Sy Tan vs. Sy Tiong Gue

A regional trial court's finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is binding and conclusive absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, especially when the judge has personally examined the complainant and witnesses through searching questions and their testimonies establish a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and the objects sought are in the place to be searched.

On April 15, 2003, respondents allegedly robbed Guan Yiak Hardware of cash, checks, liquor, and equipment. Petitioner Romer Sy Tan, representing the hardware, reported that respondent Felicidad Chan Sy, accompanied by police officers and maids, took the items and brought them to the 7th and 8th floors of 524 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila. An Information for Robbery was subsequently filed against the respondents.

• The Robbery Incident: On April 15, 2003, respondents allegedly conspired to rob Guan Yiak Hardware, taking cash, postdated checks, boxes of Hennessy XO Cognac, a television set, a computer set, and documents, with a total value of over P11,000,000.00.
• Application for Search Warrants: On April 22, 2003, Police Inspector Edgar A. Reyes filed two applications for search warrant before RTC Manila, Branch 7, based on personal knowledge that Felicidad Chan Sy possessed the stolen items. The applications were supported by the sworn statements of petitioner Romer Sy Tan and witnesses Maricho Sabelita and Anicita Almedilla.
• Issuance and Enforcement: On April 22, 2003, Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas examined the applicant and witnesses and issued Search Warrant No. 03-3611 (for the 8th floor, targeting the Hennessy XO) and Search Warrant No. 03-3612 (for the 7th floor, targeting the checks). Upon enforcement, three boxes containing twelve Hennessy XOs and one box containing seven Hennessy XOs were seized under SW No. 03-3611, while SW No. 03-3612 yielded negative results.
• Motion to Quash: Respondents filed a Motion to Quash the search warrants, which the RTC denied on September 1, 2003. The RTC likewise denied respondents' Motion for Reconsideration on October 28, 2003.
• CA Proceedings: Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The CA granted the petition on December 29, 2005, concluding that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants, notwithstanding its finding that the judge asked probing questions and the warrants particularly described the items.

• Existence of Probable Cause: Petitioner argued that substantial basis existed for the RTC judge to conclude that the crime of robbery had been committed, justifying the issuance of the search warrants.
• Regular Determination by the RTC: Petitioner maintained that the RTC judge personally determined the existence of probable cause based on the sworn statements and the testimonies of the witnesses during the hearing, and thus committed no grave abuse of discretion.

• Absence of Probable Cause: Respondents countered that the CA correctly appreciated the statements and admissions of petitioner and his witnesses, which, taken together, negate any finding of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants.

• Probable Cause: Whether there was probable cause warranting the issuance of the subject search warrants by the RTC.

• Probable Cause: The assailed Court of Appeals decision was reversed because the RTC judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause. The determination of probable cause rests upon evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the accused. The issuing judge's finding of probable cause is binding absent grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the sworn statements and the 37-page transcript of the witnesses' testimonies, taken under oath and through searching questions, sufficiently established that the respondents took the items to the specified locations. Probable cause requires only probability, not absolute or moral certainty, and the CA erred in substituting its judgment for that of the issuing judge. The guilt of the accused remains to be determined in the criminal action, not in the proceeding for the issuance of a search warrant.

• Probable Cause for Search Warrant — Defined as such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. The determination of probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty, and does not require the same standards of proof as a judgment of conviction after trial on the merits.
• Requisites for Issuing a Search Warrant — The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. All these requisites were complied with by the RTC.

• "The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, 'probable cause' is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial."

• Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA 224 — Followed. Cited for the principle that probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or moral certainty, and does not require the same standard of proof as a judgment of conviction.
• Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. v. Gomez, G.R. No. 154491, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 18 — Followed. Cited for the definition of probable cause as reasons supported by facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe an offense has been committed and the objects sought are in the place to be searched.
• People v. Court of Appeals, 468 Phil. 1 (2004) — Followed. Cited for the principle that a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is intended only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Rule 126, Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rules of Court — Section 4 provides that a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause determined personally by the judge after examination under oath of the complainant and witnesses, and particularly describing the place and things to be seized. Section 5 mandates that the judge must personally examine the complainant and witnesses through searching questions and answers in writing and under oath. Section 6 states that if the judge is satisfied of the existence of probable cause, the warrant shall be issued. The Court found that the RTC judge fully complied with these provisions.
• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Cited as the constitutional basis for the exclusive vesting of the power to issue search warrants in trial judges in the exercise of their judicial functions.

Renato C. Corona (Chairperson), Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Jose Catral Mendoza.