Tamin vs. Court of Appeals

A writ of possession and writ of demolition may not be issued before trial in an action for recovery of possession where the defendant claims ownership and the status of the land is the subject of a pending cadastral proceeding, which constitutes a prejudicial question that must first be resolved. Furthermore, Rule 67 on eminent domain cannot be applied by analogy to justify such writs absent deposit of just compensation and compliance with statutory requirements.

The Municipality of Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur, claimed ownership of a 5,894-square-meter parcel of land reserved for public plaza under Presidential Proclamation No. 365 issued on March 15, 1968. During the incumbency of a previous mayor in 1958, the municipality had leased a 1,350-square-meter portion to respondents Vicente Medina and Fortunata Rosellon. Medina, however, claimed to have purchased the land from a Subanan native as early as 1947, predating the proclamation. Cadastral proceedings (Cadastral Case No. N-10) to settle ownership over the land were pending before another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur when the municipality filed its ejectment complaint. The national government had appropriated funds for a municipal gymnasium on the property, and the municipality sought immediate possession to prevent reversion of the appropriation.

The Complaint: On September 24, 1990, the Municipality of Dumingag, represented by Mayor Domiciano E. Real, filed a complaint for "Ejectment with Preliminary Injunction and Damages" against Vicente Medina and Fortunata Rosellon. The municipality alleged ownership of a 5,894-square-meter parcel reserved for public plaza under Presidential Proclamation No. 365 (March 15, 1968); that in 1958, the late Mayor Isidoro E. Real, Sr. leased 1,350 square meters to respondents on condition they vacate if needed for public purposes; that respondents paid rentals until 1967 but thereafter refused; that respondents had filed a cadastral answer claiming ownership; that ongoing construction of a municipal gymnasium funded by national appropriation could not continue due to respondents' buildings; and that the appropriation faced reversion.

The Trial Court's Orders: On October 10, 1990, Judge Camilo E. Tamin denied respondents' motion to dismiss, characterizing the action as an accion de reivindicacion within RTC jurisdiction. The same day, he granted a writ of possession with ancillary writ of demolition, applying Rule 67 on eminent domain by analogy, reasoning that the necessity was greater because the land was covered by a Presidential Proclamation and the appropriation was endangered.

The Cadastral Proceedings and Private Claim: Cadastral Case No. N-10 (LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-108, Lot 9481 [Pls-61] TS-218) was pending before another RTC branch. Respondent Vicente Medina claimed ownership dating to 1947 when he allegedly purchased the land from a Subanan native. Proclamation No. 365 expressly reserved the land "subject to private rights, if any there be."

Implementation of the Writs: On October 19, 1990, the writs were enforced, resulting in dispossession and demolition of respondents' structures.

Court of Appeals Decision: The CA upheld RTC jurisdiction over the complaint as one for recovery of possession, citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas. However, it nullified the writs, ruling that (a) writs of possession are available only in land registration, extrajudicial foreclosure, judicial foreclosure, and execution sales; (b) Rule 67 could not justify the writs absent statutory authority for taking possession and deposit of just compensation, as held in Manila Railroad Co. v. Paredes; and (c) respondents claimed ownership, making dispossession before resolution unjust.

• Nature of Action as Abatement of Public Nuisance: Petitioner municipality contended that the allegations in the complaint constituted a cause of action for abatement of public nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code, not merely recovery of possession. The structures on the public plaza hindered or impaired the use of property for public purposes. Accordingly, the writ of possession and writ of demolition were justified as summary abatement measures.

• Personal Liability for Damages: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals had erroneously ruled them personally liable for damages to private respondents for abating a public nuisance.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Private respondents maintained that the complaint was actually one for illegal detainer, which falls within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal trial court, not the RTC.

• Pendency of Cadastral Case: Respondents asserted that Cadastral Case No. N-10 involving the same parcel of land and parties was pending before another court, which should bar or suspend the ejectment proceedings.

• Invalidity of the Writs: Respondents challenged the writs of possession and demolition as having been issued without legal basis and in violation of due process, since they claimed ownership and the land's status remained unresolved.

• Validity of the Writ of Possession and Writ of Demolition: Whether the trial court had authority to issue a writ of possession and ancillary writ of demolition before trial in an action for recovery of possession where the defendants claim ownership and the land is subject of a pending cadastral proceeding.

• Personal Liability for Damages: Whether the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners were personally liable for damages to private respondents.

• Validity of the Writ of Possession and Writ of Demolition: The writs were void. The Court of Appeals correctly upheld RTC jurisdiction over the complaint, which alleged that the land was part of the public domain reserved for public plaza, making it an action for recovery of possession under the doctrine of Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas (a lease of public plaza land is void and the municipality may recover possession). However, the issuance of the writs before trial was improper for two independent reasons.

  First, the status of the land remained unresolved. Presidential Proclamation No. 365 expressly reserved the land "subject to private rights, if any there be," and Cadastral Case No. N-10 was pending to settle ownership. The cadastral proceeding constituted a prejudicial question: its outcome would determine whether respondents had rights to the land, and consequently whether the demolition was justified or unjust. Applying by analogy Quiambao v. Osorio, the trial court should have held the ejectment proceedings in abeyance pending resolution of the cadastral case to avoid a potentially futile trial and unjust demolition. Had the land been conclusively established as public plaza, summary abatement would have been justified under Villanueva v. Castañeda, Jr. and Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio. But that determination had yet to be made.

  Second, the trial court's application by analogy of Rule 67 on eminent domain was erroneous. Under Rule 67 and Presidential Decree No. 42, the taking of possession in expropriation requires deposit of an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. No such deposit was made. Even assuming expropriation was proper, possession could not be obtained without compliance. The case of National Power Corporation v. Jocson was cited for the two-stage nature of expropriation proceedings.

• Personal Liability for Damages: The appellate court did not impose personal liability for damages on petitioners. The CA decision expressly stated it had no jurisdiction over the claim for damages and directed that such claim be pursued in an appropriate action before the RTC. The dispositive portion contained no award of damages against petitioners. The apprehension was unfounded.

• Prejudicial Question in Civil-Civil Actions — A prejudicial question is one whose resolution is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in another case and whose cognizance pertains to another tribunal. Although the Rules of Court define prejudicial question in the context of civil and criminal actions, the doctrine applies by analogy where two civil actions involve identical parties and issues, and the resolution of one determines whether the other may proceed. Economy of time and effort for the court, counsel, and litigants justifies suspension of the second action pending resolution of the first.

• Public Plaza as Property of Public Dominion — A town plaza is property of public dominion, outside the commerce of man, and cannot be disposed of or leased by the municipality to private parties. Structures built thereon constitute a nuisance subject to summary abatement. However, this rule applies only where the land's status as public plaza is conclusively established.

• Writ of Possession — Exclusive Instances — A writ of possession may be issued only in: (1) land registration proceedings (in rem); (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of realty mortgage; (3) judicial foreclosure of mortgage, provided the mortgagor is in possession and no third party not privy to the suit has intervened; and (4) execution sales under Rule 39, Section 35.

• Eminent Domain — Two Stages — Expropriation proceeds in two phases: first, determination of the authority to exercise eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise, ending in an order of dismissal or condemnation; second, determination of just compensation with the assistance of commissioners. Possession may be taken only upon deposit of an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property under Presidential Decree No. 42.

• "A public plaza is outside the commerce of man and constructions thereon can be abated summarily by the municipality."

• "Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties." — citing Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio.

• "The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants."

• "Faced with these alternative possibilities, and in the interest of justice, we rule that the petitioner municipality must put up a bond to be determined by the trial court to answer for just compensation to which the private respondents may be entitled in case the demolition of their buildings is adjudged to be illegal."

• Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602 (1915) — Controlling precedent. Applied for the rule that a lease by a municipal corporation of a public plaza is null and void because land for public use is outside the commerce of man; the lessee must restore possession. Established that an action to recover such land is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (now RTC).

• Villanueva v. Castañeda, Jr., 154 SCRA 142 (1987) — Followed. Affirmed that structures on a public plaza constitute a nuisance subject to summary abatement, and the mayor had authority to order demolition without judicial proceedings where the land's status as public plaza was judicially and legislatively declared.

• Quiambao v. Osorio, 158 SCRA 674 (1988) — Applied by analogy. Defined prejudicial question and its elements; held that where resolution of a pending case would determine the right of possession in an ejectment suit, the latter should be held in abeyance.

• Mabale v. Apalisok, 88 SCRA 234 (1979) — Followed. Enumerated the exclusive instances when a writ of possession may issue under the Rules of Court.

• Manila Railroad Co. v. Paredes, 31 Phil. 118 (1915) — Cited for the rule that taking of possession by the government requires statutory authority and deposit of value; otherwise, it constitutes deprivation of property without due process.

• National Power Corporation v. Jocson, G.R. No. 94193-99 (February 25, 1992) — Followed. Reiterated the two-stage nature of expropriation and the requirement of deposit under P.D. No. 42 before possession may be taken.

• Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 595 (1991) — Distinguished. In Francisco, the owner was in lawful possession by virtue of a government permit when demolition occurred; here, the legality of respondents' possession was still to be determined in the cadastral proceedings.

• Article 694, Civil Code — Defines nuisance to include any act or condition of property that "hinders or impairs the use of property." Cited by petitioners as basis for characterizing the action as one for abatement of public nuisance.

• Article 695, Civil Code — Distinguishes public from private nuisance. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons.

• Article 699, Civil Code — Enumerates remedies against a public nuisance: (1) prosecution under the Penal Code or local ordinance; (2) a civil action; or (3) abatement without judicial proceedings. The municipality chose the second remedy by filing a civil action.

• Rule 67, Revised Rules of Court (Eminent Domain) — Governs expropriation proceedings. The trial court erroneously applied this rule by analogy to justify the writ of possession without requiring deposit of just compensation.

• Presidential Decree No. 42 — Requires a plaintiff in expropriation to deposit an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property before taking possession. Non-compliance rendered the issuance of the writ illegal.

• Presidential Proclamation No. 365 (March 15, 1968) — Reserved the subject land for school site, public plaza, and playground purposes "subject to private rights, if any there be." This clause necessitated resolution of the cadastral case before the land's status as public dominion could be conclusively determined.

• Section 149(z)(ee), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code) — Required the Sangguniang Bayan to pass an ordinance before the municipality could summarily abate a public nuisance. The municipality avoided this route by filing a civil action.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Nocon, JJ., concurred. Bellosillo, J., was on leave.

N/A — The decision was unanimous among the participating justices.