Tagastason vs. People of the Philippines

The judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is an exclusive prerogative of the issuing judge that cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice on the executive finding of probable cause; under the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, such an appeal does not hold in abeyance proceedings before the trial court unless a motion to defer proceedings is filed.

Susano Bacala and Emalyn Bacala, along with their witnesses, filed a complaint-affidavit for murder and frustrated murder against Jessie Tagastason, Rogelio Tagastason, Jr., Marlon Tagastason, Jerson Tagastason, Elias Tagastason, Annie Bacala-Tagastason, Gil Ugacho, and Merlyn Bacala-Ugacho. The accused, through counsel, moved for an extension of time to file their counter-affidavits until 10 April 2012. The City Prosecutor partially granted the motion, giving them until only 4 April 2012. On 4 April 2012, the City Prosecutor issued an Omnibus Motion finding probable cause for both offenses and filed the corresponding Informations that same day. The cases were raffled to the sala of Executive Judge Francisco F. Maclang on 10 April 2012, who issued warrants of arrest against all accused on the same day. The accused claimed they learned of the partial grant of their extension, the prosecutor’s resolution, the filing of the Informations, and the issuance of the warrants only on 10 April 2012.

• The Complaint and Preliminary Investigation: In March 2012, private respondents Susano Bacala and Emalyn Bacala, with their witnesses, filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Murder and Frustrated Murder against petitioners Jessie Tagastason, Rogelio Tagastason, Jr., Annie Bacala-Tagastason, Jerson Tagastason, and four other accused. The accused, through counsel, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File their Counter-Affidavits, praying for an extension until 10 April 2012.

• Partial Grant of Extension and Filing of Informations: The City Prosecutor issued an Order dated 23 March 2012 partially granting the motion, allowing the accused only until 4 April 2012 to file their counter-affidavits. The mailing envelope of the Order was stamped “registered 4/4/12,” which was the deadline itself. On 4 April 2012, the City Prosecutor issued an Omnibus Motion finding probable cause for both crimes and filed the corresponding Informations at 12:00 noon of the same day.

• Issuance of Warrants of Arrest: On 10 April 2012, the cases were raffled to the sala of Executive Judge Francisco F. Maclang of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 3. Judge Maclang—who was already handling all other pending cases between the same parties—issued warrants of arrest against all accused on the very day of the raffle.

• Discovery by the Accused and Subsequent Actions: The accused learned of the partial grant of their motion for extension, the Omnibus Motion, the filing of the Informations, and the issuance of the warrants of arrest only on 10 April 2012. They immediately: (1) filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice; (2) filed an Administrative Complaint against the City Prosecutor; and (3) filed a Motion for Inhibition and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest before the trial court. Judge Maclang denied the Motion to Hold in Abeyance but set the Motion for Inhibition for hearing. The accused moved for reconsideration of the denial. While that motion was pending and before Judge Maclang could resolve the Motion for Inhibition, the accused filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals, invoking extreme urgency as the cases involved deprivation of liberty.

• Ruling of the Court of Appeals: The Court of Appeals found no denial of due process, noting that lawyers cannot assume motions for extension will be granted as a matter of course; the grant or denial rested within the sound discretion of the City Prosecutor. It further ruled that the accused could still ventilate their defenses through a motion for reconsideration or appeal before the DOJ, which they had in fact filed. On the warrants of arrest, the appellate court held there was no prohibition against Judge Maclang issuing them on the day of the raffle, as the judicial determination of probable cause concerns only the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators. Finally, the Court of Appeals declined to rule on the motion for inhibition, which was still pending before Judge Maclang and whose resolution was anchored on his sound discretion; the accused presented no evidence to support their allegation of partiality.

• Validity of the Warrants of Arrest: Petitioners assailed the issuance of the warrants of arrest, contending that Judge Maclang should have deferred issuing them pending resolution of the petition for review before the DOJ Secretary because the finding of probable cause by the prosecutor was allegedly tainted by the denial of their full opportunity to submit counter-affidavits.

• Denial of Due Process: Petitioners argued they were deprived of due process because the City Prosecutor filed the Informations and found probable cause without waiting for their counter-affidavits, after granting only a truncated extension that they could not have received in time.

• Bias and Partiality of the Trial Judge: Petitioners alleged that Judge Maclang, who was handling all other cases between the parties, exhibited partiality by issuing the warrants of arrest on the same day the cases were raffled to him and by denying their motion to hold the warrants in abeyance. They sought his inhibition.

• Exclusive Judicial Function and No Deferral: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the judge’s function to issue a warrant of arrest upon determination of probable cause is exclusive and cannot be deferred pending a petition for review before the DOJ Secretary, which concerns only the executive determination of probable cause. To hold otherwise would encroach on a judicial prerogative.

• Non-Suspension of Trial Court Proceedings: The OSG invoked the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, Section 5, which provides that an appeal to the DOJ Secretary does not automatically hold in abeyance the proceedings before the trial court; the appellant must file a motion to defer proceedings. Petitioners failed to file such a motion.

• No Vested Right to an Extension: The OSG pointed out that petitioners had no basis to assume their motion for extension would be granted; extensions to file counter-affidavits are discretionary. Under the 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors, extensions may not exceed ten days; petitioners had asked for 15 days and the City Prosecutor granted ten, acting well within his authority.

• Warrants of Arrest: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in sustaining the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Maclang despite the pending petition for review before the DOJ Secretary.

• Due Process: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in ruling that petitioners were not deprived of due process in the preliminary investigation.

• Warrants of Arrest: The judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is an exclusive function of the judge that cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice on the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause. A judge’s determination is independent of the prosecutor’s executive determination; the judge does not act as an appellate body reviewing the prosecutor’s finding but independently assesses the evidence solely to decide whether placing the accused under custody is necessary to avoid frustrating the ends of justice. To defer implementation of a warrant merely because an appeal is pending before the DOJ would encroach upon the judge’s exclusive prerogative. Further, under Section 5 of the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, an appeal before the DOJ Secretary does not hold in abeyance the proceedings before the trial court unless a motion to defer proceedings is filed. No such motion was filed in this case.

• Due Process: The issue of whether the Informations were validly filed remained pending before the DOJ Secretary. It was premature for the Supreme Court to preempt that resolution. The Court of Appeals correctly observed that petitioners could not assume their motion for extension would be granted, as extensions are discretionary. The City Prosecutor acted within the bounds of the 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors, which limits extensions to ten days; petitioners asked for 15 days and were given ten. On the motion for inhibition, its resolution lay within the sound discretion of Judge Maclang. Petitioners filed their certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals without awaiting the trial judge’s ruling on the motion set for hearing, and they presented insufficient evidence to support the alleged prejudice against them.

• Two Kinds of Determination of Probable Cause — The executive determination of probable cause is made by the public prosecutor during preliminary investigation to decide whether an Information should be filed in court; the prosecutor has broad quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those believed to have committed the crime. The judicial determination of probable cause is made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should issue; the judge independently evaluates the evidence solely to determine whether placing the accused under custody is necessary to avoid frustrating the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant. The judge does not act as an appellate court over the prosecutor and has no power to review the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause.

• Exclusive and Non-Deferrable Nature of Judicial Probable Cause Determination — The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon determination of probable cause is exclusive. It cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice, which pertains only to the executive dimension of probable cause. To defer the implementation of the warrant would encroach on the judge’s exclusive prerogative.

• Non-Suspension Rule Under the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal — Under Section 5 of the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal (Department Circular No. 70), an appeal before the DOJ Secretary does not hold in abeyance the proceedings before the trial court. If an Information has already been filed in court, the petition for review must be accompanied by a motion to defer proceedings filed in court. Absent such motion, the trial court proceedings continue uninterrupted.

• "There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. … The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice."

• "We stress that the function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of probable cause is exclusive and cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable cause, which is a function that is executive in nature. To defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest."

• Mendoza v. People, 733 Phil. 603 (2014) — Distinguished between the executive and judicial determinations of probable cause; followed and applied as the governing doctrinal framework.

• People v. Castillo and Mejia, 607 Phil. 754 (2009) — Cited within Mendoza as authority for the distinction between the two kinds of probable cause; followed.

• Viudez II v. Court of Appeals, 606 Phil. 337 (2009) — Established that the judicial function to issue a warrant of arrest upon determination of probable cause is exclusive and cannot be deferred pending a DOJ petition for review; directly applied.

• Section 5, 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal (Department Circular No. 70, 3 July 2000) — Provides that if an Information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, a motion to defer proceedings must accompany the petition for review. The rule confirms that an appeal to the DOJ Secretary does not automatically suspend trial court proceedings. Applied to hold that petitioners’ failure to file such a motion meant the trial court could proceed with the issuance of warrants.

• 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors — Limits extensions of time to file a counter-affidavit to a maximum of ten days. The City Prosecutor’s grant of a ten-day extension (against the 15 days prayed for) complied with this limit, negating any claim of grave abuse.

Justices Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier concurred.

N/A — The decision was unanimous.