Tanega vs. Masakayan

The Court held that the prescription period for a penalty of imprisonment imposed by final judgment commences only when the convict, having already commenced service of the sentence, escapes confinement. Where a convict has never been placed under actual deprivation of liberty, the statutory trigger of "evasion" under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code is absent, and the penalty cannot prescribe.

Petitioner Adelaida Tanega stood convicted of slander by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V, following an appeal from a City Court conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, rendering the sentence final. The trial court scheduled the execution of her penalty of 20 days of arresto menor and a fine of P100.00. Upon petitioner’s motion, the execution date was deferred to February 12, 1965. Petitioner failed to appear on the scheduled date, prompting the trial court to issue warrants for her arrest. She remained at large for over a year and a half before moving to quash the warrants on the ground that the penalty had prescribed.

• The City Court of Quezon City initially convicted petitioner of slander. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V.
• The trial court found petitioner guilty anew and sentenced her to 20 days of arresto menor, ordered indemnification of the offended party in the amount of P100.00, imposed subsidiary imprisonment, and awarded costs.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Court subsequently denied a petition for certiorari, rendering the judgment final and executory.
• On January 11, 1965, the trial court directed that execution of the sentence be carried out on January 27, 1965. Petitioner filed a motion to defer execution, and the court reset the date to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m.
• Petitioner failed to appear on the scheduled date. The respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest on February 15, 1965, followed by an alias warrant on March 23, 1965. Petitioner was never apprehended.
• On December 10, 1966, petitioner filed a motion to quash the arrest warrants, asserting that the penalty had prescribed.
• On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge denied the motion, ruled that the penalty must be served, and ordered the issuance of another alias warrant, prompting the present petition.

• Petitioner maintained that the penalty of arresto menor had prescribed because more than one year had elapsed since the final judgment became executory.
• Petitioner argued that under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescriptive period for light penalties commences upon finality or notification of the sentence, and that her failure to voluntarily submit to custody did not toll the running of the period.
• Petitioner sought the quashal of the arrest warrants and the prohibition of their execution on the ground that the state's right to enforce the penalty had been extinguished by prescription.

• Respondent judge and the Solicitor General contended that the penalty had not prescribed because the petitioner was never placed in actual confinement.
• Respondents argued that Article 93 requires "evasion of service of sentence" to trigger the prescriptive period, and evasion legally presupposes an escape from actual custody.
• Respondents maintained that because petitioner never commenced service of the sentence, the one-year period never began to run, and the arrest warrants remained legally enforceable.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its original jurisdiction over certiorari and prohibition to quash the trial court's order denying the motion to quash arrest warrants and to enjoin the execution of the sentence.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the prescription period for a penalty of imprisonment under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code commences upon finality of judgment or only upon the convict's escape after commencement of service of sentence.

• Procedural: The Court exercised its original jurisdiction to resolve the petition on the merits, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the prescription claim. The Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition, leaving the arrest warrants intact and the execution of the sentence undisturbed.
• Substantive: The Court held that prescription of a penalty of imprisonment does not commence until the convict escapes after having begun to serve the sentence. The Court interpreted Article 93 in conjunction with Article 157, which defines evasion of sentence as escaping during the term of imprisonment. Relying on the legislative history of the Revised Penal Code and Spanish penal law, the Court found that the deletion of the "date of notification" clause from the old Spanish code left "quebrantamiento de la condena" as the sole triggering event. Because the petitioner was never confined, she could not have evaded service, and the one-year prescriptive period never commenced.

• Prescription of Penalties — Prescription of penalties under the Revised Penal Code extinguishes the state's right to enforce a final criminal sentence after a statutory period. For penalties involving deprivation of liberty, the prescriptive period commences only upon the convict's evasion of service, which legally requires an escape from actual confinement. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that a convict who has never been placed in custody cannot invoke prescription, as the statutory trigger of escape has not occurred.

• "We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment." — This passage establishes the controlling test for when the prescriptive period begins, directly anchoring it to the physical act of escape from confinement rather than the mere finality or notification of judgment.
• "Reason dictates that one can escape only after he has started service of sentence." — The Court employed this logical premise to reject the petitioner's argument that prescription runs from notification or finality, emphasizing that evasion is a legal and physical impossibility without prior confinement.

• People v. Abilong, 82 Phil. 172 — Cited to clarify the correct translation and controlling meaning of Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, confirming that "evading service of sentence" requires the convict to be suffering deprivation of liberty at the time of escape.
• Alvarez v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 43 — Referenced to support the interpretation that evasion of sentence is synonymous with jailbreaking, reinforcing the requirement that the offender must first be confined before prescription can be triggered.

• Article 9, Revised Penal Code — Cited to classify arresto menor and the imposed fine as a light penalty, which triggers the one-year prescription period under Article 92.
• Article 92, Revised Penal Code — Provides that light penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe in one year.
• Article 93, Revised Penal Code — Governs the commencement of the prescriptive period for penalties, stating it runs from the date the culprit evades service of sentence. The Court interpreted this provision to require actual escape from confinement.
• Article 157, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of evasion of service of sentence, establishing the elements of final conviction, actual service of sentence involving deprivation of liberty, and escape. The Court used this to define "evasion" under Article 93.
• Article 158, Revised Penal Code — Cited to further illustrate that evasion presupposes leaving a penal institution where the convict is confined.
• Article 134, Spanish Penal Code of 1870 — Cited for legislative history, showing that the original provision included the date of personal notification as a starting point for prescription, which was deliberately omitted in the Revised Penal Code to leave only "evasion" as the trigger.