Tamayo vs. People

A compromise agreement or reimbursement of the defrauded amount after the commission of estafa extinguishes only the civil liability pro tanto and does not extinguish criminal liability, which is a public offense that must be prosecuted by the State regardless of the offended party's waiver.

In May 1993, petitioner Aurora Tamayo and Erlinda Anicas introduced themselves to spouses Pedro and Juanita Sotto as assemblers of passenger jeeps payable on installment basis. After showing a Malaguena-type jeep, they proposed to assemble one for the spouses for ₱210,000.00. Allured by the proposal, the spouses made partial payments totaling ₱120,000.00 between June 2 and June 30, 1993. Petitioner failed to deliver the jeep, misappropriated the funds, and ignored demands for return. An information for estafa was filed against petitioner and Anicas on August 15, 1994.

• The Transaction and Fraud: Sometime in May 1993, petitioner and Anicas proposed to assemble a passenger jeep for spouses Pedro and Juanita Sotto for ₱210,000.00. Between June 2 and June 30, 1993, the spouses made partial payments totaling ₱120,000.00, evidenced by receipts signed by petitioner and Anicas. When Pedro Sotto requested to see the jeep, petitioner claimed it was in Laguna and refused to accompany him, eventually hiding. Subsequent demands for the return of the money were ignored.
• Defense Version: Petitioner testified that she merely introduced Pedro to a mechanic named Ernesto Ravana, who agreed to assemble the jeep for ₱120,000.00. She claimed Pedro backed out of the deal, prompting her to reimburse him, and that she filed an estafa complaint against Ravana when he failed to deliver.
• Conviction and Finality: The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, imposing an indeterminate penalty and ordering indemnification. The CA affirmed the conviction in toto on April 22, 2004. Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review, causing the CA Decision to become final and executory on June 1, 2004.
• Motion to Suspend Execution: After the RTC issued an order of arrest on June 13, 2006, petitioner filed a motion to suspend execution, alleging a supervening event. She claimed that while the case was pending before the CA, she and Pedro had entered into a compromise agreement where she reimbursed the ₱120,000.00 in two tranches, and Pedro agreed to dismiss the case. She further alleged that her former counsel was negligent in failing to present this agreement to the CA.

• Compromise Agreement: Petitioner argued that the execution of the final judgment would be unjust and inequitable because she and Pedro had entered into a compromise agreement where she reimbursed the defrauded amount and Pedro agreed to dismiss the case, thereby extinguishing her criminal and civil liability.
• Negligence of Counsel: Petitioner maintained that she informed her former counsel of the compromise, but his failure to relay this to the CA constituted negligence that should not be attributed to her, as it resulted in great damage and prejudice to her.

• Denial of Compromise: Respondents, through Juanita Sotto and their counsel, expressly and consistently denied that a compromise took place and that Pedro received money from petitioner, asserting that the receipt presented by petitioner was falsified or fictitious.
• Nature of Criminal Liability: Respondents argued that criminal liability for estafa is a public offense and cannot be extinguished by a compromise or reimbursement, as the crime is committed against the State.

• Finality of Judgment and Compromise: Whether a final and executory judgment of conviction for estafa can be modified or set aside in light of an alleged compromise agreement between the accused and the private complainant.
• Negligence of Counsel: Whether the client is bound by the negligence of counsel in failing to inform the appellate court of the alleged compromise agreement.

• Finality of Judgment and Compromise: The final judgment cannot be modified or set aside. Under Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judgment of conviction may only be modified before it becomes final. Once final, the judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified except to correct clerical errors. Furthermore, criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise or reimbursement, as it is a public offense against the State. Reimbursement or compromise extinguishes only civil liability pro tanto and does not obliterate criminal liability.
• Evidentiary Burden: The alleged compromise was not proven by clear, positive, and convincing evidence. Petitioner failed to prove the genuineness of the handwritten receipt, which respondents denounced as falsified.
• Negligence of Counsel: The general rule applies: the mistake or negligence of counsel binds the client. The recognized exceptions—where counsel's mistake is so great as to deprive the client of a day in court, or where counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in deprivation of liberty without due process—do not apply. Counsel sufficiently performed his duties, and even if he was negligent in not raising the compromise, it would not have affected the outcome, as a compromise does not extinguish criminal liability.
• Propriety of Penalty: The RTC erred in imposing the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence (4 years, 2 months, and 1 day of prision correccional), as the correct duration of prision correccional in its minimum to medium periods is anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months only. However, the erroneous penalty can no longer be corrected because the judgment of conviction had already become final and executory.

• Finality of Judgments — A judgment that has become final and executory can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect, except to correct clerical errors or make nunc pro tunc entries. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the RTC's final judgment of conviction could no longer be modified despite the alleged compromise agreement.
• Effect of Compromise on Estafa — Criminal liability for estafa is not extinguished by a compromise or reimbursement of the amount swindled. Reimbursement or compromise affects only the civil liability pro tanto and does not obliterate criminal liability, as estafa is a public offense prosecuted by the State on its own motion. The Court relied on this to rule that the alleged compromise between petitioner and the private complainant did not extinguish her criminal liability.
• Negligence of Counsel — The mistake or negligence of counsel binds the client, as acts performed by counsel within the scope of their authority are regarded as acts of the client. Exceptions exist only where (1) the counsel's mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied a day in court, or (2) the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the client's deprivation of liberty or property without due process. The Court found that counsel had sufficiently performed his duties and no gross negligence existed that would exempt petitioner from the general rule.

• "Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered or modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries. Nothing further can be done to a final judgment except to execute it."
• "It is a hornbook doctrine in our criminal law that the criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the government on its own motion, even though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the private offended party."
• "The reimbursement or restitution to the offended party of the sums swindled by the petitioner does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. It only extinguishes pro tanto the civil liability."

• Firaza v. People, G.R. No. 154721, 22 March 2007 — Followed. Reimbursement of sums swindled in estafa does not extinguish criminal liability, only civil liability pro tanto.
• Recuerdo v. People, G.R. No. 168217, 27 June 2006 — Followed. Reiterated that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise.
• Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda, G.R. No. 134436 — Followed. Payment, indemnification, or compromise after the commission of malversation or estafa affects only civil liability and does not extinguish criminal liability.
• Ceniza-Manantan v. People, G.R. No. 156248, 28 August 2007 — Followed. Established the rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client, subject to exceptions where counsel's negligence is so gross as to deprive the client of due process.

• Section 7, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that a judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside upon motion of the accused before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. The Court applied this provision to rule that the CA's judgment of conviction could no longer be modified after it attained finality on June 1, 2004.
• Article 315, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of estafa (swindling). The Court applied this provision to affirm petitioner's conviction and analyze the propriety of the imposed penalty, noting the graduated penalty scale for amounts defrauded exceeding ₱22,000.00.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in computing the proper penalty for estafa. The Court noted that the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by the RPC, while the maximum term should not exceed twenty years of reclusion temporal.

Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Ruben T. Reyes