Tano vs. Socrates

Local government units may validly enact ordinances restricting the catching and shipment of live marine organisms to protect the environment and preserve ecological balance, as this is a legitimate exercise of police power under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code; the preferential right of subsistence fishermen to the use of communal marine resources is not absolute and must yield to the State's duty to protect and conserve the environment.

Puerto Princesa City and the Province of Palawan enacted ordinances banning the shipment of live fish and lobster and the catching of specific marine coral-dwelling organisms for a period of five years to prevent cyanide fishing and protect coral reefs. Fishermen and merchants charged with violating these ordinances directly filed a petition with the Supreme Court to declare the ordinances unconstitutional, circumventing the lower courts and the prosecutors' offices.

• Ordinances Enacted: On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa enacted Ordinance No. 15-92, banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside the city from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998, with exceptions for sea bass, catfish, mudfish, and milkfish fries. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of specific live marine coral-dwelling aquatic organisms for five years.
• Implementing Order: Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, directing the inspection of cargo containing live fish and lobster to ascertain compliance with the Mayor's permit and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) clearance.
• Criminal Charges: Petitioners Alfredo Tano and others were charged criminally with violating Ordinance No. 2 in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay. Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim were charged with violating Ordinance No. 15-92 before the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa. Another group of petitioners was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Palawan.
• Direct Resort to Supreme Court: Without seeking redress from the lower courts or filing motions to quash the informations, petitioners directly invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction by filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

• Petitioners argued that the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
• Petitioners contended that Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation or condition under which the Mayor's permit could be granted or denied, granting the Mayor absolute authority.
• Petitioners asserted that Ordinance No. 2 altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling, and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms without distinction as to whether they were caught through lawful fishing methods, thereby taking away their right to earn a livelihood in lawful ways.

• Respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2 as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the LGC) and its specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties under Sections 447, 458, and 468 of the LGC.
• Respondents maintained there was no violation of due process because public hearings were conducted before enactment, and the Ordinance had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means.
• Respondents argued there was no violation of equal protection because a substantial distinction existed between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live (who uses sodium cyanide) and a fisherman who does not.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the petition is premature for failure to file motions to quash in the lower courts.
  • Whether the petition violates the hierarchy of courts.
  • Whether the petition, insofar as the second set of petitioners is concerned, is actually one for declaratory relief over which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the Ordinances violate the constitutional rights of subsistence fishermen and the right to livelihood under Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII and Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
  • Whether the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan have the authority to enact the challenged Ordinances under the Local Government Code.

• Procedural: The Court found the petition procedurally infirm. As to the first set of petitioners (those criminally charged), the petition was premature because they had not filed motions to quash the informations on the ground that the ordinances were unconstitutional; the denial of such a motion would not immediately justify a petition for certiorari. As to the second set of petitioners, the petition was effectively one for declaratory relief, over which the Court exercises only appellate jurisdiction. Furthermore, the direct filing with the Supreme Court violated the hierarchy of courts. However, the Court opted to resolve the case on the merits because the lifetime of the challenged ordinances was about to end and the issues were novel and of paramount importance.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that the Ordinances are valid and constitutional. The Ordinances were enacted in the valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code (Section 16) and the specific devolved powers to protect the environment and enforce fishery laws in municipal waters. The constitutional provisions invoked by petitioners do not grant absolute rights. Section 2, Article XII primarily imposes a duty on the State to protect marine wealth, and the preferential right of subsistence fishermen under Section 7, Article XIII is subject to the State's power to protect, develop, and conserve marine resources. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The prohibition against catching live fish is a reasonable means to combat cyanide fishing, which destroys coral reefs. The Local Government Code repealed or amended provisions of P.D. 704 that required approval by the Secretary of Natural Resources for municipal fishing ordinances, thereby affirming the devolved power of local government units.

• Police Power of Local Government Units — Local government units may exercise police power through the General Welfare Clause (Section 16, LGC), which authorizes them to enact ordinances that are necessary, appropriate, or incidental for efficient governance and essential to the promotion of general welfare, including the enhancement of the right of the people to a balanced ecology.
• Preferential Right of Subsistence Fishermen — The preferential right of subsistence fishermen to the use of communal marine and fishing resources is not absolute. It is subject to the State's exercise of police power to protect, develop, and conserve such resources for present and future generations.
• Hierarchy of Courts — A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly set out in the petition. The concurrence of jurisdiction does not accord parties an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of court forum.
• Presumption of Constitutionality — Laws and ordinances enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. Where doubt exists, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality.

• "The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment ..." — This underscores the limitation on the exploitation of natural resources, even by subsistence fishermen, when such exploitation leads to ecological destruction.
• "To doubt is to sustain." — This articulates the strength of the presumption of constitutionality enjoyed by legislative enactments.

• Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993) — Followed. The Court reiterated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a self-preservation right that carries a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
• People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415 (1989) — Followed. The Court applied the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, holding that concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant parties absolute freedom to choose the court forum for extraordinary writs.
• Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993) — Followed. The Court reiterated the policy against direct resort to the Supreme Court to prevent inordinate demands on its time and avoid inevitable delays.

• Section 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution — The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Court held this provision primarily imposes a duty on the State to protect marine wealth rather than an absolute right for fishermen.
• Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution — The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to the preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources and shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The Court held that the preferential right is not absolute and must yield to the State's duty to conserve.
• Section 16, R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code) — The General Welfare Clause. The Court relied on this provision to uphold the power of local government units to enact the challenged ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology.
• Sections 447(a)(1)(vi), 458(a)(1)(vi), and 468(a)(1)(vi), R.A. 7160 — Direct the sangguniang bayan, panlungsod, and panlalawigan to enact ordinances to protect the environment and impose penalties for acts which endanger the environment. The Court used these provisions to validate the specific objectives of the ordinances.
• Section 534, R.A. 7160 — Repealing clause. The Court held that this provision expressly repealed or amended Sections 16 and 29 of P.D. 704 insofar as they required approval by the Secretary of Natural Resources for municipal fishing ordinances.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Vitug, Panganiban, Torres, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Mendoza.

• Bellosillo, J. (joined by Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.) — The dissent argued that the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa lacked the authority to enact Ordinance No. 15-92 because the subject matter fell within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under P.D. No. 704. Furthermore, the dissent contended that the Ordinance was unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), as required by P.D. No. 704.