Tamares vs. Heirs of De Guia

A registered owner's heir may lose the right to recover possession of registered land by reason of laches, even though title to registered land cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession; and a duly notarized deed of sale, being both a public document and an ancient document, prevails over the mere possession of an original certificate of title where the registered owner voluntarily disposed of rights over the property.

The subject property, Lot 2189-B consisting of 2,181 square meters in Iba, Zambales, was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5589 registered in the name of Andrea De Guia. Upon Andrea's death, her sole heir was Saturnina Apagalang, who in turn was survived upon her death in 1978 by her only son, Sebastian Tamares (petitioner). On the other side, respondents are the heirs of spouses Natividad and Rafael De Guia, Sr., whose predecessor Rafael purchased a 1,875-square-meter portion of the property from Saturnina in 1945. The Torrens system's interplay with possessory rights, the evidentiary status of notarized and ancient documents, and the equitable doctrine of laches as applied to heirs of registered owners form the legal backdrop of the dispute.

The subject property is Lot 2189-B, a parcel of land with an area of 2,181 square meters located at Barangay San Agustin, Iba, Zambales, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5589 registered in the name of Andrea De Guia. When Andrea died, she was survived by her sole heir, Saturnina Apagalang. On January 2, 1945, Saturnina executed a Deed of Purchase and Sale over a 1,875-square-meter portion of the property in favor of Rafael De Guia, who was married to Natividad De Guia, for the sum of ₱50.00. The deed was duly notarized before Justice of the Peace Bernardo Parrales and recorded in the Notarial Registry as Doc. No. 2, Page 37, Book No. VII, Series of 1945.

Thereafter, respondents, as heirs of Natividad and Rafael, took possession of the 1,875-square-meter lot in the concept of an owner. They introduced permanent improvements, including concrete houses, and planted fruit-bearing trees and other plants. They also paid real estate taxes, as evidenced by a tax declaration issued in the name of Rafael. On August 5, 1961, Magno Giron and respondents caused a subdivision survey of the property covered by OCT No. 5589. Magno had purchased a 1,562-square-meter portion, and the property was subdivided into Lot 2189-A (1,562 square meters for Magno) and Lot 2189-B (2,181 square meters for respondents). When respondents realized that only 1,875 square meters of the 2,181 square meters of Lot 2189-B belonged to them, apparently encroaching on the remaining 306 square meters still owned by Saturnina, they compensated Saturnina in the amount of ₱200.00. However, respondents failed to register the purchase of the 306-square-meter area with the Register of Deeds and thus never obtained a certificate of title over it.

On July 28, 1978, Saturnina died intestate, leaving her only son, Sebastian Tamares. On June 1, 1999, twenty-one years after Saturnina's death, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents before the Municipal Trial Court of Iba, Zambales. The MTC granted the complaint on October 5, 1999, and the RTC affirmed on December 19, 2000. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed in toto on May 20, 2002, holding that petitioner's Torrens title prevailed over respondents' possessory claim. An Order of Demolition issued by the RTC on December 12, 2005 was implemented on January 9, 2006.

Respondents had earlier filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and reconveyance with damages on September 22, 2005, which the RTC dismissed in 2008 for lack of jurisdiction. On July 27, 2010, respondents filed a new complaint for recovery of ownership and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. RTC-3025-I, asserting absolute ownership over the 2,181-square-meter property by virtue of the Deed of Purchase and Sale and their continuous possession in the concept of an owner since 1945. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents on October 17, 2014, declaring them the rightful owners. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on December 18, 2014, and his appeal to the CA was likewise dismissed on March 23, 2017. The CA concurred with the RTC that the Deed of Purchase and Sale evidenced respondents' ownership and additionally held that respondents had acquired the property by acquisitive prescription, given their continuous, adverse, and public possession for over sixty years. Petitioner died on January 22, 2018 and was substituted by his daughter, Ofelia Tamares Panelo.

• Torrens Title as Conclusive Evidence: Petitioner invoked the rule that a Torrens title is conclusive evidence of ownership and that the titleholder is entitled to all attributes of ownership, arguing that respondents' proof of ownership cannot prevail over the unencumbered original certificate of title in his possession.
• Prescription and Cause of Action: Petitioner averred that respondents' right to file the action had already prescribed and that they had no valid cause of action against him, asserting that his right of succession was transmitted to him by operation of law upon the death of his mother, Saturnina.
• Lack of Documentary Proof: Petitioner pointed out that there was no record of transfer or documents of sale in the Zambales Provincial Assessor's Office to prove that respondents' predecessor-in-interest bought the lot from Saturnina, and that respondents never demanded recovery of the property from Saturnina during her lifetime or from petitioner after her death.
• Estoppel and Laches: Petitioner asserted that respondents were estopped or barred by laches from instituting the case.
• Invalidity of the Deed: Petitioner insisted that the Deed of Purchase and Sale had no probative value, as there was no proof of its due execution—either documentary or testimonial—and it bore no notarial seal.
• Capacity of Vendor: Petitioner asserted that the registered owner, Andrea, was still alive at the time the deed was allegedly executed, so Saturnina was not in a position to sell and transfer absolute ownership of the property.

• Validity of the Deed: Respondents alleged that the Deed of Purchase and Sale dated January 2, 1945 was entered into during the end of World War II, possessed the characteristics of an ancient document being more than thirty years old and produced from the National Archives, and that no proof of forgery in Saturnina's signature was presented.
• Validity of the Verbal Sale: Respondents argued that the verbal sale of the 306-square-meter lot was not void because it was made before the effectivity of the New Civil Code, when execution of a public document was not required.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Respondents asserted that acquisitive prescription had already set in because they had possessed and claimed the property for more than thirty years.
• Tax Declarations: Respondents maintained that the tax declarations all referred to the subject property, as they had no other land in Iba, Zambales.
• Admission by Co-Heirs: Respondents argued that petitioner could not deny the sale, which was admitted by the other co-heirs of Saturnina who refused to join in filing the complaint, with only petitioner acting for himself.

• Validity of the Deed of Purchase and Sale: Whether the CA erred in upholding the validity of the Deed of Purchase and Sale as the basis of respondents' ownership of the property.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Whether the CA erred in ruling that respondents had already acquired the subject property by acquisitive prescription.

• Validity of the Deed of Purchase and Sale: No. The Deed of Purchase and Sale was duly notarized and thus enjoyed the presumption of authenticity and due execution; it likewise qualified as an ancient document under the Rules of Court, requiring no further authentication. Petitioner failed to present clear, positive, and convincing evidence to overcome these presumptions.
• Acquisitive Prescription: No, but on a different ground. The CA's ruling on prescription was erroneous because Section 47 of PD 1529 prohibits acquisition of registered land by prescription or adverse possession. However, the petition was still denied because petitioner was barred by laches and respondents had a better right under the Deed.

• Validity of the Deed of Purchase and Sale: The Deed of Purchase and Sale dated January 2, 1945 was signed by vendor Saturnina and duly notarized before the Justice of the Peace. The act of notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible without further proof of authenticity, and a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. The burden to overturn this presumption fell upon petitioner, who offered only the testimony of Ofelia that her grandmother never executed any document of sale—a testimony the RTC found utterly unfounded and uncorroborated. Following Tapuroc vs. Loqueliano Vda. de Mende, a bare denial of a predecessor's signature is insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of notarized documents. Even assuming the deed were treated as a private document, it satisfied all requisites of an ancient document under the Rules of Court: it was more than thirty years old, produced from the National Archives where it would naturally be found if genuine, and unblemished by any alteration or circumstance of suspicion. Petitioner's allegation of forgery in Saturnina's signature did not suffice, as the ancient document rule's requirement regarding the absence of suspicious circumstances refers to the extrinsic quality of the document itself. Petitioner's additional argument that Andrea was still alive when the deed was executed called for a review of facts, which is inappropriate under Rule 45. Furthermore, the age-old rule that a Torrens titleholder is entitled to possession applies only as long as the registered owner has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land; once a registered owner voluntarily disposes of rights, an action for reconveyance is available to the person with a better right. The Torrens system was not designed to shield one who holds title in bad faith.

• Acquisitive Prescription: The Court disagreed with the CA's finding that respondents acquired the subject property by prescription. Under Section 47 of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529), no title to registered land in derogation of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Even if respondents occupied the property for a significant period, the registered and lawful owner has the right to demand return at any time. However, petitioner is neither the lawful owner nor the registered owner of the subject property—he is merely an heir of Saturnina. Following Heirs of Lacamen vs. Heirs of Laruan, while a person may not acquire title to registered property through adverse possession, the heir of the registered owner may lose the right to recover possession and title by reason of laches. Respondents and their predecessors had been in open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession since 1945, yet petitioner only began asserting ownership in 1999—fifty-four years later. Petitioner's neglect to assert his alleged ownership for an unreasonable length of time bars the present action. In any case, respondents have a better right by virtue of the Deed of Purchase and Sale.

• Presumption of Regularity of Notarized Documents — A duly notarized document enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution, as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. The burden of overturning this presumption falls on the party challenging the document, and a bare denial of a predecessor's signature is insufficient to overcome it. Applied here, petitioner's only evidence—the testimony of his daughter—was found utterly unfounded and uncorroborated, failing to discharge the burden.
• Ancient Document Rule — Under the Rules of Court, a document is considered an ancient document if: (a) it is more than thirty years old; (b) it is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and (c) it is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. An ancient document, akin to a public document, need not be authenticated. The requirement that the document be unblemished refers to its extrinsic quality, not to allegations of forgery in signature. Applied here, the 1945 Deed satisfied all three requisites, having been retrieved from the National Archives.
• Indefeasibility of Torrens Title and Its Exceptions — Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but only a means of confirming its existence with notice to the world. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner. Once a registered owner voluntarily disposes of rights over the property, the rule that the titleholder is entitled to possession no longer applies, and an action for reconveyance is available to the person with a better right. The Torrens system was not designed to shield one who holds title in bad faith.
• No Prescription Over Registered Land — Under Section 47 of PD 1529, no title to registered land in derogation of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. However, the heir of the registered owner may lose the right to recover possession and title by reason of laches, even though a third party cannot acquire title by prescription.
• Laches — Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is based on equity and operates as a bar to recovery. Applied here, petitioner waited fifty-four years from 1945 before asserting ownership in 1999, constituting neglect that bars his action. The maxim vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subveniunt—"the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights"—applies.

• "It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property." — This passage, quoted from Borromeo vs. Descallar, articulates the fundamental principle that a Torrens certificate is evidence of ownership, not its source, and that possession of title alone does not conclusively establish ownership.

• "[W]hile a person may not acquire title to the registered property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover back the possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of laches." — Quoted from Heirs of Lacamen vs. Heirs of Laruan, this passage establishes the critical distinction that while prescription cannot defeat a Torrens title, laches can bar an heir from recovering registered land, forming the ratio decidendi for denying the petition despite rejecting the CA's prescription ruling.

• "In this case, the 'Deed of Purchase and Sale' is an ancient document as envisioned by Section 22 [sic], Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Having executed in January 2, 1945 which is now more than 30 years old, coming from the National Archives office which said document can naturally be found, and is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion, there is no further proof of due execution and authenticity required." — This passage, quoted from the CA decision as adopted by the Supreme Court, applies the ancient document rule to uphold the deed's evidentiary weight without need of further authentication.

• Borromeo vs. Descallar, 599 Phil. 332 (2009) — Followed. Cited for the principle that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership and that mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner; the indefeasibility of title does not apply where the transferee is not a holder in good faith.
• Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr., 661 Phil. 306 (2011) — Followed. Cited for the distinction between title as a concept of ownership and the certificate of title as evidence thereof, and that placing land under the Torrens system does not mean ownership can no longer be disputed.
• Tapuroc vs. Loqueliano Vda. de Mende, 541 Phil. 93 (2007) — Followed. Cited for the rule that a bare denial of a predecessor's signature on a notarized deed of sale is insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of notarized documents.
• Heirs of Lacamen vs. Heirs of Laruan, 160 Phil. 615 (1975) — Controlling on the laches issue. Cited for the doctrine that while prescription cannot acquire registered land, the heir of the registered owner may lose the right to recover by laches.
• Director of Lands vs. Register of Deeds, 92 Phil. 826 (1953) — Cited for the nature of an action for reconveyance, which respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible and seeks to transfer the land to the rightful owner.
• Pen Development Corp. vs. Martinez Leyba, Inc., 816 Phil. 554 (2017) — Followed. Cited for the rule that under Section 47 of PD 1529, the registered and lawful owner has the right to demand return of registered land at any time, notwithstanding adverse possession.

• Section 47, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provides that no title to registered land in derogation of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Applied to reject the CA's ruling that respondents acquired the property by prescription, while preserving the denial of the petition on the alternative ground of laches.
• Section 21, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Defines an ancient document as one more than thirty years old, produced from proper custody, and unblemished by alteration or suspicion. Applied to uphold the Deed of Purchase and Sale as an ancient document requiring no further authentication.
• New Civil Code provisions on prescription — Referenced in connection with the CA's discussion of ordinary acquisitive prescription (possession in good faith and with just title for ten years) and extraordinary prescription (uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without title or good faith), though the Supreme Court ultimately found prescription unavailing over registered land.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J. (Chairperson), Hernando, Gaerlan, and Rosario, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were noted.