Tandoc vs. Resultan

A city court has the power and authority to conduct a preliminary examination and proceed with the trial of offenses within its jurisdiction, notwithstanding a prior preliminary investigation by the city fiscal that dismissed the charges, provided the offense has not prescribed; such dismissal does not bar prosecution on double jeopardy grounds, and reinvestigation by the fiscal is not available for cases cognizable by inferior courts and filed for trial on the merits.

The controversy concerns the respective roles of the Office of the City Fiscal of San Carlos City, Pangasinan and the City Court of San Carlos City in initiating prosecutions for offenses falling within the city court's jurisdiction. The petitioners were among the accused in complaints filed by the private respondents, while the public respondent was the presiding judge of that city court. Under the then Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts, and those within the concurrent jurisdiction of city or municipal courts with Courts of First Instance, did not entitle the accused to a preliminary investigation proper; the city court could conduct a preliminary examination for issuance of a warrant of arrest and then proceed to trial.

On October 19, 1980, at about 6:35 p.m., an altercation occurred at the house and store of Pacita B. Tandoc on Rizal Avenue, San Carlos City, Pangasinan. According to the complaint filed with the Office of the City Fiscal, Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay and his companions entered the store and dining room without permission. During an argument about the stoning of Tandoc's store and house, Arnold picked up stones and struck Tandoc but hit her helper Bonifacio Menor, who suffered physical injuries that would heal in more than thirty days. Beda Acosta, who was behind Arnold, also threw a stone at Tandoc but hit helper Fred de la Vega, who suffered injuries that would heal in less than nine days. The matter was reported to the barangay chairman and the station commander.

On the same date, October 19, 1980, a criminal complaint docketed as I.S. No. 80-198 was lodged with the Office of the City Fiscal of San Carlos City. It charged Serious Physical Injuries, filed by Bonifacio Menor against Arnold Payopay; Slight Physical Injuries, filed by Fred de la Vega against Beda Acosta; and Trespass to Dwelling, filed by Pacita Tandoc against Arnold Payopay, Beda Acosta, Manuel Cancino, Nadong Fernandez, and Arturo Syloria. Pending resolution of that complaint, on December 2, 1980, Arnold Payopay, Conrado Payopay, Sr., and Manuel Cancino filed I.S. No. 80-233 with the Office of the City Fiscal against Pedro Tandoc, Pacita Tandoc, Rudy Diaz, Fred Menor, Rogelio Ercella, Juan Rosario, and Fred de la Vega for Trespass to Dwelling, Serious Oral Defamation, Grave Threats, and Physical Injuries.

On December 10, 1980, the investigating fiscal found reasonable ground to believe that Trespass to Dwelling had been committed by all respondents in I.S. No. 80-198, Serious Physical Injuries by Arnold Payopay, and Slight Physical Injuries by Beda Acosta, and recommended that informations be filed. The respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied on January 5, 1981, and informations for Slight Physical Injuries, Trespass to Dwelling, and Serious Physical Injuries were filed with the City Court, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 1992, 2000, and 2001. As to I.S. No. 80-233, the Office of the City Fiscal recommended dropping the charges of Serious Oral Defamation, Grave Threats, and Physical Injuries because they were in the nature of countercharges filed more than one month after the October 19, 1980 incident, but it found a prima facie case for Trespass to Dwelling filed by Conrado Payopay, Sr. against Pedro Tandoc. On January 28, 1981, an information for Trespass to Dwelling was filed with the City Court, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2017.

On July 28, 1981, Arnold Payopay, Conrado Payopay, Sr., and Manuel Cancino directly lodged four criminal complaints with the City Court against the petitioners. Criminal Case No. 2105 charged Serious Physical Injuries, filed by Arnold Payopay as private complainant; Criminal Case No. 2106 charged Trespass to Dwelling, filed by Conrado Payopay, Sr.; Criminal Case No. 2107 charged Less Serious Physical Injuries, filed by Manuel Cancino; and Criminal Case No. 2108 charged Grave Threats to Kill, filed by Arnold Payopay.

On August 13, 1981, after conducting a preliminary examination of the four cases, the City Court issued Orders finding reasonable ground to believe that the offenses charged may have been committed by the accused and that they were probably guilty, and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest, although the warrants were later suspended upon motion of the petitioners. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied, and their motion for reinvestigation by the Office of the City Fiscal was denied on October 21, 1981; their reconsideration of that denial was likewise denied. The City Court's findings that the offenses were within its jurisdiction, that the incident occurred on October 19, 1980, and that the complaints were filed on July 28, 1981, were material to the Supreme Court's resolution of the petition.

• Power of City Court: Whether the city court has the power and authority to conduct anew a preliminary examination of charges previously the subject of a preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the City Fiscal and thereafter dismissed by the latter.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the earlier dismissal of the complaints by the investigating fiscal bars the filing of said complaints with the city court on the ground of double jeopardy.
• Prescription: Whether the offenses charged had prescribed.
• Reinvestigation: Whether petitioners may seek a reinvestigation by the Office of the City Fiscal after the city court found reasonable ground.

• Power of City Court: Yes. The city court has the power and authority to conduct a preliminary examination and proceed with the trial of cases within its jurisdiction, as long as the offense has not prescribed.
• Double Jeopardy: No. A preliminary investigation is not a trial and does not place the accused in jeopardy; the dismissal by the fiscal does not bar the filing of the complaints with the city court.
• Prescription: No. The crimes had not prescribed; the incident occurred on October 19, 1980, and the complaints were filed on July 28, 1981, within the applicable prescriptive periods.
• Reinvestigation: No. Reinvestigation by the Office of the City Fiscal applies only where a case is cognizable by the Court of First Instance but filed with the City Court for preliminary investigation only and dismissed for lack of a prima facie case; for cases cognizable by inferior courts and filed for trial, the fiscal has no authority to reinvestigate.

• Power of City Court: A preliminary investigation is intended to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense, and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer, and to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. It has two stages: the preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses prior to the arrest of the accused to determine whether there is ground to issue a warrant of arrest, and the preliminary investigation proper, wherein the accused, after arrest, is informed of the complaint and given access to the testimonies and evidence, and is permitted to introduce evidence in his favor. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, not a trial on the merits, and does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. Under Section 10, Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court, as well as in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of city or municipal courts with Courts of First Instance, the accused was not entitled to be heard in a preliminary investigation proper. The reason is to avoid loss of time and mental anguish, assure a speedy and expeditious trial, and because the preliminary examination and sworn statements of the complainant and witnesses generally suffice to establish reasonable ground. Here, the offenses of Trespass to Dwelling, Grave Threats, and Physical Injuries were all within the jurisdiction of the City Court of San Carlos City. The complaints could be filed directly with the City Court, which is empowered to conduct a preliminary examination for purposes of issuing warrants of arrest and thereafter to proceed with the trial on the merits. The preliminary investigation proper conducted by the Office of the City Fiscal could have been dispensed with. Thus, the city court had the power and authority to conduct a preliminary examination and proceed with the trial.

• Double Jeopardy: The result of a preliminary investigation can neither constitute nor give rise to the defense of double jeopardy because such preliminary investigation is not and does not in itself constitute a trial or even any part thereof. The only purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine, before the presentation of evidence by the prosecution and by the defense, whether there are reasonable grounds for proceeding formally and resolutely against the accused. For the defense of jeopardy to lie, there must be a former judgment, either of acquittal or of conviction, rendered by a court competent to render the same, not only by reason of the offense committed, which must be the same or at least comprised within it, but also by reason of the place where it was committed. None of these circumstances existed. Consequently, the earlier order of dismissal of the complaints by the investigating fiscal did not bar the filing of said complaints with the city court on the ground of double jeopardy.

• Prescription: As long as the offense charged has not prescribed, the city court has the power and authority to conduct a preliminary examination and proceed with the trial of the case properly within its jurisdiction. The prescriptive period of a crime depends upon the penalty imposed by law. The penalty of arresto mayor is imposed for Trespass to Dwelling, Grave Threats which is not subject to a condition, and Less Serious Physical Injuries which has incapacitated the offended party for ten days or requires medical attendance for the same period. For Serious Physical Injuries which has caused illness or incapacity for labor for more than thirty days, the penalty is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. Offenses punishable by arresto mayor prescribe in five years, while crimes punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in ten years. The incident occurred on October 19, 1980, while the complaints were filed with the City Court nine months later, or on July 28, 1981. Thus, the crimes charged had not yet prescribed.

• Reinvestigation: From the order of the City Court finding reasonable ground to believe that a crime was committed and the accused probably guilty thereof, petitioners cannot seek a reinvestigation by the Office of the City Fiscal. The reinvestigation sought by petitioners applies only to instances where a case is cognizable by the Court of First Instance but filed with the City Court for purposes of preliminary investigation only and thereafter dismissed by the latter on the ground that no prima facie case exists. However, for cases cognizable by inferior courts and filed with the same not only for purposes of preliminary investigation but for trial on the merits, the Office of the City Fiscal has no authority to reinvestigate.

• Preliminary Investigation — A preliminary investigation is intended to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense, and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt has first been ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer, and to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. It has two stages: the preliminary examination of the complainant and witnesses before arrest to determine whether a warrant of arrest should issue, and the preliminary investigation proper after arrest, where the accused is informed of the complaint, given access to evidence, and allowed to present evidence. It is merely inquisitorial, not a trial on the merits, and does not place the accused in jeopardy. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the fiscal's earlier dismissal of the charges did not bar the city court from conducting a preliminary examination and proceeding to trial.

• Jurisdiction of Inferior Courts Over Preliminary Examination — Under Section 10, Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court, as well as in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of city or municipal courts with Courts of First Instance, the accused is not entitled to be heard in a preliminary investigation proper. The city court may conduct a preliminary examination for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest and thereafter proceed with the trial on the merits. The Court applied this doctrine because the offenses charged were within the City Court's jurisdiction, so the complaints could be filed directly there and the preliminary investigation proper by the fiscal could be dispensed with.

• Double Jeopardy — Double jeopardy requires a former judgment of acquittal or conviction rendered by a court competent to render the same, for the same offense or an offense comprised within it, and at the same place. A preliminary investigation is not a trial or any part thereof and cannot give rise to double jeopardy. The Court applied this doctrine to reject petitioners' claim that the fiscal's dismissal of the complaints barred their subsequent filing with the city court.

• Prescription of Offenses — The prescriptive period of a crime depends upon the penalty imposed by law. Offenses punishable by arresto mayor prescribe in five years, while crimes punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in ten years. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the crimes charged had not prescribed because the incident occurred on October 19, 1980, and the complaints were filed on July 28, 1981.

• Reinvestigation by the Fiscal — Reinvestigation by the Office of the City Fiscal applies only to instances where a case is cognizable by the Court of First Instance but filed with the City Court for purposes of preliminary investigation only and thereafter dismissed by the latter on the ground that no prima facie case exists. For cases cognizable by inferior courts and filed with the same not only for preliminary investigation but for trial on the merits, the Office of the City Fiscal has no authority to reinvestigate. The Court applied this doctrine to deny petitioners' motion for reinvestigation.

• "A preliminary investigation is intended to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials." — This passage states the purpose of preliminary investigation, which underpins the Court's conclusion that the fiscal's dismissal did not bar the city court's independent preliminary examination and trial.

• "The result of a preliminary investigation can neither constitute nor give rise to the defense of double jeopardy in any case, because such preliminary investigation is not and does not in itself constitute a trial or even any part thereof." — This is the Court's ratio on double jeopardy: because preliminary investigation is not a trial, its outcome cannot bar a subsequent prosecution.

• "As long as the offense charged has not prescribed, the city court has the power and authority to conduct a preliminary examination and proceed with the trial of the case properly within its jurisdiction." — This is the central holding on the city court's authority, conditioned only on the non-prescription of the offense.

• "The re-investigation sought by petitioners applies only to instances where a case is cognizable by the Court of First Instance but filed with the City Court for purposes of preliminary investigation only and thereafter dismissed by the latter on the ground that no prima facie case exists. However, for cases cognizable by inferior courts and filed with the same not only for purposes of preliminary investigation but for trial on the merits, the Office of the City Fiscal has no authority to re- investigate." — This passage defines the narrow scope of fiscal reinvestigation and explains why petitioners were not entitled to it.

• Salta vs. CA, L-41395, 31 July 1986, 143 SCRA 228 — Cited for the purpose of preliminary investigation: to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense, and burden of a formal trial, and to protect the state from useless and expensive trials.
• Biron vs. Cea, G.R. No. 48110, 16 Sept. 1942, 73 Phil. 673; Hashim vs. Boncan, 24 Phil. 116 — Cited for the two stages of preliminary investigation.
• People vs. Badilla, L-23792, 17 February 1926, 48 Phil. 718 — Cited for the rule that preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime.
• U.S. vs. Yu Tuico, L-1115, 10 March 1916, 34 Phil. 209; People vs. Medted, L-46108, 22 Sept. 1939, 68 Phil. 485 — Cited for the rule that preliminary investigation is not a trial on the merits and does not place the accused in jeopardy.
• Banzon vs. Cabato, L-31447, 27 June 1975, 64 SCRA 419 — Cited for the reason behind withholding the right to a preliminary investigation proper in cases triable by inferior courts.
• Fable vs. On, L-46773, 16 July 1979, 91 SCRA 451 — Cited for the sufficiency of the preliminary examination and sworn statements of the complainant and witnesses to establish reasonable ground.
• People vs. Peji Bautista, G.R. No. 45739, April 25, 1939 — Cited for the purpose of preliminary investigation and the rule that it does not place the accused in jeopardy.

• Section 10, Rule 112, 1964 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — In cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court, as well as in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of city or municipal courts with Courts of First Instance, the accused was not entitled to be heard in a preliminary investigation proper. Applied because the offenses were within the City Court's jurisdiction, so the preliminary investigation proper by the fiscal could be dispensed with.
• Section 9, Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and those covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure do not require a preliminary investigation. Cited as the procedural rule governing cases filed directly with the fiscal or the Municipal Trial Court.
• Revised Penal Code, Art. 280 — Defines and penalizes Trespass to Dwelling. Applied to determine that the offense was punishable by arresto mayor and thus prescribed in five years.
• Revised Penal Code, Art. 282 — Defines and penalizes Grave Threats. Applied to determine that Grave Threats not subject to a condition was punishable by arresto mayor and prescribed in five years.
• Revised Penal Code, Art. 265 — Defines and penalizes Less Serious Physical Injuries. Applied to determine that the offense was punishable by arresto mayor when the offended party was incapacitated for ten days or required medical attendance for the same period.
• Revised Penal Code, Art. 263 — Defines and penalizes Serious Physical Injuries. Applied to determine that the offense was punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period when it caused illness or incapacity for labor for more than thirty days.
• Revised Penal Code, Art. 90 — Provides for the prescription of crimes. Applied to hold that offenses punishable by arresto mayor prescribe in five years and crimes punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in ten years, and that the crimes charged had not prescribed.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.