Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag

An amendment to a criminal information that merely changes the stage of execution of the same offense—from frustrated to consummated murder—is a formal amendment, not a substantial one, and does not necessitate a new preliminary investigation.

Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr. was charged with frustrated murder for shooting Maureen Navarro Hultman. After the prosecution rested its case and before the defense could file a demurrer to evidence, the victim died. The prosecution then moved to file an amended information charging consummated murder. The trial court admitted the amended information. At arraignment, Teehankee refused to plead, alleging lack of preliminary investigation for the new charge. The court entered a plea of not guilty, appointed a counsel de oficio when his counsel refused to participate, and proceeded with trial. Teehankee then filed this special civil action challenging these orders.

• Nature of the Original Charge: Petitioner was charged with frustrated murder for shooting Maureen Navarro Hultman on July 13, 1991.
• Supervening Event: After the prosecution rested its case and before petitioner could file a demurrer to evidence, the victim died.
• Filing of Amended Information: The prosecution filed an omnibus motion to admit an amended information charging consummated murder, which the trial court granted.
• Arraignment and Refusal: At arraignment, petitioner refused to plead to the amended information, claiming lack of preliminary investigation. The court ordered a plea of "not guilty" entered.
• Appointment of Counsel: When petitioner's counsel of record refused to participate in proceedings, the trial court appointed a counsel de oficio.
• Petitioner's Core Claim: The amendment was substantial, changing the nature of the offense, thus requiring a new preliminary investigation.

• Substantial Amendment: Petitioner argued that the addition of the victim's death constituted a substantial amendment because it changed the offense from frustrated to consummated murder, involving a new factual allegation (the cause of death) that must be established.
• Right to Preliminary Investigation: Petitioner maintained that a new preliminary investigation was essential for the amended information, as it charged an "entirely different offense" based on a new fact.
• Improper Appointment of Counsel: Petitioner contended that the appointment of a counsel de oficio was improper because he was represented by counsel of choice who refused to participate on a valid legal ground (the alleged denial of due process).
• Rushed Trial: Petitioner claimed the trial was being preferentially and improperly rushed.

• Formal Amendment: The prosecution's theory (implicit in the motion and the Court's ruling) was that the amendment merely added a supervening fact (death) to the same essential offense, making it a formal amendment permissible during trial.
• No Prejudice to Defense: The defense available under the original information for frustrated murder would be equally applicable to the amended information for consummated murder.
• No Need for New Preliminary Investigation: Because the offenses are necessarily included, an inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts as the other, negating the need for a new preliminary investigation.
• Sound Discretion of Trial Court: The scheduling of cases and appointment of counsel de oficio are within the trial court's sound discretion, provided no substantial rights are prejudiced.

• Amendment vs. Substitution: Whether the amended information charging consummated murder constitutes a substantial amendment requiring a new preliminary investigation or merely a formal amendment.
• Appointment of Counsel: Whether the trial court validly appointed a counsel de oficio for an accused whose counsel of record refused to participate in the proceedings.
• Trial Scheduling: Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in scheduling the case for "over-speedy and preferential" trial.

• Amendment vs. Substitution: The amendment was formal, not substantial. Frustrated murder is necessarily included in consummated murder; both share the same essential elements except for the result of death. The addition of the victim's death was a supervening fact that did not alter the prosecution's theory or prejudice the defense. Therefore, no new preliminary investigation was required.
• Appointment of Counsel: The appointment was proper. The refusal of petitioner's counsel to participate, based on a baseless legal issue, contributed to potential delay. The trial court was justified in appointing a counsel de oficio to ensure the proceedings continued.
• Trial Scheduling: The matter of scheduling cases is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, provided the substantial rights of the accused are not prejudiced. No such prejudice was demonstrated here.

• Amendment vs. Substitution of Information — An amendment may be of form or substance and can be made before plea without leave of court, or after plea as to form with leave of court. Substitution involves a substantial change to a different offense, requires dismissal of the original information, and necessitates a new preliminary investigation and arraignment. The test is whether the new information charges the same offense or one necessarily included in the original charge. If so, amendment suffices; if not, substitution is required.
• Test for Formal Amendment — An amendment is one of form if a defense under the original information would be equally available after the amendment, and any evidence the accused might have would be equally applicable to both informations.

• "What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder." — This passage clarifies that the amendment did not alter the fundamental nature of the crime, only its completion stage.
• "The test of whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment has been said to be whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other..." — This articulates the controlling standard for distinguishing formal from substantial amendments.

• Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950) — Cited for the rule on when one offense necessarily includes another.
• Almeda vs. Villaluz, et al., 66 SCRA 38 (1975) — Cited for the definition of a substantial amendment as one reciting facts constituting the offense and determinative of jurisdiction.
• People vs. Montenegro, et al., 159 SCRA 236 (1988) — Cited for the rule that after arraignment, amendments are allowed only as to matters of form and without prejudice to the accused.
• People vs. Magpale, 70 Phil. 176 (1940) — Cited for the proposition that a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary if the original and amended charges are related such that an inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts.

• Section 14, Rule 110, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Governs the amendment and substitution of an information or complaint. The Court applied its first paragraph to allow the amendment as a matter of form after plea, and distinguished it from the second paragraph on substitution.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, J., took no part.