Tapispisan vs. Court of Appeals

A protest under the Civil Service rules lies only against an appointment or a promotion, not against a mere designation, which is temporary in nature, imposes only additional duties upon an incumbent official, and does not confer security of tenure; consequently, such a designation is not a "transfer" within the meaning of the prohibition on transfers of civil service officers and employees during the election period.

Petitioner Librada D. Tapispisan was a public school teacher who had occupied the position of Teacher III since September 1, 1992, with thirty years of teaching service, assigned at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City. Respondents Aida M. Rumbaoa and Myrna M. Teves were likewise teachers at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School, Rumbaoa having been appointed Elementary School Head Teacher III effective March 15, 1995 and Teves having been appointed Master Teacher II effective February 18, 1987. The dispute implicated the Civil Service rules governing protests against appointments and promotions, the qualification standards and selection-board procedure prescribed by the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987), and COMELEC Resolution No. 2731 dated December 5, 1994, which prohibited the transfer of officers and employees in the civil service during the election period from January 8, 1995 to June 7, 1995.

Petitioner Librada D. Tapispisan was a public school teacher who had occupied the position of Teacher III since September 1, 1992, had been teaching for thirty years, and was then assigned at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City. Respondents Aida M. Rumbaoa and Myrna M. Teves were fellow teachers at the same school. Rumbaoa had been appointed Elementary School Head Teacher III effective March 15, 1995, an appointment attested by the Civil Service Commission, and Teves had been appointed Master Teacher II effective February 18, 1987, likewise attested by the CSC.

On May 30, 1995, respondent Atty. Ricardo T. Sibug, Schools Division Superintendent of Pasay City, issued Division Memorandum No. 33 designating Rumbaoa as Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Head Teacher of P. Villanueva Elementary School and Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary School, both in Pasay City. Feeling that she had been unduly by-passed, Tapispisan filed with Sibug a protest contesting the designation. Sibug denied the protest, and Tapispisan brought the matter to respondent Dr. Nilo L. Rosas, Regional Director of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports for the National Capital Region, who likewise denied it.

On December 11, 1995, Tapispisan filed with the DECS a "Complaint/Protest Against the Illegal and Indiscriminate Appointment and Promotion of Mesdames Aida Rumbaoa and Myrna Teves," docketed as Adm. Case No. 96-001. Named as respondents, aside from Rumbaoa and Teves, were Dr. Rosas, Atty. Sibug, and Mrs. Alicia G. Benzon, Principal IV and Coordinating Principal of the South District. In her complaint/protest, Tapispisan alleged that the designation of Rumbaoa and Teves was made with evident favoritism and in gross violation of Civil Service and DECS rules and regulations on promotions, and that she was more qualified for promotion than both. She pointed out that in the 1994-1995 annual qualifying examination conducted for both teachers and principals, she placed No. 4 in the Division List of Promotables for Head Teachers while the names of Rumbaoa and Teves did not appear therein, yet they were the ones recommended and designated to the subject positions. She enumerated her credentials: a Bachelor of Science in Elementary Education from FEU (1970) and a Master of Arts in Industrial Education, Administration and Supervision, from TUP (1992); Professional Board Examination for Teachers eligibility (71.06%, 1982) and Competitive Examination eligibility (90%, 1971); service as Classroom Teacher (1971-1981) and E.G.T. (1981-1992); and a DECS Rating of 94% as Teacher for 1993-1994, a Potential Teacher Rating of 9.8 for 1994-1995, a Bronze Service Award from the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (1990), a Certificate of Merit from Villamor Air Base Elementary School (1989), and Recognition and Appreciation from Nichols Air Base (1979). She claimed that she had completed her master's degree long before Rumbaoa and Teves completed theirs and that she had become Teacher III ahead of them, but that in making their recommendation, respondents Benzon and Sibug disregarded these objective criteria for promotion and instead resorted to personal or relative factors, which are the weakest of the standards for evaluation, to favor Rumbaoa and Teves. She prayed that the promotions of Rumbaoa and Teves be recalled and that they be disallowed from occupying, in acting capacity, the positions to which they had been designated.

In their answer, respondents Benzon and Sibug asserted that the evaluation of the qualifications of the teachers considered for promotion was made by a Division Section/Board of Promotions in accordance with Section 9, Rule VI, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service laws, and that the qualifications of each applicant were juxtaposed against the qualification standards provided in Sections 1 to 7, Rule IV of the same omnibus rules. They maintained that all the standards and procedures were complied with by the Board of Promotions, which found Tapispisan "wanting of qualification for the position of Head Teacher or Principal." For her part, respondent Rumbaoa averred that she had already been promoted as Elementary School Head Teacher III on March 15, 1995 and subsequently re-assigned as OIC-Head Teacher of P. Villanueva Elementary School on May 30, 1995; that even with the new assignment she retained the position of Elementary School Head Teacher III at Villamor Air Base Elementary School; and that the head of P. Villanueva Elementary School is a Head Teacher, not a principal, so that her assignment thereat was not a promotion since it did not involve an increase in rank and salary. Respondent Teves, in turn, averred that she had been promoted as Master Teacher II as far back as 1987; that whenever the principal of Don Carlos Elementary School was on leave or assigned to other missions, she would be designated OIC thereof; and that the head of that school is Principal I, which is lower in salary than that of Master Teacher II at Villamor Air Base Elementary School, the position she still held.

After evaluating the parties' arguments, then DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria issued an Order dated April 10, 1996 dismissing the complaint/protest, finding the appointment of Rumbaoa and Teves as Head Teacher III and Master Teacher II, respectively, as well as their subsequent designation as OIC-Head Teacher and OIC-Principal, to be in order. As to Teves, Secretary Gloria found that her appointment as Master Teacher II effective February 18, 1987 had been attested by the CSC, so that such final and completed promotional appointment could no longer be the subject of protest nor set aside by recall; that it rested on her Performance Efficiency Ratings, which had been "OUTSTANDING" for the last five consecutive years, and on several awards including Outstanding Teacher of Pasay City in 1993; and that her designation as OIC-Principal was of a temporary nature, not a permanent movement from Villamor Air Base Elementary School nor a promotion, and could be recalled at any time. As to Rumbaoa, he found that her appointment as Elementary School Head Teacher III on March 15, 1995 had likewise been attested by the CSC and had become complete and final; that it was based on her Performance Efficiency Ratings, which had been "OUTSTANDING" for the last four consecutive years (1991-1995), and on several achievement awards for teaching excellence; that she ranked No. 2 in the Division List of Promotables for school year 1993-1994 with a total score of 63.19 against Tapispisan's 53.38, so that even if Tapispisan ranked No. 4 the following school year, the same did not affect Rumbaoa's rank earned the previous year; and that Rumbaoa's appointment took place prior to the qualifying examination in which Tapispisan ranked No. 4, so that Rumbaoa no longer had to take that examination. He stressed that performance ratings, outstanding accomplishments, experience, and specialized education and training comprise ninety percent (90%) of the whole ranking process, while the written examination is only one of the factors considered in determining fitness for the position, and that Rumbaoa's designation as OIC-Head Teacher was merely temporary, did not remove her from her incumbent position as Head Teacher III at Villamor Air Base Elementary School, and was neither a permanent transfer nor a promotion.

• Protest Without Appointment or Promotion: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals committed serious error in upholding the finding of the Civil Service Commission that a protest will not lie in the absence of an appointment or promotion, maintaining that she had been unduly by-passed and that the designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves should be recalled and disallowed.
• Timeliness of the Protest: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals committed serious error in upholding the CSC's finding that her protest was filed out of time.
• Violation of the Election Ban: Petitioner maintained that the transfer/designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves made pursuant to the May 30, 1995 Division Memorandum No. 33 was violative of COMELEC Resolution No. 2731, which expressly bans the transfer of officers and employees in the civil service during the election period designated from January 8, 1995 to June 7, 1995.
• Comparative Qualifications: Petitioner asserted that respondents Rumbaoa and Teves were not qualified for the positions to which they were designated because their names were not included in the 1994 Division List of Promotables, they having obtained failing marks in the qualifying examination conducted for school year 1994-1995, and that while their designation appeared temporary, the intent to permanently appoint them could be inferred from the tenor of Division Memorandum No. 33.

• Regularity of the Selection Process: Respondents Benzon and Sibug asserted that the evaluation of the qualifications of the teachers considered for promotion was made by a Division Section/Board of Promotions in accordance with Section 9, Rule VI, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service laws, with each applicant's qualifications juxtaposed against the qualification standards in Sections 1 to 7, Rule IV of the same rules, and that all standards and procedures were complied with by the Board, which found petitioner "wanting of qualification for the position of Head Teacher or Principal."
• Designation Is Not a Promotion: Respondent Rumbaoa averred that she had already been promoted as Elementary School Head Teacher III on March 15, 1995 and merely re-assigned as OIC-Head Teacher of P. Villanueva Elementary School on May 30, 1995, retaining her position at Villamor Air Base Elementary School; since the head of P. Villanueva Elementary School is a Head Teacher, not a principal, her assignment was not a promotion because it involved no increase in rank and salary.
• Designation Is Temporary and Non-Promotional: Respondent Teves averred that she had been promoted as Master Teacher II way back in 1987 and that her designation as OIC of Don Carlos Elementary School whenever its principal was on leave or on assignment elsewhere was temporary; the head of that school is Principal I, which is lower in salary than her Master Teacher II position at Villamor Air Base Elementary School, which she still holds.

• Protest Against a Designation: Whether a protest under the Civil Service rules may be lodged against a mere designation to an acting or officer-in-charge position in the absence of an appointment or promotion.
• Timeliness of the Protest: Whether petitioner's protest was filed out of time.
• Election Ban on Transfers: Whether the designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves pursuant to Division Memorandum No. 33 violated COMELEC Resolution No. 2731, which bans the transfer of officers and employees in the civil service during the election period from January 8, 1995 to June 7, 1995.
• Comparative Qualifications and Administrative Prerogative: Whether the designation should be set aside on the ground that petitioner was more qualified than the designees.

• Protest Against a Designation: No. Only appointments or promotions may be the subject of a protest under Sections 40, 42, and 47(d) of the Civil Service Commission's Uniform Rules of Procedure; a designation is temporary, imposes only additional duties, and does not amount to the issuance of an appointment.
• Timeliness of the Protest: Not resolved. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the issue of timeliness, the protest being dismissible on the other grounds discussed.
• Election Ban on Transfers: No. The designation did not involve a movement from one position to another nor the issuance of any appointment, and respondents retained their incumbent positions; hence it was not a "transfer" within the meaning of COMELEC Resolution No. 2731.
• Comparative Qualifications and Administrative Prerogative: No. The designation was well within the prerogative of the DECS officials, and no grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law attended it.

• Protest Against a Designation: Sections 40, 42, and 47(d) of the Civil Service Commission's Uniform Rules of Procedure contemplate a protest by a qualified next-in-rank employee against an appointment made in favor of another, to be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the issuance of the appointment or promotion, and requiring dismissal where no appointment has actually been issued to the protestee. The CSC, in Resolution No. 972501 dated April 14, 1997, construed these provisions to mean that only appointments or promotions, and not designations, may be the subject of a protest, a designation being temporary in nature and amounting to a mere imposition of additional duties rather than the issuance of an appointment. That construction, rendered by the agency charged with enforcement of the statute and observed over a long period, was accorded great weight and respect. The Court drew the distinction between an appointment and a designation: an appointment is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office, and when completed usually with its confirmation, it results in security of tenure unless the office is replaceable at pleasure; a designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, is essentially legislative in nature as against the executive character of an appointment, and, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, implies that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority, conferring no security of tenure. The designations of Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of P. Villanueva Elementary School and Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary School merely imposed on them additional duties on top of those corresponding to their incumbent positions at Villamor Air Base Elementary School, and Secretary Gloria himself underscored that the designations were temporary in nature, not a permanent transfer nor a promotion. Accordingly, the protest did not lie.

• Timeliness of the Protest: The Court, having found the protest dismissible on the substantive grounds discussed, expressly declared that it no longer found it necessary to resolve the issue relating to the timeliness of petitioner's protest.

• Election Ban on Transfers: COMELEC Resolution No. 2731 dated December 5, 1994 declared as a prohibited act the transfer of officers and employees in the civil service during the election period from January 8, 1995 up to June 7, 1995. Transfer is defined under Section 5, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 as "a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment." The designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves did not involve a movement from one position to another, nor did it involve the issuance of any appointment to the said positions in their favor; both retained their incumbent positions at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School. Their designation therefore could not be considered a "transfer" within the meaning of a prohibited act during the election period.

• Comparative Qualifications and Administrative Prerogative: Even granting arguendo that a protest may be properly lodged against a designation, petitioner's protest on the ground that she was more qualified would still fail. In her 4th Indorsement dated August 10, 1995, respondent Benzon, as Principal IV and Coordinating Principal of the South District, clarified that respondent Teves was considered for designation as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary School because of her orientation and training, and because, aside from occupying the position of Master Teacher II, she carried with her three years of work experience as officer-in-charge of the same school; Benzon likewise justified the designation of respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of P. Villanueva Elementary School on the ground that she was qualified therefor, having been duly appointed Head Teacher III effective March 15, 1995 and having ranked No. 2 in the Division List of Promotables for school year 1993-1994. These explanations were well taken by respondent Sibug, Schools Division Superintendent, in his 5th Indorsement dated August 15, 1995 and by respondent Rosas, Regional Director of the DECS for NCR, in his 6th Indorsement dated September 1, 1995, both of whom recommended the dismissal of the protest, as Secretary Gloria ultimately did in his Order dated April 10, 1996. The designation was thus well within the prerogative of the DECS officials, and the Court would refrain from unduly interfering with the exercise of such administrative prerogative, administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies being entitled to respect and sustainable only on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law — none of which was shown to have attended the designation. Separately, the Court noted that the appointing power is vested in the Department Head/Secretary, although it may be delegated to the regional director subject to the approval, revision, modification, and reversal of the Department Secretary; that the appointments of Rumbaoa and Teves as Head Teacher III and Master Teacher II had been made by the appropriate appointing authority and duly attested by the CSC, which under the Constitution is the central personnel agency charged with determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service; that the appointing officer and the CSC, acting together though not concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment complete; and that the appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities, his final choice being entitled to respect and not to be disturbed by the courts.

• Appointment Distinguished from Designation — Appointment is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office; when completed, usually with its confirmation, it results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official; appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature. Where a person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority, so that the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment that does not confer security of tenure. In this case, the designations of Rumbaoa and Teves as OIC-Head Teacher and OIC-Principal merely imposed additional duties on top of those corresponding to their incumbent positions and did not confer security of tenure.

• Protest Lies Only Against an Appointment or Promotion — Under Sections 40, 42, and 47(d) of the Civil Service Commission's Uniform Rules of Procedure, a qualified next-in-rank employee may protest an appointment made in favor of another within fifteen (15) days from notice of the issuance of the appointment or promotion, and a protest shall be dismissed where no appointment has actually been issued to the protestee. A designation, being temporary in nature, does not amount to the issuance of an appointment but is a mere imposition of additional duties, and therefore cannot be the subject of a protest.

• Deference to Administrative Construction — Although technically not binding and controlling on the courts, the construction given by the agency or entity charged with the enforcement of a statute should be given great weight and respect, particularly if such construction has been observed and acted on for a long period of time. The CSC's construction that only appointments or promotions, and not designations, may be the subject of a protest was thus accorded great weight and respect.

• Transfer Defined for Purposes of the Election Ban — Transfer is defined as a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment. A designation that involves neither a movement from one position to another nor the issuance of an appointment, and under which the designee retains his incumbent position, is not a "transfer" within the meaning of COMELEC Resolution No. 2731 prohibiting transfers of civil service officers and employees during the election period.

• Completeness of an Appointment and the Appointing Authority's Prerogative — The appointing power is vested in the Department Head/Secretary, although it may be delegated to the regional director subject to the approval, revision, modification, and reversal of the Department Secretary. The appointing officer and the Civil Service Commission, acting together though not concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment complete. In the appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers not only civil service eligibilities but also performance, education, work experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency examinations, and seniority; he has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, and his final choice should be respected and left undisturbed, judges not being permitted to substitute their judgment for his.

• Respect for Administrative Decisions — Administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. None of these vices having been shown to attend the designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves, the Court refrained from interfering with the exercise of the DECS officials' administrative prerogative.

• "Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties of an incumbent official … . It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature." — This passage, drawn from Sevilla vs. Court of Appeals, supplies the canonical distinction between appointment and designation on which the entire ruling rests, and explains why a designation cannot be the subject of a protest.
• "However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named." — This is the ratio for holding that the designations of Rumbaoa and Teves neither amounted to appointments nor conferred security of tenure, and thus fell outside the scope of a protestable appointment.
• "Transfer is defined as 'a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment.'" — Quoting Section 5, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, this definition is the controlling test applied to hold that the designation did not violate COMELEC Resolution No. 2731's election-period ban on transfers.
• "Consequently, the appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed. Judges should not substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority." — This passage, quoted from Civil Service Commission vs. De la Cruz, states the standard of judicial deference applied to the DECS officials' designation of respondents and to the appointments earlier upheld by Secretary Gloria.

• Sevilla vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88498, June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 637 — The controlling precedent from which the Court adopted the definition of appointment and designation and the rule that a designation is an acting or temporary appointment conferring no security of tenure.
• Umoso vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 110276, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 617 — Cited for the rule that the appointing power is vested in the Department Head/Secretary, although it may be delegated to the regional director subject to the approval, revision, modification, and reversal of the Department Secretary.
• Civil Service Commission vs. Tinaya, G.R. No. 154898, February 16, 2005 — Cited for the constitutional characterization of the Civil Service Commission as the central personnel agency of the government charged with determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service.
• Abella, Jr. vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November 17, 2004 — Cited for the rule that the appointing officer and the CSC, acting together though not concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment complete.
• Civil Service Commission vs. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 158737, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 403 — The source of the passage on the appointing authority's right of choice and the rule that judges should not substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority.
• Dimaandal vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 122197, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 322 — Cited for the rule that the construction given by the agency charged with the enforcement of a statute should be given great weight and respect, particularly if observed and acted upon for a long period of time; applied to the CSC's construction of the protest rules.
• Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124261, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 285 — Cited for the rule that administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.
• Martinez, Estrella V. (CSC Resolution No. 95-3512) — The Civil Service Commission ruling, quoted in CSC Resolution No. 972501, distinguishing a promotional appointment from a designation or reassignment order, the latter merely requiring performance of additional duties and responsibilities and being questionable only by the person so reassigned.

• Sections 40, 42, and 47(d), Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 94-0521 (Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigation) — Section 40 governs who may file a protest and where, allowing a qualified next-in-rank employee to protest an appointment made in favor of another; Section 42 fixes the fifteen-day period from notice of the issuance of the appointment or promotion within which the protest must be filed; Section 47(d) requires dismissal of a protest where no appointment has actually been issued to the protestee. These provisions supplied the basis for holding that only appointments or promotions, and not designations, may be the subject of a protest.
• Section 9, Rule VI, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) — Requires the establishment of a Selection/Promotion Board in every department or agency to adopt a formal screening procedure and formulate criteria for evaluating candidates, and to determine en banc the list of employees recommended for promotion from which the appointing authority may choose. Respondents Benzon and Sibug invoked this provision in asserting that the evaluation of the candidates was made by a Division Section/Board of Promotions in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
• Sections 1 to 7, Rule IV, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 — Define qualification standards as the statement of minimum qualifications for a position, including education, experience, training, civil service eligibility, and physical characteristics and personality traits required by the job, and direct that these be used as guides in appointments and in the adjudication of protested appointments. These provisions were cited by respondents Benzon and Sibug as the standards against which each applicant's qualifications were juxtaposed.
• Section 5, Rule VII, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 — Defines transfer as "a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment." This definition controlled the holding that the designation of respondents was not a prohibited transfer.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 2731 dated December 5, 1994 — Declared as a prohibited act the transfer of officers and employees in the civil service during the election period from January 8, 1995 up to June 7, 1995. Because the designation involved neither a movement from one position to another nor the issuance of an appointment, and the designees retained their incumbent positions, the resolution was held not to have been violated.
• 1987 Constitution — Civil Service Commission as the central personnel agency — The Court cited the Constitution for the proposition that the CSC is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service, which underpinned the respect accorded to the CSC's attestation of the appointments of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves.

Artemio V. Panganiban, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Dante O. Tinga, and Minita V. Chico-Nazario concurred. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno were on official leave, and Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia took no part. No separate concurring opinion appears in the text.