Te vs. Court of Appeals

A pending civil action for annulment or declaration of nullity of a first marriage does not constitute a prejudicial question that warrants suspension of a criminal prosecution for bigamy, because the sole material element is whether the first marriage was subsisting at the time the second marriage was contracted, and under Article 40 of the Family Code, a marriage is deemed valid until judicially declared void in a final judgment.

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988, under the Family Code, which had taken effect on August 3, 1988. They never cohabited after the ceremony but met regularly until the birth of their daughter on April 21, 1989, after which petitioner ceased visiting private respondent. Petitioner is a registered civil engineer licensed by the Professional Regulation Commission, a status that became relevant when private respondent sought revocation of his license on grounds of immorality and falsification.

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage, although they met each other regularly. After private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her. On May 20, 1990, while his marriage to private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with one Julieta Santella.

Upon learning of the second marriage, private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit sometime in June 1990, which led to the filing on August 9, 1990 of an information charging petitioner with bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409. Earlier, on July 20, 1990, petitioner had filed in the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, an action for annulment of his marriage to private respondent, alleging that he was forced to marry her, that she had concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage, and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform essential marital obligations. On November 8, 1990, private respondent filed an administrative case with the Professional Regulation Commission against petitioner and Santella, seeking revocation of their engineering licenses on the ground of immorality for living together and marrying despite knowledge of petitioner's existing marriage, and charging petitioner with falsification for stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still single.

After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal proceedings, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and a motion to inhibit the trial judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for displaying antagonism and animosity toward petitioner's counsel. The trial court denied the demurrer in an Order dated November 28, 1990, finding that the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case, and likewise denied the motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals challenging both denials. Separately, when the PRC Board denied petitioner's motion to suspend the administrative proceedings in view of the pending civil and criminal cases, petitioner filed a second petition for certiorari. The two petitions were consolidated, and on August 31, 1994, the Court of Appeals upheld the RTC's denial of the motion to inhibit and the demurrer, and found no prejudicial question that would warrant suspension of either the criminal or administrative proceedings. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on October 18, 1996, giving rise to the instant petition.

• Prejudicial Question: Petitioner maintained that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil annulment case before the criminal proceedings for bigamy could continue, because a declaration that the marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability. He likewise argued that the pendency of the annulment case warranted suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board, and that continuation of those proceedings could render nugatory his right against self-incrimination in the criminal case.
• Demurrer to Evidence: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt, contending that the original copies of both marriage contracts were not presented, the signatures therein were not properly identified, there was no showing that the requisites of a valid marriage were complied with, and no witness was presented to prove that a second marriage ceremony actually took place.
• Inhibition of Trial Judge: Petitioner contended that Judge Peralejo exhibited partiality and bias in several instances: by declaring that a motion for reconsideration would be denied before it was filed, by questioning counsel's claim of illness and requiring a medical certificate, and by characterizing the demurrer to evidence as dilatory and declaring it would be denied before it was filed.

• Prejudicial Question: Whether the pendency of a civil case for annulment of marriage constitutes a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy and the administrative case before the PRC Board.
• Demurrer to Evidence: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's denial of petitioner's demurrer to evidence.
• Inhibition: Whether the trial judge should have been required to inhibit himself on the ground of bias and partiality.

• Prejudicial Question: No. The pendency of the civil annulment case did not pose a prejudicial question, because all that is required for bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second is contracted, and under Article 40 of the Family Code, a marriage is deemed valid until judicially declared void. No prejudicial question exists where one case is administrative and the other is civil.
• Demurrer to Evidence: No. The trial court's denial of the demurrer was not attended by grave abuse of discretion, the prosecution having established a prima facie case for bigamy; the proper recourse of the accused is to present evidence in his defense.
• Inhibition: No. The instances cited by petitioner did not conclusively show bias or prejudgment by the trial judge, and mere suspicion of partiality is insufficient to compel inhibition under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court.

• Prejudicial Question: A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused; for it to suspend a criminal action, the resolution of the issue in the civil case must necessarily determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The outcome of the civil annulment case had no bearing on the determination of guilt in the bigamy case, because the elements of bigamy require only that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second is contracted. Petitioner's reliance on People vs. Mendoza and People vs. Aragon, which held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage void ab initio, was rejected; those rulings have been overturned by Article 40 of the Family Code, which provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, a marriage—even one void or voidable—is deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime, petitioner's marriage to private respondent was, under the law, still valid and subsisting. As for the administrative proceedings, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case; there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. Furthermore, Section 32 of the PRC Board's Rules expressly provides that administrative proceedings shall not be suspended notwithstanding the pendency of criminal or civil cases involving the same facts, and the administrative complaint contained additional charges of immoral conduct beyond the bigamous marriage itself.
• Demurrer to Evidence: The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling shall not be disturbed absent grave abuse of such discretion. The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse, the trial court having based its denial on the existence of a prima facie case and the insufficiency of petitioner's allegations. An appellate court will not review the prosecution's evidence in a certiorari proceeding and decide in advance whether guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court's finding of a prima facie case meant only that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition unless rebutted—not that petitioner was guilty. The denial of the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to determine whether a full-blown trial was necessary. Petitioner's proper recourse was to adduce evidence in his defense.
• Inhibition: While bias and prejudice are valid reasons for voluntary inhibition under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that mere suspicion of partiality is not enough; clear and convincing evidence is required. The grounds raised by petitioner were not among those mandatorily disqualifying under Section 1, Rule 137, so the decision to inhibit lay within the sound discretion of the judge. The test for propriety of denial is whether the petitioner was deprived of a fair and impartial trial. The denial of the motion to suspend and the demurrer were in accord with law and jurisprudence; the requirement of a medical certificate to support counsel's claim of illness was reasonable and aimed at preventing unjustified delays, consistent with the judge's duty to dispose of court business promptly.

• Prejudicial Question — A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. To suspend a criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would necessarily determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale is to avoid two conflicting decisions. In this case, the Court held that a pending civil annulment case does not constitute a prejudicial question to a bigamy prosecution, because the validity of the first marriage at the time the second was contracted is all that matters, and under Article 40 of the Family Code, a marriage is deemed valid until judicially declared void.
• Article 40 of the Family Code — Presumption of Validity of Marriage — The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. This doctrine overturned the earlier rule in People vs. Mendoza and People vs. Aragon that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage void ab initio.
• Elements of Bigamy — The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved; (3) the offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The Court applied these elements by holding that the only material inquiry is whether the first marriage was subsisting at the time the second was contracted.
• Demurrer to Evidence — Prima Facie Case — A finding of a prima facie case by the trial court means only that the prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that the accused committed the offense, unless rebutted; it is not a pronouncement of guilt. The denial of a demurrer is not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to determine whether a full-blown trial is necessary.
• Inhibition of Judges — Under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judge may, in the exercise of sound discretion, disqualify himself for just and valid reasons other than those mandatorily specified. Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough; clear and convincing evidence is required. The test for propriety of denial of a motion to inhibit is whether the movant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial.

• "The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner's innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the prejudicial question issue, articulating the principle that the subsistence of the first marriage at the time of the second is the sole material element for bigamy.
• "The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner's marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." — This passage defines the controlling rule on the presumption of validity of marriage under the Family Code and its effect on bigamy prosecutions.
• "Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists." — Quoted from Landicho vs. Relova, this formulation is frequently cited for the principle that marital nullity requires a judicial declaration.
• "The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial." — This passage articulates the governing standard for evaluating the denial of a motion to inhibit a trial judge.

• People vs. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843 (1954) — Previously held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage void ab initio. The Court expressly stated that this ruling has been overturned by Article 40 of the Family Code.
• People vs. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957) — Same as above; the rule that no judicial decree is needed for void marriages was overturned by the Family Code.
• Landicho vs. Relova, 22 SCRA 731 (1968) — Held that parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity; only a competent court's declaration can render a marriage void. Followed and quoted in support of the presumption of validity of marriage.
• Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000 — Cited as recent jurisprudence supporting the rule under Article 40 of the Family Code that a marriage is deemed valid until judicially declared void.
• Bobis vs. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000 — Cited alongside Mercado vs. Tan for the same proposition regarding Article 40.
• Ocampo vs. Buenaventura, 55 SCRA 267 (1974) — Held that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. Followed.
• People vs. Mercado, 159 SCRA 453 (1988) — Held that the grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Followed.
• People vs. Cruz, 144 SCRA 677 (1986) — Held that an appellate court will not review in a certiorari proceeding the prosecution's evidence and decide in advance whether guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Followed.
• People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 705 (1999) — Held that mere suspicion of a judge's partiality is insufficient; clear and convincing evidence is required to prove bias and partiality. Followed.

• Article 40, Family Code — Provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Applied to hold that petitioner's first marriage was deemed valid and subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage, notwithstanding the pending annulment case.
• Section 1, Rule 137, Revised Rules of Court — Governs disqualification of judges, distinguishing mandatory disqualification from voluntary inhibition in the exercise of sound discretion. Applied to hold that the trial judge's inhibition was not mandatory and that the denial of the motion to inhibit was proper absent clear and convincing evidence of bias.
• Section 32, Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals (PRC Board) — Provides that the filing or pendency of criminal and/or civil cases shall neither suspend nor bar administrative proceedings before the Board involving the same facts. Applied to uphold the PRC Board's denial of petitioner's motion to suspend the administrative case.
• Section 15, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court — Referenced as the procedural basis for the accused's recourse to present evidence after denial of a demurrer to evidence.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.