Tamargo vs. Awingan

A trial court faced with a motion to withdraw an Information based on a DOJ resolution must independently assess the entire evidence, and it commits grave abuse of discretion if it relies only on evidence supporting probable cause while ignoring contradictory evidence; an extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator is inadmissible against co-accused absent independent proof of conspiracy.

Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo was a lawyer and political figure in Buguey, Cagayan, where respondents Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and Lloyd Antiporda held mayoral office. The murder prosecution arose against a backdrop of political rivalry between Atty. Tamargo and the Antipordas, and of related election and kidnapping cases. Those circumstances explain why the respondents characterized the charges as politically motivated.

Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila. The police had no leads on the perpetrators until Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that Columna was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna. After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of Geron’s affidavit, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution dated December 5, 2003 finding probable cause against Columna and three John Does. On February 2, 2004, the corresponding Informations for murder were filed against them in the RTC of Manila, one assigned to Branch 27 for the death of Atty. Franklin Tamargo, and the other to Branch 29 for the death of the minor Gail Franzielle. Columna was arrested in the province of Cagayan on February 17, 2004 and brought to Manila for detention and trial.

On March 8, 2004, Columna, whose real name was Manuel, Jr., executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as “look out” during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan, alias “Mumoy,” as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda. The former was the ex-mayor and the latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor. Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo, brother of Atty. Tamargo, filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor, who subjected him to clarificatory questions.

Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They alleged that Licerio was a candidate for mayor in Buguey, Cagayan during the May 2004 elections and that the case was instituted by his political opponents in order to derail his candidacy. The Antipordas admitted that Atty. Tamargo was their political rival for the mayoralty post of Buguey. Atty. Tamargo had been defeated twice by Lloyd and once by Licerio. Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo filed an election case against Lloyd and a kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against Licerio. However, they claimed that both cases were dismissed as Lloyd emerged as the winner in the elections and Licerio was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan. During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented Columna’s unsolicited handwritten letter dated May 3, 2004 to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columna’s jail cell in Manila. In the letter, Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings. Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.

Due to the submission of Columna’s letter and affidavit, the investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing to enable Columna to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him. Thus, on November 10, 2004, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges. This was approved by the city prosecutor. Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia dated October 29, 2004, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail. He requested that he be transferred to another detention center. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an appeal to the DOJ. On May 30, 2005, the DOJ, through then Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the Informations for murder. He opined that the March 8, 2004 extrajudicial confession was not effectively impeached by the subsequent recantation and that there was enough evidence to prove the probable guilt of respondents. Accordingly, the Informations were filed and the cases were consolidated and assigned to the RTC of Manila, Branch 29.

However, on August 12, 2005, Secretary Gonzales granted the Antipordas’ motion for reconsideration and directed the withdrawal of the Informations. This time, he declared that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible against respondents and that, even if it was admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence. As a result, on August 22, 2005, the trial prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations. On October 4, 2005, Secretary Gonzalez denied petitioner’s MR. The RTC, through Judge Cielito Mindaro-Grulla, granted the motion to withdraw the Informations in an order dated October 26, 2005. Petitioner filed an MR but the judge voluntarily inhibited herself without resolving the same. The cases were re-raffled to Branch 19, presided by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna. Judge Daguna granted the MR of petitioner in a resolution dated December 9, 2005. She ruled that, based on Columna’s March 8, 2004 affidavit which he affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. She denied the MR of the Antipordas in an order dated February 6, 2006. Consequently, respondent Awingan filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition in the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. The Antipordas separately filed another certiorari case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94188.

• Probable Cause / Independent Assessment: Petitioner argued that, based on the independent assessment of Judge Daguna, there was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna; she considered all the pieces of evidence but did not give credit to Columna’s recantation.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondents countered that Judge Daguna committed grave abuse of discretion by limiting her evaluation and assessment only to evidence that supported probable cause while completely disregarding contradicting evidence.
• Res Inter Alios Acta: Respondents contended that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against them because of the rule on res inter alios acta.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion / Probable Cause: Whether the CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against respondents.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion / Probable Cause: No. The CA correctly found grave abuse of discretion because Judge Daguna selectively assessed the evidence, ignored Columna’s recantation and other contradictory evidence, and relied on an extrajudicial confession inadmissible against the respondents absent independent proof of conspiracy.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion / Probable Cause: The SC began from the settled rule that when a trial court is confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a DOJ Secretary resolution, it has the duty to make an independent assessment of the merits; it may agree or disagree with the Secretary, and reliance alone on the Secretary’s resolution would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The RTC must itself be convinced that there is indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused. The SC agreed with the CA that Judge Daguna limited herself only to Columna’s March 8, 2004 affidavit implicating the respondents, his April 19, 2004 affirmation during the clarificatory hearing, his October 29, 2004 letter, and the May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution upholding the prosecutor’s recommendation to file murder charges. She completely ignored other relevant evidence: Columna’s May 3, 2004 letter to Lloyd Antiporda narrating the torture he suffered to force him to admit participation and implicate the respondents; his May 25, 2004 affidavit stating that neither he nor the respondents had any involvement in the murders; and his testimony during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing categorically affirming his May 3, 2004 letter and May 25, 2004 affidavit. Citing Jimenez vs. Jimenez, the SC noted that although there is no general formula or fixed rule for determining probable cause, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason; the judge or fiscal should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial, for that would be a flagrant violation of a basic right. Had Judge Daguna reviewed the entire records, she would have seen that other evidence cast doubt on the pieces she relied on. The SC quoted with approval the CA’s observation that her selectivity sidetracked the guidelines for independent assessment and impaired the substantial rights of the accused; she should have made a circumspect evaluation by looking at everything made available to her. Under Santos vs. Orda, Jr., the trial judge may make an independent assessment based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the trial court may order produced; or any evidence already adduced before the trial court by the accused at the time the motion is filed. The SC also held that Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible against the respondents under the rule on res inter alios acta: the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, and an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against co-accused, and is hearsay against them. The exception for an admission by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 requires that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself, (b) the admission relate to the common object, and (c) it have been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy; otherwise, it cannot be used against alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them. Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy; there was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible against them. Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence, it would be unfair to hold respondents for trial; once no probable cause exists, they should be relieved from the pain of going through a full-blown court case, and when the evidence at preliminary investigation is nothing more than an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint should not prosper. The SC noted that the rule was all the more significant because Licerio Antiporda remained in detention for the murder charges under the warrant issued by Judge Daguna. Judge Daguna’s duty at that stage was only to satisfy herself whether there was probable cause or sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial as co-conspirators; given that she had no sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause, her orders denying the withdrawal of the Informations were issued with grave abuse of discretion. The SC thus held that the CA committed no reversible error in granting the certiorari petitions.

• Independent assessment of a motion to withdraw an Information — When a trial court acts on a motion to withdraw an Information grounded on lack of probable cause based on a DOJ Secretary resolution, it must independently assess the merits; it may agree or disagree with the Secretary, but reliance alone on the Secretary’s resolution is an abdication of its duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The SC applied this against Judge Daguna because she selectively relied on evidence supporting probable cause and ignored contradictory evidence.
• Probable cause — There is no general formula or fixed rule for determining probable cause; it depends on the conditions of each case and largely on the judge’s finding, but the finding must not disregard the facts or run counter to reason. A judge or fiscal should not proceed with prosecution hoping that credible evidence will later appear at trial. The SC applied this in finding grave abuse of discretion.
• Res inter alios acta — The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against co-accused, and is hearsay against them. The SC applied this to exclude Columna’s March 8, 2004 affidavit against the respondents.
• Admission by conspirator (exception to res inter alios acta) — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against a co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Requisites: (a) the conspiracy is first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it was made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. The SC applied this and found the exception unavailable because no independent evidence of conspiracy existed.
• Uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator — When the evidence offered during preliminary investigation is nothing more than an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint should not prosper; the accused should be relieved from the pain of a full-blown court case once no probable cause exists. The SC applied this because Columna’s recanted confession was the sole evidence against respondents.
• Grave abuse of discretion in denying withdrawal — A trial court commits grave abuse of discretion when it denies a motion to withdraw Informations based on a selective assessment of the evidence, ignoring substantial contradictory evidence and relying on an inadmissible recanted extrajudicial confession. The SC applied this to Judge Daguna’s orders.

• “It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the ground of lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion.” — The SC stated the trial court’s duty when acting on a motion to withdraw an Information based on a DOJ resolution.
• “Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.” — The SC used this maxim to exclude Columna’s extrajudicial confession as evidence against the respondents.
• “Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.” — The SC set out the three requisites for the conspirator-admission exception, which the prosecution failed to meet.
• “Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.” — The SC concluded that the only evidence against the respondents could not support probable cause.

• Jimenez vs. Jimenez, G.R. No. 158148, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 516 — Followed for the rule that probable cause has no fixed formula but the finding must not disregard the facts or run counter to reason.
• Santos vs. Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 158236, Sept. 1, 2004, 437 SCRA 504 — Followed for the sources a trial judge may use in making an independent assessment of probable cause.
• Gandarosa vs. Flores, G.R. No. 167910, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 776 — Followed for the duty of the trial court to independently assess a motion to withdraw an Information.
• Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc. vs. Eugenio, Jr., G.R. No. 163741, Aug. 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 274 — Followed for the rule that reliance alone on the DOJ Secretary’s resolution is an abdication of the trial court’s duty.
• Fuentes vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 139618, July 11, 2006, 494 SCRA 478 — Followed for the rule that the trial court must itself be convinced that there is no sufficient evidence against the accused.
• People vs. Vda. De Ramos, 451 Phil. 214 (2003) — Followed for the rule that an extrajudicial confession binds only the confessant and is hearsay against co-accused.
• People vs. Tena, G.R. No. 100909, Oct. 21, 1992, 215 SCRA 43 — Followed for the three requisites of the admission-by-conspirator exception.
• Sistoza vs. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117 (2002) — Followed for the rule that an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator should not prosper in preliminary investigation.

• Section 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Admission by third party; the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. The SC applied this to exclude Columna’s extrajudicial confession against the respondents.
• Section 30, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Admission by conspirator; the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against a co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The SC applied this and found the exception unavailable because no independent evidence of conspiracy existed.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The petition for review on certiorari was the procedural vehicle used to bring the CA decision and resolution before the SC.
• Constitutional right to be confronted with witnesses and to cross-examine them — The SC invoked this right in explaining why an extrajudicial confession cannot be used against alleged co-conspirators absent the conspirator-admission exception.