Tamani vs. Salvador

A notarized deed of sale enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution, but that presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence, including expert testimony on simulated forgery and highly questionable circumstances; in a civil case, forgery need only be established by preponderance of evidence. A purchaser is not in good faith where he is a neighbor and co-owner who cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on guard.

Respondents Roman Salvador and Filomena Bravo and the Spouses Demetrio Tamani and Josefa Caddauan were co-owners of an undivided 776-square-meter parcel under TCT No. 8582, with respondents owning 345 square meters and the Spouses Tamani owning the remaining 431 square meters. Petitioners are the surviving children and legal heirs of the Spouses Tamani. A prior specific performance suit by Benigno Magpale and Leoncia Velasco against the Spouses Tamani over a 496-square-meter residential lot was dismissed by the CFI of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court.

Respondents Roman Salvador and Filomena Bravo and the Spouses Demetrio Tamani and Josefa Caddauan were co-owners of an undivided 776-square-meter parcel of land in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, covered by TCT No. 8582. Under that title, respondents owned 345 square meters, while the Spouses Tamani owned the remaining 431 square meters, which became the disputed property. Petitioners are the surviving children and legal heirs of the Spouses Tamani.

On August 17, 1959, the Spouses Tamani allegedly sold the disputed property to Milagros Cruz for P2,500.00 by a Deed of Absolute Sale. On December 11, 1980, Cruz sold the same property to respondents for the same amount of P2,500.00 through another Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondents thereby acquired the entire 776-square-meter area; TCT No. T-8582 was cancelled and TCT No. T-55328 was issued in their names.

In 1973, Benigno Magpale and Leoncia Velasco filed a complaint for specific performance against the Spouses Tamani in the CFI of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, seeking to compel the Spouses Tamani to execute a deed of sale over a 496-square-meter residential lot allegedly sold to them in 1936 without documentation. The CFI dismissed the complaint on February 28, 1977, and the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed. The Tamanis and their heirs remained in actual possession of the 431-square-meter area and had leased the building thereon to tenants.

When respondents filed the complaint for quieting of title, petitioners answered that they were the lawful owners and in actual possession of the disputed property by inheritance from their parents, and they assailed the August 17, 1959 Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground that their parents’ signatures were forged. At petitioners’ instance, Demetrio Tamani’s signature on the deed and his standard signatures were examined by the NBI. Bienvenido C. Albacea of the NBI reported that the questioned and standard signatures were written by one and the same person. Dissatisfied, petitioners sought a second examination by the PNP Crime Laboratory Service. Mely Sorra of the PNP reported that the questioned signature and the standard signatures marked S-1 to S-11 and S-19 were written by two different persons; she disregarded S-12 to S-18 because they were executed several years apart from the questioned signature.

Sorra testified that the questioned signature was executed in a slow and drawn manner while the standard signatures were fast; that the line quality of the questioned signature, particularly the letters “o,” “m,” and “n,” exhibited hesitation and patchings; and that the lateral spacing was crumpled. She characterized the case as one of simulated or copied forgery, where similarities are superficial. The RTC gave more weight to the PNP report and Sorra’s testimony because of her educational, professional, and work background. The RTC also found the sale spurious because the whole lot had been mortgaged to the GSIS for P12,000.00 on June 14, 1958, with Demetrio Tamani as a signatory, making a sale of his portion for P2,500.00 a year later contrary to human nature; because Tamani continued to declare the land for taxation and pay taxes from 1955 to 1973; because Cruz never declared or paid taxes from 1959 to 1980; because Cruz bought for investment at P2,500.00 and sold 21 years later for the same price; and because Cruz never ascertained the land’s identity, occupants, or improvements.

The CA, on appeal, examined the signatures and found the similarities of strokes more prominent than the dissimilarities, and noted that petitioners did not question Josefa Caddauan’s signature. The Supreme Court, however, found the PNP examiner’s testimony more credible because she limited her examination to S-1 to S-11 and S-19, while the NBI examiner considered all 19 specimen signatures, including S-12 to S-18 executed from 1933 to 1952 and 1974.

• Appellate Court’s Role in Conflicting Expert Testimonies: Petitioners argued that the CA disregarded the proper role of an appellate court in cases where expert testimonies conflict and improperly interpreted its duty to independently evaluate the authenticity of Demetrio Tamani’s signature.
• Overturning RTC Factual Findings: Petitioners maintained that the CA had no basis for overturning the factual findings of the trial court.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners argued that the assailed CA issuances were issued in grave abuse of discretion and not in accord with Supreme Court decisions.
• Spurious Deed of Sale: Petitioners argued that the alleged deed of sale was spurious because Cruz never took action to possess the property from 1959 to 1980; Tamani continuously declared the land in his name and paid real property taxes after the supposed sale; and the land was sold to Cruz for P2,500.00 in 1959 but resold to respondents for the same amount 21 years later.
• Forgery by Preponderance: Petitioners maintained that one alleging forgery must establish the case by preponderance of evidence, and that they had satisfactorily discharged that burden.
• Respondents Not Buyers in Good Faith: Petitioners argued that respondents could not be considered buyers in good faith because they were neighbors and co-owners who should have known of petitioners’ possession and claims over the property.

• Second Re-examination: Respondents claimed that the first examination of Tamani’s signature was at the instance of petitioners; the Court noted that respondents should have objected to the second re-examination but did not.

• Conflicting Expert Testimonies and Appellate Review: Whether the CA properly exercised its appellate role and independently evaluated the authenticity of Demetrio Tamani’s signature when the expert testimonies of the NBI and PNP conflicted.
• Overturning RTC Factual Findings: Whether the CA had basis to overturn the factual findings of the RTC.
• Forgery of the 1959 Deed: Whether the signature of Demetrio Tamani on the August 17, 1959 Deed of Absolute Sale was forged, rendering the deed void.
• Presumption of Notarized Document: Whether the notarized deed’s prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution was overcome.
• Good Faith Purchaser: Whether respondents were buyers in good faith of the disputed property.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the CA issued its assailed Decision and Resolution in grave abuse of discretion and contrary to Supreme Court decisions.

• Conflicting Expert Testimonies and Appellate Review: Partly. The CA correctly required the judge to conduct an independent examination of the signatures, but its conclusion that the similarities prevailed was reversed; the Court found the PNP examiner’s testimony more credible.
• Overturning RTC Factual Findings: No. The CA had no sufficient basis to overturn the RTC; the conflicting findings authorized the Supreme Court to re-examine the evidence, and preponderance favored petitioners.
• Forgery of the 1959 Deed: Yes. The signature of Demetrio Tamani was forged; the deed is void. The PNP examiner’s testimony on slow execution, hesitation, patchings, and simulated forgery established the forgery.
• Presumption of Notarized Document: Yes. The prima facie presumption was overcome by clear and convincing evidence and highly questionable circumstances; respondents failed to present the deed’s witness or the notary public.
• Good Faith Purchaser: No. Respondents were neighbors and co-owners who knew or should have known of petitioners’ possession and claims; they cannot claim good faith.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The CA’s reversal was set aside because it was contrary to the evidence and applicable jurisprudence.

• Conflicting Expert Testimonies and Appellate Review: The general rule is that CA factual findings are conclusive, but an exception exists when trial and appellate court findings conflict; here, the RTC and CA disagreed on forgery, so the Supreme Court could re-examine the evidence. The CA correctly stated that the judge must independently examine the signatures and not rely solely on an expert’s credentials. However, after reviewing the testimonies, the Supreme Court found Sorra’s PNP testimony more credible. Sorra testified that the questioned signature was slow and drawn while standards were fast; line quality showed hesitation and patchings in “o,” “m,” and “n”; lateral spacing was crumpled; and the case involved simulated or copied forgery with only superficial similarities. The Court observed many of the differences she noted. Although Albacea’s NBI report found one writer, Sorra limited her examination to S-1 to S-11 and S-19, while Albacea considered all 19 specimen signatures, including S-12 to S-18 executed from 1933 to 1952 and 1974, which were too remote from the 1959 questioned signature. Sorra’s superior credentials gave added value. Thus, the CA erred in reversing the RTC’s forgery finding.
• Overturning RTC Factual Findings: The RTC’s finding of forgery was supported by the evidence and circumstances. The Court cited the mortgage contract of June 14, 1958, where the whole lot was collateral for a P12,000 GSIS loan with Demetrio Tamani as signatory; it was contrary to human nature for him to sell his 431-square-meter portion for only P2,500 a year later. Tamani continued to declare the land for taxation and paid taxes from 1955 to 1973, acts inconsistent with having sold it. Cruz did not declare or pay taxes from 1959 to 1980. Cruz bought for investment at P2,500 and sold 21 years later for the same price, casting doubt on the sale. Cruz did not know the floor area, material, occupants, or number of houses, and did not inspect the premises. These circumstances, together with Sorra’s testimony, showed the deed was spurious. The burden of proving forgery by preponderance of evidence was discharged.
• Forgery of the 1959 Deed: One alleging forgery must prove it by preponderance of evidence. The value of a handwriting expert’s opinion depends not on the mere conclusion but on the assistance in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and discrepancies. Sorra’s testimony identified specific differences between the questioned and standard signatures: slow/drawn execution, hesitation and patchings, crumpled lateral spacing, and differences in letters D, E, M, T, O, I, N, and terminal stroke. She explained that differences were not normal variations but indicated simulated forgery, where similarities are superficial. The Court found her testimony credible and sufficient, together with the suspicious circumstances, to establish forgery. The 1959 deed was therefore void.
• Presumption of Notarized Document: A notarized document is evidence of the facts expressed and enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution; only clear and convincing evidence overcomes it. Here, the highly questionable circumstances put the presumption in dispute. Respondents should have presented the witness to the deed and the notary public, but Cruz did not know or remember the witness, and the acknowledgment showed only the purported notary’s signature without his complete name. The presumption was thus overcome.
• Good Faith Purchaser: A purchaser in good faith buys without notice of another’s right or interest and pays full and fair price, believing the seller could convey title; he cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on guard. Respondents were neighbors and co-owners of the land under TCT No. 8582 and had dealt with the Tamanis in the past, including mortgaging their property together for a GSIS loan. It was inconceivable that they did not know of petitioners’ open, continuous, and notorious possession. Like Cruz, they should have ascertained the land’s identity and character given the houses and leases. They were not buyers in good faith.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Because the CA reversed the RTC without sufficient basis and contrary to the evidence and jurisprudence, its Decision and Resolution were reversed and set aside. The petition was granted.

• Preponderance of Evidence in Civil Cases — In civil cases, the party with the burden of proof must establish the case by preponderance of evidence, meaning the greater weight of credible evidence or probability of truth. The Court applied this to hold that petitioners discharged their burden to prove forgery despite the absence of direct evidence, because the aggregate evidence favored them.
• Presumption of Authenticity and Due Execution of Notarized Documents — A notarized document is prima facie evidence of the facts expressed and enjoys a presumption of authenticity and due execution; only clear and convincing evidence overcomes it. The Court found the presumption overcome by highly questionable circumstances, including the lack of a known witness or notary and the implausible sale terms.
• Handwriting Expert Testimony and Simulated Forgery — The value of a handwriting expert’s opinion depends not on the mere conclusion but on the assistance in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and discrepancies that would escape an unpracticed observer. The Court credited the PNP examiner’s testimony that the signature was a simulated or copied forgery, with superficial similarities but differences in execution, line quality, and spacing.
• Buyer in Good Faith — A purchaser in good faith buys property without notice of another’s right or interest and pays full and fair price, believing the seller can convey title; he cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on guard. The Court held respondents were not good-faith purchasers because they were neighbors and co-owners who should have known of petitioners’ possession and claims.
• Appellate Review of Conflicting Factual Findings — Although CA factual findings are generally conclusive, the Supreme Court may review them when the trial court and appellate court reach conflicting conclusions. The Court applied this exception because the RTC and CA disagreed on the forgery of Tamani’s signature.
• Acts of Dominion as Evidence Against Sale — A seller’s continued tax declarations, tax payments, and lease contracts over the property after an alleged sale are inconsistent with having parted with ownership. The Court relied on Demetrio Tamani’s continued tax declarations and payments and Teresita Tamani’s lease contracts as indications that the land was never sold.
• Burden of Proving Forgery — One who alleges forgery has the burden of establishing it by preponderance of evidence. The Court found petitioners satisfied this burden through expert testimony and circumstantial evidence.

• "The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer." — This passage defines the standard for evaluating expert handwriting testimony; the Court used it to credit the PNP examiner’s identification of specific differences over the NBI examiner’s bare conclusion.
• "The deed of sale may have been notarized and it is true that a notarial document is considered evidence of the facts expressed therein. A notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution, and only clear and convincing evidence will overcome such legal presumption. Nonetheless, given the highly questionable circumstances present in the case at bar such prima facie presumption was properly put in dispute." — This states the Court’s ratio on the notarial presumption and explains why the presumption did not save the 1959 deed.
• "A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays the full and fair price for it at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. He cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith." — This is the canonical formulation of good faith applied to hold respondents, as neighbors and co-owners, not innocent purchasers.
• "Withal, although there is no direct evidence to prove forgery, preponderance of evidence inarguably favors petitioners. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence." — This passage confirms that forgery in a civil case may be established by circumstantial and expert evidence satisfying the preponderance standard.

• Borillo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55691, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 130, 140 — Cited for the exception to the conclusiveness of CA factual findings when the trial court and appellate court conflict.
• Salvador vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109910, April 5, 1995, 243 SCRA 239, 253 — Cited alongside Borillo for the same exception.
• Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 138696, July 7, 2010 — Cited for the rule that the value of a handwriting expert’s opinion depends on the assistance in pointing out distinguishing marks and discrepancies.
• Delfin vs. Billones, G.R. No. 146550, March 17, 2006, 485 SCRA 38, 48 — Cited for the burden of proving forgery by preponderance of evidence.
• Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, 193 Phil. 326, 335 (1981) — Cited for the rule that a notarial document is evidence of the facts expressed therein.
• Gutierrez vs. Mendoza-Plaza, G.R. No. 185477, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 807, 817 — Cited for the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution of a notarized document.
• Domingo vs. Robles, 493 Phil. 916, 921 (2005) — Cited for the rule that only clear and convincing evidence overcomes the presumption.
• Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes vs. Mijares, 457 Phil. 120, 136-137 (2003) — Cited for the definition of a purchaser in good faith.
• Go vs. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 883, 890-891 (2001) — Cited for the definition of preponderance of evidence.

• Rule 132, Section 30, Rules of Court — Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of execution. The Court cited this in discussing the notarized deed’s presumption, which was overcome by contrary evidence.
• Article VIII, Section 13, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the Chief Justice’s certification that the conclusions were reached in consultation before assignment to the writer. No substantive application to the dispute.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Roberto A. Abad, Jose Catral Mendoza, and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Special Order No. 978, dated March 30, 2011).