Sumilang vs. Ramagosa

In a probate proceeding, the court's inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will—testamentary capacity and compliance with the formal requisites—and a person without an interest in the estate, will, or property affected, such as a stranger to the decedent, has no legal standing to oppose probate; alleged implied revocation by sale of devised properties is an intrinsic matter and not a ground to dismiss the petition for probate.

Hilarion Ramagosa's estate was the subject of a petition for probate of a Tagalog will dated February 26, 1949, which named Mariano Sumilang as sole heir. The opposing parties asserted a relationship to the decedent and sought to prevent probate, while Sumilang challenged their standing. The proceeding implicated the settled distinction between the extrinsic validity of a will, which probate determines, and its intrinsic validity or the legality of its dispositions.

Hilarion Ramagosa died on December 1, 1959. On July 5, 1960, Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition for probate of a Tagalog document dated February 26, 1949, alleged to be Ramagosa's last will and testament. The document instituted Sumilang as sole heir of the testator.

The petition was opposed by the oppositors-appellants. The first set, Saturnina and Santiago Ramagosa, questioned the due execution of the document, claiming it was made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament. They also claimed that they, instead of petitioner, were entitled to inherit the estate. The other oppositors, Enrique Pabella, Liceria Pabella, and Andrea Ravalo, representing themselves simply as next of kin, prayed only for the disallowance of the will.

At the hearings, petitioner adduced his evidence and rested his case on February 16, 1961. Reception of oppositors' evidence was set for July 14, 1961. On July 3, 1961, however, oppositors moved for dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because the will, if ever really executed by the decedent, was revoked by implication of law six years before his death. They alleged that after making the will Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner Mariano Sumilang and his brother Mario the parcels of land described in the will, so that at the time of the testator's death the titles to those lands were no longer in his name. Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion on July 17, 1961, supplemented it on August 14, 1961, and filed a rejoinder on August 21, 1961.

On October 22, 1962, petitioner moved to strike out the oppositors' pleadings on the grounds that they had no legal standing and no personality to oppose the probate, and that they had no valid claim or interest in the distribution of the estate. The lower court found that the oppositors had no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and were total strangers to the deceased whose will was under probate. The uncontradicted evidence, consisting of certified true copies of the parties' baptism and marriage certificates, supported that finding. The court struck out the opposition and other pleadings, and the oppositors appealed.

• Lack of Legal Standing: Petitioner moved to strike out oppositors' pleadings on the ground that oppositors have no legal standing in court and are bereft of personality to oppose the probate of the last will and testament.
• No Valid Claim or Interest: Petitioner maintained that oppositors have no valid claim and interest in the distribution of the estate and no existing valid right whatsoever.
• Appeal Interlocutory: Petitioner-appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order appealed from is interlocutory.

• Due Execution and Duress: Oppositors questioned the due execution of the document, claiming that it was made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament.
• Right to Inherit: Saturnina and Santiago Ramagosa claimed that they, instead of petitioner, were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased.
• Disallowance as Next of Kin: The other oppositors, representing themselves simply as next of kin, prayed only for the disallowance of the will.
• Lack of Jurisdiction and Implied Revocation: Oppositors moved to dismiss the petition for probate mainly on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter because the will was revoked by implication of law six years before the testator's death, alleging that after making the will the testator sold the parcels of land described therein to petitioner and his brother Mario, so that at the time of death the titles were no longer in his name.

• Standing to Oppose Probate: Whether oppositors who are not related to the decedent within the fifth degree and have no interest in the estate may oppose the probate of the will.
• Scope of Probate Inquiry: Whether the probate court may dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that the testator impliedly revoked the will by selling the devised properties before his death.
• Appealability of Order Striking Out Opposition: Whether the order striking out the oppositors' opposition on the ground of lack of personality is final and appealable.

• Standing to Oppose Probate: No. Only a person with an interest in the estate, will, or property affected may intervene; oppositors had no relationship within the fifth degree and were strangers to the decedent.
• Scope of Probate Inquiry: No. Probate is limited to extrinsic validity—testamentary capacity and formal requisites; alleged implied revocation by sale is intrinsic and not a ground to dismiss probate.
• Appealability of Order Striking Out Opposition: Yes. The order striking out the opposition on lack of personality was final and appealable insofar as the oppositors were concerned.

• Standing to Oppose Probate: The rule is that a person may intervene in a probate proceeding only if he has an interest in the estate, in the will, or in the property affected by it, either as executor or as a claimant of the estate. An interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The reason for excluding strangers is not to prevent the court from learning facts that might justify denial of probate, but to prevent the courts and litigants from being molested by the intervention of persons with no interest in the estate. Here, the lower court found that oppositors had no relationship within the fifth degree and were strangers to the decedent. The oppositors did not take issue with that finding in their brief and did not attempt to show any interest in the estate. The uncontradicted baptism and marriage certificates supported the finding. Thus, they had no personality to oppose the will.
• Scope of Probate Inquiry: A petition for probate limits the court's inquiry to the extrinsic validity of the will. The only questions are the testator's testamentary capacity and compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the will's provisions, or the legality of any devise or legacy, is premature. The alleged sale of the devised lands and the resulting implied revocation did not furnish a ground to dismiss the petition for probate. Probate is distinct from the validity of testamentary provisions: probate decides execution and testamentary capacity, while descent and distribution concern the provisions. If the will is not admitted to probate, questions of revocation become superfluous because there is no will to revoke. Moreover, the revocation invoked was implied from subsequent acts, not express, and would affect not the will itself but only the particular devise or legacy. Thus, the motion to dismiss was properly denied.
• Appealability of Order Striking Out Opposition: The order striking out the oppositors' opposition on the ground that they had no personality to intervene was final and appealable insofar as they were concerned. Although the appellee moved to dismiss the appeal as interlocutory, the motion had to be denied. The denial was practically academic because the main issue had been resolved, but the order nonetheless terminated the oppositors' participation and was final as to them.

• Probate limited to extrinsic validity — In a petition for probate, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will: the testator's testamentary capacity and compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the will's provisions, or the legality of any devise or legacy, is premature. The Court applied this rule to hold that the alleged implied revocation by sale of the devised properties was not a ground to dismiss the petition for probate.
• Standing to intervene in probate proceedings — A person may intervene in a probate proceeding only if he has an interest in the estate, in the will, or in the property to be affected by it, either as executor or as a claimant of the estate. An interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The Court applied this rule to affirm the striking out of the opposition filed by persons found to have no relationship within the fifth degree and no interest in the estate.
• Implied revocation as intrinsic matter — An implied revocation of a will arising from subsequent acts of the testator, such as the sale of devised properties, does not affect the will itself but only the particular devise or legacy. It is an intrinsic matter and is not a ground for dismissing a petition for probate. The Court applied this rule to reject the oppositors' jurisdictional challenge based on the alleged sale of the lands described in the will.
• Final and appealable order striking out opposition — An order striking out an opposition to probate on the ground that the oppositors have no personality to intervene is final and appealable insofar as those oppositors are concerned. The Court applied this rule to deny the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal as interlocutory.

• "The petition below being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the scope of probate: only extrinsic validity is resolved, while intrinsic matters are premature.
• "It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate; and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor." — This defines the standing requirement for opposing or intervening in probate and supplies the test applied to the oppositors.
• "True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is another." — This distinguishes probate from the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions and explains why the motion to dismiss was denied.
• "The motion, although now practically academic in view of our resolution of the main issue involved, must be denied, since the order of the lower court striking out appellants' opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that they have no personality to intervene in the case, was final and therefore appealable order insofar as they were concerned." — This addresses the appealability of the order striking out the opposition and rejects the motion to dismiss the appeal as interlocutory.

• Nuguid vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966 — Cited for the rule that in a petition for probate, the court's inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will; testamentary capacity and formal requisites are the only questions, and intrinsic validity is premature.
• Alemany, et al. vs. CFI of Manila, 3 Phil. 424 — Cited for the purpose of probate proceedings: to establish conclusively the execution of the will with required formalities and the testator's capacity; the judgment determines nothing more.
• Fernandez, et al. vs. Dimagiba, L-23638 and Reyes, et al. vs. Dimagiba, L-23662, October 12, 1967 — Cited for the principle that implied revocation from subsequent acts does not affect the will itself but only the particular devise or legacy.
• Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963 — Cited for the rule that a person may intervene in a probate proceeding only if he has an interest in the estate, will, or property affected, either as executor or claimant.
• Teotico vs. Del Val, etc., G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965 — Cited for the definition of an interested party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
• Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244 — Cited for the reason for excluding strangers from contesting a will: to prevent courts and litigants from being molested by intervention of persons with no interest in the estate.

Concepcion, C.J.; Reyes, J.B.L.; Dizon; Makalintal; Bengzon, J.P.; Zaldivar; Sanchez; Castro; Angeles; and Fernando, JJ., concur.