Talaroc vs. Uy

A person who was considered a Filipino citizen under the prevailing jus soli doctrine at the time of the adoption of the 1935 Constitution remains a Filipino citizen notwithstanding the subsequent abandonment of that doctrine in favor of jus sanguinis. The Constitution's citizenship clause was not intended to divest those who were citizens by judicial declaration at the time of its adoption, and the Tan Chong decision itself expressly reserved the citizenship of those who had been declared Filipino citizens by the courts.

The case arose from a quo warranto proceeding challenging the eligibility of Alejandro D. Uy, who had been elected municipal mayor of Manticao, Misamis Oriental, on November 13, 1951. Uy was born on January 28, 1912, in Iligan, Lanao, to a Chinese father, Uy Piangco, and a Filipino mother, Ursula Diabo, who were living together as husband and wife at the time but married ecclesiastically on March 3, 1914. The controlling legal question concerned the doctrine of citizenship under the 1935 Constitution, specifically whether the abandonment of the jus soli principle in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor and Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the Philippines affected the citizenship status of those who were citizens under the earlier Roa doctrine at the time of the Constitution's adoption.

Alejandro D. Uy was born on January 28, 1912, in the municipality of Iligan, province of Lanao, to a Chinese father, Uy Piangco, and a Filipino mother, Ursula Diabo, who were then living together as husband and wife but contracted an ecclesiastical marriage on March 3, 1914. The couple had seven children, with Alejandro being the fifth. Uy Piangco, a native of Chuitao, Amoy, China, had arrived in the Philippines around 1893 or 1895 and never left the country until his death on February 17, 1917, in Iligan, Lanao, where he had been residing continuously. Ursula Diabo never remarried and died on August 29, 1949, in Manticao, Misamis Oriental.

The respondent never went to China and had voted in previous elections held in the country. He had held various government positions, including Inspector of the Bureau of Plant Industry in 1943, teacher under the Bureau of Public Schools in Manticao District in 1935, 1946, and 1947, filing clerk in the Municipal Treasury of Initao from 1935 to 1945, and acting Municipal Treasurer of Lugait from 1942 to 1943. He also served with the 120th Infantry Regiment of the guerrillas and at one time was a tax collector for the Japanese occupation government in Misamis Oriental.

The respondent's brothers also held positions indicating their integration into Philippine society: one was an income tax examiner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, another a practicing certified public accountant who had been accountant of the National Abaca and Fiber Corporation, a third a practicing physician who had been a captain in the Philippine Army during the war, and a younger brother a lieutenant in the 120th Infantry Regiment of the guerrillas. All his brothers married Filipino women and were never identified with any Chinese political or social organization. His mother campaigned for woman suffrage in 1935 and voted in subsequent elections.

The petitioner, Laureto A. Talaroc, one of the defeated candidates for the same office, filed the quo warranto action on the ground that the respondent was a Chinese national and therefore ineligible. The respondent contended that his father was a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899 by virtue of Article 17 of the Civil Code, that his mother ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon the death of her husband on February 17, 1917, and that the child followed her citizenship, and that he was a citizen of the Philippines by the mere fact of his birth therein. The trial court noted that under the Roa doctrine, Uy would be a Filipino citizen regardless of the nationality of his parents, but held that this doctrine was abandoned in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the Philippines, and Villahermosa vs. The Commissioner of Immigration.

• Ineligibility Based on Chinese Nationality: The petitioner alleged that the respondent is a Chinese national and therefore ineligible to hold the office of municipal mayor, grounding the quo warranto petition on this claim of alienage.

• Father's Spanish Subjectship: The respondent contended that his father was a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899 by virtue of Article 17 of the Civil Code, which would affect the determination of his own citizenship status.
• Mother's Reacquisition of Citizenship: The respondent argued that his mother ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon the death of her husband on February 17, 1917, and that the child followed her citizenship.
• Citizenship by Birth: The respondent maintained that he is a citizen of the Philippines by the mere fact of his birth therein, invoking the jus soli principle.

• Applicability of the Roa Doctrine: Whether the respondent was a Filipino citizen at the time of the adoption of the 1935 Constitution under the then-prevailing jus soli doctrine, notwithstanding its subsequent abandonment in Tan Chong and Swee Sang.
• Citizenship Through Mother's Reacquisition: Whether the respondent became a Filipino citizen upon his father's death, when his mother reacquired her Filipino citizenship and his nationality followed hers.

• Applicability of the Roa Doctrine: Yes. The Tan Chong and Swee Sang decisions were not controlling because the respondent had attained the age of majority when the Constitution went into effect and had been allowed to exercise the right of suffrage, to hold public office, and to take the oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth Government or Republic of the Philippines. The Constitution's citizenship clause was not intended to exclude those who were citizens by judicial declaration at the time of its adoption.
• Citizenship Through Mother's Reacquisition: Yes. Under the rule of the Roa case, a Filipino woman married to a Chinese ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon her husband's demise, and her minor children's nationality automatically followed that of the mother. This rule was not changed by the adoption of the jus sanguinis doctrine and was in force until Commonwealth Act No. 63 went into effect in 1936.

• Applicability of the Roa Doctrine: The Court recalled that in Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs, the petitioner was born in lawful wedlock in the Philippines to a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, and the Court held that Article 17 of the Civil Code affirmed and recognized the principle of nationality by place of birth, jus soli. The Roa decision, promulgated on October 30, 1912, set a precedent uniformly followed until September 16, 1947, when the principle was renounced in Tan Chong and Swee Sang. However, the Court found these two decisions not controlling in this case. On the strength of the Roa doctrine, Uy was undoubtedly considered a full-fledged Philippine citizen on the date of the adoption of the Constitution, when jus soli had been the prevailing doctrine. Quoting Justice Laurel in Ramon Torres, et al. vs. Tan Chin, the Court noted that the members of the Constitutional Convention were aware of the Roa rule and, in abrogating the doctrine by making jus sanguinis the predominating principle, did not intend to exclude those who were citizens of the Philippines by judicial declaration at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. The Court cited the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention where Delegate Roxas stated that those who are citizens by judicial decisions will be citizens. Unlike the Tan Chong case, Uy had attained the age of majority when the Constitution went into effect and had been allowed to exercise the right of suffrage, to hold public office, and to take the oath of allegiance. The Tan Chong decision itself made an express reservation that it was not intended to deprive of their Filipino citizenship those who had been declared to be Filipino citizens or upon whom such citizenship had been conferred by the courts. The Court found it would be neither fair nor good policy to hold the respondent an alien after he had exercised the privileges of citizenship and the Government had confirmed his Philippine citizenship on the faith of a legal principle that had the force of law, noting that the Secretary of Justice had on several occasions declared as Filipino citizens persons similarly circumstanced.
• Citizenship Through Mother's Reacquisition: The Court held that Uy became a Philippine citizen at least upon his father's death. According to the rule of the Roa case, a Filipino woman married to a Chinese ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon her husband's demise, and thereafter her minor children's nationality automatically followed that of the mother. This rule was not changed by the adoption of the jus sanguinis doctrine and was in force until Commonwealth Act No. 63 went into effect in 1936, by which the legislature, for the first time, provided a method for regaining Philippine citizenship by Filipino women in such cases. The Court noted that when Commonwealth Act No. 63 was passed, Ursula Diabo had been a widow for 19 years and Alejandro D. Uy had been of age for 3 years, and that the new law carries a provision giving it retroactive effect.

• Jus soli under the Roa doctrine — The principle that nationality is determined by place of birth, recognized in Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs through Article 17 of the Civil Code. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Uy was a Filipino citizen at the time of the adoption of the 1935 Constitution, and that the subsequent abandonment of the doctrine in Tan Chong and Swee Sang did not divest him of that citizenship.
• Constitutional confirmation of existing citizenship — The citizenship clause of the 1935 Constitution was not intended to exclude those who were citizens by judicial declaration at the time of its adoption. The Court relied on the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention and the reservation in Tan Chong to hold that the shift to jus sanguinis did not divest those already considered citizens.
• Reacquisition of citizenship by a widow — Under the Roa rule, a Filipino woman married to a Chinese ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon her husband's demise, and her minor children's nationality automatically followed that of the mother. The Court held this rule remained in force until Commonwealth Act No. 63 went into effect in 1936.

• "These two decisions are not, in our opinion, controlling in this case." — This passage states the Court's threshold determination that the Tan Chong and Swee Sang cases, which abandoned the jus soli principle, do not govern Uy's situation because of his circumstances at the time of the Constitution's adoption.
• "With it, as Mr. Justice Laurel said in Ramon Torres, et al. vs. Tan Chin, 69 Phil., 519, 'the bench and the bar were familiar. The members of the Constitutional Convention were also aware of this rule and in abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case, by making the jus sanguinis the predominating principle in the determination of Philippine citizenship, they did not intend to exclude those who, in the situation of Tranquilino Roa, were citizens of the Philippines by judicial declaration at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.'" — This passage articulates the core constitutional interpretation that the shift to jus sanguinis was not intended to divest existing citizens.
• "Certainly, it would neither be fair nor good policy to hold the respondent an alien after he had exercised the privileges of citizenship and the Government had confirmed his Philippine citizenship on the faith of legal principle that had the force of law." — This passage expresses the equitable policy rationale for confirming Uy's citizenship given his exercise of the privileges of citizenship.
• "It has been seen that, according to the rule of the Roa case, a Filipino woman married to Chinese ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon her husband's demise and that thereafter her minor children's nationality automatically followed that of the mother's." — This passage states the rule governing the reacquisition of citizenship by a widow and the effect on her minor children's nationality.

• Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., 315 — Controlling precedent establishing the jus soli principle under Article 17 of the Civil Code. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Uy was a Filipino citizen at the time of the Constitution's adoption.
• Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil., 249 — Distinguished. The Court held this case, which abandoned the jus soli doctrine, was not controlling because Uy had attained majority and exercised the privileges of citizenship before the Constitution took effect, and because the decision itself reserved the citizenship of those declared Filipino citizens by the courts.
• Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the Philippines, 79 Phil., 249 — Distinguished, decided with Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, and not controlling for the same reasons.
• Villahermosa vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, 80 Phil., 541 — Cited by the lower court as among the cases abandoning the Roa doctrine, but not controlling in this case.
• Ramon Torres, et al. vs. Tan Chin, 69 Phil., 519 — Quoted for the proposition that the Constitutional Convention did not intend to exclude those who were citizens by judicial declaration at the time of the Constitution's adoption.

• Article IV, Section 1(1), 1935 Constitution — The citizenship clause providing that citizens of the Philippines include those who were citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. The Court applied this provision to hold that Uy, being a citizen under the Roa doctrine at the time of adoption, remained a citizen.
• Article 17, Civil Code — The provision affirming and recognizing the principle of nationality by place of birth, jus soli, as interpreted in the Roa case.
• Commonwealth Act No. 63 — The statute that, for the first time, provided a method for regaining Philippine citizenship by Filipino women who had married aliens. The Court noted that this law, which took effect in 1936, carried a retroactive effect provision, but that the Roa rule was in force until its enactment.

• Bengzon, J.
• Montemayor, J.
• Bautista Angelo, J.
• Paras, C.J. (concurred in the result)
• Pablo, J. (concurring, with separate opinion)
• Padilla, J. (concurring, with separate opinion)
• Labrador, J. (concurred with Padilla, J.)

Justice Pablo concurred on the ground that Uy was born a Filipino citizen because his mother was not legally married to his Chinese father at the time of his birth, and that upon reaching majority, Uy opted for Filipino citizenship by exercising the right of suffrage and serving in government positions. Justice Padilla concurred on the ground that Uy was born out of wedlock of a Filipino mother and Chinese father, became a Chinese citizen when his parents married, and reacquired his original citizenship upon his father's death when his mother reacquired her Filipino citizenship.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the case text.