Tacas vs. Cariaso

A prior conviction for less serious physical injuries bars a subsequent prosecution for assault upon a person in authority arising from the same single criminal act, because the latter offense necessarily includes the former and falls within the double jeopardy protection under Article IV, Section 22 of the Constitution and Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

Valerio Tacas was the accused in two criminal complaints filed by Chief of Police Felipe Agdeppa of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, both arising from a bolo attack on Emiterio Ibaan, the duly elected and incumbent barrio captain of Bo. Zapat, Sinait, Ilocos Sur. The case turns on the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy under Article IV, Section 22 of the Constitution and Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which govern when a prior conviction or acquittal bars another prosecution.

At about 4:30 p.m. on December 15, 1972, in Barrio Zapat, Sinait, Ilocos Sur, Valerio Tacas attacked Emiterio Ibaan with a bolo, inflicting multiple hacking and stab wounds that were alleged to incapacitate Ibaan from his customary labor for at least thirty days and to require medical attendance for the same period. Ibaan was the duly elected and incumbent barrio captain of the barrio.

On January 2, 1973, Chief of Police Felipe Agdeppa filed a criminal complaint against Tacas for less serious physical injuries. On the same day that he was charged, Tacas pleaded guilty and was immediately sentenced to thirty days of arresto menor, with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty in his favor. He served the sentence.

After his release, on April 17, 1973, another criminal complaint was filed against Tacas, this time for assault upon a person in authority. The second complaint alleged that on the same date, time, and place, Tacas, with deliberate intent, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assaulted and attacked Emiterio Ibaan, a duly elected and incumbent barrio captain of Bo. Zapat, Sinait, Ilocos Sur, by stabbing him three times with a jungle bolo.

Tacas objected to the second prosecution on jeopardy grounds, but the respondent Judge ruled against him. The records before the Supreme Court showed that both complaints rested on the same date, time, place, victim, and act—the bolo stabbing of Ibaan—and that Tacas had already served the sentence imposed in the first case. The second case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 103-K.

• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner argued that after his previous conviction for less serious physical injuries based on the same facts, he could no longer be held accountable again for assault upon a person in authority, invoking the constitutional provision on double jeopardy and prior decisions such as United States vs. Montiel and People vs. Bonotan.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that the respondent Judge's negative ruling was a grave abuse of discretion, warranting certiorari and prohibition.
• Single Act/Complex Crime: Petitioner pointed out that from the commission of the act complained of, there was no supervening event or circumstance that could affect or change the nature of the act originally committed, and that the case involved a single act resulting in a complex crime.

• Non-Identity of Offenses: The Solicitor General objected that the second charge was not one of those cases where the offense is identical, and therefore the constitutional bar against double jeopardy did not apply.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the constitutional provision on double jeopardy bars a prosecution for assault upon a person in authority after the accused had been previously charged and convicted of less serious physical injuries for the same act and had fully served his sentence.
• Necessarily Included Offense: Whether the offense charged in the second complaint is an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first complaint.
• Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition: Whether certiorari and prohibition lie to nullify the respondent Judge's orders rejecting the double jeopardy objection.

• Double Jeopardy: Yes. The prior conviction for less serious physical injuries bars the subsequent prosecution for assault upon a person in authority arising from the same single act; the constitutional guarantee and Section 9, Rule 117 extend to offenses necessarily included in the former charge.
• Necessarily Included Offense: Yes. The second charge necessarily includes the first, because the single act resulted in a complex crime and the offense of assault upon a person in authority includes less serious physical injuries; the Solicitor General's non-identity objection fails.
• Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition: Yes. Certiorari lies because the respondent Judge's orders were contrary to the constitutional provision on double jeopardy and constituted grave abuse of discretion.

• Double Jeopardy: The Court applied Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which provides that when a defendant has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal bars another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. Tacas had been convicted of less serious physical injuries and had fully served his sentence. The second complaint for assault upon a person in authority arose from the same act. There was no supervening event or circumstance that could affect or change the nature of the act originally committed. The single act resulted in the complex crime of less serious physical injuries and assault upon a person in authority. Because the indictment was solely for less serious physical injuries, it was too late to hold him liable as well for assault upon a person in authority. The constitutional requirement is satisfied if the subsequent indictment is for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

• Necessarily Included Offense: The Solicitor General's objection that the offense was not identical could not be sustained. The Court relied on People vs. Bonotan, where the charge of direct assault upon a person in authority with physical injuries necessarily included the offense of less serious physical injuries; conviction for the latter could be had under the information if the other ingredients of the crime charged were not proved, and the defense of double jeopardy was well taken. The Court also cited United States vs. Gustilo, which held that the protection against double jeopardy should cover every result flowing from a single criminal act impelled by a single criminal intent, and that a single criminal act impelled by a single intent should not be divided into separate crimes and punished accordingly. People vs. Elkanish reaffirmed Gustilo and emphasized that penal statutes are construed liberally in favor of the accused and that double jeopardy is secured by the Constitution. People vs. Tumlos likewise illustrated that a single act with a single intent cannot be divided into separate offenses, as where theft of cows belonging to different owners was committed in one act. Thus, the second charge necessarily included the first.

• Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition: Certiorari lies because the respondent Judge's orders were contrary to the constitutional provision on double jeopardy. The orders of July 5, 1973 and July 31, 1973 were nullified and set aside, and respondent Judge was ordered to desist from taking any further action in Criminal Case No. 103-K for assault upon a person in authority, except for the purpose of dismissing the same.

• Double Jeopardy — The constitutional guarantee under Article IV, Section 22 of the Constitution, implemented by Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, bars a second prosecution when the accused has been convicted or acquitted by a competent court upon a valid complaint or information after pleading, for the same offense or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the former charge. The Court applied this guarantee to bar the second prosecution for assault upon a person in authority after Tacas had been convicted and had served sentence for less serious physical injuries arising from the same act.
• Necessarily Included Offense — Double jeopardy may be invoked even if the offenses are not identical, provided the subsequent indictment is for an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. The Court held that the charge of assault upon a person in authority necessarily included the offense of less serious physical injuries for which Tacas had already been convicted.
• Single Act, Single Criminal Intent — A single criminal act impelled by a single criminal intent should not be divided into separate crimes and punished accordingly. The Court found that the bolo stabbing was one act, with no supervening event changing its nature, and that it gave rise to a complex crime.
• Complex Crime — A single act may result in a complex crime consisting of two offenses. The Court characterized the act as resulting in the complex crime of less serious physical injuries and assault upon a person in authority, and because the indictment was solely for less serious physical injuries, the later prosecution for assault was barred.
• Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes — Penal statutes, whether substantive or remedial/procedural, are construed strictly or liberally in favor of the accused, especially where the protection against double jeopardy is secured by the Constitution. The Court cited People vs. Elkanish in reaffirming this principle.

• "This is a case therefore of there Being a single act resulting in the complex crime of less serious physical injuries and assault upon a person in authority. The indictment, was, however, solely for less serious physical injuries. it is therefore now too late to hold him liable as well for the offense of assault against a person in authority." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the same single act gave rise to a complex crime, and because the first indictment was only for less serious physical injuries, the later charge for assault upon a person in authority was barred.
• "The objection coming from the Solicitor-General that this is not one of those cam where the offense is Identical cannot be sustained in view of the well-settled interpretation embodied in the Rules of Court provision cited such constitutional requirement is satisfied if the subsequent indictment is "for any offense which necessarily includes or is n necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information."" — This passage rejects the non-identity argument and defines the scope of the double jeopardy bar under the Rules of Court.
• "We are confident that the portion of the Philippine Bill embodying the principle that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense should, in accordance with its letter and spirit, be made to cover as nearly as possible every result which flows from a single criminal act impelled by a single criminal intent." — Quoted from United States vs. Gustilo, this passage supports the Court's extension of double jeopardy to offenses arising from a single criminal act and a single criminal intent.
• "the charge, of direct assault upon a person in authority with physical injuries as set out in the information n necessarily includes the offense of less serious physical injuries charged in the complaint" — Quoted from People vs. Bonotan, this passage is the precedent the Court found directly in point for holding that the second charge necessarily included the first.

• People vs. Bonotan, 105 Phil. 1349 — Directly in point; the Court relied on it to hold that a charge of direct assault upon a person in authority with physical injuries necessarily includes less serious physical injuries, so a prior conviction for the latter bars a later prosecution for the former.
• United States vs. Montiel, 9 Phil. 162 (1907) — Cited by petitioner as the earliest decision relied upon for the double jeopardy claim.
• United States vs. Gustilo, 19 Phil. 208 (1911) — Cited by the Court to support the principle that double jeopardy covers every result flowing from a single criminal act impelled by a single criminal intent.
• People vs. Elkanish, 90 Phil. 53 (1961) — Cited as reaffirming Gustilo; the Court noted that penal statutes are construed liberally in favor of the accused and that double jeopardy is secured by the Constitution.
• People vs. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 32D (1939) — Cited to illustrate that a single act with a single intent cannot be divided into separate offenses, as where theft of cows belonging to different owners was committed in one act.

• Article IV, Section 22, Constitution — Provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, and that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either bars another prosecution for the same act. The Court applied this guarantee to bar the second prosecution.
• Section 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Provides that a prior conviction or acquittal by a competent court upon a valid complaint or information, after the defendant has pleaded, bars another prosecution for the offense charged, or any attempt or frustration thereof, or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged. The Court relied on this provision to hold that the later assault charge was barred.

• Justice Concepcion, Jr. — Concurred.
• Justice Barredo — Concurred in the result on the basis that the second information in effect charged exactly the same offense as the first; he would have voted differently if the second information had properly charged assault, which was not the offense to which petitioner was prosecuted and put in jeopardy under the first information.
• Justice Aquino — Concurred, sustaining the plea of double jeopardy (autrefois convict) because the offenses charged in the first and second complaints are the same: less serious physical injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code. He reasoned that the body of the second complaint did not sufficiently allege direct assault or atentado contra la autoridad under Article 148 because it failed to allege that Ibaan was engaged in the performance of official duties or on the occasion thereof; the designation of the offense is not conclusive, and what controls are the allegations in the body. The second complaint was thus a repetition of the first and could be quashed under Section 9, Rule 117. He also noted that the crime actually committed was the complex offense of direct assault with lesiones menos graves from a single act, and that Montiel and Bonotan held that conviction for one offense forming part of the complex offense bars prosecution for the other or for the entire complex crime.