Taborite vs. Sollesta

Before granting bail, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, the court must give the prosecutor reasonable notice of the hearing or require the prosecutor to submit a recommendation; in capital offenses, the court's discretion may be exercised only after a hearing to ascertain the weight of the evidence of guilt, and granting bail in non-bailable offenses without such hearing constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Complainants Felisa Taborite and Lucy T. Gallardo are the widow and sister, respectively, of Bienvenido Taborite, the victim in Criminal Case No. 3398 for murder before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Surallah-Lake, South Cotabato. Respondent Judge Manuel S. Sollesta was the acting presiding judge of that MCTC. The administrative complaint concerns the procedure for bail applications under Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires notice to the prosecutor and, in capital offenses, a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.

Complainants Felisa Taborite and Lucy T. Gallardo are the widow and sister, respectively, of Bienvenido Taborite. On June 26, 1998, Bienvenido was killed by Reynaldo Divino. The following day, a complaint for murder was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Surallah-Lake, South Cotabato, where respondent Judge Manuel S. Sollesta was the acting presiding judge.

On September 1, 1998, the Philippine National Police - Criminal Investigation Group (PNP-CIG) of Koronadal, South Cotabato arrested the accused. The accused then filed with the MCTC a petition for bail, which was set for hearing on September 23, 1998. Complainants and the PNP-CIG did not receive any subpoena. The hearing was again set on September 30, 1998. This time, SPO2 Wilfredo D. Bautista of the PNP-CIG was notified, but not the public prosecutors. During the hearing, only counsel for the accused and SPO2 Bautista appeared.

On October 21, 1998, respondent issued an Order granting the petition and fixing the bail bond at ₱50,000.00. On January 14, 1999, the accused posted his bail, and on January 20, 1999, he was ordered released. Complainants alleged that respondent, in ordering the release of the accused charged with murder without the requisite hearing and recommendation from the prosecutor, committed oppression and knowingly rendering unjust judgment.

In his comment dated August 5, 1999, respondent averred that after several hearings, he granted the petition for bail because the evidence against the accused was weak. He further stated that on January 28, 1999, he forwarded the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding information.

The order granting bail did not mention that the prosecutor was present during the hearing; only the accused and his counsel, Atty. Bonifacio Pagunsan, appeared. No government prosecutor appeared for lack of notice, and the prosecution had no opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong.

• Lack of Notice and Hearing: Complainants alleged that respondent granted bail and ordered the release of the accused charged with murder without the requisite hearing and without the recommendation of the prosecutor.
• Deprivation of Prosecution's Opportunity: Complainants maintained that they and the PNP-CIG did not receive any subpoena, and that while SPO2 Wilfredo D. Bautista was notified, the public prosecutors were not; thus only counsel for the accused and SPO2 Bautista appeared at the hearing.
• Oppression and Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment: Complainants charged respondent with oppression and knowingly rendering unjust judgment for ordering the release of the accused under those circumstances.

• Weak Evidence: Respondent averred that after several hearings, he granted the petition for bail because the evidence against the accused was weak.
• Forwarding to Prosecutor: Respondent stated that on January 28, 1999, he forwarded the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding information.
• Hearings Conducted: Respondent claimed that he heard the petition for admission to bail several times and pointed to his order as proof that there was a hearing.

• Notice to Prosecutor: Whether a judge may grant an application for bail, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, without giving the prosecutor reasonable notice of the hearing or requiring the prosecutor to submit a recommendation.
• Hearing in Capital Offenses: Whether the court may exercise its discretion to grant bail in a capital offense without a hearing to ascertain the weight of the evidence of guilt against the accused.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Whether respondent judge is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for granting bail to an accused charged with murder without notice to the prosecutor and without the requisite hearing.

• Notice to Prosecutor: No. Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the court to give reasonable notice of the bail hearing to the prosecutor or require the prosecutor to submit a recommendation.
• Hearing in Capital Offenses: No. In cases involving capital offenses, the court's discretion may be exercised only after a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Yes. Granting bail in non-bailable offenses without hearing constitutes gross ignorance of the law; respondent was fined ₱20,000 with a stern warning.

• Notice to Prosecutor: Under Section 18, Rule 114, before a judge may grant an application for bail, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, the prosecutor must be given reasonable notice of hearing or asked to submit a recommendation. Cortes vs. Catral laid down the duties of a judge in bail applications, including notifying the prosecutor and, where bail is discretionary, conducting a hearing regardless of whether the prosecution refuses to present evidence. In this case, only the accused and his counsel were present; no government prosecutor appeared for lack of notice. The prosecution was thus deprived of the opportunity to oppose the petition and to introduce evidence on the strength of the evidence of guilt.
• Hearing in Capital Offenses: The accused was charged with murder, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Baylon vs. Sison held that in capital offenses, the discretion of the court may be exercised only after a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused. The discretion lies not in determining whether there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt. Because no prosecutor appeared and no evidence was presented by the prosecution, any order granting bail was not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim, caprice, and outright arbitrariness.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Granting bail in non-bailable offenses without hearing is gross ignorance of the law. When the law is elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes ignorance of the law; everyone is presumed to know the law, and ignorance excuses no one, certainly not a judge. Respondent fell short of the Code of Judicial Conduct's injunction to maintain professional competence. The penalty of ₱20,000 was consistent with Rosalia Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, Panganiban vs. Cupin-Tesoro, and Layola vs. Gabo, Jr., where judges were fined ₱20,000 for similar bail-related lapses.

• Duties of a judge in bail applications — In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, the judge must notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require the prosecutor to submit a recommendation. Where bail is a matter of discretion, the judge must conduct a hearing regardless of whether the prosecution refuses to present evidence, decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of the prosecution's evidence, and if the guilt is not strong, discharge the accused upon approval of the bail bond; otherwise, the petition should be denied. This doctrine was applied in finding that respondent failed to notify the public prosecutors and held a hearing at which only the accused and his counsel appeared.
• Bail in capital offenses — In cases involving capital offenses, the discretion of the court may be exercised only after a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused. The discretion lies not in determining whether there will be a hearing but in appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt. Any order issued in the absence of the requisite evidence is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. This rule was applied to the murder charge, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
• Gross ignorance of the law — Granting bail in non-bailable offenses without hearing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. When the law is elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes ignorance of the law; everyone is presumed to know the law, and ignorance excuses no one, certainly not a judge. Respondent was found liable under this doctrine and was fined ₱20,000.
• Procedural due process in bail — The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence, and judicial discretion must be exercised regularly, legally, and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. The prosecution was found to have been denied such opportunity because the public prosecutors were not notified.

• "In this jurisdiction, before a judge may grant an application for bail, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, the prosecutor must be given reasonable notice of hearing or he must be asked to submit his recommendation." — This passage states the controlling procedural rule under Section 18, Rule 114 and anchors the finding that respondent deprived the prosecution of notice and an opportunity to oppose bail.
• "Quintessentially, and as a matter of law, the discretion of the court in cases involving capital offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused." — Quoted from Baylon vs. Sison, this formulation defines the standard for granting bail in capital offenses and was applied to the murder charge against the accused.
• "Granting bail in non-bailable offenses without hearing is gross ignorance of the law." — This is the Court's concise statement of the administrative offense and the basis for the ₱20,000 fine.
• "It follows that any order issued in the absence of the requisite evidence is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness." — This passage explains why the bail order was procedurally invalid and supports the finding of gross ignorance.

• Cortes vs. Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-138, September 10, 1997, 279 SCRA 1 — Laid down the duties of a judge in bail applications, including notifying the prosecutor and conducting a hearing where bail is discretionary; relied upon to measure respondent's procedural lapses.
• Baylon vs. Sison, 243 SCRA 284, 295 — Held that in capital offenses, the court's discretion to grant bail may be exercised only after a hearing to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused; applied because the accused was charged with murder.
• Rosalia Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1767, March 28, 2003 — Imposed a ₱20,000 fine for gross ignorance of the rules where bail was granted to two accused charged with murder without a hearing and while they were at large; cited to support the penalty.
• Panganiban vs. Cupin-Tesoro, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1454, August 27, 2002 — Fined a judge ₱20,000 for gross ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for hastily granting bail without notice to the prosecutor and without a hearing; cited for the penalty.
• Layola vs. Gabo, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1524, January 26, 2000 — Fined a Regional Trial Court judge ₱20,000 for granting bail in a murder case without the requisite bail hearing; cited for the penalty.
• SPO1 Eduardo Cañeda and SPO1 Charlito Duero vs. Hon. Quintin B. Alaan, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1376, January 23, 2002 — Cited for the rule that before a judge may grant an application for bail, the prosecutor must be given reasonable notice of hearing or asked to submit a recommendation.
• Sule vs. Biteng, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1018, April 18, 1995, 243 SCRA 524 — Cited for the principle that granting bail in non-bailable offenses without hearing is gross ignorance of the law.

• Section 18, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended — Provides that in an application for bail under Section 8, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require the prosecutor to submit a recommendation. The Court found respondent violated this provision by failing to notify the public prosecutors.
• Section 8, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that at the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person in custody for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. Because the accused was charged with murder, the prosecution should have been given the opportunity to discharge this burden.
• Section 7, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Cited in Cortes vs. Catral for the rule that where bail is a matter of discretion, the court must conduct a hearing regardless of whether the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong.
• Section 19, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Cited in Cortes vs. Catral for the rule that if the guilt of the accused is not strong, the accused should be discharged upon approval of the bail bond; otherwise, the petition should be denied.
• Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct — Requires judges to maintain professional competence. The Court found respondent fell short of this injunction.

Puno (Chairman), Panganiban, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.