Taar vs. Lawan

A judgment approving the subdivision of a parcel of land does not preclude other parties with a better right from instituting free patent applications over it; entitlement to agricultural lands of the public domain requires a clear showing of compliance with the Public Land Act, and only the State may bring an action to cancel a free patent and certificate of title. A Rule 65 petition for certiorari is also not a substitute for an available appeal where the alleged error is one of judgment and no grave abuse of discretion is shown.

Petitioners Francisca Taar, Joaquina Taar, Lucia Taar, and the Heirs of Oscar L. Galo trace their claim to predecessors-in-interest who were parties to a 1948 Court of First Instance partition of inherited Tarlac lands. Private respondents Claudio Lawan, Marcelino L. Galo, Artemio Abarquez, Augusto B. Lawan, and Adolfo L. Galo asserted possession and occupation of the same parcel. The dispute implicated Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which governs the disposition of agricultural lands of the public domain through homestead, sale, lease, or confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, including free patents under Section 44.

Narcisa Taar, Alipio Duenas, Fortunata Duenas, and Pantaleon Taar inherited two vast tracts of land in Tarlac. One parcel was adjudicated exclusively to Pantaleon, while the other was given to Pantaleon, Narcisa, Alipio, and Fortunata. Narcisa sold her share to Spouses Primitivo T. Adaoag and Pilar Tandoc and to Spouses Ignacio Gragasin and Genoveva Adaoag. Later, Pantaleon, Alipio, Fortunata, the Adaoag Spouses, and the Gragasin Spouses executed an agreement to partition the second parcel, which the Court of First Instance of Tarlac approved in its February 18, 1948 Decision in Civil Case No. 140. Pantaleon, Alipio, and Fortunata were the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners Francisca Taar, Joaquina Taar, Lucia Taar, and Oscar L. Galo. The property in dispute is a 71,014-square-meter parcel located in Barangay Parsolingan, Genova, Tarlac.

Based on the February 18, 1948 Decision, petitioners prepared a subdivision plan over the property in 2000. The plan, denominated Subdivision Plan No. Ccs-03-000964-D, was approved on February 6, 2001. Petitioners then applied for free patents over the property. On March 16, 2001, private respondents Claudio Lawan, Marcelino M. Galo, Artemio Abarquez, Augusto B. Lawan, and Adolfo L. Galo filed a verified protest alleging that their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, physical, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land since 1948. Petitioners countered that private respondents occupied the property as tenants.

The Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in Region III conducted an ocular inspection and required the parties to submit documentary evidence. In its May 29, 2002 Order, DENR Regional Executive Director Leonardo R. Sibbaluca found that private respondents were the actual occupants of the property and that there were no improvements or other traces of possession by petitioners. He cancelled Subdivision Plan No. Ccs-03-000964-D and denied petitioners' free patent applications. Neither party appealed or moved for reconsideration, and the order attained finality. Later that year, private respondents filed their own free patent applications before the Tarlac Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, covering the same property. On January 23, 2004, their applications were approved, and free patents and certificates of title denominated as "Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo" were issued in their favor.

On July 29, 2004, petitioners filed before the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources a Verified Petition to annul Director Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002 Order on the ground of extrinsic fraud and to cancel private respondents' free patents and certificates of title. Petitioners alleged that they were deprived of due process. The DENR Undersecretary for Legal Affairs formed an investigating team to ascertain the actual occupants of the property. During the ocular inspection, the team found concrete residential houses of petitioners with fences, fruit trees, and coconut trees, as well as other houses owned by relatives and friends of the parties. The team gathered documentary evidence, discovered several leasehold contracts between the parties, and saw rice fields cultivated by Augusto, Marcelino, Claudio, Artemio Tabuyo, Artemio Abarquez, and Romy Tabuyo. Based on these findings, the team concluded that petitioners were entitled to the property.

In his January 18, 2007 Decision, DENR Secretary Angelo T. Reyes adopted the investigating team's findings and ordered the cancellation of the free patents and certificates of title issued in favor of private respondents. Private respondents moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied in the June 14, 2007 Order. They appealed to the Office of the President. In its October 20, 2008 Decision, the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, reversed Secretary Reyes' January 18, 2007 Decision and reinstated Director Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002 Order, holding that Secretary Reyes erred in reversing an order that had already attained finality. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied in the March 26, 2009 Resolution.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging that the Office of the President committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating Director Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002 Order because their predecessors-in-interest had been declared ipso jure owners of the property as early as 1948 by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright, and the Supreme Court ultimately reviewed the case on a petition for review on certiorari. The Court of First Instance's February 18, 1948 Decision approved only an agreement of partition and did not expressly or impliedly recognize that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest occupied and cultivated the property for more than 30 years since 1915 or declare them ipso jure owners.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion and Wrong Remedy: Petitioners claimed that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their petition for certiorari and that the Office of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion in reinstating Director Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002 Order. They alleged that the Office of the President failed to appreciate the merits of the February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance.
• Res Judicata and Ownership: Petitioners insisted that their predecessors-in-interest were declared ipso jure owners of the property by the Court of First Instance in its February 18, 1948 Decision, which recognized that they possessed, occupied, and cultivated the lots for more than 30 years since 1915. They argued that res judicata barred private respondents from asserting title to the property.
• Fraud and Misrepresentation: Petitioners added that private respondents procured their free patents through fraud and misrepresentation and prayed for the cancellation of the free patents and certificates of title.

• Procedural Impropriety and Late Filing: Private respondents asserted that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari because petitioners filed it after the lapse of more than two months from receipt of the adverse decision of the Office of the President and because petitioners raised errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction.
• No Res Judicata: Private respondents contended that they were not bound by the February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance and that res judicata did not apply because there was no identity of parties and subject matter. The Office of the Solicitor General shared this view, pointing out that the 1948 Decision simply adopted an agreement of partition arising from a dispute among petitioners' predecessors-in-interest.
• Finality of the DENR Order: Private respondents insisted that petitioners were bound by Director Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002 Order, which had already attained finality.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by Francisca Taar, Joaquina Taar, Lucia Taar, and the Heirs of Oscar L. Galo.
• Res Judicata and Free Patent Applications: Whether the February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance bars Claudio Lawan, Marcelino L. Galo, Artemio Abarquez, Augusto B. Lawan, and Adolfo L. Galo from applying for free patents over the property.
• Validity of Free Patents and Fraud: Whether the free patents and certificates of title issued in favor of Claudio Lawan, Marcelino L. Galo, Artemio Abarquez, Augusto B. Lawan, and Adolfo L. Galo are valid and were secured through fraud and misrepresentation.

• Propriety of Certiorari: No. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Rule 65 petition outright; the alleged failure to appreciate the 1948 Decision was an error of judgment, not jurisdiction, and appeal under Rule 43 was available. No grave abuse of discretion was shown.
• Res Judicata and Free Patent Applications: No. Res judicata did not bar the free patent applications because there was no identity or substantial identity of parties and no identity of subject matter between the 1948 partition judgment and the free patent applications.
• Validity of Free Patents and Fraud: Petitioners' challenge fails. Extrinsic fraud was not substantiated, and in any event only the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, may bring an action to cancel a free patent and certificate of title.

• Propriety of Certiorari: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an extraordinary remedy limited to errors of jurisdiction; errors of judgment are reviewable only by appeal. The alleged failure of the Office of the President to appreciate the merits of the February 18, 1948 Decision involved an error of judgment, not jurisdiction, and there was no showing that the Office of the President exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. Petitioners could have appealed the October 20, 2008 Decision and March 26, 2009 Resolution of the Office of the President by filing a petition for review under Rule 43, which governs appeals from judgments of quasi-judicial agencies. Although courts may entertain certiorari despite the availability of appeal, petitioners failed to allege and prove that appeal would be inadequate to promptly relieve them of the effects of the assailed Decision and Resolution. A petition for certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if the loss resulted from petitioners' own negligence or error in choosing a remedy. The Court of Appeals therefore did not err in dismissing the petition outright.
• Res Judicata and Free Patent Applications: Res judicata requires (1) a final judgment; (2) rendition by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) a judgment on the merits; and (4) identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the first and second actions. Only the first three elements were present. The February 18, 1948 Decision was final, on the merits, and rendered by a competent court, but it did not bar private respondents' free patent applications. There was no identity or substantial identity of parties: the 1948 Decision involved an agreement among petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, namely Alipio Duenas, Fortunata Duenas, Spouses Primitivo T. Adaoag and Pilar Tandoc, Spouses Ignacio Gragasin and Genoveva Adaoag, Pantaleon Taar, Lucia Taar, Joaquina Taar, Feliciano Taar, Paulino Taar, and Oscar Galo. Private respondents were not parties to that agreement, and there was no clear showing that they or their predecessors-in-interest shared a common interest with any party to it. Assuming identity or substantial identity of parties, there was also no identity of subject matter: the 1948 Decision simply approved a partition of the bigger parcel, while the free patent applications involved the establishment of private respondents' rights as purported occupants and cultivators of the property. The Court of First Instance did not recognize, expressly or impliedly, that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest occupied and cultivated the property for more than 30 years since 1915, nor did it declare them ipso jure owners. Thus, the 1948 Decision could not bar the subsequent free patent applications, and petitioners could not rely solely on it to obtain free patents. Entitlement to agricultural lands of the public domain requires compliance with Commonwealth Act No. 141. Under Section 11, agricultural lands may be disposed of by homestead settlement, sale, lease, or confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Free patents are governed by Section 44, as amended by Republic Act No. 6940, and require: (1) natural-born citizenship; (2) ownership of not more than 12 hectares; (3) continuous occupation and cultivation by the applicant or predecessors-in-interest; (4) continuous occupation and cultivation for at least 30 years before April 15, 1990, the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6940; and (5) payment of real estate taxes while the land has not been occupied by other persons. By applying for free patents, petitioners acknowledged that the land still belonged to the government and remained part of the public domain. The 1948 Decision could not serve as proof of compliance with these requirements; at most, it could be used as the basis of a subdivision plan.
• Validity of Free Patents and Fraud: Section 91 of the Public Land Act provides for the automatic cancellation of applications, concessions, titles, or permits based on false statements or omission of material facts. Only extrinsic fraud may be raised to review or reopen a decree of registration; extrinsic fraud is fraud employed to deprive parties of their day in court and prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the applicant's name. Petitioners invoked Section 91 impliedly by claiming extrinsic fraud and misrepresentation, but they failed to substantiate their claims and did not establish the circumstances constituting extrinsic fraud. They could have pointed to irregularities during the proceedings to show that the free patents were not issued in accordance with the Public Land Act. The existence or nonexistence of fraud is a factual matter beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari, and petitioners failed to allege and prove that the case fell under any exception. Assuming that private respondents procured their free patents and certificates of title through extrinsic fraud and misrepresentation, the petition would still be denied because petitioners are not the proper parties to bring an action for cancellation. The validity or invalidity of free patents granted by the government and the corresponding certificates of title is a matter between the grantee and the government. Under Section 101 of the Public Land Act, all actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Private persons may not bring an action for reversion or any action that would have the effect of canceling a land patent and the corresponding certificate of title, such that the land covered would again form part of the public domain. Since the title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. Thus, even if fraud existed, only the State could seek cancellation of the free patents and certificates of title.

• Certiorari under Rule 65 is limited to errors of jurisdiction — A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy whose scope of review is narrow and limited to errors of jurisdiction; errors of judgment may involve appreciation of facts and conclusions of law and are reviewable only by appeal. Certiorari generally will not lie if appeal is available, unless the appeal is inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve the party from the injurious effects of the order complained of. Mere possibility of delay does not warrant direct recourse to certiorari. Applied: the Office of the President's alleged failure to appreciate the 1948 Decision was an error of judgment, and petitioners failed to show that appeal under Rule 43 was inadequate.
• Res judicata — A final judgment or decree rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive upon the rights of the parties or their privies in subsequent actions. It has two aspects: bar by prior judgment, which precludes prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action; and conclusiveness of judgment, which precludes relitigation of issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit between the same parties involving a different cause of action. The elements are: (1) final judgment; (2) jurisdiction over subject matter and parties; (3) judgment on the merits; and (4) identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Res judicata does not require absolute identity of parties; substantial identity exists when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second even if the latter was not impleaded. Applied: only the first three elements were present; there was no identity or substantial identity of parties and no identity of subject matter between the 1948 partition judgment and the free patent applications.
• Modes of disposition of agricultural lands of the public domain — Under Section 11 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands of the public domain may be disposed of by homestead settlement, sale, lease, or confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Confirmation may be judicial legalization under Section 48 or administrative legalization through free patents under Section 44, as amended by Republic Act No. 6940. Free patent requisites: (1) natural-born citizen; (2) not owner of more than 12 hectares; (3) continuous occupation and cultivation by the applicant or predecessors-in-interest; (4) continuous occupation and cultivation for at least 30 years before April 15, 1990; and (5) payment of real estate taxes while the land has not been occupied by other persons. Applied: petitioners' reliance on the 1948 partition decision did not establish compliance with these requisites.
• Free patent applicant acknowledges public domain — An applicant for a free patent does not claim that the land is his or her private property but acknowledges that the land is still part of the public domain. A patent is a governmental grant of a right, privilege, or authority, and a free patent is an instrument by which the government conveys public land to a private person. Applied: by applying for free patents, petitioners acknowledged that the property remained public land and could not rely solely on the 1948 Decision as proof of ownership.
• Only the State may seek cancellation or reversion of a free patent — The validity or invalidity of free patents granted by the government and the corresponding certificates of title is a matter between the grantee and the government. Private persons may not bring an action for reversion or any action that would have the effect of canceling a land patent and the corresponding certificate of title, such that the land would again form part of the public domain. Under Section 101 of the Public Land Act, only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may institute reversion proceedings in the name of the Republic. Applied: petitioners, as private persons, were not proper parties to seek cancellation of private respondents' free patents and certificates of title.
• Extrinsic fraud — Only extrinsic fraud may be raised as a ground to review or reopen a decree of registration. Extrinsic fraud is fraud employed to deprive parties of their day in court and prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the applicant's name. Applied: petitioners failed to substantiate extrinsic fraud, and the determination of fraud is a factual matter beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari.

• "A judgment approving the subdivision of a parcel of land does not preclude other parties with a better right from instituting free patent applications over it. Entitlement to agricultural lands of the public domain requires a clear showing of compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act." — This opening passage states the core ruling: a partition judgment does not bar free patent applications by non-parties, and public land entitlement requires strict compliance with the Public Land Act.
• "The mere allegation of grave abuse of discretion in a petition for certiorari does not mean that the petition will automatically be given due course, The general invocation of grave abuse of discretion is insufficient. Parties must satisfy other exacting requirements under the Rules of Court." — This passage explains why the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the Rule 65 petition and emphasizes that a bare claim of grave abuse of discretion does not suffice.
• "The applicant for a free patent should comply with the following requisites: (1) the applicant must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) the applicant must not own more than 12 hectares of land; (3) the applicant or his or her predecessors-in-interest must have continuously occupied and cultivated the land; (4) the continuous occupation and cultivation must be for a period of at least 30 years before April 15, 1990, which is the date of effectivity of Republic Act No. 6940; and (5) payment of real estate taxes on the land while it has not been occupied by other persons." — This excerpt enumerates the requisites for a free patent under Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 6940.
• "Private persons may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling a land patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis of the patent, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Only the O[ffice] [of the] S[olicitor] G[eneral] or the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since the title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee." — This passage establishes the rule that only the State may seek cancellation or reversion of a free patent and certificate of title, which defeated petitioners' challenge even assuming fraud.

• Fernando vs. Vasquez, 142 Phil. 266 (1970) — Cited for the distinction between errors of judgment and errors of jurisdiction; errors of jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari, while errors of judgment are reviewable only by appeal.
• Madrigal Transport, Inc. vs. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 479 Phil. 768 (2004) — Held that certiorari cannot be used to review the intrinsic correctness of a judgment and cannot substitute for a lost appeal.
• Milwaukee Industries Corporation vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 650 Phil. 429 (2010) — Defined without jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion; applied to reject petitioners' claim of grave abuse.
• Club Filipino, Inc. vs. Bautista, 750 Phil. 599 (2015) — Stated the two aspects and elements of res judicata; applied to find no identity of parties and subject matter.
• Sendon vs. Ruiz, 415 Phil. 376 (2001) — Explained substantial identity of parties as a community of interest; applied to find none between private respondents and the parties to the 1948 partition.
• Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic, 717 Phil. 141 (2013) — Discussed judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) and the requirement that the land be alienable and disposable; cited to distinguish judicial legalization from free patents.
• De Leon vs. De Leon-Reyes, G.R. No. 205711, May 30, 2016, 791 SCRA 407 — Distinguished judicial confirmation from administrative legalization through free patents and recognized the DENR's jurisdiction over public land disposition.
• Sumail vs. Court of First Instance of Cotabato, 96 Phil. 946 (1955) — Held that a free patent applicant acknowledges the land as public domain and cannot bring an action to cancel a free patent and certificate of title.
• Cawis vs. Cerilles, 632 Phil. 367 (2010) — Held that an action questioning the validity of a sales patent is a reversion suit that only the State may institute under Section 101 of the Public Land Act.
• Lorzano vs. Tabayag, 681 Phil. 39 (2012) — Reiterated that only the government, through the Office of the Solicitor General, may assail a fraudulently acquired free patent.
• Kayaban vs. Republic, 152 Phil. 323 (1973) — Explained that an action for annulment of a free patent should have been initiated by the Director of Lands or with prior authority and consent.
• Mendoza vs. Valle, 768 Phil. 539 (2015) — Defined extrinsic fraud as fraud that deprives a party of its day in court; cited for the requirement to substantiate extrinsic fraud.
• Encinares vs. Achero, 613 Phil. 391 (2009) — Stated that only extrinsic fraud may be raised to review or reopen a decree of registration.

• Section 11, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) — Enumerates the modes of disposition of agricultural lands of the public domain: homestead settlement, sale, lease, and confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Applied to classify free patents as administrative legalization and to require compliance with the governing mode.
• Section 44, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 6940 — Governs free patents and requires: natural-born citizenship; ownership of not more than 12 hectares; continuous occupation and cultivation by the applicant or predecessors-in-interest; continuous occupation and cultivation for at least 30 years before April 15, 1990; and payment of real estate taxes while the land has not been occupied by other persons. Applied: petitioners failed to prove compliance through the 1948 partition decision.
• Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 3872 and Presidential Decree No. 1073 — Governs judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, including possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain since June 12, 1945. Applied to distinguish judicial legalization from free patents.
• Section 91, Commonwealth Act No. 141 — Provides for automatic cancellation of applications, concessions, titles, or permits based on false statements or omission of material facts. Applied: petitioners invoked it impliedly but failed to substantiate extrinsic fraud or misrepresentation.
• Section 101, Commonwealth Act No. 141 — Requires all actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon to be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Applied: only the State may seek cancellation of private respondents' free patents and certificates of title.
• Rule 65, Section 1, Rules of Court — Requires that a petition for certiorari be filed only when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Applied: petitioners had an available appeal under Rule 43.
• Rule 43, Section 1, Rules of Court — Governs appeals from judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies, including the Office of the President. Applied: petitioners should have filed a petition for review instead of certiorari.
• Article XII, Section 3, paragraph 1, Constitution — Limits alienable lands of the public domain to agricultural lands; citizens may lease not more than 500 hectares or acquire not more than 12 hectares by purchase, homestead, or grant; private corporations may lease not more than 1,000 hectares. Applied as context for the statutory limits on free patents and other modes of disposition.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, and Gesmundo, JJ., concurred. Martires, J., was on official leave.