Tan vs. City of Davao

The Court held that a city or municipality has the personality to institute escheat proceedings under Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court, and that a judicial declaration of presumptive death may be made as an incident to proceedings for the settlement of an absentee's intestate estate, pursuant to Article 390 of the Civil Code.

Dominga Garcia, the registered owner of a lot in Davao City, emigrated to China with her husband and three children in 1923 and never returned. She allegedly died intestate in 1955. In 1962, the City of Davao filed a petition to declare the property escheated, alleging that Garcia left no heirs in the Philippines. Ramon Pizarro, a nephew of Garcia's adoptive mother, opposed the petition, claiming that Garcia's daughter, Vicenta Tan, was alive and had executed documents in his favor. The trial court found Pizarro's evidence and testimony incredible and ruled in favor of the City.

• The spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia adopted Dominga Garcia.
• Dominga Garcia married Tan Seng and had three children: Vicente, Mariano, and Luis.
• In 1923, Dominga Garcia and her children emigrated to Canton, China; her husband followed shortly after.
• Dominga Garcia allegedly died intestate in 1955, leaving a 1,966-square-meter lot in Davao City registered under her name.
• From 1923 until the filing of the escheat petition in 1962, neither Dominga Garcia nor any of her heirs returned to the Philippines or claimed the property.
• In 1948, Ramon Pizarro, a nephew of Cornelia Pizarro, occupied part of the property and collected rentals.
• The City of Davao filed an escheat petition, which Ramon Pizarro opposed, claiming Vicenta Tan was alive.
• Pizarro presented pictures, an extrajudicial settlement, and a special power of attorney allegedly executed by Vicenta Tan in Hong Kong in 1966.
• The trial court found Pizarro's evidence and the testimony of his corroborating witnesses not credible and internally inconsistent.

• Petitioner argued that the City of Davao lacked personality to file the escheat petition, contending that under the Revised Rules of Court (Rule 91), only the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, could commence such proceedings.
• Petitioner maintained that Dominga Garcia and her heirs could not be declared presumptively dead, as a direct judicial declaration of presumptive death cannot be the sole purpose of an action.

• Respondent countered that the applicable rule at the time the petition was filed in 1962 was Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court, which expressly allowed a city or municipality to file an escheat petition.
• Respondent argued that the presumption of death under Article 390 of the Civil Code could be invoked incidentally in proceedings for the settlement of the absentee's estate.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the City of Davao had the legal personality to file the escheat petition under the procedural rules in effect at the time of filing.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the courts could declare Dominga Garcia and her heirs presumptively dead as an incident to the escheat proceedings for the settlement of her intestate estate.

• Procedural: The Court ruled that the City of Davao had personality to file the petition. The petition was filed on September 12, 1962, when Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court was still operative, which permitted a municipality or city to file escheat proceedings. Applying the revised Rule 91 (effective January 1, 1964), which vested standing solely in the Republic, would work injustice and was barred by the saving clause in Rule 144.
• Substantive: The Court affirmed that a judicial declaration of presumptive death could be made as an incident to an action or special proceeding for the settlement of an intestate estate. Direct evidence of death was unnecessary; the presumption under Article 390 of the Civil Code arose from the prolonged, unexplained absence of the heirs. The factual findings of the lower courts—that the oppositor's evidence was not credible—were binding on the Court.

• Presumption of Death Under Article 390 of the Civil Code — This article provides that after an absence of seven years, with it being unknown whether the absentee still lives, the absentee shall be presumed dead for all purposes except succession. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that such a presumption may be invoked and made in a case that is tried or heard by a competent court, particularly in proceedings connected with the settlement of the absentee's estate.

• "This presumption ... may arise and be invoked and take in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding." — This passage from In re Szatraw, cited by the Court, establishes that a declaration of presumptive death is not a standalone cause of action but is permissible when incidental to another proper judicial proceeding, such as estate settlement.

• In re Szatraw, 81 Phil. 461 — Cited as controlling authority for the principle that a judicial presumption of death may be declared incidentally in a proper action or special proceeding, such as one for estate settlement, but cannot be the sole subject of an independent proceeding.

• Article 390 of the New Civil Code — Provides the legal basis for the presumption of death after an unexplained absence of seven years, which the Court applied to the facts of the case.
• Rule 92, Section 1 of the 1940 Rules of Court — The procedural rule in effect at the time the petition was filed, which authorized a city or municipality to file a petition for escheat when a person dies intestate leaving no heirs.
• Rule 91 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court — The subsequent rule that limited the personality to file escheat proceedings to the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General. The Court held this rule did not apply retroactively to the case.
• Rule 144 of the 1964 Rules of Court — Contains the saving clause stating that the revised rules shall not apply to pending cases to the extent that their application would work injustice.