Tan vs. People

The Court held that lumber is included in the term "timber" under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO 277, and the possession of lumber without the required legal documents is prohibited and penalized. Because the law makes no distinction between raw or processed timber, courts cannot create one.

On October 26 and 30, 1989, forest guards intercepted two dump trucks owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan and driven by his employees, loaded with narra, white lauan, and tanguile lumber, in Romblon. No documents showing legal possession were presented upon demand, leading to the confiscation of the lumber and the filing of criminal charges against Tan and his employees for violation of Section 68 of PD 705.

• Apprehension: On October 26, 1989, forest guards intercepted a dump truck driven by Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee of A & E Construction owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan, loaded with narra and white lauan lumber. On October 30, 1989, another truck driven by Crispin Cabudol, also a Tan employee, loaded with tanguile lumber was apprehended. In both instances, no documents showing legal possession were presented upon demand.
• Charges: Tan, Moreno, and Ismael Ramilo (caretaker/timekeeper) were charged for the October 26 incident, while Tan, Ramilo, and Cabudol were charged for the October 30 incident, both under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
• Defense Evidence: Petitioners denied that forest guards demanded documents. Defense witness Prisco Marin, former OIC of the Bureau of Forest Development, testified that the lumber was bought by Tan's Cajidiocan Trading from Matzhou Development Corporation, presenting an auxiliary invoice from March 1987. The appellate court found Marin's testimony "anything but credible" because he inspected the lumber in December 1989 after being relieved of his position.

• Petitioners maintained that "lumber" is distinct from "timber" and other forest products under PD 705; thus, possession of lumber without documents is not punishable under Section 68.
• Petitioners argued that EO 277 cannot be applied retroactively because the lumber was allegedly lawfully possessed since March 1987, prior to the law's effectivity.
• Petitioners contended that Section 68 of EO 277 violates substantive due process by penalizing the possession of ordinary items like firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, grass, and shrubs without documents.
• Petitioners asserted that the lower courts erred in finding unauthorized possession, absence of corpus delicti, and conspiracy.

• Respondent countered that lumber is included in the term timber; to exclude it would allow illegal loggers to evade liability by simply sawing timber on the spot.
• Respondent argued that petitioners lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of EO 277 regarding items they were not charged with possessing.
• Respondent maintained that petitioners failed to present the required documents (certificate of lumber origin, sales invoice, delivery receipt, tally sheet, and certificate of transport agreement) at the time of apprehension.

• Procedural Issues: Whether petitioners possess the requisite standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 68 of EO 277.
• Substantive Issues:
  1. Whether lumber is considered timber or a forest product within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
  2. Whether EO 277 applies retroactively to the petitioners.

• Procedural: The Court ruled that petitioners lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 68 of EO 277. Because petitioners were not charged with possessing firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, grass, or shrubs, the inclusion of these items in the law was of no concern to them and did not present an actual case or controversy susceptible of judicial determination.
• Substantive:
  1. The Court held that lumber is included in the term "timber" under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Lumber is a processed log or timber. Because the law makes no distinction between raw or processed timber, the Court applied the principle ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus.
  2. The Court held that EO 277 does not apply retroactively. The unlawful possession occurred in October 1989, when EO 277 was already in effect. The crime is malum prohibitum, and absence of malice or criminal intent does not exempt the accused from liability.

• Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus — Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Applied to Section 68 of PD 705, which makes no distinction between raw or processed timber (lumber).
• Constitutionality of Statutes — A statute is presumed constitutional, and one who attacks it must convincingly prove its invalidity. A successful judicial inquiry requires an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights. Petitioners cannot challenge the inclusion of items they do not possess.
• Malum prohibitum — The prohibited act under Section 68 is malum prohibitum; thus, absence of malice or criminal intent does not exempt the accused from liability.

• "Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither do we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus."

• Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430 (1996) — Controlling precedent holding that lumber is included in the term timber under Section 68 of PD 705.
• Lalican vs. Vergara, G.R. No. 108619 (1997) — Reiterated Mustang; held that excluding possession of lumber from Section 68 would emasculate the law.
• Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236 (1993) — Cited for the principle that judicial inquiry into constitutionality requires an actual case or controversy.
• Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 279 (1993) — Cited for the principle that illegal possession of forest products is malum prohibitum.

• Section 68, PD 705 (Forestry Reform Code), as amended by Executive Order No. 277 — Penalizes cutting, gathering, collecting, or possessing timber or other forest products without license or legal documents. Applied to hold petitioners liable for possessing lumber without the required documents.
• Section 3(q), PD 705 — Defines forest products. Cited by petitioners to argue lumber is not included.
• Section 3(aa), PD 705 — Defines processing plant, mentioning lumber as a processed forest raw material. Used by the Court to establish that lumber is processed timber.
• Articles 309 and 310, Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalties imposed for violations of Section 68.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

• Vitug — Reiterated his separate opinion in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. CA, which maintained that lumber is not included in the term timber under PD 705.