i) of the Administrative Code, not under Act No. 4103.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concurred. Laurel, J., filed a separate opinion concurring in the result but withholding assent to the statement that Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, is inapplicable to the present case.

• Concepcion, J. — He concurred in the result but dissented from the majority’s interpretation of the second condition of the appellant’s parole. He opined that the “commission” of a crime may only be determined upon the “conviction” of the accused; it is not sufficient that a person be charged with having committed a crime, because innocence is presumed and only conviction after due and legal prosecution overcomes it, and the courts have exclusive jurisdiction to pronounce conviction. In this case, however, a judicial pronouncement could not be required because the information for adultery was dismissed for failure of the complaining witness to appear. As an exception to the general rule, the Board of Indeterminate Sentence was justified in investigating the crime complained of and in recommending to the President the arrest and recommitment of the appellant for violation of his conditional pardon, for it is not just that by the omission or negligence of a witness who fails to appear in court, the violation of the pardon granted conditionally to the appellant should be left unpunished.