Tak Ng vs. Republic of the Philippines

A conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, such as profiteering, disqualifies an applicant from naturalization as a Filipino citizen, and a false statement under oath regarding one's marital and parental status constitutes a deliberate falsehood amounting to perjury that demonstrates lack of good moral character, which is a continuing disqualification not cured by a subsequent marriage.

The petitioner, Tak Ng, also known as Tedy Ng, was born in Manila on January 9, 1922, and had resided in the Philippines since birth without ever going abroad. He was employed as a salesman at the St. George Grocery and Cold Store Inc. in Manila. The applicable law governing naturalization was Commonwealth Act No. 473, which set forth the qualifications and disqualifications for admission to Philippine citizenship, including the requirement of good moral character and the disqualification of persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.

Tak Ng, also known as Tedy Ng, was born in Manila on January 9, 1922, and had resided in the Philippines since birth without ever going abroad. He was employed as a salesman at the St. George Grocery and Cold Store Inc. with a salary of more than P2,200.00 a year. He filed his petition for naturalization on June 15, 1956, at which time he was single, although since 1951 he had been cohabiting extramaritally with Leonarda Cabacungan, with whom he had three children: Adelaida, Anthony, and Alfred, all surnamed Ng. He finally married Cabacungan on May 15, 1957.

The petitioner secured clearances from various government agencies, including the Manila Police Department, the City Fiscal's Office, the NBI, the Bureau of Prisons, the NICA, the Bureau of Immigration, the Court of First Instance of Manila, the CAFA, the Anti-Dummy Board, and the Central Bank of the Philippines. However, according to Exhibit 0-1, he was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case No. 6811 on October 29, 1948, of profiteering under Executive Order No. 91, s. 1946, and sentenced to pay a fine of P50.00. As a consequence, he was reprimanded and warned by the Deportation Board on February 8, 1957, in Deportation Case No. R-211.

The petitioner presented two character witnesses: Hilario M. Uaje, who knew the petitioner for more than 11 years and testified that he believed in the principles underlying the Constitution and was a person of good moral character with a fixed income of P150.00 a month; and Pedro Nieva, Jr., who knew the petitioner since 1944 and observed him to be attached to the principles underlying the Constitution and disposed to the good order and happiness of the Filipino people. The petitioner speaks and writes English and Tagalog, does not own any real property in the Philippines, believes in the fundamental principles underlying the Constitution, and is not opposed to any organized government.

The trial court denied the petition on two grounds: (1) the petitioner was convicted of profiteering on October 29, 1948, and sentenced to pay a fine of P50.00, as a result of which he was charged before the Deportation Board which reprimanded and warned him; and (2) he falsely stated in his declaration of intention dated November 27, 1954, that he had no children, when in fact he already had three children with Leonarda Cabacungan at that time.

The petitioner contended that his conviction for profiteering should not be held against him because he was a mere employee of the St. George Grocery and Cold Store Inc. at the time, had nothing to do with the fixing of the selling price of commodities, and pleaded guilty upon the advice of his lawyer and the manager of the establishment. He also claimed that he failed to marry Cabacungan in 1951 because she was then only 17 or 18 years of age and her parents objected to the marriage because he was a Chinese citizen.

• Conviction for Profiteering: Petitioner contended that his conviction for profiteering should not be taken against him because he was a mere employee of the St. George Grocery and Cold Store Inc. at the time, had nothing to do with the fixing of the selling price of commodities sold therein, and pleaded guilty upon the advice of his lawyer and the manager of the establishment.
• Failure to Marry: Petitioner claimed that he failed to marry Leonarda Cabacungan in 1951 because she was then only 17 or 18 years of age and her parents objected to the marriage because he was a Chinese citizen.

• Marriage for Convenience: The Solicitor General argued that the petitioner's marriage to Leonarda Cabacungan on May 15, 1957, almost one year after he had filed his petition for naturalization, was evidently entered into merely "for convenience and with the avowed purpose of circumventing the provision of laws regarding irreproachable character and good moral conduct."

• Crime Involving Moral Turpitude: Whether profiteering is a crime involving moral turpitude that disqualifies the petitioner from admission to Philippine citizenship.
• False Statement Under Oath: Whether the petitioner's statement in his declaration of intention and petition for naturalization that he was single and had no children, when he in fact had three children with Leonarda Cabacungan, constitutes a deliberate falsehood amounting to perjury that disqualifies him from naturalization.
• Effect of Subsequent Marriage: Whether the petitioner's marriage to Leonarda Cabacungan on May 15, 1957, cured his disqualification for lack of good moral character.

• Crime Involving Moral Turpitude: Yes. Profiteering is a crime involving moral turpitude, and having been convicted of such a crime, the petitioner is disqualified from naturalization as a Filipino citizen under Section 4(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 473.
• False Statement Under Oath: Yes. The petitioner's statement in his declaration of intention and petition for naturalization that he was single and had no children, when he in fact had three children with Leonarda Cabacungan, is a deliberate falsehood amounting to perjury, showing wanton disregard for truth and lack of good moral character.
• Effect of Subsequent Marriage: No. The petitioner's marriage to Leonarda Cabacungan on May 15, 1957, did not cure his disqualification for lack of good moral character.

• Crime Involving Moral Turpitude: The Court defined "moral turpitude" as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man," citing Traders & General Ins. Co. vs. Rusell, or "conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals," citing Marsh vs. State Bar of California. The Court held that profiteering, an offense severely and heavily penalized with imprisonment of not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than P10,000.00, or both, under Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 600, involves moral turpitude because it affects the price of prime commodities and goes to the life of the citizens, especially the poor. The Court cited People vs. Tiu Cecille, which held that profiteering affects the poor people in general and that any raise in price above that authorized by law causes great hardship to the country. The Court rejected the petitioner's explanation that he was a mere employee who had nothing to do with the fixing of prices, finding it hard to believe that the petitioner would suffer to have his name stained with a criminal record by pleading guilty if he had absolutely nothing to do with the offense charged. The Court also observed that it is not easy to believe that the petitioner did not know he was selling over the price fixed by the authorities, as these price limits are made known to stores.

• False Statement Under Oath: The Court held that the petitioner's act of cohabiting with Leonarda for six years without the benefit of marriage clearly indicates his bad character, which disqualifies him from becoming a Filipino citizen under Section 2(3) of Commonwealth Act No. 473. The Court rejected the petitioner's claim that her parents objected to the marriage, noting that even assuming the parents disapproved, the petitioner could have legally married her when she was already 18 years of age, since under Article 62 of the Civil Code, only the advice of her parents is required, which, if not given, does not prevent the celebration of the marriage three months after the completion of the publication of the application for marriage license. The Court found that the petitioner never made any attempt or effort to marry Leonarda but chose instead to live with her openly for six years without the benefit of marriage, begetting three children out of wedlock. The Court agreed with the trial court and the Solicitor General that the petitioner's statement in his declaration of intention and petition for naturalization that he was single and had no children, when he in fact had three children, is a deliberate falsehood amounting to perjury, as he concealed his true status under oath, showing wanton disregard for truth and lack of good moral character.

• Effect of Subsequent Marriage: The Court held that the fact that the petitioner married Leonarda on May 15, 1957, did not cure his disqualification for lack of good moral character, citing Sy Kiam vs. Republic and Lo Kio vs. Republic.

• Moral Turpitude — Defined as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man," or "conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." The Court applied this definition to hold that profiteering, which affects the price of prime commodities and goes to the life of citizens, especially the poor, is a crime involving moral turpitude that disqualifies an applicant from naturalization under Section 4(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 473.

• Good Moral Character as a Continuing Requirement — An applicant for naturalization must possess good moral character, and a subsequent marriage does not cure a prior disqualification arising from lack of good moral character. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the petitioner's marriage to Leonarda Cabacungan after filing his petition did not cure his disqualification arising from his six-year extramarital cohabitation and his false statements under oath.

• Deliberate Falsehood Amounting to Perjury — A false statement made under oath in a declaration of intention or petition for naturalization, concealing one's true status, constitutes a deliberate falsehood amounting to perjury and shows wanton disregard for truth, demonstrating lack of good moral character. The Court applied this doctrine to the petitioner's concealment of his three children in his declaration of intention and petition.

• "Moral turpitude has been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man." — This passage defines the controlling doctrine of moral turpitude and is the canonical formulation applied to determine whether profiteering disqualifies an applicant from naturalization.

• "There can be no doubt that profiteering, an offense severely and heavily penalized with imprisonment of not more than 10 years, or by a fine of not more than P10,000.00, or by both, involves moral turpitude, inasmuch as it affects the price of prime commodities and goes to the life of the citizens, especially those who are poor and with hardly the means to sustain themselves." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for the first ground of disqualification, holding that profiteering is a crime involving moral turpitude.

• "We agree with the trial court and the Solicitor General that petitioner's statement in his declaration of intention and his petition for naturalization that he was single and that he did not have any child at all, when in truth and in fact he had then already 3 children with Leonarda Cabacungan, is a deliberate falsehood amounting to perjury, as he concealed his true status under oath and, likewise, shows petitioner's wanton disregard for truth, hence, lack of good moral character disabling him from acquiring Philippine citizenship." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for the second ground of disqualification, holding that the petitioner's false statements under oath demonstrate lack of good moral character.

• Traders & General Ins. Co. vs. Rusell, Tex. Civ. App., 99 S.W. (2d) 1079 — Cited as authority for the definition of moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man."
• Marsh vs. State Bar of California, 210 Cal. 303, 219 P. 583 — Cited as authority for the alternative definition of moral turpitude as "conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."
• People vs. Tiu Cecille, 96 Phil., 738, 51 Off. Gaz., (4), 1863 — Cited as authority for the proposition that profiteering affects the poor people in general and that any raise in price above that authorized by law causes great hardship to the country.
• Yu Lo vs. Republic, 92 Phil., 105, 48 Off. Gaz., 4334 — Cited as authority for the proposition that cohabiting without the benefit of marriage indicates bad character disqualifying an applicant from naturalization.
• Yu Singco vs. Republic, 94 Phil., 191, 50 Off. Gaz., 104 — Cited as authority for the proposition that cohabiting without the benefit of marriage indicates bad character disqualifying an applicant from naturalization.
• Sy Kiam vs. Republic, 102 Phil., 575, 54 Off. Gaz., 3802 — Cited as authority for the proposition that cohabiting without the benefit of marriage indicates bad character disqualifying an applicant from naturalization, and that a subsequent marriage does not cure the disqualification.
• Lo Kio vs. Republic — Cited as authority for the proposition that cohabiting without the benefit of marriage indicates bad character disqualifying an applicant from naturalization, and that a subsequent marriage does not cure the disqualification.

• Section 4(d), Commonwealth Act No. 473 — The provision disqualifying from naturalization any person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Applied to hold that the petitioner's conviction for profiteering disqualified him from admission to Philippine citizenship.
• Section 2(3), Commonwealth Act No. 473 — The provision requiring that an applicant for naturalization must have conducted himself in an irreproachable manner during the period of residence in the Philippines. Applied to hold that the petitioner's six-year extramarital cohabitation indicated bad character disqualifying him from naturalization.
• Section 3, Commonwealth Act No. 600 — The provision penalizing profiteering with imprisonment of not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than P10,000.00, or both. Cited to demonstrate the severity of the offense of profiteering and its character as a crime involving moral turpitude.
• Article 62, Civil Code of the Philippines — The provision requiring only the advice of parents for the marriage of a person between 18 and 21 years of age, which, if not given, does not prevent the celebration of the marriage three months after the completion of the publication of the application for marriage license. Applied to reject the petitioner's claim that parental objection prevented his marriage to Leonarda Cabacungan.
• Executive Order No. 91, s. 1946 — The executive issuance defining the offense of profiteering for which the petitioner was convicted on October 29, 1948.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concurred.