Switzer vs. Municipality of Cebu

The power of a municipal council under section 39(f) of the Municipal Code to prescribe the "kind of buildings" that may be constructed within fire limits does not authorize it, in a special and specific manner, to require that buildings have more than one story or display a prescribed style of architecture or ornamentation; in the absence of definite legal provisions, the exercise of such power must be subjected to the requirements of reason and public expediency.

John M. Switzer held lots 3 and 4 of block 2 of the official plan of Cebu water-front reclamation No. 2 as lessee of the Insular Government under Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission. The Municipality of Cebu, a first-class municipal corporation governed in all its acts by the Municipal Code, exercised regulatory authority over construction within its jurisdiction, its council being empowered under section 39(f) of that Code to establish fire limits, prescribe the kind of buildings that may be constructed within those limits, and issue permits for their erection without charging fees. The controversy required the Court to measure that delegated regulatory authority against the property rights of a lessee proposing to build on the Cebu waterfront.

John M. Switzer, a resident of the Municipality of Cebu, leased from the Insular Government lots 3 and 4 of block 2 of the official plan of Cebu water-front reclamation No. 2, under the provisions of Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission, on or about January 24, 1910, and held those lots as lessee thereafter. The defendant, the Municipality of Cebu, was a municipal corporation of the first class, duly organized under the provisions of law in force in the Islands and governed in all its acts by the Municipal Code. The leased lots lay on Calle Morga, which was classified as a street of the first class under ordinance No. 3, and were situated on the water front of Cebu where all the steamers in the port loaded and discharged.

On or about March 26, 1910, Switzer secured the approval of the architect of the Insular Government of the plan for a building he proposed to erect on the lots — a one-story structure of reinforced concrete with a galvanized-iron roof, 5 meters and 20 centimeters in height to the ceiling and 8½ meters to the ridge of the roof, intended for use as a storeroom and warehouse. The parties later agreed that the building would be of strong materials, with cement walls reinforced with steel rods and a galvanized-iron roof. On April 18, 1910, Switzer submitted to the Municipality of Cebu a written application for a permit to erect the building.

The municipality and its officers refused, and continued to refuse, to issue the permit. They notified Switzer that the erection of the building was prohibited and threatened him with prohibition and perpetual suspension of the construction. The refusal rested on two municipal enactments. Ordinance No. 3, approved and published on May 15, 1901, and never repealed or suspended, provided in paragraph 13 that every building erected on "McClernand" street and its parallels toward the sea should be of three stories with specified heights and a front in harmony with the ornamentation adopted by the municipality for that street, and that on the remaining streets of the same class houses of two stories might be erected in the style of the government building of the city; paragraph 15 required all houses on streets of the second class to be of two stories and strictly prohibited buildings known as warehouses, stores, or shops on streets of the first and second class. Ordinance No. 100, approved and published on April 23, 1910, was also invoked against him, but on April 28, 1910, the provincial board of Cebu suspended its operation, and that suspension remained in force.

In the meantime, Switzer had purchased and had in his possession a large quantity of materials for the construction of the proposed building, had entered into a contract for the construction work, and had begun that work.

The trial court found as established that the projected building fulfilled all the conditions reasonably necessary for safeguarding the public health and for protection against fire and other dangers and calamities, being of fireproof materials with good ventilating facilities, and that the land on which it was to stand was situated on the water front of the municipality of Cebu, where all the steamers of the port loaded and discharged and where warehouses and storerooms were very necessary to facilitate the commerce of Cebu. These findings, together with the parties' agreement as to the character and dimensions of the building, framed the controversy on appeal.

• Scope of "Kind of Buildings" under Section 39(f): The Municipality of Cebu, as defendant-appellant, contended that it had authority to require that the building in question be of more than one story and fulfill the conditions prescribed in sections 13 and 15 of ordinance No. 3, by virtue of section 39(f) of the Municipal Code, which empowers the municipal council to establish fire limits, prescribe the kind of buildings that may be constructed within said limits, and issue permits for the erection of the same without charging fees. It argued that the expression "kind of buildings" includes not only the material of which the buildings are to be composed but also their style — that is, whether the structure is to be a warehouse or a dwelling house and, if the latter, whether it is to have one, two, or three stories.
• Error in Annulling the Ordinances: The appellant assigned as the ground of its appeal that the court below erred in annulling ordinance No. 100 and sections 13 and 15 of ordinance No. 3 enacted and published by the municipal council of Cebu.

• Ordinance No. 100: Whether ordinance No. 100 could be invoked as a ground for the municipality's refusal to issue the building permit, it having been suspended by the provincial board of Cebu.
• Scope of Section 39(f) of the Municipal Code: Whether the power of a municipal council to prescribe the "kind of buildings" that may be constructed within fire limits authorized it, in a special and specific manner, to require that buildings have more than one story or display a prescribed style of architecture or ornamentation.
• Reasonableness of the Refusal: Whether the municipal council of Cebu could lawfully prohibit the construction of the proposed one-story warehouse and storeroom on the water front of Cebu.
• Propriety of the Injunctions: Whether the permanent injunction ordered by the trial court, and the temporary injunction it had issued, should be maintained.

• Ordinance No. 100: No. Ordinance No. 100 was suspended by the provincial board and was therefore not in force; it cannot serve as a ground for refusing the permit, and what was said of sections 13 and 15 of ordinance No. 3 may be considered applicable to it as well.
• Scope of Section 39(f) of the Municipal Code: No. Even admitting for the sake of argument that the provision carries the broad meaning attributed to it, it does not authorize the municipal council in a special and specific manner to direct that buildings necessarily have more than one story or a special and prescribed style of architecture or ornamentation.
• Reasonableness of the Refusal: No. In the absence of definite legal provisions, the power must be exercised subject to reason and public expediency; requiring more than one story or prescribed ornamentation of a warehouse and storeroom on the Cebu water front was unreasonable.
• Propriety of the Injunctions: The permanent injunction was eliminated and the temporary injunction dissolved, the order to issue the permit having removed any justification for injunctive relief.

• Ordinance No. 100: Ordinance No. 100 had to be dismissed immediately from consideration because, as the trial judge held, it was suspended by the provincial board and therefore not in force, so it could not be invoked as the ground for refusing the permit requested by the plaintiff. The Court added that what was said in the decision regarding sections 13 and 15 of ordinance No. 3 might be considered applicable to ordinance No. 100 as well.

• Scope of Section 39(f) of the Municipal Code: The appellant relied on section 39(f) of the Municipal Code. The Court declined to settle the question in the concrete manner in which the appellant presented it and admitted for the sake of argument that the legal provision really had the scope and meaning counsel attributed to it. Even on that assumption, the provision does not authorize the municipal council in a special and specific manner to direct that buildings necessarily have more than one story or a special and prescribed style of architecture or ornamentation. If such authority existed, it would be included only by implication in the general authority granted to councils to fix the kind of buildings that should or might be permitted within their respective jurisdictions; it is not so clearly and evidently beyond all argument that the law does not confer the specific power mooted. What does appear unquestionable is that the law does not in any way prescribe the form in which such power should be exercised, the terms being so general and abstract that they contain no detailed provision regarding the manner of exercising the alleged power. The exercise of the power must therefore be subjected to the requirements of reason and public expediency, which, in the absence of definite provisions of law, must serve as a guide. It would be absurd to suppose that municipalities may exercise such power in all ways without any restriction; without regulations controlling its exercise, the most vexatious arbitrariness would be easily attained.

• Reasonableness of the Refusal: Applying that standard, the Court considered the case as one dealing with a building intended for warehouses and storerooms in a place especially given over to loading and discharging the steamers that called at the port of Cebu. It was not reasonable to require that such a building have more than one story or display a special and prescribed style of ornamentation; the commercial interests and purposes that should unquestionably prevail in that location did not require such a thing, nor would they probably secure greater benefit from it. The building fulfilled the conditions reasonably necessary for security, healthfulness, and hygiene, as stated in the judgment appealed from. The Court therefore concluded that the municipal council of Cebu had no right to oppose or prohibit the construction of the building, expressly limiting the ruling to the case before it and disclaiming any intention to lay down a general rule for all cases. The judgment appealed from was accordingly affirmed in its principal part on that definite ground.

• Propriety of the Injunctions: Because the defendant was bound under the judgment to issue the permit requested by the plaintiff, the permanent injunction ordered by the trial court ceased to have any justification and had to be eliminated from the judgment. The temporary injunction issued by the court on April 30, 1910, was likewise dissolved. The judgment was affirmed insofar as it ordered the municipal council of the Municipality of Cebu to issue the permit that gave rise to the suit, with the costs of the instance against the appellant.

• Exercise of Delegated Municipal Power Subject to Reason and Public Expediency — Where a statute confers on municipal councils a power in general and abstract terms without prescribing the manner of its exercise, the power must be exercised subject to the requirements of reason and public expediency; otherwise the most vexatious arbitrariness would be easily attained. The Court applied this standard to measure the municipality's refusal of the permit and found the requirement of a multi-story, ornamented building unreasonable for a waterfront warehouse.

• "Kind of Buildings" under Section 39(f) of the Municipal Code — The power to prescribe the kind of buildings that may be constructed within fire limits does not authorize a municipal council, in a special and specific manner, to require that buildings have more than one story or display a prescribed style of architecture or ornamentation; any such authority would arise only by implication from the general grant and is not clearly conferred. The Court assumed arguendo the broad scope urged by the appellant and still held the specific requirements unauthorized.

• Suspension of a Municipal Ordinance by the Provincial Board — An ordinance suspended by the provincial board is not in force and cannot be invoked as a legal ground for official action. Ordinance No. 100 could not justify the refusal of the permit.

• Limited Adjudication — The Court expressly declined to lay down a general rule for all cases, confining its holding to the particular building and location before it.

• "It would be absurd to suppose that the municipalities may exercise such power in all ways without any restriction. Without regulations controlling its exercise, the most vexatious arbitrariness would be easily attained. In the absence of definite legal provisions, these regulations can not be other than those dictated by reason and public expediency." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the standard governing a delegated municipal power conferred in general terms, and is the formulation of the reason-and-public-expediency test applied to the refusal of the permit.

• "it is certain such provision does not authorize the municipal council in a special and specific manner to direct that the buildings necessarily have more than one story or a special and prescribed style of architecture or ornamentation." — This is the core holding on the scope of section 39(f) of the Municipal Code, reached even on the assumption that the provision carried the broad meaning urged by the appellant.

• "In the present case, which deals with a building intended for warehouses and storerooms in a place especially given over to loading and discharging the steamers that call at the port of Cebu, we do not regard it at all reasonable to require that such building have more than one story or display a special and prescribed style of ornamentation." — This passage applies the reasonableness standard to the facts, tying the invalidity of the requirement to the building's waterfront location and commercial purpose.

• "we believe that the municipal council of Cebu, in the case before us, for it is not our intention to lay down a general rule for all cases, has no right to oppose or to prohibit the construction of said building, and therefore the judgment appealed from must on this definite ground be affirmed in its principal part." — This states the limited scope of the holding and identifies the definite ground on which the judgment was affirmed.

• Section 39(f), Municipal Code — Empowers the municipal council to "establish fire limits, prescribed the kind of buildings that may be constructed within said limits and issue permits for the erection of the same, but without charging fees for said permits." The Court admitted for the sake of argument that the provision carried the broad meaning urged by the appellant but held that it did not authorize, in a special and specific manner, the requirement of more than one story or a prescribed style of architecture or ornamentation, and that its exercise must be governed by reason and public expediency.
• Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission — Under this Act, Switzer leased lots 3 and 4 of block 2 of the official plan of Cebu water-front reclamation No. 2 from the Insular Government, establishing his standing as lessee of the land on which he proposed to build.
• Ordinance No. 3, Sections 13 and 15, Municipality of Cebu — Section 13 required buildings on "McClernand" street and its parallels toward the sea to be of three stories with prescribed heights and ornamentation, and permitted two-story houses on the remaining streets of the same class; section 15 required two-story houses on streets of the second class and strictly prohibited warehouses, stores, or shops on streets of the first and second class. The trial court declared these provisions illegal, null and void, and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in its principal part on the ground that the municipality had no right to prohibit the construction in this case.
• Ordinance No. 100, Municipality of Cebu — Approved and published on April 23, 1910, and suspended by the provincial board of Cebu on April 28, 1910; being inoperative, it could not be invoked as a ground for refusing the permit.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ.