Teñido vs. People

Credibility findings of the trial court, especially on eyewitness identification, are factual and generally beyond Rule 45 review; absent exceptional circumstances, a categorical positive identification that is sufficiently explained prevails over denial and alibi.

Nelson Teñido y Silvestre and Rizaldo Alvarade y Valencia were charged with robbery under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code for the alleged June 22, 1988 robbery at the Pandacan, Manila residence and store of Lolita Sus de Enriquez. Alvarade remained at large, so the case proceeded against Teñido alone. The prosecution's principal eyewitness was Aurora Guinto, a neighbor of Enriquez. The offense's penalty depends on whether the robbery was committed in an inhabited house or its dependency, by breaking a wall, with value exceeding P250.00, and without the offender carrying arms.

Nelson Teñido y Silvestre and Rizaldo Alvarade y Valencia were charged with robbery under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 88-67398 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25. The information alleged that on or about June 22, 1988, in the City of Manila, they conspired and confederated, and with intent of gain and without the owner's consent, by means of force upon things, broke into and entered house no. 1250, Kahilom I, Pandacan, Manila, inhabited by Lolita Sus de Enriquez, by destroying the chicken wire of the store door and removing a small piece of lawanit nailed to it, and passing through an opening not intended for entrance or egress. Once inside, they allegedly took cash money amounting to P600.00, one Rolex wristwatch worth P2,000.00, one Citizen wristwatch worth P995.00, one gold ring with stone (brillante) worth P1,500.00, one wallet containing P1,200.00, and one gold-plated Seiko 5 watch worth P1,200.00, with a total value of P7,495.00 belonging to Enriquez.

The prosecution presented Aurora Guinto, whose house was directly across and five meters away from Enriquez's house. At around 3:30 a.m. of June 22, 1988, Guinto woke up to prepare breakfast for her family. While opening the windows of her second-floor room, she saw two men trying to enter the house of Mary Amor Galvez. When they failed to open that house, the two transferred to Enriquez's house, went to the side where the store was located, and entered by destroying the screen door. They later came out carrying a square-shaped box and went into an alley. Because the premises of Enriquez's house were well-lighted, Guinto recognized the two men as Teñido, alias Dolphy or Pidol, and Alvarade, alias Bukol. She had known Teñido since 1976 and had seen him frequently loitering around the neighborhood. She did not immediately report the incident because she was frightened.

Enriquez testified that at about the same time, she was awakened by a noise coming from the door of the store adjacent to her house. She woke her husband, and they checked their property. They discovered that the store door was opened and the lawanit (chicken wire) covering the wall of the store was detached. Upon further probing, she found missing a gold ring with diamond worth P1,500.00; a Rolex wristwatch valued at P2,000.00; a Seiko 5 with gold bracelet worth P1,200.00; a Citizen lady's wristwatch worth P995.00; her husband's wallet containing P1,200.00 in cash; and a box containing the daily sales amounting to P600.00.

Teñido denied any involvement in the robbery and interposed alibi. He claimed that at around 3:30 a.m. of June 22, 1988, he was in his house together with his parents. He recalled that he was arrested by a certain Mar Brun, who brought him to Precinct 10, and that he was subjected to inquest one week thereafter. Enriquez had been his neighbor for about 10 years prior to the incident.

The RTC gave more weight and credibility to the prosecution's evidence than to Teñido's lone testimony. It found that the identity of Teñido as one of the perpetrators was positively and convincingly established by Guinto's eyewitness testimony. The CA likewise found no circumstance showing that the RTC arbitrarily evaluated Guinto's testimony or overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied substantial facts. It observed that Guinto's positive identification of Teñido was firm and candid, that she had known him for a long time, and that her house was directly opposite the crime scene, the premises of which was sufficiently illuminated. The CA treated the alleged loopholes in her testimony as immaterial and held that her two-month delay in reporting did not make her testimony less credible because she explained that she got nervous and frightened.

• Credibility of Guinto's Testimony: Teñido questioned the credibility accorded by the RTC to Guinto's testimony despite her failure to categorically testify on the identity of Teñido as one of the culprits, what the culprits were wearing, which culprit entered or exited first, and who was holding the box allegedly carried out of the Enriquez residence.
• Delay in Reporting: Teñido alleged that Guinto's failure to report the incident immediately, instead of two months later, cast doubt on the veracity of her declarations.
• Back-Profile Identification: Teñido attacked the trustworthiness of Guinto's testimony based on her cross-examination declaration that she did not recognize the man who first entered the store because she only saw the back profile of the robbers.
• Failure to Shout for Help: Teñido discredited the reliability of Guinto's testimony because she failed to shout for help while allegedly witnessing the robbery.
• Denial and Alibi: Teñido denied any involvement in the robbery and claimed that at around 3:30 a.m. of June 22, 1988, he was in his house with his parents.

• Credibility Review under Rule 45: Whether a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may obtain a re-evaluation of the RTC and CA's assessment of the credibility of prosecution eyewitness Guinto.
• Eyewitness Identification: Whether Guinto's positive identification of Teñido as one of the robbers is credible despite her alleged failure to testify categorically on the identity of the culprits, their clothing, the order of entry or exit, and who carried the box.
• Delay in Reporting: Whether Guinto's two-month delay in reporting the robbery impairs the credibility of her testimony.
• Denial and Alibi: Whether Teñido's denial and alibi overcome Guinto's positive identification.
• Penalty: Whether the indeterminate penalty imposed by the CA for robbery under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code is correct and should be modified.

• Credibility Review under Rule 45: No. Questions of credibility are factual and generally outside the ambit of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under Rule 45, which raises only questions of law; no exceptional circumstance justified re-evaluation.
• Eyewitness Identification: Yes. Guinto's positive identification was categorical, straightforward, consistent, and spontaneous; the alleged loopholes were immaterial, and she had identified Teñido before entry while the robbers were destroying the lawanit wall.
• Delay in Reporting: No. Delay in revealing the identity of perpetrators does not necessarily impair credibility where sufficiently explained; Guinto explained that she was nervous and frightened, and no ill motive was shown.
• Denial and Alibi: No. Positive identification prevails over denial and alibi; alibi requires proof of physical impossibility, which Teñido failed to establish because he admitted being at his house across the street from the Enriquez residence.
• Penalty: Modified. Under Article 299, subdivision (a), number (2), paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty is prision mayor; with no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, it is imposed in its medium period, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law fixes the minimum at prision correccional and the maximum at prision mayor medium.

• Credibility Review under Rule 45: The arguments reiterated in the petition involved the RTC's assessment of Guinto's credibility and its ruling that her testimony repudiated Teñido's denial and alibi. Questions of witness credibility are factual and generally outside the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. A Rule 45 petition shall raise only questions of law; a question inviting review of factual findings of lower tribunals is beyond the Court's power of review and generally justifies dismissal. Absent a showing that the trial court overlooked substantial facts and circumstances affecting the final disposition, appellate courts are bound to give due deference to its evaluation of eyewitness credibility and probative value, because the trial court was in a better position to rate credibility after hearing the witnesses and observing their deportment. The Court found no cogent reason to depart from these tenets and no exceptional circumstance justifying re-evaluation; the CA did not misapprehend or overlook relevant facts.
• Eyewitness Identification: Teñido attacked Guinto's testimony because she said on cross-examination that she did not recognize the man who first entered the store, having seen only the back profile of the robbers. Her entire testimony, however, showed that even before the robbers entered the store, while they were on their way from a nearby house and while they were destroying the store's lawanit wall, she had already identified them as Teñido and Alvarade. Thus, the detail of who first entered the store was inconsequential. The CA found no arbitrariness in the RTC's evaluation; Guinto's identification was firm and candid, she had known Teñido for a long time, and her house was directly opposite the crime scene, which was sufficiently illuminated. The alleged loopholes pertained to immaterial facts.
• Delay in Reporting: Teñido discredited Guinto because she did not shout for help and took two months to report the incident. Delay attributed to a prosecution witness cannot be taken against her; what matters is that her testimony bears the earmarks of truth and dependability. The Court quoted the rule that delay in revealing the identity of perpetrators does not necessarily impair credibility, especially where sufficient explanation is given, because no standard form of behavior can be expected from people who witnessed a strange or frightful experience; witnesses may be reluctant to volunteer information for varied reasons, including fear for their lives or family. Where there is delay, the reason for the delay, not its length, is more important. Guinto sufficiently explained that she got nervous and frightened. There was no showing that she was impelled by ill motive to fabricate facts and attribute a serious offense against Teñido; absent such evidence, the presumption is that she was not actuated by improper motive and that her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
• Denial and Alibi: Guinto testified in a categorical, straightforward, consistent, and spontaneous manner. Her positive identification of Teñido as one of the perpetrators prevailed over Teñido's self-serving denial and weak alibi. For alibi to prosper, the accused must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time it was committed. Teñido failed to prove such physical impossibility; he even admitted that on the night of the incident he was at his house, which was just across the street from the Enriquez residence.
• Penalty: The penalty for robbery in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house committed by breaking a wall, where the value taken exceeds P250.00 and the offender does not carry arms under Article 299, subdivision (a), number (2), paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, is prision mayor. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty becomes prision mayor in its medium period under Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range is prision correccional in any of its periods as minimum to prision mayor medium as maximum. The imposable penalty should thus be anywhere between six months and one day to six years as minimum, and eight years and one day to ten years as maximum. The maximum penalty imposed by the CA should be modified to eight years and one day of prision mayor in its medium period. Although the minimum penalty imposed by the CA was within the range, the Court deemed it proper to modify it in consonance with jurisprudence involving a robbery case with identical circumstances where the minimum prison term imposed was four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional.

• Rule 45 and credibility findings — A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall raise only questions of law. Questions pertaining to the credibility of a witness are factual and generally outside the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction; review of factual findings of lower tribunals is beyond the Court's power and generally justifies dismissal. Appellate courts are bound to give due deference to the trial court's evaluation of eyewitness credibility and probative value absent a showing that it overlooked substantial facts and circumstances affecting the final disposition. The Court listed exceptional circumstances that may justify re-evaluation: (1) when the factual findings of the CA and trial court are contradictory; (2) when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (3) when the inference made by the CA from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the CA is premised on misapprehension of facts; (7) when the CA failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record. No such exceptional circumstance was present.
• Positive identification prevails over denial and alibi — A categorical, straightforward, consistent, and spontaneous positive identification by a credible eyewitness prevails over the accused's self-serving denial and weak alibi. For alibi to prosper, the accused must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time it was committed. Teñido failed to prove physical impossibility because he admitted being at his house just across the street from the Enriquez residence.
• Delay in reporting does not necessarily impair credibility — Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient explanation is given. No standard form of behavior can be expected from people who witnessed a strange or frightful experience. Jurisprudence recognizes that witnesses are naturally reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or unwilling to be involved in criminal investigations for varied reasons, including fear for their lives and family or because those involved are relatives or townmates. Where there is delay, the reason for the delay, which must be sufficient or well-grounded, is more important than the length of delay. Guinto's two-month delay was sufficiently explained by her nervousness and fright.
• Presumption from absence of improper motive — Where there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witness was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that she was not so actuated and that her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. No ill motive was shown against Guinto.
• Penalty for robbery under Article 299(a)(2), paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code — Robbery in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house committed by breaking a wall, where the value taken exceeds P250.00 and the offender does not carry arms, is punishable by prision mayor. In the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its medium period under Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum is prision correccional in any of its periods and the maximum is prision mayor medium. The Court modified the minimum to four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional and the maximum to eight years and one day of prision mayor medium.

• "Questions pertaining to the credibility of a witness are factual in nature and are, generally, outside the ambit of the Court's appellate jurisdiction." — This states the threshold rule that credibility issues are not reviewable under Rule 45 absent exceptional circumstances.
• "Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient explanation is given. No standard form of behavior can be expected from people who had witnessed a strange or frightful experience. Jurisprudence recognizes that witnesses are naturally reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in criminal investigations because of varied reasons. Some fear for their lives and that of their family; while others shy away when those involved in the crime are their relatives or townmates. And where there is delay, it is more important to consider the reason for the delay, which must be sufficient or well-grounded, and not the length of delay." — This is the Court's canonical formulation on delay in reporting, explaining why Guinto's two-month delay did not impair her credibility.
• "Where there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witness was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that she was not so actuated and that her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit." — This supports the Court's reliance on Guinto's testimony despite the defense's attacks on her credibility.
• "For alibi to prosper, the accused must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time it was committed." — This defines the strict requirement for alibi, which Teñido failed to satisfy because he admitted being at his house across the street from the crime scene.

• People vs. Gamez, G.R. No. 202847, October 23, 2013, 708 SCRA 625, 634 — Cited for the rule that appellate courts must give due deference to the trial court's evaluation of an eyewitness's credibility and the probative value of testimony, because the trial court heard the witness and observed her deportment.
• Vidar, et al. vs. People, 625 Phil. 57, 68 (2010) — Cited for the rule that delay attributed to a prosecution witness cannot be taken against her where her testimony bears the earmarks of truth and dependability, and for the presumption that a witness not shown to be actuated by improper motive is entitled to full faith and credit.
• People vs. Berondo, Jr., 601 Phil. 538, 544-545 (2009) — Cited as the source of the Court's formulation that delay in revealing the identity of perpetrators does not necessarily impair credibility where sufficiently explained, and that the reason for delay is more important than its length.
• People vs. Castro, et al., 684 Phil. 319, 328-329 (2012) — Cited for the requirement that alibi must be supported by proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
• Estioca vs. People, 578 Phil. 853, 873 (2008) — Cited for the penalty computation under Article 299 and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and for the minimum term of four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional in a robbery case with identical circumstances.
• Salcedo vs. People, 400 Phil. 1302, 1308-1309 (2000), citing Fuentes vs. CA, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168-1169 (1997) — Cited for the enumeration of exceptional circumstances that may justify a re-evaluation of factual findings despite the general rule that credibility questions are outside Rule 45 review.
• Natividad vs. Mariano, et al., 710 Phil. 57, 68 (2013) — Cited for the rule that a question inviting review of factual findings of lower tribunals is beyond the Supreme Court's power of review and generally justifies dismissal of the petition.

• Article 299, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes robbery in an inhabited house or dependency. The Court applied subdivision (a), number (2), paragraph 4, which covers robbery in a dependency of an inhabited house by breaking a wall, where the value taken exceeds P250.00 and the offender does not carry arms; the penalty is prision mayor.
• Article 64, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty prescribed by law shall be imposed in its medium period. Applied to prision mayor because no modifying circumstances attended the robbery.
• Article 76, Revised Penal Code — Cited in the Court's computation of the penalty range, supporting the statement that the imposable penalty ranged from six months and one day to six years as minimum and eight years and one day to ten years as maximum.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law. Applied to deny review of the credibility findings of the RTC and CA.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate penalty, with the minimum within prision correccional and the maximum within prision mayor medium.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur. Bersamin, J., was an additional member per Raffle dated October 8, 2014, vice Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.