Tel-Equen vs. Datumanong

A public official cannot be held in contempt of court for implementing an Ombudsman dismissal order while an appeal is pending, absent malice, bad faith, or deliberate intent to obstruct justice; where the official acted after the appellate court affirmed the decision and after verifying the absence of any injunction, the act constitutes at most an error of judgment, not contumacious conduct.

Petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen served as District Engineer of Mountain Province under the DPWH Cordillera Administrative Region. The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed an administrative complaint against him and several others before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-91-0430, involving the anomalous payment of ₱553,900.00 for government-owned bailey bridge components. The administrative case proceeded through the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court of Appeals, and ultimately the Supreme Court, while the execution of the dismissal order became the subject of the present contempt petition against the DPWH Secretary who implemented it.

Petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen was the District Engineer of Mountain Province under the DPWH Cordillera Administrative Region. The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed an administrative complaint against him and several others before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-91-0430, involving the anomalous payment of ₱553,900.00 for bailey bridge components owned by the government. On March 28, 1994, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and ordered their dismissal with accessory penalties pursuant to Section 23 of Rule XIV, Book V of Executive Order No. 292.

After the denial of motions for reconsideration, three petitions were filed before the Supreme Court, which were consolidated and referred to the Court of Appeals in light of the ruling in Fabian vs. Desierto, directing that appeals from Ombudsman administrative decisions be referred to the appellate court under Rule 43. On March 2, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Ombudsman's decision, finding petitioner and two co-accused guilty as charged and dismissing them from the service, while exonerating two other respondents for lack of evidence. Petitioner and his two co-accused appealed to the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 144694.

While that appeal was still pending, Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong of the DPWH issued a Memorandum Order dated October 5, 2001, referencing the Ombudsman's order and the Court of Appeals' decision, and stating that because the order of dismissal was not subject to any injunction or restraining order from the Supreme Court, it was immediately executory. The Memorandum Order directed that petitioner and co-accused Rudy P. Antonio be dropped and dismissed from the service effective upon receipt. Petitioner filed the instant petition to cite Secretary Datumanong in contempt of court, contending that the issuance of the Memorandum Order despite knowledge of the pending appeal constituted a contumacious act and unlawful interference with the proceedings before the Court.

Two supervening events occurred after the petition was filed. First, on March 28, 2005, the Court in G.R. No. 144694 affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Ombudsman ordering petitioner's dismissal. Second, the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure were amended by Administrative Order No. 17, signed by Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo on September 15, 2003, making Ombudsman decisions in administrative cases executory pending appeal, with the respondent considered preventively suspended during the pendency of the appeal and entitled to back salaries and emoluments if the appeal is won.

• Contumacious Conduct: Petitioner contended that in issuing the Memorandum Order despite knowledge of the pendency of G.R. No. 144694, Secretary Datumanong committed a contumacious act, a gross and blatant display of abuse of discretion, and an unlawful interference with the proceedings before the Court, thereby directly or indirectly impeding, obstructing, and degrading the administration of justice, and pre-empting the Court's sole right to make a decision in accord with the evidence and law.

• Contempt of Court: Whether the issuance by Secretary Datumanong of a Memorandum Order dismissing petitioner from the service while his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court constitutes contumacious conduct warranting citation in contempt of court.
• Execution of Ombudsman Decisions Pending Appeal: Whether decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are immediately executory pending appeal under the applicable laws and rules.

• Contempt of Court: No. The issuance of the Memorandum Order was not contumacious conduct, there being no willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice; at most, it was an error of judgment or a result of confusion regarding the rules on execution pending appeal.
• Execution of Ombudsman Decisions Pending Appeal: Under the law as it stood at the time of the Secretary's act, Ombudsman decisions imposing penalties beyond public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month were not immediately executory; an appeal timely filed stayed implementation. However, the Ombudsman's Rules were subsequently amended by Administrative Order No. 17 to make such decisions executory pending appeal, and this procedural amendment applies retroactively.

• Contempt of Court: The power to declare a person in contempt is inherent in courts and serves to protect the dignity of the court and the administration of justice, but it must be exercised judiciously and sparingly, not for retaliation or vindiction. Contumacious conduct implies willfulness, bad faith, or a deliberate intent to cause injustice. The Court found none of these elements present: Secretary Datumanong did not dismiss petitioner immediately after the Ombudsman rendered its decision on March 28, 1994, but only after the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on March 2, 2000, and only after ascertaining that no injunction or restraining order had been issued by the Supreme Court. At most, the act may be considered an error of judgment or a result of confusion considering the different rules regarding execution of decisions pending appeal. The Secretary's remedy — or rather, petitioner's remedy — was to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction, not to file a contempt petition.

• Execution of Ombudsman Decisions Pending Appeal: The Court traced the relevant statutory framework. Under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of 1989), all provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory, but only decisions imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary are final and unappealable. By the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, all other decisions — including those imposing dismissal — are not final, unappealable, and immediately executory; an appeal timely filed stays implementation. Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure contained a similar provision. The Court applied the principle that where two statutes apply to a particular case, the one specially designed for that case must prevail. However, the Ombudsman's Rules were subsequently amended by Administrative Order No. 17, which made Ombudsman decisions in administrative cases executory pending appeal, with the respondent considered preventively suspended and entitled to back wages if the appeal is won. Procedural laws are construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and are deemed retroactive in that sense; no vested right attaches to or arises from procedural laws. Moreover, no vested right exists in a public office. These supervening events — the affirmance of petitioner's dismissal in G.R. No. 144694 and the amendment of the Ombudsman's Rules — further supported the dismissal of the contempt petition.

• Nature and Scope of Contempt Power — The power to declare a person in contempt is inherent in courts, used to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of proceedings, and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders. However, it must be exercised judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint, for correction and preservation of dignity, not for retaliation or vindication. Contumacious conduct implies willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice. In this case, the Secretary's act did not meet this standard because he acted only after the CA affirmed the Ombudsman's decision and after verifying no injunction existed.

• Finality and Executory Nature of Ombudsman Decisions (Pre-Amendment) — Under Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770, all provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory, but only decisions imposing public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary are final and unappealable. By the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, all other decisions (including dismissal) are not immediately executory; a timely appeal stays implementation. The right to appeal from Ombudsman decisions generally carries with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal; otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as appealable would be rendered nugatory.

• Retroactive Application of Procedural Laws — Procedural laws are construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to or arise therefrom. The amended Ombudsman Rules (A.O. No. 17) are procedural; no vested right of the petitioner was violated as he was considered preventively suspended while his case was on appeal, with entitlement to back salaries if he won.

• No Vested Right in Public Office — Excepting constitutional offices providing for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office. This principle supported the conclusion that the retroactive application of the amended Ombudsman Rules did not violate any personal right of the petitioner.

• "A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice, which is not so in the case at bar." — This passage defines the standard for contumacious conduct and forms the ratio decidendi for the Court's finding that the Secretary's act did not constitute contempt.

• "The clear import of these statements taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said Section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision." — This passage, quoted from Lapid vs. Court of Appeals, articulates the rule that Ombudsman decisions imposing penalties beyond those enumerated in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 are not immediately executory pending appeal, and is the key legal basis for finding that the Secretary's act was at most an error of judgment rather than a deliberate disregard of the pending appeal.

• "Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom." — This passage states the doctrine of retroactive application of procedural laws, which the Court relied upon to apply the amended Ombudsman Rules to the pending case.

• Fabian vs. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998) — Established that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be referred to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. This ruling caused the consolidation and referral of the earlier petitions to the Court of Appeals.

• Lapid vs. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 236 (2000) — Held that under Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770, Ombudsman decisions imposing penalties not enumerated as final and unappealable (i.e., penalties beyond public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month) are not immediately executory; a timely appeal stays implementation. This case was the primary authority for the rule that the Secretary's act was at most an error of judgment, not contumacious conduct.

• Neeland vs. Villanueva, Jr., 416 Phil. 580 (2001) — Cited for the proposition that where the legislature has declared a quasi-judicial agency's decision immediately final and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so provides; otherwise, execution takes place only when decisions become final and executory.

• Calacala vs. Republic, G.R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 438 — Cited for the doctrine that procedural laws are construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and are deemed retroactive, and that no vested right attaches to procedural laws.

• Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes vs. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 303 (1998) — Cited for the principle that there is no vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office, excepting constitutional offices with special immunity.

• Section 27, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Provides that all provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory; decisions imposing public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary are final and unappealable; in all other administrative disciplinary cases, decisions may be appealed to the Supreme Court (now the Court of Appeals) by petition for certiorari (now petition for review under Rule 43) within ten days. The Court applied the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius to hold that penalties not enumerated (such as dismissal) are not immediately executory pending appeal.

• Section 7, Rule III, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (pre-amendment) — Provided that in cases where the penalty is public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month's salary, the decision is final and unappealable; in all other cases, the decision becomes final after ten days from receipt unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari is filed. This provision supported the conclusion that the Secretary's implementation of the dismissal was premature.

• Section 7, Rule III, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, September 15, 2003) — Now provides that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory; if the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins the appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid salary and emoluments not received. The Court applied this amended provision retroactively as a procedural law.

• Section 47(4), Chapter 6, Title I, Book V, Executive Order No. 292 (Revised Administrative Code of 1987) — Provides that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal. Cited to show the contrast between Civil Service Commission decisions (immediately executory pending appeal) and Ombudsman decisions (not immediately executory under the pre-amendment rules).

• Section 37(d), Article IX, Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree of the Philippines) — Contains a provision substantially similar to Section 47(4) of E.O. No. 292 regarding the executory nature of decisions pending appeal. Cited for the same comparative purpose.

• Section 47, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 1999) — Provides that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. Cited to show that the amended Ombudsman Rules are now essentially similar to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

Artemio V. Panganiban (Chief Justice, Chairperson), Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Associate Justices.