Tanada vs. Yulo

Act No. 3899 does not apply to a justice of the peace appointed prior to its approval who completed sixty-five years of age after January 1, 1933, and a transfer of a justice of the peace from one municipality to another under Section 206 of the Administrative Code does not constitute a new appointment.

Juan Tanada was appointed justice of the peace of Alabat, Tayabas, by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission on December 4, 1911. Act No. 3899, approved on November 16, 1931, amended the Administrative Code to require justices of the peace who had reached 65 years of age to cease holding office by January 1, 1933. Section 206 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2768, allowed the Governor-General to transfer a justice of the peace from one municipality to another without the consent of the Philippine Senate.

Juan Tanada was appointed justice of the peace of Alabat, Tayabas, by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission on December 4, 1911. He continued in that position until September 8, 1934, when, at his own request and pursuant to section 206 of the Revised Administrative Code, he was transferred to the same position in the municipality of Perez, same province, by a communication signed by the Governor-General. Tanada completed the age of sixty-five years on October 5, 1934.

Thereafter, the Judge of First Instance of Tayabas, acting on instructions from the Department of Justice, directed Tanada to cease to act as justice of the peace of Perez, Tayabas. Tanada surrendered his office under protest and instituted an original action of quo warranto. The Solicitor-General defended the removal by arguing that Act No. 3899 applied to all justices of the peace who reached the age of sixty-five, and that Tanada's acceptance of a transfer constituted a new appointment bringing him within the purview of the law.

• Defective Title: Petitioner contended that Act No. 3899 is unconstitutional because of a defective title.
• Discriminatory Class Legislation: Petitioner alleged in the answer that the law is discriminatory and class legislation, and, consequently, unconstitutional.

• Applicability of Act No. 3899: Respondent argued that Act No. 3899 applies to all justices of the peace who reach the age of sixty-five years, regardless of when they were appointed.
• Transfer as New Appointment: Respondent contended that the petitioner's acceptance of a transfer from one municipality to another constituted a new appointment, thereby bringing him within the purview of Act No. 3899.
• Liberal Construction: Respondent urged a liberal construction of the statute, conceding that the language of the proviso was somewhat defective, and ultimately desired the court to insert words and phrases into the law to supply the legislature's intention.

• Applicability of Act No. 3899: Whether Act No. 3899 applies to a justice of the peace appointed prior to its approval who completed sixty-five years of age subsequent to the approval of the Act and to January 1, 1933.
• Effect of Transfer: Whether a transfer of a justice of the peace from one municipality to another under section 206 of the Administrative Code amounts to a new appointment bringing the justice under the purview of Act No. 3899.
• Judicial Legislation: Whether a court may insert words and phrases into a statute to supply a perceived legislative intent when the statutory language is defective.

• Applicability of Act No. 3899: No. Act No. 3899 does not apply to a justice of the peace appointed prior to its approval who completed sixty-five years of age after January 1, 1933.
• Effect of Transfer: No. A transfer of a justice of the peace does not amount to an appointment; it is merely an enlargement or change of jurisdiction grounded on the original appointment.
• Judicial Legislation: No. Courts cannot engraft upon a law something that has been omitted; doing so constitutes judicial legislation, which is forbidden by the tripartite division of powers.

• Applicability of Act No. 3899: The natural and reasonable meaning of the language used in Act No. 3899 dictates that only justices of the peace who had completed sixty-five years of age at the time the Act took effect were required to cease holding office on January 1, 1933. Tanada turned 65 on October 5, 1934, and was therefore not included in the law. This conclusion aligns with the prior ruling in Regalado vs. Yulo, which was re-examained and affirmed en banc.
• Effect of Transfer: Under the Organic Act, an appointment of a justice of the peace by the Governor-General requires the consent of the Philippine Senate. However, a transfer under section 206 is accomplished without such consent. Following the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Alberto vs. Nicolas, a transfer simply amounts to an enlargement or change of jurisdiction grounded on the original appointment and does not require a new appointment. Thus, Tanada's transfer did not bring him under the purview of the retirement law.
• Judicial Legislation: Legislative intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself. While liberal construction is permissible to find the true meaning from the language, subject matter, and purpose, there is a sharp distinction between liberal construction and engrafting omitted provisions onto a law. Inserting words to supply an intention constitutes judicial legislation, which violates the tripartite division of powers. The court cannot import words into a statute to change its meaning.

• Legislative Intent from Statutory Language — Legislative intent is the primary consideration in statutory interpretation, but it must be determined from the language of the statute itself. Courts cannot create obscurities to clear up by construction or seek hidden meanings at variance with the language used. Departing from the expressed meaning alters the statute and constitutes judicial legislation rather than interpretation.
• Transfer vs. Appointment of Justices of the Peace — A transfer of a justice of the peace from one municipality to another under section 206 of the Administrative Code is merely an enlargement or change of jurisdiction grounded on the original appointment. It does not constitute a new appointment and does not require the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate.

• "To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute, is to legislate not to interpret." — This passage articulates the fundamental principle that courts must adhere to the plain language of a statute and cannot amend it through judicial construction.
• "There is a sharp distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial." — This defines the boundary between permissible liberal construction and prohibited judicial legislation.
• "When the Senate confirmed Severino Alberto to be a justice of the peace for San Jose del Monte, sec. 206, with the proviso, was in force; and when the Senate confirmed him, it confirmed him with the knowledge of the possibility declared in the law that his powers and his functions as a justice of the peace upon designation of the Governor-General might be performed and exercised in another jurisdiction, if the Governor-General should think it wise in the public interest in his regulation of the conduct of justices of the peace." — Quoted from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Alberto vs. Nicolas, this explains why a transfer does not require new Senate consent.

• Regalado vs. Yulo — Controlling precedent on the applicability of Act No. 3899. The Court applied its ruling that the Act did not apply to justices appointed before its approval who turned 65 after January 1, 1933, and reaffirmed it en banc.
• Nicolas vs. Alberto — Distinguished and overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Philippine Supreme Court had held that Senate consent was necessary for a transfer, but this was reversed.
• Alberto vs. Nicolas — Controlling precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court on the effect of a transfer. The Philippine Supreme Court was duty-bound to follow it, holding that a transfer is merely a change of jurisdiction and not a new appointment.
• Newhall vs. Sanger — Corroborative authority from the U.S. Supreme Court stating that courts have no authority to import a word into a statute to change its meaning.
• Commissioner of Immigration vs. Gottlieb — Corroborative authority stating courts must follow the plain words of a statute with no room for construction.
• Cliff vs. Wentworth — Cited to support the proposition that a transfer of an officer amounts merely to a change of position or grade of service.

• Section 203, Revised Administrative Code (as amended by Act No. 3899) — Provides for the appointment and distribution of justices of the peace. The proviso requires present justices who had completed 65 years of age at the time the Act took effect to cease holding office on January 1, 1933. The Court held this did not apply to Tanada, who turned 65 after that date.
• Section 206, Revised Administrative Code (as amended by Act No. 2768) — Governs the tenure of office and transfer of justices of the peace. It allows the Governor-General to transfer a justice of the peace from one municipality to another when the public interest requires it, without Senate consent. The Court held this transfer was not a new appointment.

Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Butte, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concurred.