Terre vs. Terre

A lawyer who contracts a second marriage while his first marriage remains subsisting, without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, commits grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court — particularly where he inveigled the complainant into the first marriage, exploited her financial support through law school, and then abandoned her without means.

Complainant Dorothy B. Terre and respondent Atty. Jordan Terre were former high school classmates who later married each other in 1977. At the time of their marriage, Dorothy was previously married to Merlito A. Bercenilla, a fact known to respondent. Respondent, a member of the Philippine Bar employed at the Commission on Audit, convinced Dorothy that her first marriage was void ab initio because she and Bercenilla were allegedly first cousins, and that no judicial declaration of nullity was necessary. The administrative complaint for disbarment was filed under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for grossly immoral conduct, specifically for contracting a second marriage and living with another woman while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.

Dorothy B. Terre and Jordan Terre first met as fourth-year high school classmates in Cadiz City High School. At the time, Dorothy was married to Merlito A. Bercenilla, a fact of which Jordan was aware. Jordan began courting Dorothy during their high school years, but nothing came of the courtship initially. Both later moved to Manila to pursue their respective education — Jordan as a law student at Lyceum University. Jordan persisted in his courtship, and when Dorothy resisted on account of her existing marriage, Jordan explained to her that her marriage to Bercenilla was void ab initio because she and Bercenilla were first cousins. Convinced by this explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother and ex-in-laws, Dorothy agreed to marry him. On June 14, 1977, they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila. Despite Dorothy's objection, Jordan wrote "single" as her status in their marriage license, explaining that since her first marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such.

Throughout their married life, Dorothy supported Jordan financially, supplementing the allowance he received from his parents, until he finished law school. Their son, Jason Terre, was born on June 25, 1981. However, Jordan disappeared in 1981, leaving Dorothy penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital expenses arising from her pregnancy. Dorothy later discovered that on May 3, 1981, Jordan had married one Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan, while his marriage to Dorothy remained subsisting — no judicial action had been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of his prior marriage.

Dorothy filed several cases against Jordan: a criminal case for abandonment of a minor before the City Court of Pasay City (Criminal Case No. 816159), a bigamy case against Jordan and Helina Malicdem before the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan where a prima facie case was found to exist, and an administrative case with the Commission on Audit where Jordan was employed, which was rendered moot when Jordan was considered automatically separated from the service for absence without official leave. On December 24, 1981, Dorothy filed a sworn complaint for disbarment with the Supreme Court, charging Jordan with grossly immoral conduct.

Jordan evaded five attempts to serve the complaint and the Court's resolution, moving from one place to another so that he could not be found at his alleged places of employment or residence. After three and a half years with no answer, the Court suspended him from the practice of law on April 24, 1985. He eventually filed an answer on September 28, 1985, claiming he had married Dorothy upon her representation that she was single, that he later learned she was previously married to Bercenilla in 1968, and that when he confronted Dorothy about this, she drove him out of their conjugal residence and told him that the child she was carrying was Bercenilla's. He claimed he married Helina Malicdem in good faith, believing his marriage to Dorothy was null and void ab initio.

Dorothy denied that Jason was Bercenilla's child, citing the birth certificate and the child's physical resemblance to Jordan. She explained that she had registered Jason as a dependent of Bercenilla at the PAFGH out of extreme necessity, to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus, which was in a difficult breech position. By that time, Jordan had already abandoned her, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising from her pregnancy. The case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, where Dorothy presented her evidence ex parte after Jordan repeatedly failed to appear despite notice. The Investigating Solicitor considered Jordan to have waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The OSG submitted its Report and Recommendation on February 26, 1990, recommending disbarment.

• Grossly Immoral Conduct: Complainant charged respondent with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting, constituting a violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
• Abandonment and Exploitation: Complainant's evidence demonstrated that respondent had abandoned her after she supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of their child, and that Jason Terre was respondent's son as evidenced by the birth certificate and physical resemblance.

• Good Faith Belief in Nullity: Respondent argued that he had contracted marriage with complainant upon her representation that she was single, and that he subsequently learned she was married to Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968. He claimed that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, she drove him out of their conjugal residence and mockingly told him of her private meetings with Bercenilla and that the child she was carrying was Bercenilla's.
• Void ab initio First Marriage: Respondent maintained that he believed in good faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, and that no judicial declaration of nullity was necessary, justifying his second marriage to Helina Malicdem.

• Grossly Immoral Conduct: Whether respondent's conduct — inveigling complainant into marriage, abandoning her after she supported him through law school, and contracting a second marriage while his first remained subsisting — constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment.
• Good Faith Defense: Whether respondent's claim of good faith belief that his first marriage was void ab initio without judicial declaration constitutes a valid defense against the charge of grossly immoral conduct.

• Grossly Immoral Conduct: Yes. Respondent's conduct constituted grossly immoral conduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment. The pattern of deception, exploitation, abandonment, and bigamous marriage demonstrated a character unworthy of membership in the Bar.
• Good Faith Defense: No. The defense was spurious. As a lawyer, respondent knew or should have known that prevailing case law requires a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio before contracting a second marriage. Even assuming arguendo that he held such belief in good faith, his first marriage would be valid and his second marriage bigamous.

• Grossly Immoral Conduct: The Court found that respondent's moral character was deeply flawed by multiple circumstances. He convinced complainant that her prior marriage was null and void ab initio and that she was free to marry him. After their marriage, complainant supported respondent through law school. Once he had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned her without support and without means for the safe delivery of his own child. He then contracted a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant was subsisting. The Court relied on Pomperada vs. Jochico, where it was held that making a mockery of marriage — a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects — demonstrates unfitness for Bar membership, and on Bolivar vs. Simbol, where a respondent who made a dupe of a woman, lived on her bounty through schooling, and then married another was found guilty of grossly immoral conduct. The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that respondent's actions eloquently displayed his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar.
• Good Faith Defense: The Court rejected respondent's claim as a spurious defense for two reasons. First, respondent had not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts underscoring his bad faith. Second, the pretended defense was the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing her prior marriage was void — that no judicial declaration was necessary. As a lawyer, respondent knew or should have known that this argument ran counter to prevailing case law, which holds that a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential before contracting a second marriage (citing Gomez vs. Lipana, Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS, and Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy). Even assuming arguendo that respondent held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result would follow: if his first marriage to complainant was deemed valid, his second marriage to Helina Malicdem would be bigamous and criminal in character.

• Grossly Immoral Conduct as Ground for Disbarment — Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct. The Court applied this provision to respondent's pattern of conduct: inveigling a woman into marriage by misrepresenting the legal effect of her prior marriage, living on her financial support through law school, abandoning her without means after getting her pregnant, and contracting a second marriage while the first remained subsisting. Such conduct was held to demonstrate a character not worthy of a member of the Bar.
• Judicial Declaration of Nullity Required Before Second Marriage — For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. This rule was derived from case law (Gomez vs. Lipana, Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS, Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy) and later codified in Article 40 of the Family Code. A lawyer is expected to know this rule; a claim of good faith belief that a marriage is void without obtaining such judicial declaration is not a valid defense, and the very argument is spurious when invoked by a member of the Bar.
• Marriage as a Basic Social Institution — Marriage is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code). Making a mockery of marriage through deception and serial contracting of marriages demonstrates unfitness for membership in the legal profession.

• "We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted 'grossly immoral conduct' under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre." — This passage states the ratio decidendi, enumerating the specific acts that collectively constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment.
• "Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential." — This articulates the rule requiring a judicial declaration of nullity and the heightened standard of legal knowledge expected of lawyers, forming the basis for rejecting the good faith defense.
• "He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error forthwith." — This reflects the Court's view that respondent's moral unfitness existed even at the time of his admission to the Bar, and that disbarment serves to correct that error.

• Pomperada vs. Jochico, 133 SCRA 309 (1984) — Followed. The Court relied on this case where a bar applicant was denied admission for making a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects, to support the conclusion that respondent's conduct demonstrated unfitness for Bar membership.
• Bolivar vs. Simbol, 16 SCRA 623 (1966) — Followed. The Court found respondent's pattern analogous to the respondent in Bolivar, who made a dupe of a woman, lived on her bounty through schooling, and married another as soon as he finished his studies — conduct held indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar.
• Gomez vs. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615 (1970) — Cited for the rule that a judicial declaration of nullity is essential before contracting a second marriage, which respondent as a lawyer knew or should have known.
• Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS, 37 SCRA 316 (1971) — Cited for the same rule on the necessity of judicial declaration of nullity.
• Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986) — Cited for the same rule on judicial declaration of nullity, later codified in Article 40 of the Family Code.

• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Provides the grounds for disbarment, including grossly immoral conduct. The Court applied this provision to find that respondent's conduct — inveigling complainant into marriage, exploiting her support, abandoning her, and contracting a second marriage while the first remained subsisting — warranted disbarment.
• Article 40, Family Code (Executive Order No. 209) — Codified the rule that a judicial declaration of nullity is essential before contracting a second marriage. The Court noted that this statutory provision formalized the case law rule that respondent, as a lawyer, knew or should have known.
• Article 216, Civil Code — Referenced through the Pomperada citation regarding marriage as a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects, underscoring the gravity of respondent's mockery of the institution.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.