Tapucar vs. Tapucar

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral private conduct, including keeping a mistress, contracting a second marriage while the first subsists, and abandoning family; previous administrative sanctions for the same misconduct do not insulate the lawyer but may aggravate the case.

Remedios Ramirez Tapucar and respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar were married on October 29, 1953 and had eleven children. Respondent practiced law and later served as a CFI Judge in Butuan City beginning January 30, 1976. Before the present disbarment complaint, the Supreme Court had already imposed two disciplinary sanctions on him: a six-month suspension without pay in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, and separation from the service on January 31, 1981 in consolidated Administrative Matters Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI. Both sanctions stemmed from complaints about his relationship with Elena (Helen) Peña.

Remedios Ramirez Tapucar and Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962, respondent relocated the family to Dadiangas, Cotabato, now General Santos City, where their last three children were born and where he practiced law until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.

In August 1976, shortly after becoming a CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with Elena (Helen) Peña in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On December 28, 1977, Elena gave birth to their first child, Ofelia Sembrano Peña. Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint for immorality against respondent; after investigation, the Supreme Court imposed a six-month suspension without pay in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980.

Respondent nonetheless continued to cohabit with Elena, leading to further consolidated administrative charges for immorality, conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. On January 31, 1981, the Supreme Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. Even that sanction did not stop him: he continued living with Elena, and on September 20, 1989 their second child, Laella Peña Tapucar, was born. He had by then completely abandoned complainant and their children.

Respondent later returned from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing Elena and their two children. On March 5, 1992, he married Elena in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. His marriage to complainant still subsisted; nothing in the record showed its dissolution.

Complainant had migrated to the United States upon her retirement from government service in 1990, but her children in Antipolo kept her informed of the misery they allegedly suffered from their father’s deception and intrigues. Although she had previously withdrawn a similar case filed in 1976, she filed the present disbarment complaint on November 22, 1993, assisted by her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua. During the IBP investigation, respondent did not contradict the charges; the investigating commissioner found him far from contrite and noted that he displayed arrogance and made a mockery of the proceedings.

• Gross Immorality: Complainant argued that respondent’s continuing cohabitation with Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous circumstances constituted continuing grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment.
• Abandonment and Family Cruelty: Complainant alleged that respondent completely abandoned her and their children and perpetrated deception and intrigues against them, compelling her to seek protection through the disbarment proceeding.

• Double Jeopardy: Respondent maintained that the prior suspension and separation from service for the same relationship barred further discipline, and that disbarment for marrying Elena would constitute triple jeopardy; he added, “If that’s the law so be it.”

• Gross Immorality: Whether respondent’s continued cohabitation with Elena, second marriage while his first marriage still subsisted, and abandonment of his lawful wife and children constituted grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment.
• Effect of Prior Disciplinary Sanctions: Whether respondent’s prior suspension and dismissal from judicial service barred or mitigated the present disbarment proceeding.

• Gross Immorality: Yes. The conduct constituted grossly immoral conduct in violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, warranting disbarment.
• Effect of Prior Disciplinary Sanctions: No. The prior penalties neither barred nor mitigated disbarment; respondent’s persistence after sanctions demonstrated moral indifference and defiance of established norms.

• Gross Immorality: Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the bar but must also remain intact to maintain good standing. The legal profession demands high-toned morality, and Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility forbid unlawful, dishonest, immoral, deceitful, or scandalous conduct that discredits the profession. The record showed that respondent began cohabiting with Elena in 1976, fathered two children with her, contracted a second marriage in 1992 while his marriage to complainant still subsisted, and abandoned his lawful family. These facts were analogous to the gross immorality that warranted disbarment in Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr. and Toledo vs. Toledo. The investigating commissioner also found him arrogant rather than contrite. The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors was therefore sustained.

• Effect of Prior Disciplinary Sanctions: The earlier six-month suspension and later dismissal from judicial service did not preclude disbarment. Respondent persisted in the same relationship despite those sanctions, demonstrating moral indifference and outright defiance of established norms. His former judicial office aggravated rather than excused his infractions, because judges and lawyers alike are invested with public trust and must uphold integrity and decency. The power to disbar is exercised with caution, but the evidence here presented a clear case of misconduct seriously affecting the lawyer’s standing and character. The prior penalties thus operated as proof of his want of reform, not as a bar to discipline.

• Continuing Good Moral Character — A lawyer’s good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession but must also remain intact to maintain good standing. Applied here, respondent’s continuing affair, bigamous marriage, and abandonment demonstrated his failure to preserve that character.

• Disbarment for Private Misconduct — Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct whether in professional or private capacity, where the misconduct shows want of moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor. Respondent’s purely private family misconduct furnished a sufficient basis for discipline.

• Grossly Immoral Family Conduct — Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, and abandoning or mistreating one’s family constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court relied on this principle to conclude that respondent’s acts put the legal profession in disrepute and endangered the integrity of the administration of justice.

• Aggravation by Prior Judicial Office and Prior Sanctions — A lawyer who was formerly a judge is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct. Prior judicial office and previous sanctions for the same misconduct aggravate rather than mitigate professional infractions, especially where the lawyer persists in the same conduct.

• Cautious Exercise of Disbarment Power — Disbarment is exercised with great caution and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the lawyer’s standing and character as an officer of the court and member of the bar. The Court found that standard satisfied.

• "Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity." — States the continuing moral-character requirement underlying the disbarment.

• "Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." — Identifies the ethical rules that respondent violated.

• "Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath." — Specifies the acts constituting gross immorality in this case.

• "The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar." — Defines the standard for imposing the ultimate penalty.

• Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., 128 SCRA 485 — Followed as an analogous disbarment case where a lawyer abandoned his wife and son and had adulterous relations with a married but separated woman.

• Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768 — Followed; disbarment was imposed where the lawyer abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.

• Rayos-Omhoc vs. Atty. Royos, Adm. Case No. 2884, January 28, 1998 — Cited for the rule that good moral character is a continuing requirement for lawyers.

• Dy Teban Hardware & Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapucar, 102 SCRA 493 (1981) — Referred to as the consolidated administrative case in which respondent was separated from the service, establishing his prior disciplinary record.

• Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Respondent’s continued cohabitation and bigamous marriage violated this rule.

• Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law and scandalous behavior that discredits the profession. Respondent’s public and private misconduct fell within this prohibition.

• Section 27, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court — Authorizes disbarment or suspension for misconduct, whether in professional or private capacity, showing want of moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor. This was the procedural basis for disciplining respondent.

• Section 20, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court — Governed referral of the complaint to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report, and recommendation.

• Section 12(b), Rule 139-B, Rules of Court — Required the IBP Board of Governors to transmit its resolution recommending disbarment, together with the record, to the Supreme Court for final action.

• Rule 1.01 and Rule 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct — Judges should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence and should behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Respondent’s former judicial office made these standards relevant to the evaluation of his character.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, and Quisumbing, JJ., concurred. Bellosillo and Purisima, JJ., took no part.