Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, and the mere marking of a document as an exhibit at pre-trial does not constitute its formal offer as evidence. A trial court may not take judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases, even those pending before the same court, unless the conditions for the exception are established—namely, absence of objection, knowledge of the opposing party, or consent of the parties to the reference or withdrawal of the records.

The case involves a dispute over a parcel of residential land of about 440 square meters in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. The estate of Alfredo Tabernilla filed an action for recovery of ownership against Jose Tabuena, who was the son of Damasa Timtiman and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr. The dispute traces back to an alleged 1926 sale between Juan Peralta, Jr. and Alfredo Tabernilla while both were in the United States, and a subsequent conveyance in 1934 by Damasa Timtiman acting upon her son Juan's instruction. The Rules of Court provision on formal offer of evidence, specifically Rule 132, Section 35, governs the central procedural question in this case.

The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square meters situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot.

As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own.

The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even before World War II and had been living thereon since then and until they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the Makato River.

Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A," "B" and "C," which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve the ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same parties but a different parcel of land. The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows: Exh. "A," letter dated October 4, 1921 addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh. "A-1," paragraph 2 of the letter indicating that the amount of P600.00—the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest since October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2," paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B," a Spanish document; Exh. "C," deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1," paragraph 4 of Exh. "C."

In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in evidence as disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted at length. The challenged decision also upheld the use by the trial court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second case.

Upon examination of the record, the Supreme Court found that the exhibits submitted were not the above-described documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their sub-markings, which were the last will and testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. The trial court categorically declared that Exhibits "A-1," "A-2," "B," "C" and "C-1" were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix. The appellate court seems to have confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y," the evidence mentioned in the quoted transcript.

The trial court said the said exhibits could be validly considered because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of the plaintiff's witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant's counsel. However, although she did testify, all she did was identify the documents; nowhere in her testimony can be found a recital of the contents of the exhibits. Her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran: "LEGASPI: That is this Exh. 'A' about? A The translation of the letter. Q What is the content of this Exh. 'A', the letter of the sister of Juan Peralta to Alfredo Tabernilla? Court: The best evidence is the document. Proceed." She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.

The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." Nevertheless, it applied the exception that in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.

The Supreme Court found that these conditions were not established. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract. The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of the other case, striking off all reference thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiff's cause because "the said testimony was merely corroborative of other evidences submitted by the plaintiff." However, the exhibits it intends to corroborate, to wit, Exhibits "A," "B" and "C," have themselves not been formally submitted.

The Court also noted that even assuming the lot was the same property sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no question that before 1934 the land in question belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly conveyed title to property that did not belong to him unless he had appropriate authorization from the owner, and no such authorization was presented. The Court observed that the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest possessed the disputed property since even before World War II, and the tax declarations in their name became weighty and compelling evidence of the petitioner's ownership. Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had been in possession for more than fifty years, she paid the realty taxes in her own name, Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the lot, and he even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private persons who acknowledged him as the owner.

• Lack of Basis for the Decision: Petitioner faulted the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for lack of basis, arguing that the lower courts should not have taken into account evidence not submitted by the private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
• Improper Consideration of Unoffered Exhibits: Petitioner complained that the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A," "B" and "C," which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence.
• Improper Judicial Notice of Another Case: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred when, to resolve the ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same parties but a different parcel of land, and that the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.

• Formal Submission of Exhibits: The respondent court held that, contrary to the allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in evidence as disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted at length.
• Corroborative Nature of the Testimony: The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of the other case, striking off all reference thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiff's cause because "the said testimony was merely corroborative of other evidences submitted by the plaintiff."

• Formal Offer of Evidence: Whether the trial court properly considered Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" which were marked at pre-trial but never formally offered in evidence.
• Judicial Notice of Another Case: Whether the trial court properly took judicial notice of the petitioner's testimony in a prior case (Civil Case No. 1327) without the petitioner's knowledge or consent.
• Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Evidence: Whether the private respondent, as plaintiff below, proved his claim of ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under the adjudicative laws.

• Formal Offer of Evidence: No. The mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. Under Rule 132, Section 35 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, and the purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
• Judicial Notice of Another Case: No. The exception to the general rule against taking judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases applies only when, in the absence of objection, with the knowledge of the opposing party, or at the request or with the consent of the parties, the case is clearly referred to or the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives and admitted as part of the record of the case then pending. These conditions were not established.
• Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Evidence: No. The private respondent failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under the adjudicative laws, and the complaint should have been dismissed for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its allegations.

• Formal Offer of Evidence: Rule 132, Section 35 of the Rules of Court provides that "[t]he court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified." The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time; they were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As stated in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value." Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale: "The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial." While People vs. Napat-a held that even without formal offer, an exhibit may still be admitted against the adverse party if it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case, these requirements were not satisfied here. Although Cunegunda Hernandez testified, all she did was identify the documents; nowhere in her testimony can be found a recital of the contents of the exhibits. The trial court categorically declared that Exhibits "A-1," "A-2," "B," "C" and "C-1" were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix, which contradicts the appellate court's finding.

• Judicial Notice of Another Case: As a general rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." The exception, as stated in U.S. vs. Claveria, applies only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions were not established here. The petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court; the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract. The respondent court's justification that the testimony was "merely corroborative of other evidences submitted by the plaintiff" fails because the exhibits it intends to corroborate—Exhibits "A," "B" and "C"—have themselves not been formally submitted.

• Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Evidence: Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, the complaint should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its allegations. The plaintiff failed to prove that the subject lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends. Even assuming it was the same lot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no question that before 1934 the land in question belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly conveyed title to property that did not belong to him unless he had appropriate authorization from the owner, and no such authorization was presented. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, that rule is not absolute and yields to the accepted and well-known exception. It is not even disputed that the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have possessed the disputed property since even before World War II. In light of this uncontroverted fact, the tax declarations in their name become weighty and compelling evidence of the petitioner's ownership. As held in Republic vs. Court of Appeals, "While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property." The Court also noted that all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they were the owners of the disputed property: Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had been in possession for more than fifty years; she paid the realty taxes in her own name; Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the lot; and he even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private persons who acknowledged him as the owner. These acts denote ownership and are not consistent with the private respondent's claim that the petitioner was only an overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.

• Formal Offer of Evidence — Under Rule 132, Section 35 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, and the purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not constitute its formal offer as evidence; marking at pre-trial is only for the purpose of identification. The Court applied this rule to exclude Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" from consideration, as they were marked but never formally offered.

• Exception to Formal Offer Requirement — Even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. The Court found these requirements unsatisfied because the witness only identified the documents without reciting their contents.

• Judicial Notice of Records of Other Cases — Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court. The exception applies only when, in the absence of objection, with the knowledge of the opposing party, or at the request or with the consent of the parties, the case is clearly referred to or the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives and admitted as part of the record of the case then pending. The Court held that these conditions were not established, as the petitioner was unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered.

• Tax Declarations as Evidence of Ownership — While tax declarations and receipts for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. The Court applied this doctrine where the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest possessed the disputed property since before World War II, making the tax declarations in their name weighty and compelling evidence of ownership.

• "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified." — This is the text of Rule 132, Section 35 of the Rules of Court, the controlling procedural rule that the trial court violated by considering Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" which were never formally offered.

• "The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party." — This states the core distinction between marking exhibits for identification and formally offering them as evidence, which is the ratio decidendi of the Court's ruling on the first issue.

• "The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial." — Quoted from Chief Justice Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, this explains the rationale behind the formal offer requirement.

• "While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property." — This articulates the doctrine on tax declarations as evidence of ownership, which the Court applied in favor of the petitioner given his long and actual possession of the disputed property.

• Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that documents marked but not formally offered cannot be considered evidence nor given any evidentiary value.

• People vs. Napat-a, 179 SCRA 403 — Cited for the exception that even without formal offer, an exhibit may still be admitted against the adverse party if duly identified by testimony recorded and incorporated in the records of the case; the Court found the requirements unsatisfied in this case.

• U.S. vs. Claveria, 29 Phil. 527 — Cited as the source of the exception to the general rule against taking judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases, which the Court found inapplicable because the conditions were not established.

• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 533 — Cited for the doctrine that tax receipts and declarations of ownership become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession.

• Heirs of Celso Amarante vs. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 585 — Cited for the proposition that it is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land covered by the tax declaration that such circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership.

• Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 194 — Cited for the principle that tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the subject parcels of land for more than 30 years qualify the possessors to register title to the said parcels.

• Rule 132, Section 35, Rules of Court — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, and the purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The Court applied this provision to exclude Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" from consideration because they were marked at pre-trial but never formally offered.

• Justice Narvasa
• Justice Gancayco
• Justice Griño-Aquino
• Justice Medialdea