Tan vs. People

A conviction for fencing under P.D. No. 1612 cannot stand where the prosecution fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt the underlying crime of theft — including the corpus delicti thereof — and the accused's knowledge that the items were derived from stolen proceeds.

Rosita Lim owned Bueno Metal Industries, a business manufacturing propellers and spare parts for boats located in Tondo, Manila. Manuelito Mendez was one of her employees until he left the company's employ sometime in February 1991. Petitioner Ramon C. Tan operated Ramon Hardware, a marine spare parts store in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and had an existing business relationship with Lim's husband, William Tan, involving mutual purchases of propellers and brass woods. The Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612) was enacted in 1979 to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit from the effects of robbery and theft, creating a presumption of fencing and treating the fence as a principal in a separate and distinct offense rather than a mere accessory under the Revised Penal Code.

Rosita Lim owned Bueno Metal Industries at 301 Jose Abad Santos Street, Tondo, Manila, a business engaged in manufacturing propellers, bushings, welding rods, and other boat spare parts. Manuelito Mendez was employed at Bueno Metal Industries from November 1990 until February 1991, when he left the company. Sometime after his departure, Lim noticed that certain welding rods, propellers, and other spare parts — including bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws — were missing. An inventory conducted on February 19, 1991 revealed losses valued at approximately P48,000.00. Some of the missing items had been purchased under the name of Asia Pacific, the guarantor of their Industrial Welding Corporation, or under the name of William Tan, Lim's husband, but all were actually delivered to the store and paid for by him.

Lim informed Victor Sy, the uncle of Mendez, of the loss. Sy sent his son to Cebu and requested a police officer acquaintance to arrest Mendez and bring him back to Manila. Upon his return, Mendez admitted to having stolen the missing spare parts together with his co-employee Gaudencio Dayop, and he asked Lim for forgiveness. Mendez pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the person who bought the stolen items, paying P13,000.00 in cash, which Mendez and Dayop split between themselves. Lim did not file a case against Mendez or Dayop. She likewise never reported the theft or loss to the police. When Lim confronted Tan, he denied having bought the stolen items.

On April 12, 1991, Mendez executed an affidavit prepared by a certain Perlas, a CIS personnel, subscribed before Notary Public Jose Tayo at Magnolia House, Carriedo, Manila. Mendez stated that he had talked to Tan over the phone before delivering the spare parts, and that it was Tan himself who accepted the stolen items in the morning at about 7:00 to 8:00 o'clock and paid P13,000.00 for them. Mendez also stated that it was usually Tan's secretary who accepted items delivered to Ramon Hardware. On relation of complainant Lim, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed an information charging Tan with violation of P.D. No. 1612 for knowingly receiving, keeping, acquiring, and possessing spare parts valued at P48,130.00 belonging to Lim, which he knew or should have known to have been derived from the proceeds of theft.

Upon arraignment on November 23, 1992, Tan pleaded not guilty and waived pre-trial. The prosecution presented the testimonies of Lim, Victor Sy, and Mendez. The defense presented Lim and Mendez as hostile witnesses, and Tan himself. Tan denied having bought the stolen spare parts or having met or talked to Mendez. He contended that the receipts presented by Lim were not under her name, that the incident was not reported to the police, and that he could not have personally accepted the items at 7:00 to 8:00 in the morning because he usually reported to his office at 9:00 o'clock. The trial court credited the prosecution's evidence and convicted Tan of fencing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in toto.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to establish the essential elements of fencing, particularly the commission of the underlying crime of theft and his knowledge that the items were stolen.
• Inadmissibility of Extra-Judicial Confession: Petitioner maintained that Mendez's extra-judicial confession was inadmissible because it was executed without the assistance of counsel, and thus could not be used as evidence against him.
• Denial of Purchase: Petitioner denied having bought the stolen spare parts, having met or talked to Mendez, or having been at his office at the time the items were allegedly delivered.

• Elements of Fencing: Whether the prosecution successfully established all the essential elements of fencing under P.D. No. 1612 as against the petitioner.

• Elements of Fencing: No. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the first element — that a crime of robbery or theft had been committed — and the third element — that the accused knew or should have known that the items were derived from the proceeds of theft. The extra-judicial confession of the thief was inadmissible for lack of counsel, and the complainant's unreported loss was insufficient to establish corpus delicti.

• Elements of Fencing: The essential elements of fencing, as set out in Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, are: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, or deals in any article derived from the proceeds of the crime; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the article was derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft; and (4) there is intent to gain. The prosecution must establish all elements beyond reasonable doubt. Here, the first element was absent. Complainant Lim never reported the theft or loss to the police, and she forgave Mendez without prosecuting him. While Mendez confessed to the theft and to selling the items to Tan, his extra-judicial confession was executed without the assistance of counsel and was therefore inadmissible — not only against Mendez himself but also against the accused. A confession alone is insufficient to convict without evidence of corpus delicti, which in theft requires proof that the property was lost by the owner and that it was lost by felonious taking. The complainant's failure to report the felonious taking to public authorities left the corpus delicti unproven. Furthermore, there was no showing that Tan knew or should have known that the articles he allegedly acquired were stolen. Knowledge as an element of an offense must be determined from the overt acts of the accused, and where two equally plausible states of cognition exist, the court must choose the one sustaining the constitutional presumption of innocence. Absent proof of such knowledge, the petitioner could not be guilty of fencing.

• Elements of Fencing (P.D. No. 1612) — The crime of fencing requires: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells, or disposes of, or in any manner deals in any article derived from the proceeds of the crime; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the article was derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft; and (4) intent to gain for himself or another. The prosecution must prove all elements beyond reasonable doubt; failure to establish any element warrants acquittal. The Court applied this test and found the first and third elements unproven.

• Corpus Delicti in Theft — Corpus delicti means the body or substance of the crime, referring to the fact that the crime has been actually committed. In theft, corpus delicti has two elements: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. An extra-judicial confession alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction without corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti. The Court found that the complainant's failure to report the theft to public authorities, coupled with the inadmissibility of Mendez's uncounselled confession, left the corpus delicti unproven.

• Inadmissibility of Uncounselled Extra-Judicial Confession — An admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in evidence only against the person admitting or confessing. If given extra-judicially, the confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise, the admission is inadmissible. Such a confession is likewise inadmissible against a co-accused. Mendez's affidavit was executed without counsel and could not be used against Tan.

• Fencing as a Separate and Distinct Offense — Under P.D. No. 1612, the fence ceases to be a mere accessory after the fact (as under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code) and becomes a principal in the separate and distinct crime of fencing. The law does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit robbery or theft. Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.

• Knowledge as an Element of Fencing — "Knows" refers to actual awareness of a fact; "should know" denotes that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of a duty or govern conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of the accused, knowledge must be determined from overt acts. Where two equally plausible states of cognition exist, the court must choose the one sustaining the constitutional presumption of innocence.

• "In this case, the theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to convict, without evidence of corpus delicti." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: the failure to prove the underlying theft through independent evidence of corpus delicti, rendering the first element of fencing unestablished.

• "And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence." — This formulation, quoted from Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, defines how courts must resolve uncertainty regarding the knowledge element of fencing and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on mens rea and the presumption of innocence.

• "Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the essential elements of fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense." — This statement establishes the demanding standard of proof required for all elements of fencing, reinforcing that the prosecution's burden is non-delegable and indivisible across the four elements.

• Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, 234 SCRA 63 (1994) — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this case for the essential elements of fencing, the definition of knowledge and "should know," and the rule that where two equally plausible states of cognition exist, the court must choose the one sustaining the constitutional presumption of innocence.
• People vs. de Guzman, 227 SCRA 64 (1993) — Followed for the propositions that the law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit robbery or theft, and that fencing is a separate and distinct offense from robbery or theft.
• People vs. de la Cruz, 279 SCRA 245 (1997) — Followed for the rule that an extra-judicial confession must be corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt.
• People vs. Januario, 335 Phil. 268 (1997) — Followed for the rule that an extra-judicial confession is admissible only against the confessant and requires the assistance of counsel.
• People vs. Escalona, 227 SCRA 325 (1993) — Followed for the principle that no one shall be found guilty of a crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt.

• Section 2, P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) — Defines fencing as the act of any person who, with intent to gain, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell, or dispose of, or in any manner deal in any article of value which he knows or should have known to have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. The Court applied this definition to set out the elements of the offense charged.
• Section 5, P.D. No. 1612 — Creates a presumption of fencing. The Court noted this as a feature distinguishing prosecution under P.D. No. 1612 from prosecution as an accessory under the Revised Penal Code.
• Section 3, P.D. No. 1612 — Prescribes penalties for fencing based on the value of the property involved. The Court noted this as a feature making prosecution under P.D. No. 1612 preferable to prosecution under the Revised Penal Code.
• Article 293, Revised Penal Code — Defines robbery as the taking of personal property with intent to gain by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Cited to distinguish robbery from theft.
• Article 308, Revised Penal Code — Defines theft as taking without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Cited to identify the underlying crime required for fencing.
• Article 19, Revised Penal Code — Defines an accessory after the fact. Cited to explain that before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted as an accessory with a penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed for the principal.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concurred.