Templeton vs. Babcock

A holographic will executed by a citizen of another state may be admitted to probate under section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure where the testatrix acquired a legal domicile in that state and did not lose it by later removal, even if she died in the Philippines. The acquisition of a new domicile in another state extinguishes the old one, but a mere removal without intention to acquire a new domicile does not.

Jennie Rider Babcock’s daughter, Beatrice Babcock Templeton, sought probate of her holographic will, while the testatrix’s son, William Rider Babcock, opposed it. Because the instrument was not executed under the general Philippine law on wills, the proceeding depended on section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows probate of a will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another state or country if executed according to that state’s or country’s law and provable there. The contest therefore turned on the testatrix’s domicile and citizenship.

Jennie Rider Babcock spent her married life in Massachusetts. After her husband died in 1908, she removed a year later to Manila, where she lived with her son, W. R. Babcock, until 1917, when she joined the family of her daughter, Mrs. B. B. Templeton, in San Francisco, California. During those years, W. R. Babcock and G. D. Templeton, the testatrix’s son and son-in-law, respectively, were running a business in Manila incorporated as Babcock & Templeton, Inc., with Babcock as president and Templeton as vice-president. A branch office had been opened in San Francisco requiring the presence of an officer, so Templeton took up his abode there to manage the branch. The testatrix had acquired stock in the company and had no other independent source of income than the dividends derived from it. After remaining with the Templetons in San Francisco for several months, she returned to Manila in July 1918. During this stay in Manila she occupied an apartment in her son’s house, where she remained until August 1920. She then returned to San Francisco and lived with the Templetons until May 1923. The trial court treated this second sojourn in San Francisco as important because from her acts and statements it concluded that she had acquired a domicile in California. Her son-in-law owned a home in San Francisco and lived there without any apparent intention of removing from the state; upon arriving, the testatrix established herself as a practitioner in Christian Science; she engaged in political activities, took part in a parade advertising a cause in which she was interested, and voted in at least one general election in California; she formed an attachment for California and in many conversations referred to it as her home state and expressed her intention of returning there and building a home in which to live. Shortly before her death in Manila, she was acquiring a few pieces of Spanish furniture to take back to California.

In 1923, Babcock & Templeton, Inc. decided to close its San Francisco office and open a branch in New York City. This made it necessary for G. D. Templeton to remove with his family to New York State. He sold his home in San Francisco and went to live in New York. The testatrix gathered her personal effects together and accompanied them to New York, leaving behind in the care of friends three pieces of furniture to which she was especially attached and which she perhaps thought she might use later in California. Upon arriving in New York State, the Templetons established themselves in White Plains, near New York City. The testatrix occupied part of the apartment which the Templetons had taken, but she supplied the furniture necessary for her own use. Not long thereafter, she announced herself again in the Christian Science Journal as a practitioner of Christian Science in White Plains. Her sojourn in New York was apparently not congenial, and after a few months she returned to Manila, arriving in January 1924. She later told a friend in Manila, “Deliver me from living in New York.” What really brought her back to the Philippine Islands, apart from her dislike of the environment in New York, was not certain, but she suggested to friends that a desire to economize the cost of living may have had a part in her course.

In the Passenger Manifest of the vessel upon which she came to Manila, she caused New York City to be entered opposite her name in the column indicating “Last Permanent Residence.” Her Baggage Declaration and Entry, made on the same voyage before disembarking at Manila, stated that she was a resident of Manila. After her return to Manila in 1924, numerous conversations revealed an intention of returning to live in California. The proof showed that her removal from California to New York did not proceed from her volition but resulted from circumstances over which she had no primary control, her motive being her desire to be with her daughter and grandchildren. The testatrix also had kin in New York State whom she had visited more than once during her stay in California, and she appears to have inherited some property from a sister who had been living in New York and who died before the testatrix returned to the Philippine Islands.

The paper purporting to be her will bears the date May 26, 1926, is written wholly in the handwriting of the deceased, and bears her proper signature. It was found among her effects shortly after her death on September 3, 1926. When found, it was contained in an envelope indorsed with the name of her daughter, Mrs. G. D. Templeton, and son, Mr. W. R. Babcock. Its purport was to leave her stock and money to her three grandchildren bearing the surname Templeton — G. Douglas Templeton, Jr., Constance Babcock Templeton, and Billy Babcock Templeton — while all interest and dividends were to be given to her only daughter, Mrs. Templeton, as well as her jewelry and personal effects “for their support until the youngest is of age.”

On September 8, 1926, Beatrice Babcock Templeton filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to secure probate of the paper. The instrument was admittedly testamentary but had not been executed as a will under the general law; it was offered under section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition alleged that the testatrix was at the time of her death a resident of California, though temporarily residing in Manila, and the parties agreed that the paper could be proved in California as her holographic will. The trial court found that she had acquired a legal domicile in California and had not lost it.

• Domicile in California: Petitioner Beatrice Babcock Templeton contended that the testatrix acquired a legal domicile in the State of California by residence therein over two periods of time between 1917 and 1923, and that such domicile was never lost.
• Probate under Section 636: Petitioner sought probate under section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure, alleging that the testatrix was a resident of California though temporarily residing in Manila at the time of her death, and the parties agreed that the paper could be proved in California as her holographic will.

• No California Domicile: Respondent William Rider Babcock resisted probate on the ground that the testatrix had never acquired a legal domicile in the State of California.
• Loss of Domicile: Respondent argued that even if she had acquired a California domicile, it had been lost under the conditions discussed in the case.
• Residence in the Philippines: Respondent argued that even supposing the testatrix had not acquired a domicile in New York, she was a resident of the Philippine Islands at the time of her death and had established herself there as a place of permanent abode, so her will should not be admitted to probate as the will of a citizen of another state.
• Passenger Manifest: Respondent attached importance to the Passenger Manifest entry of New York City as her “Last Permanent Residence,” insisting that it was an admission tending to show acquisition of a domicile in New York State.

• California Domicile: Whether Jennie Rider Babcock acquired a legal domicile in the State of California.
• Abandonment by Removal to New York: Whether, having acquired a California domicile, she lost it by removing to New York.
• Residence in the Philippines: Whether her residence in the Philippine Islands at the time of her death barred probate under section 636 as the will of a citizen of another state.

• California Domicile: Yes. The trial court’s finding that the testatrix acquired a legal domicile in California was supported by the evidence, including her voting in California elections and her acts and statements during her residence there.
• Abandonment by Removal to New York: No. Her removal to New York did not proceed from her volition but from her desire to be with her daughter and grandchildren, and the evidence showed no intention to acquire a New York domicile or abandon California.
• Residence in the Philippines: No. She never intended to reside permanently in the Philippines, and a citizen of the United States cannot acquire Philippine citizenship by residence; she remained a citizen of another state, making her will provable under section 636.

• California Domicile: Under the first paragraph of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the citizenship of a person born in the United States is dependent upon the place of residence, or domicile. The SC reviewed the trial court’s finding that the testatrix had acquired a legal domicile in California and held that the finding was sufficiently supported by the facts. It attached importance to the circumstance that she had voted in California elections. Voting in a place is not conclusive of acquisition of domicile, but it is an important circumstance and, where the evidence is scanty, may have decisive weight. The exercise of the franchise is one of the highest prerogatives of citizenship, and in no other act of life does the citizen identify his interests with the state in which he lives more than in the act of voting. The record supplied no material with which to refute the trial court’s conclusion that a domicile was thus acquired in California.

• Abandonment by Removal to New York: The recognized rule is that the intention with which removal is made from a particular state determines whether or not the domicile is abandoned, and intention is revealed only in the acts and declarations of the person concerned. There were no declarations of the testatrix tending to show that, upon removal to New York, she had any intention of acquiring a legal domicile in that state. On the contrary, her short stay there and her repeated statements thereafter showed that she could not possibly have had any intention of making New York a place of permanent abode. As pointed out in In Re Estate of Johnson, a person transferring his domicile from one state of the American Union to another loses his domicile in the state of his earlier abode upon acquiring a domicile, or citizenship, in the state of his new abode; the acquisition of the new legal domicile extinguishes the old. The SC could not say with any propriety that the testatrix’s California domicile was suppressed by the acquisition of a new domicile in New York State. The Passenger Manifest was of no probative force because the passenger had no choice about indicating whether New York was the place of last residence or the place of last permanent residence, and when she told the ship’s official that she was from New York City, the name necessarily had to go down in the column. The Baggage Declaration and Entry, stating that she was a resident of Manila, was likewise of little importance because papers of that character are not commonly written with legal precision, and her long residence in Manila and return to the city sufficiently explained why she claimed to be a resident of Manila without making any conclusive commitment as to her legal domicile.

• Residence in the Philippines: The proof showed that however long the testatrix had resided in the Philippine Islands, she at no time had any intention of residing there permanently. On the contrary, her repeated declarations revealed a fixed intention of returning ultimately to the United States. It is a rule that a citizen of the United States cannot acquire citizenship in the Philippine Islands by residence here, however long continued. The testatrix therefore remained at the time of her death a citizen of the United States. Her will was therefore provable under section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the will of a citizen of another state or country.

• Domicile as basis of citizenship — For a person born in the United States, citizenship under the first paragraph of the Fourteenth Amendment depends on the place of residence or domicile. The SC treated the testatrix’s California domicile as the basis for her being a citizen of that state for purposes of section 636 probate.
• Acquisition of domicile; voting as evidence — Voting in a place is not conclusive of acquisition of domicile, but it is an important circumstance and, where the evidence is scanty, may have decisive weight. The exercise of the franchise is one of the highest prerogatives of citizenship and identifies the citizen’s interests with the state. The SC applied this to uphold the finding that the testatrix acquired a California domicile.
• Abandonment of domicile — The intention with which removal is made from a particular state determines whether the domicile is abandoned; intention is revealed only in the acts and declarations of the person concerned. The SC applied this to hold that the testatrix’s move to New York did not abandon her California domicile because she had no intention of making New York her permanent abode.
• Change of domicile between states — A person transferring his domicile from one state of the American Union to another loses his domicile in the state of his earlier abode upon acquiring a domicile, or citizenship, in the state of his new abode; the acquisition of the new legal domicile extinguishes the old. The SC applied this in In Re Estate of Johnson and held that no new New York domicile was acquired, so the California domicile remained.
• United States citizenship and Philippine residence — A citizen of the United States cannot acquire citizenship in the Philippine Islands by residence here, however long continued. The SC applied this to hold that the testatrix remained a United States citizen despite her long residence in Manila, making her will provable under section 636 as the will of a citizen of another state.
• Probate under section 636 — Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes probate of a will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country when executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which the testator is a citizen or subject and which might be proved under the law of such state or country. The SC applied this because the testatrix was a California domiciliary and the parties agreed the paper could be proved in California as her holographic will.

• “It is a recognized rule that the intention with which removal is made from a particular state determines whether or not the domicile is abandoned; and intention is revealed only in the acts and declaration of the person concerned.” — The SC used this rule to hold that the testatrix’s removal to New York did not abandon her California domicile.
• “The exercise of the franchise is one of the highest prerogatives of citizenship, and in no other act of his life does the citizen identify his interests with the state in which he lives more than in the act of voting.” — The SC explained why the testatrix’s voting in California elections supported the finding that she acquired a California domicile.
• “As was pointed out by this court in In Re Estate of Johnson (39 Phil., 156), a person transferring his domicile from one state of the American Union to another loses his domicile in the state of his earlier abode upon acquiring a domicile, or citizenship, in the state of his new abode. The acquisition of the new legal domicile extinguishes the old.” — The SC stated the rule for change of domicile and concluded that no new New York domicile had been acquired.
• “Again, it is a rule that a citizen of the United States cannot acquire citizenship in the Philippine Islands by residence here, however long continued (In Re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156).” — The SC rejected the argument that the testatrix’s residence in the Philippines at her death barred probate of her will as that of a citizen of another state.

• In Re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156 — Controlling precedent cited for the rule that a person transferring domicile from one state of the American Union to another loses the old domicile only upon acquiring a new domicile or citizenship, and for the rule that a United States citizen cannot acquire citizenship in the Philippine Islands by residence.

• Section 636, Code of Civil Procedure — Authorizes probate by Philippine courts of a will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, when executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which the testator is a citizen or subject and which might be proved under the law of such state or country. Applied because the testatrix was a California domiciliary and the parties agreed the paper could be proved in California as her holographic will.
• First paragraph, Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States — Provides that the citizenship of a person born in the United States is dependent upon the place of residence or domicile. Applied to frame the inquiry whether the testatrix acquired and retained a California domicile.