Tan vs. Pereña

The Local Government Code of 1991 did not impliedly repeal Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law of 1974, and a municipal ordinance allowing more cockpits than the statutory limit is void for contravening a statute, as a municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute.

The case involves the tension between the national government's police power to regulate cockfighting and the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the Constitution. Presidential Decree No. 449, the Cockfighting Law of 1974, imposed a limit of one cockpit per city or municipality, with two allowed where the population exceeds one hundred thousand. The Local Government Code of 1991, specifically Section 447(a)(3)(v), empowered the sangguniang bayan, "[a]ny law to the contrary notwithstanding," to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits. The Sangguniang Bayan of Daanbantayan, Cebu, enacted Ordinance Nos. 6 and 7 in 1993, the latter allowing up to three cockpits in the municipality.

In 1974, Presidential Decree No. 449, the Cockfighting Law of 1974, was enacted, and Section 5(b) thereof limited the number of cockpits to one per city or municipality, except that cities or municipalities with a population of over one hundred thousand could have two. With the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, the municipal sangguniang bayan were empowered, "[a]ny law to the contrary notwithstanding," to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks.

In 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Daanbantayan, Cebu Province, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 6, Series of 1993, the Revised Omnibus Ordinance governing cockpit operations, whose Section 5 allowed not more than the number of cockpits based upon population under P.D. 449, with a proviso that the section could be amended for additional cockpits if the municipal population so warranted. Shortly thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1993, amending Section 5 to allow "not more than three (3) cockpits" in the municipality.

On 8 November 1995, petitioner Leonardo Tan applied with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission for a permit to establish and operate a cockpit in Sitio Combado, Bagay, Daanbantayan. At that time, respondent Socorro Y. Pereña was already operating a cockpit in the municipality under a franchise valid until 2002. The Municipal Gamefowl Commission favorably recommended the issuance of a permit, and on 20 January 1996, petitioner Lamberto Te, the mayor, issued a mayor's permit allowing Tan to operate a cockpit for the period from 20 January 1996 to 31 December 1996.

Pereña filed a Complaint for damages with a prayer for injunction against Tan, Te, and Roberto Uy, alleging that there was no lawful basis for a second cockpit given the municipality's small population, and that Tan conducted his cockpit fights at a site less than five kilometers from her own cockpit. She demanded actual damages of at least ₱10,000.00 per month, moral damages of ₱150,000.00, and exemplary damages of ₱50,000.00, and prayed that the permit issued to Tan be declared null and void and that a permanent injunction be issued. The population of Daanbantayan in 1995 was 64,500, which was less than one hundred thousand.

During trial, the petitioners asserted that under the Local Government Code, the sangguniang bayan had the power to enact ordinances authorizing the establishment of cockpits, while Pereña claimed that the amendment authorizing three cockpits violated Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law. The RTC dismissed the complaint, finding no evidence of damages and no bad faith on the part of Te, and later declared the ordinances valid. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the Local Government Code did not do away with the Cockfighting Law, declared Ordinance No. 7 invalid for allowing three cockpits in unconditional terms, and enjoined Tan from operating a cockpit within Daanbantayan, while affirming the denial of damages.

• Implied Repeal of the Cockfighting Law: Petitioners argued that Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code, with its phrase "any law to the contrary notwithstanding," sufficiently repealed Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law, vesting on local government units the power and authority to issue franchises and regulate the operation and establishment of cockpits in their respective municipalities.
• Collateral Attack on Ordinance: Petitioners claimed that the Court of Appeals, in declaring Ordinance No. 7 invalid, embarked on an unwarranted collateral attack on the validity of a municipal ordinance, since Pereña's complaint did not pray for the nullity of the ordinance, the municipality was not made a party, and the Office of the Solicitor General was not given notice.

• Violation of the Cockfighting Law: Pereña claimed that the amendment authorizing the operation of not more than three cockpits in Daanbantayan violated Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law of 1974, which allowed for only one cockpit in a municipality with a population such as Daanbantayan's.
• No Lawful Basis for Second Cockpit: Pereña asserted that there was no lawful basis for the establishment of a second cockpit considering the small population of Daanbantayan, and that the unlawful operation of Tan's cockpit caused injury to her legitimate business.

• Implied Repeal: Whether the Local Government Code of 1991 has rendered inoperative the Cockfighting Law of 1974, specifically Section 5(b) thereof.
• Collateral Attack: Whether the validity of a municipal ordinance may be determined in an action for damages which does not contain a prayer to declare the ordinance invalid.

• Implied Repeal: No. The Local Government Code of 1991 did not impliedly repeal Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law. The two provisions can stand together, as Section 447(a)(3)(v) speaks essentially of the identity of the wielder of the power of control and supervision over cockpit operation, and is not inconsistent with previous enactments that impose restrictions on how such power may be exercised.
• Collateral Attack: No. The validity of Ordinance No. 7 became a justiciable matter for the RTC, as the petitioners themselves raised the valid effect of the ordinance at the heart of their defense, and the question was fully litigated in the courts below.

• Implied Repeal: The Court applied the cardinal rule that implied repeals are disfavored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. While the Local Government Code expressly repealed several laws, the Cockfighting Law was not among them, and Section 534(f) of the Code is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the acts intended to be repealed. The Court found that Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law and Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code are not irreconcilable: while the sanggunian retains the power to authorize and license cockpits, its discretion is limited in that it cannot authorize more than one cockpit per city or municipality unless the population exceeds one hundred thousand. The qualifier "any law to the contrary notwithstanding" serves notice that it is the sangguniang bayan alone which has the power to authorize and license cockpits, removing the power from the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, but it does not allow the sanggunian to authorize more cockpits than allowed under the Cockfighting Law. The Court further recognized that Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law arises from a valid exercise of police power by the national government, as cockfighting is a form of gambling essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing national productivity and self-reliance, and limiting the number of cockpits is a reasonably necessary means for controlling cockfighting.
• Collateral Attack: The Court found that the Court of Appeals did not expressly nullify Ordinance No. 7, but its injunction against Tan's operation of a cockpit had no basis absent the ordinance's invalidity. The Court held that the determination of whether injunction or damages avail requires the ascertainment of whether a second cockpit may be legally allowed in Daanbantayan. Pereña's complaint sufficiently alleged that there was no legal basis for the establishment of a second cockpit, and the petitioners themselves raised the validity of Ordinance No. 7 as an affirmative defense in their Answer. The RTC's express affirmation of the ordinance's validity was the first assigned error in Pereña's appeal, and the question was fully litigated below. Thus, the validity of Ordinance No. 7 ripened for adjudication, and the Court was comfortable reviewing that question.

• Implied Repeal — Implied repeals are disfavored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the Local Government Code did not impliedly repeal the Cockfighting Law, as the two provisions are not irreconcilable and can stand together.
• Police Power of the National Government — The national government has the ability to implement police power measures that affect the subjects of municipal government, especially if the subject of regulation is a condition of universal character irrespective of territorial jurisdictions. Cockfighting is a valid matter of police power regulation, as it is a form of gambling essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing national productivity and self-reliance.
• Local Autonomy — While local governments are empowered under Section 16 of the Local Government Code to regulate the general welfare of their constituents, the national government ought to be attuned to the sensitivities of devolution and strive to be sparing in usurping the prerogatives of local governments. However, local autonomy does not bar the national government from imposing police power measures.
• Validity of Municipal Ordinances — A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, otherwise it is void. Ordinance No. 7, which allowed three cockpits in Daanbantayan, unmistakably contravened the Cockfighting Law and was therefore void.

• "Certainly, applying the test of implied repeal, these two provisions can stand together. While the sanggunian retains the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, its discretion is limited in that it cannot authorize more than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such cities or municipalities have a population of over one hundred thousand, in which case two cockpits may be established." — This passage articulates the Court's core reasoning that the Local Government Code and the Cockfighting Law are not inconsistent, as the former identifies the wielder of power while the latter limits how that power may be exercised.
• "A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, otherwise it is void." — This states the controlling principle for the invalidity of Ordinance No. 7, which contravened Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law.
• "Limitation on the number of cockpits in a given municipality is a reasonably necessary means for the accomplishment of the purpose of controlling cockfighting, for clearly more cockpits equals more cockfights." — This passage justifies the one-cockpit rule as a valid exercise of national police power, connecting the means to the legislative purpose of controlling cockfighting.

• Philippine Gamefowl Commission vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 230 Phil. 379 (1986) — Followed; established that municipal authorities are empowered to issue cockpit licenses and that the Philippine Gamefowl Commission's powers are limited to review and supervision, not control.
• Deang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 154 SCRA 250 (1987) — Followed; affirmed the twin pronouncements that municipal authorities issue cockpit licenses and the Commission's powers are limited to review and supervision.
• Municipality of Malolos vs. Libangang Malolos Inc., 164 SCRA 290 (1988) — Followed in part; affirmed the same principles, though the Court noted that its ruling that regulation of cockpits is vested in municipal councils subject to Commission guidelines is no longer controlling under the Local Government Code.
• Adlawan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 170 SCRA 165 (1989) — Followed; affirmed the same principles regarding municipal authority over cockpit licensing.
• Cootauco vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 122 (1988) — Distinguished; noted that the Commission's power of review includes the power to disapprove, but this does not carry the authority to substitute one's own preferences.
• Maceda vs. Macaraig, 274 Phil. 1060 (1991) — Cited for the rule that implied repeals are disfavored and will not be declared unless the repugnancy between two laws is irreconcilable and clear and convincing.
• Canet vs. Decena, 420 SCRA 388 (2004) — Cited for the proposition that cockfighting, although authorized by law, is still a form of gambling.
• Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority, 204 SCRA 837 (1991) — Cited for the principle that a municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute.

• Section 5(b), Presidential Decree No. 449 (Cockfighting Law of 1974) — The provision limiting the number of cockpits to one per city or municipality, with two allowed where the population exceeds one hundred thousand. The Court held this provision remained in effect and was not repealed by the Local Government Code.
• Section 447(a)(3)(v), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — The provision empowering the sangguniang bayan, "[a]ny law to the contrary notwithstanding," to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits. The Court construed this as identifying the wielder of power, not removing the limitations imposed by the Cockfighting Law.
• Section 534(f), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — The general repealing clause of the Code, which the Court held is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the acts intended to be repealed.
• Section 16, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — The general welfare clause empowering local governments to regulate the general welfare of their constituents, which the Court acknowledged but held does not bar national police power measures.
• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1802 — The provision vesting in city and municipal mayors, with the concurrence of their sanggunians, the authority to license and regulate cockfighting, subject to the review and supervision of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, which the Court discussed as historical context for the qualifier in Section 447(a)(3)(v).

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concurred.