Teague vs. Fernandez

Violation of a safety ordinance constitutes negligence per se , and when the injury that ensues is precisely the kind the ordinance was intended to prevent, the violation is deemed the proximate cause of the harm, notwithstanding intervening events such as a fire and a resulting panic.

The Realistic Institute, a vocational school for hair and beauty culture, was owned and operated by Mercedes M. Teague. It occupied the entire unpartitioned second floor of the Gil-Armi Building in Quiapo, Manila, a two-storey semi-concrete structure. The second floor had a single stairway approximately 1.5 meters wide, eight windows each fitted with two fire-escape ladders, and an area of about 400 square meters. Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila required that buildings with less than three stories used as schools, among other uses, be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not less than 1.20 meters in width, placed as far apart as possible.

• The School Premises: The Realistic Institute occupied the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building. The floor was unpartitioned, with one stairway of about 1.5 meters in width, eight windows each equipped with two fire-escape ladders, and prominent wall markings indicating the fire exits. The building owner had begun constructing a second stairway, but it was not yet completed.

• The Fire and Panic: Around 4:00 p.m. on October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a surplus materials store approximately ten meters away, across Soler Street. Upon seeing the fire, some of the approximately 180 students inside the Realistic Institute shouted “Fire!” A panic ensued. Four instructresses, six assistant instructresses, and the registrar attempted to quell the panic. They used a microphone to tell students not to rush, to descend the stairway two by two, and to use the fire escapes; an instructress slapped three students, and the registrar physically tried to block the rush with outstretched arms. The panic could not be subdued. With the exception of a few who used the fire escapes, the students pushed and rushed toward the stairs, causing a deadly stampede.

• The Casualties: No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. However, after the panic subsided, four students were found dead and several others injured. Lourdes Fernandez sustained lacerations of both eyes and upper lip, contused abrasions, internal hemorrhage, and fractures of the second and third right ribs. The autopsy report attributed her death to shock resulting from traumatic rib fractures with perinephric hematoma and lacerations of the conjunctiva of both eyes.

• The Ordinance: Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila mandated that buildings with less than three stories used as schools, among others, be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not less than 1.20 meters in width, having an inclination of not less than 40 degrees from the perpendicular, and placed as far apart as possible.

• Applicability of the Ordinance: Petitioner contended that Section 491 refers to public buildings and did not apply to the Gil-Armi Building, which was privately owned.

• Liability of the Lessee: Petitioner argued that the obligation to comply with the ordinance devolved upon the building owners, not upon herself as a mere lessee.

• Proximate Cause: Petitioner maintained that the violation of the ordinance was not the proximate cause of Lourdes Fernandez’s death. She framed the sequence of events as: (1) violation of the ordinance, (2) fire at a neighboring place, (3) shouts of “Fire!”, (4) panic, (5) stampede, and (6) injuries and death. Under this projection, the violation was merely a remote cause or condition, with the intervening independent events of fire, panic, and stampede constituting the efficient causes of the injury.

• Sufficiency of the Complaint: Petitioner pointed out that the complaint did not specifically allege a violation of the ordinance and thus could not serve as a basis for liability.

• Negligence Per Se ** and Proximate Cause:** Respondents, citing American jurisprudence, argued that violation of a safety ordinance constitutes negligence per se, and when the injury that results is the very harm the ordinance was enacted to prevent, that violation is the legal cause of the harm. The presence of intervening causes does not render the violation too remote if the accident occurred in the manner the ordinance was intended to prevent.

• Applicability of the Ordinance: Whether Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila applies to a privately owned building used as a school.

• Liability of the Lessee: Whether the lessee who uses the building for school purposes is responsible for compliance with the safety ordinance, as opposed to the building owners.

• Proximate Cause: Whether the violation of the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez, given the intervening fire and panic.

• Sufficiency of the Complaint: Whether the complaint sufficiently alleged the ordinance violation as an act of negligence.

• Applicability of the Ordinance: The ordinance’s coverage turned on the use or purpose of the building, not on its ownership. Because the Realistic Institute was a school, the building fell squarely within the ordinance’s terms. A requirement for two stairways bears a reasonable relation to the safety of occupants, irrespective of who holds title.

• Liability of the Lessee: The lessee was the party responsible for compliance. It was the petitioner’s use of the building as a school that triggered the ordinance, and she, rather than the owners, controlled that use.

• Proximate Cause: The violation of the ordinance was properly deemed the proximate cause of the death. Although the non-compliance preceded the other events in time, it was a continuing violation of a safety measure designed to prevent a specific danger: undue overcrowding when building evacuation becomes necessary. The very emergency — a fire causing a panicked rush to the stairs and a deadly stampede — was the contingency the ordinance contemplated. Under the doctrine that violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote by intervening agencies if the accident happened in the manner the ordinance sought to prevent, the single stairway was the legal cause of the harm.

• Sufficiency of the Complaint: The complaint’s paragraph 7 alleged that the death was due to gross negligence in failing to provide adequate fire exits. This averment sufficiently comprehended the violation of the ordinance, even without citing the ordinance by number.

• Negligence Per Se ** for Violation of a Safety Ordinance** — When a standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to that standard is negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the absence of a legal excuse. It is immaterial whether the act or omission would have been regarded as negligent in the absence of the statute, or whether injury could reasonably have been anticipated from the violation.

• Proximate Cause of Violation of Safety Statute — The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. (Citing 38 Am. Jur. 841, Ross v. Hartman, and 65 C.J.S. 1156). Conversely, violation is not the proximate cause if the injury was not of the type the law sought to avert.

• Proximate Cause Defined (Philippine Jurisprudence) — The proximate legal cause is that which, acting first and producing the injury — either immediately or by setting other events in motion — constitutes a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. (Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957)

• “The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.” — This passage from 38 Am. Jur. 841, adopted by the Court, expresses the core ratio decidendi and remains the oft-cited formulation of the doctrine.

• “To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one.” — The Court clarifies that the ordinance was aimed at the specific dangerous condition — overcrowding at a single exit — that materialized during the emergency.

• Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957 — This decision defined proximate legal cause in terms of a natural and continuous chain of events. Distinguished; the Court found that the chain in the present case satisfied that definition because the violation was a continuing condition that directly resulted in the fatal overcrowding.

• Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, G.R. No. L-8328, May 18, 1956 — Cited by petitioner for the principle that a remote cause which merely furnishes the condition for injury is not the proximate cause when an independent efficient cause intervenes. Distinguished; the Court held that the fire, panic, and stampede were not independent of the violation but were the very contingency for which the ordinance required a second stairway.

• Section 491, Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila — Required buildings with less than three stories used as schools, among other public or quasi-public uses, to be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not less than 1.20 meters in width, with an inclination of not less than 40 degrees from the perpendicular, placed as far apart as possible. The Court interpreted the provision as applicable based on the use of the building, not its ownership, and held the lessee-operator responsible for compliance.

Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra, JJ., concurred. Castro and Barredo, JJ., reserved their votes.