Terry vs. People

The Court held that there can be no contempt for disobedience of a void order or an order issued without jurisdiction. A writ of execution issued after the five-year reglementary period from the finality of judgment is null and void, requiring an independent action for revival of judgment; consequently, a trial court cannot punish a party for re-entering property pursuant to such void writ.

Pedro and Leoncia Arcilla filed an action against Eugenio and Maria Arcilla, with Loreño Terry as a third-party defendant, involving Lot Nos. 13118 and 10627. The Court of First Instance of Virac, Catanduanes, ruled in favor of the Arcillas and against Terry, declaring the Arcillas the lawful owners. Terry did not appeal the decision.

• The 1979 Judgment: On August 13, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Virac, Catanduanes, decided Civil Case No. 740 in favor of Pedro and Leoncia Arcilla, declaring them the lawful owners of Lot Nos. 13118 and 10627 and ruling against third-party defendant Loreño Terry. Petitioner did not appeal.
• The Original Writ of Execution: On November 22, 1979, the trial court issued a writ of execution against petitioner. The writ was not served on petitioner and became stale by operation of law five years thereafter.
• The Alias Writ of Execution: On December 9, 1985, more than six years after the issuance of the original writ, the trial court issued an alias writ of execution. On January 13, 1986, Deputy Sheriff Ubalde certified that he had turned over possession of the lots to Leoncia Arcilla, noting that petitioner was no longer in occupation.
• Petitioner's Re-entry: On July 5, 1991, Leoncia Arcilla filed a separate action for reconveyance or annulment of sale and recovery of possession against petitioner (Civil Case No. 1586), which the trial court dismissed on October 27, 1992. By filing this action, Leoncia Arcilla acknowledged that petitioner had re-entered and was occupying the lots in question.
• The Contempt Charge: On March 27, 1995, Leoncia Arcilla filed a motion for contempt against petitioner in Civil Case No. 740 for re-occupying Lot No. 13118. The trial court found petitioner guilty of contempt and ordered him to suffer imprisonment, pay a fine, and vacate the lots.

Petitioner argued that his re-entry upon the land did not constitute indirect contempt because the underlying case had become functus officio. Because the original writ of execution was never served and the alias writ was issued beyond the five-year reglementary period, the alias writ was null and void; consequently, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the contempt order.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondent, countered that even if there was no effective service of the writ and alias writ of execution on petitioner, his re-entry upon the land is contemptuous and punishable because he was admittedly served with a copy of the original decision.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to issue an alias writ of execution more than five years after the finality of the judgment.
  • Whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to entertain a motion for contempt in a case where the judgment had become stale.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether petitioner's re-entry on the disputed lots and exercise of acts of ownership constitute indirect contempt notwithstanding the alleged invalidity of the alias writ of execution.

• Procedural: The Court ruled that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the alias writ of execution on December 9, 1985, because more than five years had lapsed since the judgment became final in 1979. Pursuant to the Rules of Court, a writ of execution by motion must be issued within five years from finality; after this period, the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action requiring an independent action for revival of judgment. A writ issued after the five-year period is null and void. Furthermore, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case entirely when the judgment became stale ten years after its finality (in 1989). Thus, the trial court's contempt orders in 1996 were void for want of jurisdiction.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that petitioner's re-entry did not constitute indirect contempt. Because the alias writ of execution was null and void, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the stale case, there can be no contempt for disobedience of an order issued without authority. Contempt requires willful disobedience to a valid order. Additionally, the trial court improperly used the contempt order to effectively revive the stale judgment by ordering petitioner to vacate the lots, which is impermissible without an independent action for revival of judgment.

• Execution of Judgment — A judgment may be executed by motion within five (5) years from the date of its finality. After the lapse of the five-year period, the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action, which must be enforced by instituting an ordinary civil action (independent action for revival of judgment) within ten (10) years from the date the judgment became final. A writ of execution issued after the five-year period is null and void. The Court applied this doctrine to nullify the alias writ of execution issued six years after the original writ.
• Contempt of Court — There can be no contempt for disobedience of an order issued without authority or which is void for want of jurisdiction. The disobedience which the law punishes as constructive contempt implies willful disobedience to a valid order. The Court applied this doctrine to acquit petitioner, holding that his re-entry could not be punished as contempt because the alias writ he allegedly disobeyed was void.

• "There can be no contempt for disobedience of an order issued without authority, or which is void for want of jurisdiction."
• "The rule is that the court could issue a writ of execution by motion within five (5) years from finality of the decision... A writ of execution issued after the expiration of that period is null and void."
• "The reason is that after the lapse of the five-year period, the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action, which judgment must be enforced, as all other ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in the regular form."

• Arambulo vs. CFI Laguna, 53 Phil. 302 (1929) — Followed for the proposition that a writ of execution issued after the five-year reglementary period is null and void.
• Dee vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 199 SCRA 238 (1991) — Followed for the doctrine that there can be no contempt for disobedience of an order issued without authority.
• Villaruel vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 305 (1989) — Followed for the rule that execution by motion must be within five years from finality.

• Rule 39, Section 6, 1964 Revised Rules of Court — Governs the period for execution of judgment. The Court applied this provision to determine that the trial court could no longer issue an alias writ of execution by motion six years after the judgment became final, rendering the alias writ null and void.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.