Sumulong vs. Cembrano

A wife who lives apart from the conjugal dwelling without proof of fault does not lose her right to support chargeable to the conjugal partnership while the marriage and the conjugal partnership regime subsist; the husband’s voluntary payment of a monthly allowance recognizes that right and bars prescription. Sums received by children from the deceased’s private funds, not shown to have come from conjugal partnership funds, are not subject to collation.

The case concerns the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera and Concepcion Cembrano. The governing statutory backdrop is the Civil Code’s regime on charges and obligations of the conjugal partnership, particularly article 1408 on support of the family, and the rules on collation of advances made by the deceased.

In 1884, Dr. Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera and Concepcion Cembrano married, each having property of their own, and they had three children: Carlos, Alfredo, and Carmen. During part of Dr. Tavera’s life, Concepcion left the conjugal roof, but the marriage and the legal conjugal partnership regime to which the spouses had submitted subsisted. Dr. Tavera died on March 26, 1925, survived by Concepcion and their three children.

After his death, Juan Sumulong, as administrator of the estate, presented to the Court of First Instance of Manila a scheme for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. On March 15, 1927, the trial court issued an order approving the inventories filed by the administrator after correcting a clerical error in item 11 of the first inventory by substituting 50 for 30 so that 50 obligations of the Ice Factory appeared instead of 30, and approving the accounts rendered by the administrator to date. The same order denied the administrator’s motion of November 18, 1926 to include the fruits and rents of the property at Nos. 77 and 83 San Vicente St., Binondo, Manila; disapproved the administrator’s liquidation scheme; and ordered him to liquidate the conjugal partnership in the manner indicated in the order, presenting the due liquidation and partition of the conjugal property at the time of the decedent’s death within 15 days, including the fruits or income of said property from his death and the collation which each of the children was bound to make.

On the wife’s support, the record showed that while Concepcion did not live under the conjugal roof during part of Dr. Tavera’s lifetime, there was no evidence of any fault or guilt on her part. Dr. Tavera willed that a monthly allowance be paid to her, and it was in fact paid; at first the allowance was paid out of Concepcion’s paraphernal property, but when those funds ran short, other funds under administration were drawn upon to continue giving the monthly sum, according to Mr. Ramirez. Because the management of the paraphernal property was carried in a separate account, that account at one point showed a debit balance, which indicated Dr. Tavera’s resolute intention that his wife’s monthly allowance should never fail. The amount of the allowance was sometimes reduced by order of Dr. Tavera to better regulate the management of the conjugal partnership. The trial court fixed a reasonable monthly allowance for her support from 1913 to 1925, which the administrator challenged as amounting to P800 a month.

As to the paraphernal property, it was not proved that Dr. Tavera discontinued managing his wife’s paraphernal property. The terms of Exhibit A did not lead to that conclusion, and the fact that a separate account was opened for the property at Dr. Tavera’s direction in 1915 did not signify that he stopped managing it.

As to the sums advanced to the three children, summaries K, L, and M, admitted as evidence, showed that the sums appeared in the private account of the late Dr. Tavera. It did not appear that those sums were taken from the conjugal partnership funds; according to the summaries, the inference was that they were taken from the private funds of the deceased. The trial court required the children to bring into collation the sums detailed in those summaries, totaling P31,952.97, and the administrator also claimed that Concepcion should reimburse the conjugal partnership P3,660.71 allegedly delivered to her by Jose V. Ramirez from partnership funds in excess of the income of her paraphernal property.

• Support During Separation: Petitioner-administrator argued that Concepcion Cembrano was not entitled to an allowance for subsistence from the conjugal partnership from 1913 to 1925 because she lived away from the conjugal dwelling against her husband’s will and without judicial sanction.
• Amount of Allowance: Petitioner-administrator argued that the allowance did not amount to P800 a month.
• Management of Paraphernal Property: Petitioner-administrator argued that during the separation Dr. Tavera managed his wife’s paraphernal property and ordered payment of support; that the rents from the wife’s paraphernal property received by her during the separation must be returned to the conjugal partnership; and that the rents from said property, even after the husband’s death, should continue to go to the conjugal partnership until liquidation.
• Prescription: Petitioner-administrator argued that any right the wife had to claim support from the conjugal partnership had already prescribed.
• Reimbursement of P3,660.71: Petitioner-administrator argued that Concepcion Cembrano should be required to reimburse the conjugal partnership P3,660.71 delivered to her by Jose V. Ramirez from partnership funds in excess of the income of her paraphernal property.
• Collation by the Children: Petitioner-administrator argued that Dr. Tavera’s children Carlos, Alfredo, and Carmen must reimburse the conjugal partnership various sums delivered to them by the decedent totaling P31,952.97.
• Liquidation Scheme: Petitioner-administrator argued that the trial court erred in disapproving the liquidation presented by the administrator and in issuing the March 15, 1927 order setting a new basis for liquidation and awarding Concepcion Cembrano a participation in the partnership property greater than that given to the husband or heirs by P53,313.77.

• Nature of the Claim / Prescription: Respondent countered that this is not an action for support not paid, but for the compensation thereof with the amounts paid to her as fruits and rents of her paraphernal property.

• Support During Separation: Whether Concepcion Cembrano, who lived away from the conjugal dwelling without judicial sanction and allegedly against her husband’s will, was entitled to an allowance for subsistence chargeable to the conjugal partnership from 1913 to 1925.
• Amount of Monthly Allowance: Whether the allowance for her support amounted to P800 a month and whether that amount was proper.
• Management of Paraphernal Property and Rents: Whether Dr. Tavera managed Concepcion’s paraphernal property during the separation, and whether the rents from that property received by her during the separation and after his death should be returned or should continue to go to the conjugal partnership until liquidation.
• Prescription: Whether any right Concepcion had to claim support from the conjugal partnership had prescribed.
• Reimbursement of P3,660.71: Whether Concepcion should reimburse the conjugal partnership P3,660.71 delivered to her by Jose V. Ramirez from partnership funds in excess of the income of her paraphernal property.
• Collation by the Children: Whether Dr. Tavera’s children Carlos, Alfredo, and Carmen must reimburse or bring into collation the various sums delivered to them by the decedent totaling P31,952.97.
• Liquidation Scheme and Participation: Whether the trial court erred in disapproving the administrator’s liquidation scheme, setting a new basis for liquidation, and awarding Concepcion a participation in the partnership property greater than that given to the husband or heirs by P53,313.77.

• Support During Separation: Yes. Under article 1408 of the Civil Code, support of the family is chargeable to the conjugal partnership while the marriage and the legal conjugal partnership subsist; living away from the conjugal roof without proof of fault does not extinguish that right.
• Amount of Monthly Allowance: Yes. The SC found no sufficient reason to change the amount fixed by the trial court as a reasonable monthly allowance, considering the family’s social position and the funds of the conjugal partnership.
• Management of Paraphernal Property and Rents: No. The administrator did not prove that Dr. Tavera discontinued managing the wife’s paraphernal property; Exhibit A and the separate account opened in 1915 did not establish that he ceased management or was estopped.
• Prescription: No. Dr. Tavera’s act of paying the monthly allowance recognized Concepcion’s right to support chargeable to the conjugal partnership and barred prescription; the claim was also not for unpaid support but for compensation with amounts paid to her as fruits and rents of her paraphernal property.
• Reimbursement of P3,660.71: No. The SC found no merit in the administrator’s assignments of error except the eighth, which concerned the children’s collation, and affirmed the lower court in all other respects.
• Collation by the Children: No. The sums detailed in Exhibits K, L, and M appeared in Dr. Tavera’s private account and were not shown to have come from conjugal partnership funds, so the children could not be required to bring them into collation.
• Liquidation Scheme and Participation: No. The SC affirmed the order in all other respects, thereby sustaining the disapproval of the administrator’s liquidation scheme and the trial court’s basis for liquidation, except for the modification on the children’s collation.

• Support During Separation: Article 1408 of the Civil Code provides that the support of the family is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. While the marriage and the legal conjugal partnership subsist, the support of the spouses is a charge against the partnership, which Manresa describes as the most sacred and important of the obligations imposed in article 1408. The rights established in that article must be acknowledged and respected unless the law provides otherwise. The mere fact of living away from the conjugal roof cannot be presumed culpable when there is no evidence of fault or guilt on the part of the one who so lived, and it does not annul the right to support granted in article 1408. Even with respect to the support spouses owe each other under article 143, living apart when not proved culpable does not extinguish the obligation to support under article 152 and correlative articles. The SC clarified that it was not concerned with the personal obligation of one spouse to support the other, but with the wife’s right under article 1408 while the marriage subsists and the legal regime of the conjugal partnership prevails. It was undisputed that the marriage subsisted and the conjugal partnership regime prevailed. Not living under the conjugal roof is not one of the cases where the law relieves the conjugal partnership from the obligations imposed in article 1408, as shown by articles 1408 to 1411. The lower court therefore did not err in holding Concepcion entitled to support from 1913 to 1925.
• Amount of Monthly Allowance: Considering the social position of the family and the amount of the funds of the conjugal partnership, the SC found no sufficient reason to change the amount fixed by the trial court as a reasonable monthly allowance for the maintenance, dwelling, clothing, and medical attendance of Concepcion.
• Management of Paraphernal Property and Rents: It was not proved that Dr. Tavera discontinued managing his wife’s paraphernal property. The terms of Exhibit A did not lead to that conclusion. The fact that a separate account was opened for said property at Dr. Tavera’s direction in 1915 did not signify that he stopped managing it. The administrator’s assignments of error on the rents from the paraphernal property therefore had no merit.
• Prescription: Dr. Tavera’s act of paying the monthly allowance constituted a recognition of Concepcion’s right to receive support chargeable to the conjugal partnership, and as such was a bar to the prescription alleged by the administrator under article 1948 of the Civil Code and section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Besides, as counsel for Concepcion observed, this was not an action for support not paid, but for the compensation thereof with the amounts paid to her as fruits and rents of her paraphernal property.
• Reimbursement of P3,660.71: The SC found no merit in the appellant’s assignments of error except the eighth, which concerned the sums received by the three children. The order appealed from was affirmed in all other respects. The administrator’s seventh assignment, on the P3,660.71 reimbursement, therefore did not succeed.
• Collation by the Children: Summaries K, L, and M, admitted as evidence, showed that the sums appeared in the private account of the late Dr. Tavera. It did not appear that said sums were taken from the conjugal partnership funds; according to said summaries, the inference was that they were taken from the private funds of the deceased. Therefore, the three children could not be required to bring into collation the respective sums detailed in Exhibits K, L, and M. The SC found the eighth assignment of error well taken.
• Liquidation Scheme and Participation: The SC found no merit in the appellant’s assignments of error except the eighth. It affirmed the order appealed from in all other respects, with the modification that the three children shall not be required to bring the P31,952.97 into collation. The disapproval of the administrator’s liquidation scheme and the trial court’s new basis for liquidation therefore stood, except for that modification.

• Support of the family as a charge on the conjugal partnership — Under article 1408 of the Civil Code, the support of the family is chargeable to the conjugal partnership, and while the marriage and the legal conjugal partnership subsist, the support of the spouses is a charge against the partnership. The SC applied this to uphold Concepcion’s support from 1913 to 1925 despite her living away from the conjugal dwelling.
• Non-culpable separation does not extinguish support — The mere fact of living away from the conjugal roof cannot be presumed culpable where there is no evidence of fault or guilt on the part of the spouse who lived apart, and it does not annul the right to support under article 1408; neither does it extinguish the obligation to support under article 152 and correlative articles when the separation is not proved culpable. Applied because no fault was shown on Concepcion’s part.
• Recognition of the obligation bars prescription — A debtor’s act of recognizing the creditor’s right constitutes a bar to prescription under article 1948 of the Civil Code and section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Dr. Tavera’s payment of the monthly allowance recognized Concepcion’s right to support chargeable to the conjugal partnership, defeating the administrator’s prescription defense.
• Collation of advances from private funds — Children cannot be required to bring into collation sums received from the deceased where the evidence shows the sums were entered in the deceased’s private account and does not show they were taken from conjugal partnership funds. Applied to the P31,952.97 detailed in Exhibits K, L, and M.
• Separate account does not prove cessation of management — The opening of a separate account for the wife’s paraphernal property at the husband’s direction does not by itself signify that he ceased managing it or that he was estopped from managing it. Applied to reject the administrator’s claim over rents from the paraphernal property.
• Court approval of liquidation scheme — The trial court may disapprove an administrator’s proposed scheme for liquidation of the conjugal partnership and order liquidation in the manner indicated by the court. The SC affirmed that disapproval except for the modification on the children’s collation.

• "The mere fact of living away from the conjugal roof which cannot be presumed culpable when, as in the instant case, there is no evidence of any fault or guilt on the part of the one who so lived, does not constitute a reason for annuling the right to support granted in the aforementioned article 1408 of the Civil Code." — The SC rejected the administrator’s premise that living apart forfeited the wife’s support, holding that non-culpable separation does not annul the article 1408 right.
• "This act of Doctor Tavera's constitutes a recognition of the appellee's right to receive support chargeable to the conjugal partnership, and as such is a bar to the prescription alleged by the appellant (art. 1948, Civil Code; sec. 50, Code of Civil Procedure)." — The SC used Dr. Tavera’s payment of the monthly allowance to defeat the administrator’s prescription defense.
• "Therefore, these three children cannot be required to bring into collation the respective sums they received which are detailed in said summaries Exhibits K, L, and M." — The SC modified the lower court’s order by excluding the P31,952.97 from collation because the sums appeared to come from Dr. Tavera’s private funds.

• Article 1408, Civil Code — Provides that the support of the family is chargeable to the conjugal partnership; the SC applied it to hold that Concepcion’s support was a charge on the conjugal partnership despite her living away from the conjugal dwelling.
• Article 142, Civil Code — Describes support as including food or sustenance, dwelling, clothing, and medical attendance; cited in the Manresa explanation of family support.
• Article 143, Civil Code — Provides for the support spouses owe each other; the SC cited it in reasoning that living apart, when not proved culpable, does not extinguish the obligation to support.
• Article 152, Civil Code — Cited with correlative articles for the rule that non-culpable separation does not extinguish the support obligation.
• Articles 1408 to 1411, Civil Code — The SC examined the provisions on charges and obligations of the conjugal partnership and found that not living under the conjugal roof is not one of the cases relieving the partnership from the article 1408 obligations.
• Article 1948, Civil Code — Provides that recognition of an obligation bars prescription; applied to Dr. Tavera’s payment of the monthly allowance.
• Section 50, Code of Civil Procedure — Cited with article 1948 on prescription; applied to reject the administrator’s prescription defense.