Teehankee vs. Rovira

Article III, section 1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution applies to all persons before conviction, including political detainees not yet formally charged, so that bail may not be denied without a hearing with due notice to the prosecuting officer and the detainee.

Petitioner Haydee Herras Teehankee was a political detainee delivered by the Counter Intelligence Corps, United States Army, to the Commonwealth Government pursuant to the Proclamation of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur dated December 29, 1944. She was one of the petitioners in Raquiza vs. Bradford and was confined at the Correctional Institution for Women under Commonwealth custody. The People's Court, acting under Commonwealth Act No. 682, exercised jurisdiction over political prisoners, while Executive Order No. 65 provided a mechanism for provisional release. The dispute implicated the Bill of Rights guarantee of bail and the statutory proviso permitting release on bail even before the presentation of an information.

Petitioner Haydee Herras Teehankee was a political detainee delivered by the Counter Intelligence Corps, United States Army, to the Commonwealth Government pursuant to the Proclamation of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur dated December 29, 1944. She was one of the petitioners in case No. L-44, Raquiza vs. Bradford, and had been confined in the Correctional Institution for Women under the custody of the Commonwealth Government since October 1945, when she was delivered to that government. While under the custody of the Counter Intelligence Corps, she was charged with (a) "Active Collaboration with the Japanese" and (b) "Previous Association with the enemy."

On October 2, 1945, petitioner, through her husband Alberto Teehankee, filed with the People's Court a petition invoking Executive Order No. 65, promulgated by the President of the Philippines on September 3, 1945. She prayed for immediate release on the ground that no evidence existed upon which she could be charged with any act punishable by law, or, alternatively, that the People's Court fix bail for her provisional liberty in conformity with the executive order, and that upon approval of such bail, an order issue directing the officer having custody of her person to release her immediately.

On October 4, 1945, Associate Judge Antonio Quirino required the Solicitor General to file his comment and recommendation as soon as possible. The Solicitor General complied on October 5, 1945, stating that on the strength of the evidence at hand, the reasonable bail recommended for petitioner's provisional release be fixed at Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000). On October 9, 1945, Presiding Judge Leopoldo Rovira entered an order referring the petition for provisional release to the Fifth Division of the People's Court, but added that in his opinion it should be denied notwithstanding the Solicitor General's recommendation for provisional release under a bond of P50,000. On the same date, Associate Judge Pompeyo Diaz entered an order disposing of and denying the petition "in view of the gravity of the offense as can be deduced from the fact that the office of the Special Prosecutors recommends as high as Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) for her provisional release." Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the People's Court, through Associate Judge Pompeyo Diaz, denied the motion.

Petitioner then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus on October 19, 1945, averring that the People's Court judges, in denying her petition for provisional liberty under bail and her motion for reconsideration, acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Respondent Judge Pompeyo Diaz answered on October 21, 1945, stating that the order denying bail was issued under the express mandate of the law, citing section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682. The People's Court had denied bail on the factual premise that the offense was grave, as inferred from the Special Prosecutors' recommendation of P50,000 bail. The Supreme Court noted that active collaboration with the Japanese and association with them during the war in the Philippines may constitute treason, a capital offense under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Excess of Jurisdiction and Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner averred that the Judges of the People's Court, in denying her petition for provisional liberty under bail as well as her motion for reconsideration, acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
• Entitlement to Immediate Release or Bail: Petitioner invoked Executive Order No. 65 and prayed that her immediate release be ordered on the ground that no evidence existed upon which she could be charged with any act punishable by law, or, alternatively, that the People's Court fix bail for her provisional liberty in conformity with the executive order.

• Express Mandate of Law: Respondent Judge Pompeyo Diaz answered that the order denying bail "was issued under express mandate of the law," citing section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682.
• Gravity of the Offense: The People's Court denied the petition in view of the gravity of the offense as deduced from the fact that the Office of the Special Prosecutors recommended as high as Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) for petitioner's provisional release.
• Denial Notwithstanding Recommendation: Presiding Judge Leopoldo Rovira referred the petition to the Fifth Division but stated that in his opinion it should be denied notwithstanding the Solicitor General's recommendation for provisional release under a P50,000 bond.

• Applicability of Constitutional Bail Guarantee: Whether Article III, section 1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution is applicable to the instant case.
• Necessity of Hearing: Whether a hearing should be held of the application for bail with attendance of the petitioner and the Solicitor General or the latter's representative.
• Nature of Hearing: If so, what kind of hearing it should be.

• Applicability of Constitutional Bail Guarantee: Yes. Article III, section 1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution applies to all persons before conviction, not only to those against whom a complaint or information has already been formally filed.
• Necessity of Hearing: Yes. Upon application by a political prisoner or detainee to the People's Court for provisional release under bail, a hearing, summary or otherwise, should be held with due notice to the Office of Special Prosecutors and to the prisoner or detainee.
• Nature of Hearing: The hearing, whether summary or otherwise, must enable the People's Court to exercise its sound discretion; the Solicitor General may oppose or not, and if he opposes, the burden is on him to show that petitioner is not entitled to bail, while petitioner may offer evidence to prove her right.

• Applicability of Constitutional Bail Guarantee: The constitutional mandate refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or information has already been formally filed. It lays down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong. Only persons arrested, detained, or otherwise deprived of liberty will have occasion to seek the benefit, but they need not wait until a formal complaint or information is filed. From the moment a person is placed under arrest, detention, or restraint by officers of the law, the guarantee of the Bill of Rights may be claimed, and it is retained unless and until the person is charged with a capital offense and evidence of guilt is strong. The Court reasoned that if the precept protects those already formally charged, there is no legal or just reason for denying its benefits to one against whom the authorities may yet conclude that no sufficient evidence of guilt exists. To place the former in a more favored position would be anomalous and absurd. The presumption of innocence in favor of one already formally charged applies a fortiori to one not yet so charged but already arrested or detained. The Court also cited Cooley's Constitutional Limitations on the humanity of the law and the presumption of innocence, and noted that under the common law all offenses, including treason, murder, and other felonies, were bailable before indictment, although the granting or refusing of bail in capital offenses was discretionary. Under the Constitution, all offenses are bailable before conviction except capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. In consonance, Rule 110, section 3 provides that non-capital offenses before conviction by the Court of First Instance are bailable as of right; section 4 allows bail after conviction at the court's discretion; and section 6 provides that no person in custody for a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if evidence of guilt is strong.
• Necessity of Hearing: Section 22 of the People's Court Act subjects the prosecution, trial, and disposal of cases before the People's Court to existing laws and rules of court, unless otherwise expressly provided. The hearing and disposal of an application for bail for provisional release before the People's Court is a mere part of the prosecution, trial, and disposal of the corresponding cases, and should therefore be governed by existing laws and rules of court. The clause "unless otherwise expressly provided herein" in section 22, read with the first proviso of section 19 of the same Act, must be construed in harmony with the Constitution under the well-settled rule of statutory construction that legislative enactments should be construed, wherever possible, in a manner that avoids their conflicting with the fundamental law.
• Nature of Hearing: Although the Solicitor General had recommended P50,000 bail on the strength of the evidence at hand, it was possible that his office might thereafter secure additional evidence sufficient to prove petitioner's guilt for a capital offense, in which case he might oppose the application for bail at the hearing. Petitioner, while under the custody of the Counter Intelligence Corps, had been charged with (a) active collaboration with the Japanese and (b) previous association with the enemy. Under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, active collaboration with the Japanese and association with them during the war in the Philippines may constitute treason, a capital offense punishable by reclusion temporal to death and a fine not exceeding P20,000. It was also possible that the Solicitor General would not oppose the application, either because no further evidence had come into his possession or because, in his judgment, the public interest would be better served by withholding the evidence until trial on the merits. At the hearing, the Solicitor General would be free to adopt one course or the other. If he opposed, the burden of proof would be on him to show that petitioner was not entitled to bail. Petitioner would have the right to offer evidence to prove her right. The hearing was for the purpose of enabling the People's Court to exercise its sound discretion as to whether, under the Constitution and laws in force, petitioner was entitled to provisional release under bail.

• Right to Bail Before Conviction — All persons before conviction are bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. The Court applied this guarantee to a political detainee not yet formally charged with an information.
• Bail Guarantee Applies from Arrest or Detention — The constitutional guarantee may be invoked from the moment a person is placed under arrest, detention, or restraint by officers of the law, even before a formal complaint or information is filed. The presumption of innocence applies a fortiori to one not yet formally charged.
• Capital Offense Exception and Burden of Proof — No person in custody for the commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of guilt is strong. On the hearing of an application for bail by such a person, the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution. The Court noted that treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code is a capital offense.
• Notice and Hearing for Bail Applications — Upon application by a political prisoner or detainee for provisional release under bail, a hearing, summary or otherwise, should be held with due notice to the Office of Special Prosecutors and to the prisoner or detainee. The hearing enables the court to exercise sound discretion.
• Statutory Construction in Harmony with the Constitution — Legislative enactments should be construed, wherever possible, in a manner that avoids their conflicting with the fundamental law. Section 22 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, read with section 19, was construed in harmony with the constitutional bail guarantee.
• People's Court Procedure Governed by Existing Laws and Rules — The prosecution, trial, and disposal of cases before the People's Court are governed by existing laws and rules of court unless otherwise expressly provided. Applications for bail before the People's Court are part of such prosecution, trial, and disposal and are therefore governed by the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 110.

• "This Constitutional mandate refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or information has already been formally filed." — This states the ratio for applying the bail guarantee before formal charge, rejecting the view that only formally accused persons may invoke it.
• "From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong." — This defines the point at which the constitutional right to bail attaches and the condition under which it may be withheld.
• "If he opposes, the burden of proof will be on him to show the petitioner is not entitled to bail. Petitioner will have the right to offer evidence to prove her right thereto." — This allocates the burden of proof at the bail hearing and recognizes the detainee's right to present evidence.
• "In fine, the hearing is for the purpose of enabling the People's Court to exercise its sound discretion as to whether or not under the Constitution and laws in force petitioner is entitled to provisional release under bail." — This defines the purpose of the hearing ordered by the Court and is the practical core of the remedy.

• Raquiza vs. Bradford, G.R. No. L-44 (p. 50, ante) — Referenced as the prior related case in which petitioner was one of the petitioners; the Court noted that while under Counter Intelligence Corps custody she was charged with active collaboration with the Japanese and previous association with the enemy.
• Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil. 210, 214 — Cited in Justice De Joya's concurring opinion as authority for the procedure outlined in the decision.
• Marcos vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, G.R. No. 46490 — Also cited in Justice De Joya's concurring opinion in support of the same procedure.

• Article III, Section 1(16), Commonwealth Constitution — All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong; excessive bail shall not be required. Applied to petitioner even before an information was filed.
• Article III, Section 1(17), Commonwealth Constitution — The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Cited to support the conclusion that the presumption applies a fortiori to one not yet formally charged but already detained.
• Rule 110, Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, Rules of Court — Sections 3 and 4 govern bailability of noncapital offenses before and after conviction; section 5 defines a capital offense; section 6 prohibits bail for a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong; section 7 places the burden on the prosecution; section 8 requires notice to the fiscal. Applied because the People's Court's bail procedure is governed by the Rules of Court.
• Section 66, General Orders No. 58 — When admission to bail is a matter of discretion, the court must require reasonable notice of the hearing to the promotor fiscal. Cited in relation to the notice requirement.
• Section 19, Commonwealth Act No. 682 — Political prisoners may, in the discretion of the People's Court, after due notice to the Office of Special Prosecutors and hearing, be released on bail even prior to the presentation of the corresponding information, unless the court finds strong evidence of the commission of a capital offense. Respondent invoked this provision; the Court construed it with the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
• Section 22, Commonwealth Act No. 682 — The prosecution, trial, and disposal of cases before the People's Court shall be governed by existing laws and rules of court, unless otherwise expressly provided. This was the basis for applying the Rules of Court to bail applications.
• Article 114, Revised Penal Code — Treason is punishable by reclusion temporal to death and a fine not exceeding P20,000. The Court noted that active collaboration with the Japanese and association with them during the war may constitute treason, a capital offense.

• Moran, C.J., and Briones, J., concur.
• Jaranilla, Feria, Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur only in the result.
• De Joya, J., filed a separate concurring opinion. He fully concurred in the opinion of Justice Hilado and stated that the procedure outlined in the decision was nothing new, citing Payao vs. Lesaca and Marcos vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. He observed that observance of the procedure would prevent criticism of the fairness and impartiality of the court and that political prisoners under custody are entitled to the same rights under the Constitution as those actually accused of crimes.

• Ozaeta, Paras, and Perfecto, JJ. (concurring and dissenting) — They concurred in the holding that Article III, section 1(16) and (17) of the Constitution are applicable and that the Rules of Court, particularly sections 3 to 8 of Rule 110, govern the procedure in the People's Court for bail applications under the first proviso of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682. They dissented, however, from the failure to enforce and give practical effect to the constitutional provisions in the present case. In their view, petitioner, who had been confined for about ten months without any formal charge, was clearly entitled to be forthwith released on bail under the Constitution and the Rules of Court. They argued that the proviso in section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 should be construed to refer only to political prisoners actually or prospectively charged with a capital offense; if construed to include noncapital offenses, it would be unconstitutional because bail before conviction for noncapital offenses is a matter of right. They further maintained that if the Solicitor General does not oppose the application, there is no necessity for a hearing because there is no issue to litigate; the court's discretion lies only in fixing the amount of bail. The majority's speculation on future evidence and its order for a hearing even without opposition would cause unnecessary delay. They noted that release on bail before conviction is provisional and may be cancelled if strong evidence of a capital offense is later shown. They warned against whittling away Bill of Rights guarantees and characterized the earlier decision in Raquiza vs. Bradford as the first wrong step for failing to enforce the due process clause.