Tajan vs. Cusi, Jr.

Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction to investigate and suspend attorneys for professional misconduct, and may institute such proceedings on their own motion, because disciplinary proceedings are undertaken for public welfare and involve no private interest, and an attorney is an officer of the court accountable to it for his conduct; any suspension ordered by a lower court is subject to full investigation and final action by the Supreme Court.

Petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan was a member of the Philippine Bar practicing in Davao. Respondent Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. was the presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao. The dispute arose from the regulatory framework governing attorney discipline under the Revised Rules of Court, specifically the interplay between Rule 138 (governing admission to and suspension from the practice of law) and Rule 139 (governing disbarment proceedings). Sections 28 to 30 of Rule 138 expressly authorize the Court of Appeals and Courts of First Instance to suspend attorneys, subject to further proceedings before the Supreme Court, while Rule 139 outlines procedures primarily applicable to complaints referred to the Solicitor General by the Supreme Court.

Petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan was a member of the Philippine Bar practicing in Davao. The controversy originated from a verified petition that petitioner had prepared, or caused to be prepared, for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7312 in favor of one Vicente Calongo. The petition, which was signed by Atty. Justo Cinco, alleged that the certificate of title had been lost by Calongo in his house in Mati, Davao, and that despite diligent search the same could not be found and was therefore presumed lost. As a result of this petition, the Court of First Instance of Davao, through Hon. Vicente P. Bullecer, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, issued an Order on June 28, 1967 directing the Register of Deeds of Davao City to issue a new owner's duplicate of TCT No. T-7312.

Respondent Judge Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. asserted that petitioner knew the averments in the petition were false, because the owner's duplicate copy had always been in the custody of Municipal Judge Bernardo P. Saludares of the Municipality of Kapalong, to whom it had been entrusted by Calongo himself. On December 5, 1967, respondent Judge sent petitioner a letter requiring him to explain within 72 hours why he should not be removed or suspended from the practice of law for preparing a petition containing factual averments which he knew to be false. Petitioner responded by letter dated December 7, 1967, denying the material averments and explaining the circumstances under which he had prepared the petition.

Apparently not satisfied with petitioner's answer, respondent Judge had the matter filed and docketed as Adm. Case No. 59 against petitioner, and jointly with Adm. Case No. 58 against Atty. Justo Cinco, gave due course and set both for hearing on January 24 and 25, 1968. At the hearing on January 24, 1968, petitioner questioned the propriety of the proceedings, contending that since the case was one for disbarment, respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over his person or the subject matter. Petitioner also orally moved that respondent Judge inhibit himself, given his conflicting positions as prosecutor and judge simultaneously; the motion was denied.

On February 1, 1968, respondent Judge proceeded to hear the evidence against petitioner. Municipal Judge Saludares testified, more or less reiterating the testimony he had previously given at the hearing of the petition for relief from the order in Misc. Case No. 2968 allowing the issuance of an owner's duplicate of title. The continuation of the hearing was set for April 26, 1968. On April 15, 1968, before the continuation could take place, petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court, which on April 17, 1968 gave due course and issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioner's posting of a bond.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Petitioner contended that respondent Judge had no authority on his own motion to hear and determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension of attorneys, because jurisdiction over such matters is vested exclusively and originally in the Supreme Court and not in Courts of First Instance.
• Applicability of Rule 139: Petitioner argued that, assuming arguendo that Courts of First Instance have such authority, the procedure outlined in Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court should govern the filing and investigation of the complaint.
• Role of the Solicitor General: Petitioner claimed that pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 139, which provides that the procedure for investigation by the Solicitor General of complaints against lawyers referred to said official by the Supreme Court shall govern the filing and investigation of complaints against lawyers in the Court of Appeals and in Courts of First Instance, the Solicitor General—and not respondent Judge—should conduct the present investigation.
• Inhibition of the Judge: Petitioner orally moved that respondent Judge inhibit himself from hearing the administrative case, on the ground that respondent occupied conflicting positions as prosecutor and judge at the same time.

• Jurisdiction over Disciplinary Proceedings: Whether a Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to hear and determine proceedings for the suspension of attorneys, or whether such jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the Supreme Court.
• Initiation on the Court's Own Motion: Whether a Court of First Instance may initiate disciplinary proceedings against an attorney on its own motion, without a formal complaint filed by a private party.
• Role of the Solicitor General: Whether the Solicitor General, rather than the trial judge, must conduct the investigation in disciplinary proceedings before Courts of First Instance pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 139.
• Procedural Due Process: Whether the 72-hour period given to petitioner to answer the charges satisfied the requirement of reasonable notice under Section 30 of Rule 138.

• Jurisdiction over Disciplinary Proceedings: Yes. Sections 28 to 30 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly confer upon the Court of Appeals and Courts of First Instance the power to investigate and suspend attorneys, subject to further investigation and final action by the Supreme Court.
• Initiation on the Court's Own Motion: Yes. Disciplinary proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare and involve no private interest; a court may therefore act upon its own motion to investigate the conduct of its own officers, as an attorney is an officer of the court.
• Role of the Solicitor General: No. Sections 3 to 6 of Rule 139, which govern the Solicitor General's investigation, refer to complaints referred to that office by the Supreme Court, not to suspension proceedings before the Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance; the intervention of the Solicitor General is unnecessary in the latter.
• Procedural Due Process: Yes, the requirement was satisfied. Petitioner not only failed to question the 72-hour period as unreasonable but actually filed his answer within that period, suffering no substantial prejudice.

• Jurisdiction over Disciplinary Proceedings: The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal profession stems from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law, but the Revised Rules of Court expressly delegate a measure of this power to lower courts. Sections 28 to 30 of Rule 138 provide that the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney for any of the causes named in the preceding section, and that upon such suspension, the lower court must transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts. The Supreme Court then conducts a full investigation and makes such order revoking, extending, or removing the attorney as the facts warrant. These provisions were derived from Sections 22, 23, and 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which similarly authorized Courts of First Instance to suspend lawyers subject to further action by the Supreme Court. The two-tiered scheme thus confers investigative and suspensive authority on lower courts while reserving final dispositive power to the Supreme Court.

• Initiation on the Court's Own Motion: Disciplinary proceedings are not civil actions involving a plaintiff and a defendant; they are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, to preserve courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice. The complainant or person who calls the court's attention to an attorney's misconduct is in no sense a party and has no private interest in the outcome. Because the court may investigate the conduct of its own officers, it is not only the right but the duty of the court to institute, upon its own motion, proper proceedings for suspension or disbarment when information before it or its own knowledge shows that an attorney has conducted himself in a manner showing him unfit to continue as an officer of the court. This protects the general public and promotes the purity of the administration of justice.

• Role of the Solicitor General: Section 9 of Rule 139 provides that, as far as applicable, the procedure for investigation by the Solicitor General of complaints referred to that official by the Supreme Court shall govern the filing and investigation of complaints against lawyers in the Court of Appeals and in Courts of First Instance. However, Sections 3 to 6 of Rule 139, which detail the Solicitor General's investigative role, refer specifically to complaints referred to that office by the Supreme Court, not to suspension proceedings before lower courts. Sections 28 to 30 of Rule 138 independently authorize the Court of Appeals and Courts of First Instance to conduct the investigation themselves, subject to another and final investigation by the Supreme Court in the event of suspension. Under this scheme, the intervention of the Solicitor General is unnecessary in proceedings before lower courts.

• Procedural Due Process: Section 30 of Rule 138 requires that no attorney shall be removed or suspended until he has had full opportunity, upon reasonable notice, to answer the charges, produce witnesses in his behalf, and be heard by himself or counsel. While Section 30 does not specify what constitutes reasonable notice, Section 2 of Rule 139 grants a respondent lawyer 10 days from service of the complaint to file an answer, and it is desirable that a similar period be granted by Courts of First Instance for uniformity. Nevertheless, in the case at bar, petitioner not only failed to question the 72-hour period as unreasonable but actually filed his answer within that period and was not substantially prejudiced. The due process requirement was therefore satisfied.

• Inherent Power of Courts to Discipline Attorneys — The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal profession stems from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law and the admission of persons to engage in that practice. An attorney is an officer of the court, continually accountable to the Court for the manner in which he exercises the privilege granted to him. Admission to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that continued enjoyment of the right depends on remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it. When misconduct shows that an attorney has become unfit, his right to continue may and ought to be forfeited. The Court applied this doctrine by affirming that Courts of First Instance, as courts of general jurisdiction, possess statutory authority under Rule 138 to investigate and suspend attorneys, and that the Supreme Court's inherent power is preserved through the requirement of further investigation upon any suspension ordered below.

• Nature of Disciplinary Proceedings — Disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are not civil actions where there is a plaintiff and a defendant. They involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance; they are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, to preserve courts from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice. The complainant is in no sense a party and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. The court may therefore act upon its own motion and be the initiator of the proceedings, because it may investigate the conduct of its own officers. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that respondent Judge validly initiated Adm. Case No. 59 on his own motion without any formal complaint by a private party.

• Two-Tiered Disciplinary Scheme — Under Sections 28 to 30 of Rule 138, a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney for causes named in the rules; upon such suspension, the lower court transmits to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order and a full statement of facts; the Supreme Court then makes a full investigation and issues such order revoking, extending, or removing the attorney as the facts warrant. The lower court's suspension is thus provisional and subject to final action by the Supreme Court. The Court applied this framework by distinguishing the lower court's investigative and suspensive power from the Supreme Court's ultimate dispositive authority.

• "Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them." — This passage articulates the fundamental nature of disbarment proceedings as public in character, distinguishing them from ordinary civil actions and establishing the basis for the court's authority to initiate proceedings on its own motion.

• "Indeed it is not only the right but the duty of the Court to institute upon its own motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or the disbarment of an attorney, when from information submitted to it or of its own knowledge it appears that any attorney has so conducted himself in a case pending before said court as to show that he is wanting in the proper measure of respect for the court of which he is an officer, or is lacking in the good character essential to his continuance as an attorney." — This formulation defines the affirmative obligation of courts to initiate disciplinary proceedings against attorneys whose conduct demonstrates unfitness, grounding that duty in the protection of the public and the purity of the administration of justice.

• "The court may therefore act upon its own motion and thus be the initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously the court may investigate into the conduct of its own officers." — This statement provides the concise ratio decidendi for the holding that a judge may initiate disbarment proceedings without a formal complaint, premised on the attorney's status as an officer of the court.

• In re MacDougall, 3 Phil. 70 (1903) — Cited in support of the procedural due process requirement that an attorney must be given full opportunity to answer charges, produce witnesses, and be heard before removal or suspension.
• In re Calderon, 5 Phil. 658 (1906) — Cited alongside MacDougall for the same due process principle in attorney disciplinary proceedings.
• In re Cuenco, 41 Phil. 32 (1920) — Cited alongside MacDougall and Calderon for the proposition that no attorney may be removed or suspended without reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.

• Sections 28, 29, and 30, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court — Section 28 authorizes the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance to suspend an attorney for causes named in the preceding section, with the suspension remaining in effect until further action by the Supreme Court. Section 29 requires the suspending court to transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts, after which the Supreme Court conducts a full investigation and issues an order revoking, extending, or removing the attorney. Section 30 guarantees procedural due process by requiring that no attorney be removed or suspended until given full opportunity, upon reasonable notice, to answer charges, produce witnesses, and be heard by himself or counsel. These provisions were the primary statutory basis for the Court's ruling that lower courts possess jurisdiction over attorney suspension proceedings.
• Section 9, Rule 139, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that, as far as applicable, the procedure for investigation by the Solicitor General of complaints referred to that official by the Supreme Court shall govern the filing and investigation of complaints against lawyers in the Court of Appeals and in Courts of First Instance. The Court construed this provision as not requiring the Solicitor General's participation in lower court proceedings, because Sections 3 to 6 of Rule 139 (which detail the Solicitor General's role) apply only to complaints referred by the Supreme Court, not to suspension proceedings initiated by lower courts under Rule 138.
• Section 2, Rule 139, Revised Rules of Court — Grants a respondent lawyer 10 days from service of the complaint within which to file an answer. The Court cited this provision as a desirable benchmark for uniformity in the notice period that Courts of First Instance should afford attorneys in disciplinary proceedings, while noting that petitioner suffered no prejudice from the shorter 72-hour period actually given.
• Sections 22, 23, and 25, Code of Civil Procedure — The historical antecedents of Sections 28, 29, and 30 of Rule 138, respectively, which similarly authorized Courts of First Instance to suspend lawyers subject to further action by the Supreme Court. The Court cited these provisions to demonstrate the continuity of the statutory framework delegating investigative and suspensive authority to lower courts.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo, Fernandez, and Aquino, JJ., concurred.