Syhunliong vs. Rivera

The crime of libel prescribes in one year from the date of its commission, and this substantive defense may be raised at any stage of the criminal proceedings even if not previously asserted in a motion to quash, as prescription totally extinguishes criminal liability and is not subject to waiver under Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

Syhunliong, President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation, employed Rivera as Accounting Manager from September 2002 until her resignation in March 2006. Following her resignation, Rivera claimed unpaid salaries, benefits, and incentives. On April 6, 2006, Rivera sent text messages to Jennifer Lumapas, her successor at BANFF, expressing frustration over the delay in payment and commenting on Syhunliong's religious observance. In December 2006, Rivera filed a labor complaint against Syhunliong. Subsequently, Syhunliong instituted a criminal complaint for libel against Rivera based on the April 2006 text messages.

• Employment Relationship: Rivera served as Accounting Manager of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation from September 2002 until her resignation in March 2006. Syhunliong is the President of BANFF and owns interests in various businesses including construction, restaurant, and hospital ventures.
• The Text Messages: On April 6, 2006, at approximately 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent two text messages to Jennifer Lumapas, her successor at BANFF, regarding the delay in the release of her unpaid salaries, benefits, and incentives. The first message stated: "I am expecting that[.] [G]rabe talagasufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha nglast pay ko. I don't deserve this [because] I did my job when I [was] still there. God bless ras[.] [S]ana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning." The second message read: "Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyanincluding incentive up to the last datena nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor."
• Labor Complaint: In December 2006, Rivera filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month pay, incentive pay, gratuities, and tax refund totaling Php 698,150.48.
• Criminal Complaint: On April 16, 2007 (or August 18, 2007 per Syhunliong's narration), Syhunliong instituted a complaint for libel against Rivera. The Information dated June 21, 2007 charged Rivera with maliciously publishing defamatory statements via text messages intended to impeach Syhunliong's honor and reputation.
• Proceedings Below: During arraignment on October 11, 2007, Rivera entered a plea of not guilty. The RTC denied her Motion to Quash on December 4, 2008, ruling that the grounds raised were evidentiary in nature and that probable cause existed. The RTC denied reconsideration on June 18, 2009, holding that privileged communication merely rebuts the presumption of malice but does not preclude proof of actual malice.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Syhunliong argued that Rivera improperly availed of a special civil action for certiorari to assail the denial of her motion to quash, citing Soriano v. People that the accused should instead enter a plea, proceed to trial, and appeal an adverse decision.
• Waiver by Arraignment: Petitioner maintained that Rivera waived her right to file a motion to quash when she voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty on October 11, 2007, as Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court requires such motion to be filed before entering a plea.
• Jurisdictional Error: Syhunliong contended that the CA improperly arrogated unto itself the power to review the Public Prosecutor and RTC's uniform finding of probable cause, characterizing any error as one of judgment, not jurisdiction.
• Existence of Libel: Petitioner argued that the text message constituted an indictment of his personality and character, portraying him as a hypocrite, and thus contained the elements of libel.
• Privileged Communication as Defense: Citing People v. Judge Gomez, Syhunliong argued that the privileged nature of a communication is not a ground for a motion to quash but merely a matter of defense to be proven during trial.

• Prescription: Rivera countered that the complaint was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period for libel under Articles 90 and 91 of the RPC, as the text message was sent on April 6, 2006, while the complaint was filed in April or August 2007.
• Failure to Constitute an Offense: Respondent argued that the facts charged in the information did not constitute the crime of libel, as the text message merely expressed legitimate grievances regarding unpaid wages and lacked the elements of malice and defamatory imputation.
• Qualified Privileged Communication: Rivera maintained that the text message fell within the purview of qualified privileged communication under Article 354 of the RPC, as she had a legal, moral, or social duty to protect her interest in recovering unpaid wages, the communication was addressed to Lumapas who had the power to expedite payment, and the statements were made in good faith without malice.
• Procedural Grounds: Respondent argued that the ground that facts charged do not constitute an offense can be raised even after arraignment and is broad enough to cover lack of probable cause, which the court may re-assess in the exercise of its inherent power of judicial review.

• Prescription: Whether the crime of libel had already prescribed, thereby extinguishing criminal liability.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether the CA properly exercised its jurisdiction in reviewing the RTC orders via certiorari.
• Waiver of Defense: Whether the defense of prescription was waived by Rivera's failure to raise it in a motion to quash before arraignment.
• Qualified Privileged Communication: Whether the text message constituted qualified privileged communication negating the element of malice.
• Sufficiency of Information: Whether the facts charged in the information constituted the offense of libel.

• Prescription: The crime of libel had prescribed. The text message was sent on April 6, 2006, and the complaint was filed on April 16, 2007 (or August 18, 2007), clearly beyond the one-year prescriptive period under Article 90 of the RPC. Prescription is a substantive right that extinguishes criminal liability and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
• Waiver of Defense: The defense of prescription was not deemed waived despite Rivera's failure to raise it in a motion to quash before arraignment. Under Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the defense of extinction of criminal action or liability is not waived even if not asserted in a motion to quash, as this rule cannot defeat the substantive provision of Article 89 of the RPC which provides that prescription totally extinguishes criminal liability.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Even assuming Rivera availed of the wrong remedy, the result would prove circuitous. Had the trial proceeded and an adverse decision been rendered, the appellate courts would still be compelled to order dismissal on account of prescription.
• Qualified Privileged Communication: The text message constituted qualified privileged communication under Article 354(1) of the RPC. Rivera had a legal and moral duty to protect her interest in recovering unpaid wages; the communication was addressed to Lumapas, who was in the best position to expedite the release of the checks; and the statements were made in good faith without malice. The message was merely an expression of grievance, not a defamatory imputation of crime, vice, or defect.
• Sufficiency of Information: The text message did not constitute libel. Breaking down the message, the first two parts merely announced Rivera's sufferings, while the third part ("sana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning") at best suggested that Syhunliong should be more compassionate, which does not impute a vice or defect constituting libel.

• Prescription as Substantive Defense: Prescription of crime is a substantive right that totally extinguishes criminal liability under Article 89 of the RPC. As the Rules of Court cannot cover substantive rights, Section 9, Rule 117 explicitly provides that the defense of extinction of criminal action or liability (including prescription) is not deemed waived even if the accused had not raised the same in a motion to quash.
• Liberal Construction of Prescriptive Laws: Statutes of limitation in criminal cases are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the statute recognizes that time gradually wears out proofs of innocence while destroying proofs of guilt.
• Requisites of Qualified Privileged Communication: Under Article 354(1) of the RPC, a communication is qualifiedly privileged if: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least had an interest to protect; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer, board, or superior having some interest or duty in the matter and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements are made in good faith and without malice.
• Determination of Libel: Libel requires a public and malicious imputation of a crime, vice, defect, or any act tending to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt. Mere expressions of opinion or grievance in connection with a plea for redress do not constitute libel if they do not impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation of another.

• "Prescription emanates from the liberality of the State. x x x Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the accused." — On the liberal construction of prescription in favor of the accused.
• "The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty." — Defining the nature of qualified privileged communication.
• "If libel is to be understood as an imputation of a crime, vice or defect to another, there can be no libel in the first two of the three statements which announced only the sufferings, albeit undeserved[,] of [Rivera]." — On the interpretation of allegedly libelous statements in context.
• "A responsible officer whose decisions may affect the fortunes of others and who is faced with criticism such as in this case should not be so onion-skinned as to react through the criminal law." — On the threshold for libel suits by public figures or responsible officers against employees.

• People v. Castro, 95 Phil. 462 (1954) — Controlling precedent establishing that the defense of prescription is not deemed waived even if not raised in a motion to quash, as prescription is a substantive right that extinguishes criminal liability.
• People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387 (1923) — Cited in Castro, emphasizing that prescription is an amnesty granted by the State and may be invoked at any stage of the proceedings.
• Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, 529 Phil. 90 (2006) — Applied for the principle that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant.
• Brillante v. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 568 (2004) — Cited for the requisites of qualified privileged communication under Article 354 of the RPC.
• Soriano v. People, 609 Phil. 31 (2009) — Distinguished; Syhunliong cited this to argue that certiorari is improper to assail denial of motion to quash, but the Court found the issue moot due to prescription.
• People v. Judge Gomez, 187 Phil. 110 (1980) — Distinguished; held that privileged communication is a matter of defense, but the Court ruled that in this case, the text clearly fell within the privilege and prescription had set in.

• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the crime of libel prescribes in one year.
• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the period of prescription commences to run from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party and is interrupted by the filing of the complaint.
• Article 354, Revised Penal Code — Enumerates instances of qualified privileged communication, including private communications made in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty.
• Section 3(a), Rule 117, Rules of Court — Ground for motion to quash that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
• Section 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Provides that failure to move to quash or allege grounds does not waive objections based on extinction of criminal action or liability.

Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chief Justice, Chairperson), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Martin S. Villarama, Jr.