Suyat, Jr. vs. Torres

A second motion for reconsideration of a final order of the Office of the President is a prohibited pleading that does not suspend the period to appeal; once the order becomes final and executory, certiorari cannot substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Certiorari lies only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment, and factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies affirmed by the Court of Appeals are conclusive absent grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Petitioner Donato S. Suyat, Jr. was the 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. Respondent Ruben D. Torres was impleaded in his capacity as Executive Secretary of the Office of the President. The administrative case proceeded under Section 46, paragraphs b(4) and b(9) of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, which penalizes grave misconduct and receiving for personal use of a fee, gift, or other valuable thing in the course of official duties. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987, governs motions for reconsideration of decisions of the Office of the President and allows only one motion for reconsideration by any one party, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.

On May 23, 1993, a robbery incident took place at the residential house of Atty. Reynaldo V. Bautista located in Pasig Greenpark Village, Barangay San Isidro, Cainta, Rizal, allegedly committed by Randy Torres, Nelson Torres, Marlon Bonson, and Bernardo Bautista. After the timely arrest of the suspects, Cainta Police authorities filed before Inquest Prosecutor Nestor V. Gapusan a criminal complaint for robbery with force upon things against them. At the inquest proper, Bernardo Bautista admitted sole responsibility for the crime and exonerated his co-suspects. Despite this admission, the preliminary investigation was still conducted upon the recommendation of the inquest prosecutor, and considering the waiver of detention signed by the suspects, they were detained in the provincial jail pending the termination of the preliminary investigation.

Not satisfied with the detention, Imelda Torres, mother of suspects Randy and Nelson Torres and aunt of suspect Marlon Bonson, followed up the case on June 8, 1993 with the Prosecutor’s Office of Rizal. In the process, she learned that Prosecutor Donato S. Suyat, Jr. was the reviewing prosecutor of all inquest cases, so she talked to him. Suyat initially demanded ₱20,000 for the dismissal of the case against her two sons and nephew. Realizing that this amount was much lower than what was required of her in the payment of a cash bond for every suspect, she bargained until Suyat finally agreed to the sum of ₱15,000 to be given in his office the following day, June 9, 1993, at 3:00 p.m.

Upon consultation with her lawyer, Atty. Mariano Santiago, Imelda Torres was referred to the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the National Bureau of Investigation for immediate assistance. The Anti-Organized Crime Division, through its Chief, Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, ordered Special Agent Mar Panganiban to form a team for the purpose of entrapping Suyat. On June 9, 1993, at about 3:00 p.m., Imelda Torres, with her daughter Mildred Torres, went to Suyat’s office. Since the dismissal papers were still being typed, they waited until 5:00 p.m., when Suyat handed Imelda the resolution dismissing the robbery case in favor of her two sons and nephew. Despite Mildred’s suggestion that the ₱15,000 be given instead on June 10, 1993 because Suyat had promised to give the release papers of Randy, Nelson, and Marlon on that day, Suyat vehemently refused and countered that he needed the money badly and had already prepared the dismissal papers. Imelda then handed to Suyat the envelope containing ₱15,000, all in one thousand denomination, and thereafter left the office with her bag under her armpit.

The foregoing was considered the pre-arranged signal to the NBI agents. The team of NBI Agent Mar Panganiban immediately entered Suyat’s office, where he was with a male companion who turned out to be his son Junior. From the introduction of the NBI agents, Suyat put down the envelope he was holding and kept his hand on his pocket. When asked to count the money in the envelope, he refused until he was forced to count it himself. Since there was only ₱9,000 in the envelope, the NBI agents searched Junior and found the folded ₱6,000 in his pocket. To relieve his son from liability, Suyat told Agent Panganiban to spare his son from any involvement in the entrapment since the money came from him anyway. Suyat was brought to the NBI for forensic chemistry examination, under which he was found positive, and despite the additional evidence produced by the NBI in relation to the entrapment activity, he opted to remain silent.

In view of the foregoing, Rosalina A. Espina, in her capacity as Supervising Agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, filed with the Department of Justice an unnumbered administrative complaint accusing Suyat of grave misconduct and receiving for personal use of a fee, gift, or other valuable thing in the course of official duties in violation of Anti-Graft laws and Section 46, paragraphs b(4) and b(9) of Executive Order No. 292 of the Administrative Code of 1987, praying for his dismissal from the government service after due hearing. The Secretary of Justice calibrated the evidence on record and ruled against Suyat; the President of the Philippines reviewed the records and evidence anew and affirmed the findings and rulings of the Secretary of Justice; and the Court of Appeals again reviewed the records and evidence and affirmed the rulings, finding petitioner undisputably liable for grave misconduct given the clear evidence imputed against him.

• Evidence on Record: Petitioner contended that the findings of fact and the Decision were erroneous because they were not supported by the evidence on record, which he characterized as an issue of law.
• Counter-Affidavits: Petitioner argued that the Decision would render useless counter-affidavits filed by respondents in administrative and criminal cases.
• Right to Remain Silent: Petitioner maintained that the Decision would compel persons under custodial investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation or other police agencies not to remain silent.
• Irregularities in AO No. 95: Petitioner alleged that the Decision ignored his allegations regarding irregularities which attended the issuance of Administrative Order No. 95, Series of 1993.
• Lack of Evidence and Gross Error: Petitioner argued before the Court of Appeals that the first questioned order was not supported by the evidence on record and was tainted with gross error of law and irregularities prejudicial to his interest.
• Pro Forma Motions for Reconsideration: Petitioner argued before the Court of Appeals that the second and third questioned orders violated the prevailing doctrine concerning pro forma motions for reconsideration.

• Right to Remain Silent: The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner’s invocation of the right to remain silent was untenable because the right of a person under custodial investigation to remain silent is primarily intended to protect him from being forced to make a confession or to give incriminating statements against himself; petitioner’s claim that he was framed up was not incriminating but favorable to him, so he should have seized the NBI investigation as an opportunity to denounce the alleged frame-up.
• Quantum of Proof for Grave Misconduct: The Solicitor General observed that petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional right to remain silent was immaterial given the apparent quantum of proof established for his administrative liability for grave misconduct.

• Finality of Administrative Order No. 95: Whether Administrative Order No. 95 of the President had become final and executory when petitioner filed his petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
• Certiorari as Substitute for Appeal: Whether the petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals was a proper substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
• Errors of Judgment vs. Errors of Jurisdiction: Whether the errors ascribed to the Office of the President were errors of judgment rather than errors of jurisdiction.
• Factual Issues under Rule 45: Whether the issues raised in the petition before the Supreme Court are factual and thus not reviewable under Rule 45.
• Substantial Evidence of Grave Misconduct: Whether the finding of grave misconduct is supported by substantial evidence.

• Finality of Administrative Order No. 95: Yes. AO No. 95 had become final and executory because petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration was a prohibited pleading and did not suspend the period to appeal; the order was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to alter, modify, or reverse.
• Certiorari as Substitute for Appeal: No. Certiorari under Rule 65 cannot substitute for the lost remedy of appeal, the two remedies being mutually exclusive.
• Errors of Judgment vs. Errors of Jurisdiction: Errors of judgment. Certiorari issues only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment; errors committed in the exercise of discretion are correctible by appeal or petition for review under Rule 43.
• Factual Issues under Rule 45: No. Only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45; the Court is not a trier of facts, and findings of quasi-judicial bodies affirmed by the Court of Appeals are conclusive absent grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Substantial Evidence of Grave Misconduct: Yes. There is more than ample evidence on record to support the finding of grave misconduct, even if the forensic chemistry examination was erroneously appreciated.

• Finality of Administrative Order No. 95: Petitioner received a copy of AO No. 95 dismissing him from the government service on December 14, 1993. He had fifteen days from that date within which to file a motion for reconsideration. He filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which the President denied in an Order dated February 16, 1996; petitioner received a copy on February 28, 1996. Instead of filing a petition for review of the said orders with the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration, which the President denied in an Order dated November 7, 1996, citing Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987, which prohibits the filing of a second motion for reconsideration of the final order or decision of the Office of the President. The filing of a second motion for reconsideration, being a prohibited pleading, did not suspend the period to appeal the February 28, 1996 Order to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review. Thus, when petitioner filed his petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals after the President denied his second motion for reconsideration, AO No. 95 had become final and executory, beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to alter, modify, or reverse. Petitioner also did not assail the ruling of the Court of Appeals that his petition for certiorari in that court was an inappropriate remedy, and he was bound by that ruling.

• Certiorari as Substitute for Appeal: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review under Rule 43 because he realized that the period within which to file the petition for review had lapsed and that AO No. 95 had become final and executory. By filing a petition for certiorari, petitioner sought to nullify the order via an independent action in lieu of his lost right of appeal. Case law holds that the existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari; the two remedies are mutually exclusive. Certiorari cannot therefore be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.

• Errors of Judgment vs. Errors of Jurisdiction: In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope and is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are to be resolved by the appellate court in an appeal by and of error or via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction; it is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court or quasi-judicial body in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, its conclusions anchored on the said findings, and its conclusions of law. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43. Petitioner’s allegations that AO No. 95 was not supported by the evidence on record, that the NBI conducted its operations with undue interest and enthusiasm, and that the Office of the President failed to appreciate his defenses, including the alleged violation of his right to remain silent and right against self-incrimination, were mere errors of judgment and not of jurisdiction.

• Factual Issues under Rule 45: Under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, the reason being that the Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of the Court to calibrate the evidence of the parties. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. Findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies of the government, if based on substantial evidence and particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the Court unless grave abuse is shown amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner failed to preponderantly establish such abuse on the part of the Court of Appeals. The Secretary of Justice calibrated the evidence on record and ruled against petitioner; the President reviewed the records and evidence anew and affirmed the findings and rulings of the Secretary of Justice; and the Court of Appeals again reviewed the records and evidence and affirmed the rulings. Even if the Secretary of Justice, the Office of the President, and the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating against petitioner the results of the forensic chemistry examination conducted by the NBI, there is more than ample evidence on record to support the finding that petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct.

• Substantial Evidence of Grave Misconduct: The records show that the Secretary of Justice calibrated the evidence on record and ruled against petitioner, and the President and the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and rulings. Even if the forensic chemistry examination was erroneously appreciated, there is more than ample evidence on record to support the finding that petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct. Petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision on the right to remain silent was immaterial given the apparent quantum of proof established for his administrative liability for grave misconduct.

• Finality of Decisions of the Office of the President; Prohibited Second Motion for Reconsideration — Under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987, decisions, resolutions, or orders of the Office of the President become final after the lapse of fifteen days from receipt of a copy by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration is filed within such period. Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases. A second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and does not suspend the period to appeal. In this case, petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration did not suspend the period to appeal the February 28, 1996 Order, so AO No. 95 became final and executory and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to alter, modify, or reverse.

• Certiorari Not a Substitute for Lost Appeal — The existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari; the two remedies are mutually exclusive. Certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be used as an independent action to nullify an order after the right to appeal has lapsed. In this case, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari instead of a petition for review under Rule 43 after the period to appeal had lapsed, so the petition was an improper substitute for his lost remedy of appeal.

• Errors of Jurisdiction vs. Errors of Judgment — Certiorari issues only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction, reversible only by appeal. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not cure errors in the appreciation of evidence or in conclusions anchored on such findings. In this case, petitioner’s allegations regarding lack of evidence, NBI conduct, failure to appreciate defenses, and violation of the right to remain silent were errors of judgment, not jurisdiction.

• Review of Factual Findings of Quasi-Judicial Bodies — Under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari; the Court is not a trier of facts. Findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies of the government, if based on substantial evidence and particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the Court unless grave abuse is shown amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner failed to show grave abuse, and the findings against him were affirmed by the Secretary of Justice, the President, and the Court of Appeals.

• Right to Remain Silent in Custodial Investigation — The right of a person under custodial investigation to remain silent is primarily intended to protect him from being forced to make a confession or to give incriminating statements against himself. It does not justify a belated claim or defense where the statement that could have been made was exculpatory and favorable to the person under investigation. In this case, petitioner’s claim that he was framed up was not incriminating; he should have seized the NBI investigation as an opportunity to denounce the alleged frame-up, and his silence did not excuse his invalid and incredible defense.

• "Thus, the filing by the petitioner of a second motion for reconsideration of AO No. 95, being a prohibited pleading, did not suspend the period to appeal the February 28, 1996 Order to the CA via a petition for review. Indubitably then, when the petitioner filed his petition for certiorari with the CA after the President denied his second motion for reconsideration, AO No. 95 of the President had become final and executory, beyond the jurisdiction of the CA to alter, modify, or reverse." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on finality: the prohibited second motion for reconsideration did not toll the appeal period, rendering AO No. 95 final and executory.
• "But case law is that the existence and the availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive." — This passage articulates the doctrine that certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal, a central ground for denying the petition.
• "Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment." — This passage defines the narrow scope of certiorari and explains why petitioner’s allegations of evidentiary and factual errors were not correctible by the extraordinary writ.
• "The right of a person under custodial investigation to remain silent is primarily intended to protect said person from being forced to make a confession or to give incriminating statements against himself." — This passage, adopted from the Solicitor General’s comment, defines the scope of the right to remain silent and explains why petitioner’s invocation did not excuse his failure to promptly denounce the alleged frame-up.

• Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 501 (2001) — Cited in support of the ruling that AO No. 95 had become final and executory and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to alter, modify, or reverse.
• Ley Construction & Development Corporation vs. Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, 339 SCRA 223 (2000) — Cited for the doctrine that the existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to certiorari and that the two remedies are mutually exclusive.
• People vs. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 687 (1999) — Cited for the distinction between errors of judgment and errors of jurisdiction, and for the rule that as long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, alleged errors in discretion are mere errors of judgment.
• Toh vs. Court of Appeals, 344 SCRA 831 (2000) — Cited for the definition of an error of judgment as one committed in the exercise of jurisdiction and reversible only by appeal, and an error of jurisdiction as one issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and correctible by certiorari.
• Tensorex Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 471 (1999) — Cited for the rule that certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in the appreciation of evidence or in conclusions anchored on such findings.
• Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 715 (1995) — Cited for the rule that for a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.
• Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, Inc. vs. Bitanga, 362 SCRA 635 (2001) — Cited for the rule that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, if based on substantial evidence and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the Court unless grave abuse is shown amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Section 7, Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987 — Provides that decisions, resolutions, or orders of the Office of the President become final after the lapse of fifteen days from receipt of a copy by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration is filed within such period, and that only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases. Applied to hold that petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration was prohibited and did not suspend the appeal period.
• Section 46, paragraphs b(4) and b(9), Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) — Penalizes grave misconduct and receiving for personal use of a fee, gift, or other valuable thing in the course of official duties. Applied as the administrative offenses charged against petitioner and as the basis for his dismissal.
• Section 1, Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 — Provides that a final order of a quasi-judicial agency shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review. Applied by the Court of Appeals in ruling that petitioner adopted the wrong remedy when he filed a petition for certiorari.
• Section 1, Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Substantially incorporates the provision that a final order of a quasi-judicial agency is appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for review. Applied to reinforce that petitioner’s proper remedy was a petition for review, not certiorari.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Applied to reject petitioner’s factual issues, the Court not being a trier of facts.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the special civil action of certiorari, which lies only to correct errors of jurisdiction. Applied to hold that certiorari was improper because petitioner raised errors of judgment and sought to substitute it for a lost appeal.
• Constitutional right to remain silent and right against self-incrimination — Invoked by petitioner during the NBI investigation. The Court held the invocation immaterial because the right protects a person under custodial investigation from being forced to make a confession or give incriminating statements, while petitioner’s claim of frame-up was exculpatory and should have been promptly raised.

Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ.