Tan vs. Crisologo

Republic Act No. 9225 does not apply retroactively to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship prior to its enactment; thus, reacquisition of Philippine citizenship upon taking the Oath of Allegiance does not retroact to the date the citizenship was lost, and the petitioner was not a Filipino citizen at the time of voter registration.

Vivenne K. Tan, a natural-born Filipino citizen, voluntarily became a naturalized citizen of the United States in 1993, thereby losing her Philippine citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was the applicable law at the time. Republic Act No. 9225, enacted in 2003, allows natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship through naturalization in a foreign country to reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an Oath of Allegiance. The right to vote and be registered in the permanent list of voters is reserved exclusively for Filipino citizens under the Constitution and the Voter's Registration Act of 1996.

Vivenne K. Tan, born to Filipino parents on 1 April 1968, became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America on 19 January 1993. On 26 October 2009, she applied to be registered as a voter in Quezon City, indicating in her application that she was a Filipino citizen by birth. The Election Registration Board approved her application on 16 November 2009, making her a registered voter of Precinct 0853-A, Sto. Domingo, Quezon City. On 30 November 2009, Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before a notary public. The following day, she filed a petition before the Bureau of Immigration for the reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, executing a sworn declaration renouncing her allegiance to the U.S.A. The Bureau of Immigration confirmed her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on the same day, and she subsequently filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the 2010 National Elections to run as congresswoman for the First District of Quezon City.

On 28 December 2009, respondent Vincent "Bingbong" Crisologo filed a petition before the Metropolitan Trial Court seeking the exclusion of Tan from the voter's list, alleging that she was not a Filipino citizen when she registered as a voter and that she failed to meet the residency requirement. Tan countered that she is a natural-born citizen who had effectively renounced her American citizenship since 1996 by continuously residing and working in the Philippines. The MeTC excluded Tan from the voter's list, finding that her subsequent acts, including taking the Oath of Allegiance, showed she was not a Filipino citizen at the time of registration. The RTC reversed the MeTC, ruling that Tan's reacquisition of citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 deemed her never to have lost her Filipino citizenship, thereby curing any defects in her nationality at the time of registration. The Court of Appeals annulled the RTC decision, holding that Republic Act No. 9225 cannot be applied retroactively and that Tan was not a Filipino citizen when she registered as a voter.

• Retroactive Effect of R.A. No. 9225: Petitioner argued that her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through R.A. No. 9225 has a retroactive effect, such that a natural-born Filipino citizen is deemed never to have lost his or her Filipino citizenship.
• Curing Defects in Registration: Petitioner maintained that the reacquisition of citizenship cured any and all defects attendant during her registration as a voter.
• No Substantial Distinction: Petitioner contended that the distinction in R.A. No. 9225 between "reacquire" and "retain" does not substantially affect her citizenship status because the framers of the law used the words interchangeably.

• Citizenship at Time of Registration: Whether Tan can be considered a Philippine citizen at the time she registered as a voter.
• Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9225: Whether the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 retroacts to the date citizenship was lost, thereby curing the invalidity of her voter registration.

• Citizenship at Time of Registration: No. Tan was not a Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a voter, as she only took her Oath of Allegiance more than a month after her registration was approved.
• Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9225: No. R.A. No. 9225 does not apply retroactively to natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship prior to its enactment; reacquisition of citizenship upon taking the Oath of Allegiance does not retroact to the date citizenship was lost.

• Citizenship at Time of Registration: The right to vote is reserved exclusively for Filipino citizens under the Constitution and the Voter's Registration Act of 1996. To be registered as a voter, the registrant must be a citizen at the time the application is filed. It is undisputed that Tan filed her voter registration application on 26 October 2009, while she only took her Oath of Allegiance on 30 November 2009. Since she lost her Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 1993, she was a foreigner at the time of her voter registration.
• Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9225: Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 distinguishes between citizens who "reacquired" their citizenship (those who lost it before the law's effectivity) and those who "retained" it (those who lost it after). Applying the plain meaning rule (verba legis), the Court refused to interpret the law retroactively, as it contains no provision stating it may be applied retroactively. Giving it retroactive effect would lead to the absurd scenario where a person who voluntarily renounced Philippine citizenship would still be considered a citizen during the period of renunciation. Statutes are construed prospectively unless the legislature intended retroactive effect. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, applicable when Tan naturalized in 1993, her loss of Philippine citizenship was a necessary consequence of her voluntary act. Thus, her reacquisition of citizenship could not cure the defect in her voter registration.

• Prospective Construction of Statutes — Statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the legislature intended to give them retroactive effect. A law has no application to past times but only to future time. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that R.A. No. 9225 cannot retroactively restore Tan's citizenship to the period before she took her Oath of Allegiance.
• Plain Meaning Rule (Verba Legis) — When the words or language of a statute are clear, there may be no need to interpret it in a manner different from what the word plainly implies. The Court used this to interpret the distinction between "reacquire" and "retain" in R.A. No. 9225, refusing to construe reacquisition as having a retroactive effect.
• Effect of Renunciation of Citizenship — Renunciation of citizenship requires a voluntary act, manifested by swearing to an oath. Once Philippine citizenship is renounced because of naturalization in a foreign country, the person is considered a foreigner unless and until allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines is reaffirmed.

• "A natural-born Filipino citizen who renounces his or her Philippine citizenship, effectively becomes a foreigner in the Philippines with no political right to participate in Philippine politics and governance." — This passage establishes the fundamental premise for the Court's ruling, emphasizing the legal consequence of voluntary naturalization in a foreign country.
• "To harmonize, given the distinction between citizens who have 're-acquired' from those who 'retained' Philippine citizenship, coupled with the legal effects of renunciation of citizenship, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225 cannot be used as basis for giving a retroactive application of the law." — This articulates the ratio decidendi regarding the non-retroactive application of R.A. No. 9225 to those who lost their citizenship prior to its enactment.
• "Finally, it is a well-settled rule that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the legislature intended to give them a retroactive effect." — This states the canonical rule of statutory construction applied to defeat the petitioner's argument for retroactivity.

• Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections, 709 Phil. 408 (2013) — Cited for the principle that renunciation of foreign citizenship requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation and full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country.
• Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Urgello, 549 Phil. 302 (2007) — Cited to support the holistic approach in statutory construction, where a statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached expressions but considered in relation to the whole law.

• Article V, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — Provides that suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law. Applied to establish that only Filipino citizens have the right to vote.
• Section 9, Republic Act No. 8189 (Voter's Registration Act of 1996) — Provides that all citizens of the Philippines may register as a voter. Applied to reinforce the citizenship requirement for voter registration.
• Section 3, Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003) — Defines the procedure for reacquiring or retaining Philippine citizenship by taking an Oath of Allegiance. Applied to distinguish between those who reacquire and those who retain citizenship, and to determine that the law does not operate retroactively.
• Section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 63 — Provides that a Filipino citizen may lose citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country or express renunciation. Applied as the governing law at the time Tan lost her Philippine citizenship in 1993.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.