Suntay vs. People

A passport may be cancelled by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs without prior hearing where the holder is facing a serious criminal charge and has left the country to evade prosecution, as due process does not necessarily require a hearing when the factual basis for the exercise of discretion is undisputed.

Emilio Suntay y Aguinaldo was a Philippine passport holder who departed for San Francisco, California, where he was enrolled in school. A verified complaint for seduction had been filed against him by the father of the alleged victim, Alicia Nubla, a minor of sixteen years. The Department of Foreign Affairs, under Executive Order No. 1, series of 1946, possessed discretionary authority to issue, refuse, withdraw, or cancel passports. The interplay between the court's power to secure the presence of an accused and the executive's discretionary authority over passports formed the legal backdrop of the dispute.

On June 26, 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of sixteen years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay y Aguinaldo in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, alleging that on or about June 21, 1954, Suntay had taken Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's Colleges in Quezon City with lewd design, brought her near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City, and had carnal knowledge of her. After investigation, an Assistant City Attorney recommended on December 15, 1954 that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. The complainant's counsel excepted to this recommendation on December 23, 1954 and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed.

On January 10, 1955, while the case was still under study by the City Attorney, Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs. Ten days later, on January 20, 1955, he departed for San Francisco, California, where he enrolled in school. On January 31, 1955, the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging Suntay with seduction, which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation (Crim. Case No. Q-1596). On February 9, 1955, the private prosecutor moved the court to direct concerned government agencies, particularly the NBI and the Department of Foreign Affairs, to bring the accused back to the Philippines. The court granted the motion on February 10, 1955.

On March 7, 1955, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs cabled the Ambassador to the United States, instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel Suntay's passport and compel his return. The Embassy was likewise directed to represent to the State Department that Suntay's presence outside the Philippines was considered detrimental to the best interest of the Government, that his passport had been withdrawn, and that he was not considered under Philippine protection while abroad. This order was not implemented, however, because the present certiorari proceedings were commenced to judicially resolve the issues raised. On July 5, 1955, Suntay's counsel wrote to the Secretary requesting reconsideration and filed a motion for reconsideration in the criminal case; both were denied on July 7 and July 15, 1955, respectively. Suntay then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

• Usurpation of Executive Discretion: Petitioner contended that the CFI's order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to take steps to bring him back could be carried out only through cancellation of his passport, and that the order was therefore illegal because while a court may review the Secretary's action in cancelling a passport and grant relief when the Secretary's discretion is abused, the court cannot in the first instance take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a passport cancelled.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner maintained that while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion to cancel passports, such discretion cannot be exercised until after a hearing, because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty protected by the Constitution and cannot be deprived without due process of law.

• Flight from Justice: The Solicitor General argued that Suntay's sudden departure from the country at a convenient time could reasonably be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to flee from justice, and that he could not complain if the strong arm of the law joined together to bring him back.
• Valid Exercise of Discretion: Respondents maintained that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs issued the cancellation order in the exercise of sound discretion, convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result from inaction, and that the order was neither whimsical nor capricious.

• Validity of the Court's Auxiliary Order: Whether the CFI's order directing the NBI and the Department of Foreign Affairs to take steps to bring the accused back to the Philippines was beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction.
• Due Process in Passport Cancellation: Whether the Secretary of Foreign Affairs could cancel a passport without prior hearing, given the petitioner's constitutional right to travel as a personal liberty.

• Validity of the Court's Auxiliary Order: No, the order was not beyond or in excess of jurisdiction. Under Section 6, Rule 124, a court may employ all auxiliary writs, processes, and means necessary to carry its jurisdiction into effect.
• Due Process in Passport Cancellation: No violation of due process occurred. Due process does not necessarily require a hearing when the factual basis for the exercise of discretion is undisputed, such as the pendency of a serious criminal charge and the passport holder's flight from prosecution.

• Validity of the Court's Auxiliary Order: The Court reasoned that when jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed. Section 6, Rule 124 expressly so provides, and where the procedure is not specifically pointed out, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted that appears most conformable to the spirit of the rules. The CFI's order did not specify what step the Secretary must take; it merely directed the agencies to take proper steps to bring the accused back. The order was therefore a valid auxiliary process within the court's jurisdiction to secure the presence of an accused facing criminal prosecution.

• Due Process in Passport Cancellation: Section 25 of Executive Order No. 1, series of 1946, expressly authorizes the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in his discretion, to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued. While this discretion may not be exercised at whim, the Court found that the petitioner was facing a serious criminal charge for seduction and had left the country at a time when the complaint was still under study by the City Attorney. His sudden departure could reasonably be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to flee from justice. The Secretary issued the cancellation order in the exercise of sound discretion, convinced that inaction would result in a miscarriage of justice. The Court held that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact — such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder — a hearing may be dispensed with as a prerequisite to cancellation. The absence of such hearing does not violate the due process clause, and the exercise of discretion cannot be deemed whimsical or capricious merely because of the absence of a hearing. The Court distinguished the U.S. cases cited by the petitioner (Bauer vs. Acheson, Nathan vs. Dulles, and Schachtman vs. Dulles) on the ground that in those cases the revocation or refusal was based on the vague reason that continued possession or issuance would be contrary to the best interest of the United States, unlike here where the factual basis was concrete and undisputed.

• Due Process Does Not Necessarily Require a Hearing — Due process does not always entail a prior hearing. When an officer vested with discretion exercises it upon an undisputed fact, a hearing may be dispensed with. The absence of a hearing does not per se violate the due process clause, nor does it render the exercise of discretion whimsical or capricious. The Court illustrated this principle by analogy to ex parte preliminary injunctions, which are issued without hearing and are not considered violative of due process.
• Auxiliary Powers of Courts — When jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes, and means necessary to carry that jurisdiction into effect may be employed. If the procedure is not specifically prescribed by the rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted that appears most conformable to the spirit of the rules. This doctrine, derived from Section 6, Rule 124, validates orders that direct other government agencies to assist in securing the presence of an accused.

• "Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such hearing." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the due process issue, establishing that a hearing is not invariably required when the factual basis for executive action is undisputed.

• "When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules." — This passage, quoting Section 6, Rule 124, establishes the doctrinal basis for the validity of the CFI's order directing government agencies to assist in bringing the accused back.

• Bauer vs. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 — U.S. case cited by the petitioner, where passport revocation was based on the vague reason that continued possession would be contrary to the best interest of the United States. Distinguished by the Court on the ground that the factual basis here was concrete and undisputed.
• Nathan vs. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 951 — Another U.S. case cited by the petitioner, similarly distinguished because the refusal to issue a passport was predicated on a vague rationale rather than a specific, undisputed factual basis.
• Schachtman vs. Dulles, No. 12406, June 23, 1955 — U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decision cited by the petitioner and distinguished on the same ground as the other two U.S. cases.

• Section 6, Rule 124, Rules of Court — Provides that when jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes, and means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed, and where procedure is not specifically prescribed, any suitable process may be adopted conformable to the spirit of the rules. Applied to uphold the CFI's order directing government agencies to bring the accused back.
• Section 25, Executive Order No. 1, series of 1946 (42 Off. Gaz. 1400) — Authorizes the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as any diplomatic or consular officer duly authorized by him, in his discretion, to refuse, withdraw, or cancel a passport already issued. Applied to confirm the Secretary's authority to cancel Suntay's passport and to establish that such discretion was properly exercised.
• Due Process Clause of the Constitution — Invoked by the petitioner as protecting the right to travel or stay abroad as a personal liberty. The Court interpreted the clause as not necessarily requiring a hearing where the factual basis for executive action was undisputed.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concurred.