Suyan vs. People

The commission of another offense while on probation is a ground for revocation under Section 11 of the Probation Law, and a probationer’s due process right is satisfied by a full opportunity to be heard on the motion to revoke, even if the probationer fails to rebut the violation report.

Neil E. Suyan was a probationer under the supervision of the Dagupan City Probation and Parole Office after having been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City and granted probation. The case concerns the implementation of Presidential Decree No. 968, the Probation Law, and the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures, particularly the requirements for revoking probation and the effect of a probationer’s commission of another offense under Section 11. A prior Court of Appeals decision had annulled an earlier revocation for procedural defects and remanded the matter to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.

On 27 October 1995, an Information was filed against Neil E. Suyan charging him with violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425. During arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the charge, and the Regional Trial Court thereafter proceeded with trial. On 22 November 1995, he was convicted and sentenced to suffer six years of prision correccional and to pay the costs. On the same date, he filed his application for probation. On 16 February 1996, the Regional Trial Court issued a Probation Order covering a period of six years.

While on probation, Suyan was arrested on two occasions, specifically on 2 September and 20 October 1999, for violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425. Two separate Informations were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City: one docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-03073-D before Branch 43, and the other as Criminal Case No. 99-03129-D before Branch 41. On 1 December 1999, Atty. Simplicio A. Navarro, Jr., then Chief Probation and Parole Officer of Dagupan City, filed a Motion to Revoke Probation. He alleged that Suyan had been apprehended twice for drug possession while on probation, that he was considered a recidivist, and that his commission of other offenses while on probation was a serious violation of its terms. He also pointed out that Suyan could no longer comply with the conditions of his probation because of his incarceration. On 15 December 1999, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order revoking Suyan’s probation and directing him to serve the sentence imposed. It denied his Motion for Reconsideration. Suyan then filed a Rule 65 Petition with the Court of Appeals, which on 2 January 2006 annulled and set aside the revocation for failure to comply with the Probation Law and the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures, and remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.

In compliance with the Court of Appeals Decision, the Regional Trial Court conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke. On 17 February 2006, a Violation Report dated 13 February 2006 was filed by the Dagupan City Parole and Probation Office recommending revocation of probation. The Violation Report stated that Suyan had manifested a negative attitude by incurring absences and not attending rehabilitation activities despite constant follow-up, and that he continued with illegal drug activities despite counselling and warning. It concluded that he had failed to recognize the value of freedom and the second chance accorded him, and that he was unworthy to continuously enjoy the privilege of probation. On 22 March 2006, the prosecution submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence. A Certification dated 23 January 2006 issued by Manuel Z. de Guzman was offered to prove that Suyan had been convicted in the Branch 43 case and had served his sentence from 30 September 2000 until his release by reason of the expiration of his maximum sentence on 8 September 2003. Suyan filed his Comment on the Formal Offer without disputing the Certification.

On 31 March 2006, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order revoking probation. It ruled that it had granted Suyan due process by affording him the full opportunity to contest the Motion to Revoke, but that instead of rebutting the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of a violation report when his probation was first revoked. The Regional Trial Court further held that there was positive testimony and documentary evidence showing that Suyan had indeed violated the conditions of his probation, and that he never rebutted the fact of his commission of another offense and conviction therefor while on probation. Suyan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal, ruling that he was afforded due process, that the procedural infirmities in the Motion to Revoke were cured when the Regional Trial Court conducted a hearing, and that he violated a condition of the Probation Order by having been apprehended twice for two offenses similar in nature. The Supreme Court later affirmed the revocation.

• Due Process: Petitioner argued that he was denied due process because no fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations was conducted by the probation officer, no results were furnished to him, no warrant of arrest was issued by the Regional Trial Court, and he was not afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence in his favor with the assistance of counsel.
• Substantive Grounds and Repentance: Petitioner maintained that he had shown repentance after his conviction; he readily admitted his accountability by pleading guilty in his first case, was convicted, and subsequently applied for probation. He alleged that of the two cases filed against him, one was ordered dismissed and he had already served his sentence for the other; since then, no derogatory information had been received by either the probation office or the trial court. He contended that he had reformed his ways and was entitled to the grace of the law, and that the Court of Appeals should have ordered him to resume probation pursuant to the positivist theory adopted in the criminal justice system.
• Absence of Violation Report at Initial Revocation: Petitioner questioned the absence of a violation report when his probation was first revoked, instead of rebutting the allegations in the Violation Report filed after remand.

• Validity of Revocation: Whether petitioner’s probation was validly revoked.

• Validity of Revocation: Yes. The probation was validly revoked; due process was satisfied by the full-blown hearing on the Motion to Revoke, and the commission of another offense while on probation rendered the probation order ineffective under Section 11 of the Probation Law.

• Validity of Revocation: Due process requires that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in support of his case; what the law prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was given a full-blown trial on the Motion to Revoke after the case was remanded, and the record showed that he had ample opportunity to refute the allegations in the Violation Report. Instead of rebutting those allegations, he merely questioned the absence of a violation report when his probation was first revoked. Because he was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and to air his side, but by his own fault or choice squandered these chances, his cry for due process must fail. On the substantive ground, petitioner did not deny that he had been convicted and had served out his sentence for another offense while on probation. This directly violated Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order. Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall render the probation order ineffective and that the offender shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation. The Court of Appeals was therefore correct in revoking petitioner’s probation and ordering him to serve the penalty. Probation is a mere discretionary grant, and petitioner was bound to observe full obedience to the terms and conditions of the probation order or run the risk of revocation. The trial court’s discretion to grant probation is exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused; having the power to grant probation, the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances. Petitioner wasted the opportunity granted him and must suffer the consequences of his violation.

• Due Process in Probation Revocation — The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in support of his case; what the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. A party who is given several opportunities to be heard and to air his side, but who squanders those chances by his own fault or choice, cannot successfully claim a denial of due process. Applied to the case, petitioner had a full-blown hearing on the Motion to Revoke but failed to rebut the Violation Report, instead questioning the absence of a report from the first revocation.
• Revocation of Probation for Commission of Another Offense — Under Section 11 of the Probation Law, a probation order takes effect upon its issuance; upon the probationer’s failure to comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the order or his commission of another offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation. The commission of another offense renders the probation order ineffective. Applied to the case, petitioner was convicted and served sentence for another offense while on probation, directly violating Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order.
• Probation as a Discretionary Grant — Probation is a mere discretionary grant, not a matter of right. The court’s discretion to grant probation is exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having the power to grant probation, the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances. Applied to the case, petitioner was bound to obey the terms and conditions of his probation or risk revocation; having violated them, revocation was proper.
• Cure of Procedural Defects by Subsequent Hearing — The procedural infirmities in the initial Motion to Revoke were cured when the Regional Trial Court conducted a hearing in accordance with the directive of the Court of Appeals. The subsequent full-blown hearing afforded petitioner the opportunity to refute the allegations, satisfying the requirements of due process.

• "The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in support of his case; what the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard." — States the standard applied to petitioner’s procedural challenge to the revocation of his probation.
• "When the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and to air his side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these chances, then his cry for due process must fail." — Explains why petitioner’s due process claim failed despite the prior procedural defects in the first revocation.
• "Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall render the probation order ineffective." — States the substantive ground for revocation relied on by the Court.
• "As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this privilege." — Articulates the discretionary nature of probation and the consequence of violating its conditions.

• Yuchengco vs. Sandiganbayan, 479 SCRA 1 (2006) — Cited for the rule that the essence of due process is a reasonable opportunity to be heard and that only the absolute absence of such opportunity is prohibited.
• Heirs of Bugarin vs. Republic, G.R. No. 174431, 6 August 2012 — Cited for the principle that a party who is given several opportunities to be heard but squanders them cannot claim denial of due process; also cited for the trial court’s power to order revocation of probation.
• Jalosjos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536, 9 October 2012 — Cited for the discretionary nature of probation.
• Soriano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123936, 4 March 1999 — Cited for the consequence that a probationer who wastes the opportunity granted by the court must suffer the consequences of his violation.
• Tolentino vs. Alconcel, 206 Phil. 79 (1983) — Cited for the principle that the court’s discretion to grant probation is exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.

• Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 — Defines possession or use of regulated drugs without the corresponding license or prescription and imposes imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four thousand pesos. Petitioner was charged under this provision, pleaded guilty, and was convicted before being placed on probation.
• Section 11, Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law) — Provides that a probation order takes effect upon its issuance and that upon the probationer’s failure to comply with any condition or commission of another offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation. The Court applied this provision because petitioner committed another offense while on probation, rendering the probation order ineffective.
• Condition No. 9 of the Probation Order — The condition violated by petitioner’s commission of another offense while on probation; the Court found that this violation directly justified revocation.
• Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures — Referenced in the prior Court of Appeals decision as prescribing procedural requisites for revocation, including fact-finding investigation, violation report, warrant of arrest, and hearing; the Regional Trial Court’s subsequent hearing was conducted in compliance with the Court of Appeals’ remand.

Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concurred. Brion, J., was designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin per raffle dated 24 March 2014.