Tan vs. Republic of the Philippines

There is no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of an individual’s citizenship; a court may pass upon citizenship only as an incident to the adjudication of a justiciable controversy properly raised by the pleadings. In a naturalization case, a court exceeds its jurisdiction when it declares the petitioner a citizen although the petition and declaration of intention alleged he was a Chinese citizen and sought admission to Philippine citizenship.

Danilo Channie Tan alias Tan Suy Chan sought to become a Philippine citizen through judicial naturalization, a status that Philippine law permits to be acquired by judicial decree. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition. The governing Naturalization Law and related jurisprudence require, among other things, that an applicant bring his children to the Philippines and enroll them in local schools.

Danilo Channie Tan alias Tan Suy Chan was the petitioner in a naturalization case before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. His petition for naturalization and his declaration of intention stated that he was a citizen of Nationalist China and that he wanted to become a citizen of the Philippines; in the petition he prayed to be “admitted” as such citizen. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition.

To support his claim that he was already a Philippine citizen, petitioner sought to prove that he was the legitimate child of Hee Acusar; that he was born in Amoy, China, on June 25, 1927; that he was married to Ong Witty, who was born in Bangkok, Siam, and resided in Hongkong; that he had two legitimate children residing in Hongkong, namely Tan Khing, born in Amoy, China, on August 12, 1948, and Tan Phing Phing, born in Hongkong; that he came to the Philippines in 1935 and resided in Bogo, Cebu; that his father Hee Acusar had his business and resided in Bogo; that Hee Acusar’s father, Calixto Acusar, and his second wife, Anastacia Arnoco, also resided in the same municipality; and that Hee Acusar and Calixto Acusar were citizens of the Philippines.

Petitioner, however, testified that he was a Chinese citizen. As far back as 1946, he registered himself as a Chinese citizen in the Immigration Office, which issued him an Alien Certificate Registration stating that he was a citizen of China; he renewed the certificate in 1951, paid the annual fees due from aliens, and held an Immigrant Certificate of Residence stating that his nationality was Chinese. The same statement appeared in Exhibit S and in his 1956 income tax return, Exhibit Y, both of which he introduced in evidence. His certificate of baptism, Exhibit AA, stated that the baptism took place on June 25, 1957, and named his father as Tan Sim.

Although petitioner testified that Tan Sim was the same person as Hee Acusar, the Court found this evidence unworthy of credence. Exhibit W showed that as early as October 20, 1877, Calixto Acuzar, the alleged father Crisanto Acusar, used Christian names and surnames; considering customs and practices in the Philippines, it was inconceivable that the son of Calixto Acusar and grandson of Crisanto Acusar would have used, fifty years later, the Chinese name Tan Sim. Hee Acusar also stated in the special power of attorney, Exhibit FF, that petitioner was a “Chinese citizen,” which matched the petition for naturalization, the declaration of intention, and petitioner’s own testimony. Petitioner never explained why he had never used the surname “Acusar” despite allegedly being a descendant of at least three generations of Acusars.

The Court further observed that petitioner’s failure to bring his children to the Philippines and enroll them in local schools, as required by the Naturalization Law, and the decisions holding that such omission bars the naturalization of the father even if the omission was sought to be justified by the alleged impossibility of getting the children out of China, explained his efforts to establish in the lower court that he was already a Philippine citizen despite the contrary allegations in his petition and declaration of intention.

• Erroneous Declaration of Citizenship: The Solicitor General, for the Republic of the Philippines, sought review of the lower court’s decision, maintaining that it erred in declaring petitioner Danilo Channie Tan alias Tan Suy Chan a citizen of the Philippines.

• Judicial Declaration of Citizenship: Whether Philippine courts may entertain an action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of an individual’s citizenship.
• Jurisdiction and Pleadings: Whether the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring petitioner a citizen when the question of citizenship was never put in issue by the pleadings in the naturalization case.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the evidence justified the lower court’s finding that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines.

• Judicial Declaration of Citizenship: No. Under Philippine law, there is no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of an individual’s citizenship; courts may pass upon status only as an incident to the adjudication of a justiciable controversy.
• Jurisdiction and Pleadings: Yes. The lower court exceeded its jurisdiction because the question of petitioner’s Philippine citizenship was never put in issue by the pleadings in the naturalization case.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The evidence did not justify the finding of Philippine citizenship; petitioner’s own testimony and official records showed he was a Chinese citizen, and his claim of Philippine parentage was not credible.

• Judicial Declaration of Citizenship: Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy granted or sanctioned by law for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, a court may pass upon and make a pronouncement relative to their status; otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. No action may be instituted to declare that a person is married, single, or a legitimate child, although a finding may be made as a necessary premise to justify relief available only to one enjoying that status. The law permits acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization, by judicial decree, but there is no similar legislation authorizing a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. Thus, the lower court’s declaration of petitioner’s citizenship was improper.

• Jurisdiction and Pleadings: The petition for naturalization and the declaration of intention stated that petitioner was a citizen of Nationalist China and wanted to become a citizen of the Philippines; the petition prayed that he be “admitted” as such citizen. The question whether he was already a Philippine citizen was therefore never put in issue. When the lower court declared him to be such citizen, it went beyond the issues raised by the pleadings and, in effect, exceeded its jurisdiction. Palanca vs. Republic was not applicable because in that case the petitioner had averred through appropriate pleadings that he possessed Philippine citizenship, thereby putting the status in issue.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The evidence on record did not justify the lower court’s finding. Petitioner testified that he was a Chinese citizen. He had registered as a Chinese citizen in the Immigration Office as far back as 1946, was issued an Alien Certificate Registration stating he was a citizen of China, renewed it in 1951, paid annual alien fees, and held an Immigrant Certificate of Residence stating his nationality was Chinese. Exhibit S and his 1956 income tax return, Exhibit Y, also stated he was Chinese. His baptismal certificate, Exhibit AA, named his father as Tan Sim. Although he claimed Tan Sim was Hee Acusar, the Court found this unworthy of credence because Exhibit W showed that as early as October 20, 1877, Calixto Acuzar, the alleged father Crisanto Acusar, used Christian names and surnames; under Philippine customs and practices, it was inconceivable that the son of Calixto Acusar and grandson of Crisanto Acusar would have used the Chinese name Tan Sim fifty years later. Hee Acusar himself stated in the special power of attorney, Exhibit FF, that petitioner was a “Chinese citizen,” consistent with the petition, declaration of intention, and petitioner’s testimony. Petitioner never explained why he never used the surname “Acusar” despite allegedly being a descendant of at least three generations of Acusars. His failure to bring his children to the Philippines and enroll them in local schools, as required by the Naturalization Law, and the decisions holding that such omission bars the father’s naturalization even if justified by alleged impossibility of getting the children out of China, explained his effort to establish that he was already a citizen despite the contrary allegations.

• No judicial action solely to declare citizenship — Philippine courts exist to settle justiciable controversies; they may pass upon a person’s status only as an incident to the adjudication of rights properly in issue. There is no law authorizing an action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of an individual’s citizenship. The Court applied this to hold that the lower court erred in declaring petitioner a citizen in a naturalization case.
• Jurisdiction limited to issues raised by the pleadings — A court exceeds its jurisdiction when it adjudicates a matter not put in issue by the pleadings. The Court applied this because petitioner’s Philippine citizenship was never raised in his naturalization petition or declaration of intention; those documents alleged he was a Chinese citizen seeking admission.
• Naturalization Law requirement to bring children and enroll them in local schools — Under the Naturalization Law and jurisprudence, an applicant’s failure to bring his children to the Philippines and enroll them in local schools bars the father’s naturalization, even if the omission is sought to be justified by the alleged impossibility of getting the children out of China. The Court cited this line of cases in explaining petitioner’s motivation to claim existing citizenship.
• Credibility of citizenship evidence — A claim of Philippine citizenship cannot rest on evidence contradicted by the claimant’s own official registrations, certificates, tax returns, and testimony. The Court applied this in rejecting petitioner’s claim of Philippine parentage.

• “Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.” — This is the Court’s central holding that Philippine courts have no power to entertain a standalone action for judicial declaration of citizenship.
• “As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.” — This defines the limited manner in which courts may adjudicate status, as an incident to a justiciable controversy.
• “In other words, the question whether or not petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines has never been put in issue in this case. As a consequence, when the lower court declared him to be such citizen, it went beyond the issues raised by the pleadings, and, accordingly, acted in a manner so irregular is to, in effect, exceed its jurisdiction.” — This explains why the lower court’s citizenship declaration was jurisdictionally defective.
• “It is clear to us that his evidence to the effect that he is a citizen of the Philippines, can not be relied upon.” — This states the Court’s conclusion on the insufficiency and incredibility of petitioner’s evidence of Philippine citizenship.

• Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578; 45 Off. Gaz., Supp., p. 204 — Distinguished. In Palanca, the petitioner had averred through appropriate pleadings that he possessed Philippine citizenship, thereby putting the status in issue; here, petitioner’s own pleadings alleged he was a Chinese citizen seeking naturalization.
• Hao Lian Chu vs. Republic, 87 Phil. 668; 48 Off. Gaz., 1780 — Cited for the rule that failure to bring children to the Philippines and enroll them in local schools bars the father’s naturalization, even if the omission is justified by alleged impossibility of getting the children out of China.
• Lim Lian Hong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950 — Cited for the same rule on the naturalization bar.
• Tan Hi vs. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 — Cited for the same rule.
• Ang Yee Koe Sengkee vs. Republic, 90 Phil. 594 — Cited for the same rule.
• Bangon Du vs. Republic, 92 Phil., Phil., 519 — Cited for the same rule.
• Yap Chin vs. Republic, 93 Phil. 215 — Cited for the same rule.
• Quin Hu Chay vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 736 — Cited for the same rule.
• Kin vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-6894, April 27, 1955 — Cited for the same rule.

• Naturalization Law — The decision refers to the requirement that an applicant bring his children to the Philippines and enroll them in local schools; failure to do so bars the father’s naturalization, even if the omission is sought to be justified by the alleged impossibility of getting the children out of China. No specific section is cited in the text.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., and Barrera, JJ.